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Abstract 
 
The governance of climate change adaptation presents a paradox: Climate change is a global risk, 
yet vulnerability is locally experienced. In order to address this paradox, debates in environmental 
governance need to find ways of integrating local perceptions of risk with global risk assessments. 
But how can local inclusiveness be achieved in the context of global environmental risks, and what 
kinds of institutions are needed?  
 
Accordingly, this thesis looks at three inter-related concepts from the social sciences that address 
the challenge of inclusive policy making, but are as yet under-examined in the context of climate 
change adaptation: (i) Participation, drawing from development studies; (ii) Expertise, drawing 
from Science and Technology Studies (STS); and (iii) Deliberation, drawing from political science. It 
is argued that these concepts have not been sufficiently advanced to take account of the 
challenges raised by the ‘adaptation paradox.’ The hypothesis of this thesis is that this paradox 
gives rise to a globalised discourse on adaptation that restricts discussion of risk to ‘global’ and 
technical expertise, and is not open to localised vulnerability-based knowledge about how risks 
are experienced.  
 
This hypothesis is tested by asking: i) What is the evidence that conflicting definitions of climate 
risk inhibit inclusive adaptation policy making?  And ii) Under what circumstances is local 
inclusiveness achieved under global climate change policy frameworks? This study collects and 
analyses a new set of data on the main avenue for the inclusion of vulnerable groups in adaptation 
policy making: National Adaptation Programmes of Actions (NAPAs). Through a detailed empirical 
case study analysis of the NAPA process in Bangladesh and Nepal, this study examines the 
evidence that NAPAs achieved inclusiveness, and the circumstances of more inclusive decision-
making. This data suggests Nepal took a more inclusive approach to NAPA preparation than 
Bangladesh; and that this was a result of the choices around how to ‘do inclusiveness’ that were in 
turn influenced by the historical and political contexts within which these decisions were made.  
 
Based on these findings, the thesis argues that current approaches to ‘local inclusiveness’ in global 
adaptation policy need to pay more attention to the deliberative component of participatory 
policy making, in terms of how deliberative institutions can shape participatory spaces, and how 
history and politics have in turn shaped how deliberation takes place in each location. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“Convention wording and the rhetoric of the nation states stand in stark contrast to the news 
reports of flooding, drought, and continued misery for many of the world’s most vulnerable 
people.” 
Adger et al, 2006:xi 
 
1.1 The problem: Introducing the “Adaptation Paradox”1 
 
The emergence of adaptation  
 
Although the world is now fully engaged in the climate change debate, international efforts to 
limit greenhouse gas emissions are not translating into a detectable slowing down of the rate of 
global warming. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)2, the impacts 
of climate change will be severe, particularly for the most vulnerable developing countries that 
have the least capacity to cope (Schneider et al., 2007). Furthermore, there is evidence of greater 
and more rapid impacts of climate change than those reported by the IPCC, with some leading 
climate change scientists suggesting that we should prepare for mean global surface temperature 
breaching the currently widely accepted 2°C threshold of ‘dangerous climate change’  (Parry et al., 
2008). As the inevitability of climate change becomes apparent, and the impacts of climate change 
are beginning to be felt, the need to support adaptation to these impacts in developing countries 
is growing in urgency. 
 
The IPCC defines adaptation as the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual 
or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
opportunities (IPCC 2007). Adaptation can be any process, action or outcome in a system 
(ecosystem, household, community, group, sector, or region) that helps that system to better 
cope with, manage, or adjust to the changing conditions, stresses, hazards, risks or opportunities 
associated with climate change (Smit and Wandel, 2006). Adaptation is generally taken as one of 
two options for managing climate change, the other being mitigation, which involves the limiting 
of greenhouse gasses (GhGs), particularly carbon dioxide and methane, to mitigate against further 
global warming.  
 
                                               
1
 The concept of the “Adaptation Paradox” has been introduced in Ayers, 2011, a publication adapted from chapter 
four of this thesis. 
2
 The IPCC was established in 1988 by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) as the international scientific body tasked with assessing the state and risks of 
climate change (see www.ipcc.ch).  
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Until recently, adaptation was a controversial topic in climate change policy debates; while 
mitigation was seen to present a globally relevant solution to climate change, action on adaptation 
is generally perceived as ‘locally’ focused on particularly vulnerable groups or places, generating 
fears that attention to adaptation could detract from mitigation efforts for the “global good” 
(Ayers and Forsyth, 2009). The fear was that some countries might consider the costs of 
adaptation to be so much lower than mitigation, and the benefits so much more immediate, that 
“no mitigation action” would be a tempting prospect (Kjellen, 2006). Indeed, in the United States, 
some climate change campaigners interpreted support for adaptation as an attempt by the 
Republicans to undermine any action on climate change. In his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance, Al 
Gore wrote,  
 
Believing that we can adapt to just about anything is ultimately a kind of laziness, an 
arrogant faith in our ability to react in time (Gore, 1992:240).  
 
As such, adaptation has historically been seen as a marginal policy option for climate change, 
mitigation’s “poor cousin” in the climate policy arena (Pielke et al., 2007).  
 
However, perspectives have recently changed, and slow progress on mitigation coupled with 
increasing evidence of the impacts of climate change, especially in vulnerable developing 
countries least able to manage them, has seen adaptation rise up the international policy agenda. 
Adaptation is now seen as a crucial supplement to mitigation under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the main international governance 
architecture for climate change. As recently as 2007, the Thirteenth Conference of the Parties to 
the UNFCCC (COP 13) in Bali finally brought adaptation formally onto equal footing with 
mitigation, highlighting it as one of the four ‘building blocks’ (along with mitigation, technology 
cooperation, and finance) of a comprehensive climate change response.  Even Al Gore has been 
reported in the Economist (Sep 11 2008) as saying:  
 
I used to think adaptation subtracted from our efforts on prevention. But I’ve changed my 
mind…Poor countries are vulnerable and need our help. (Ayers and Dodman, 2010: 163).  
 
But despite this turn in attention to adaptation, actors from development studies and disaster risk 
reduction fields have commented that climate change governance is failing to adequately address 
the needs of the most vulnerable (Ayers et al., 2010; Burton, 2004; Schipper, 2007). This thesis 
proposes that part of the problem lies in an “Adaptation Paradox”: Climate change is a global risk, 
yet vulnerability is locally experienced.  
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The adaptation paradox: Local experiences of global change 
 
The concept of a “paradox” generated by the assessment of climate change risks for adaptation 
policy-making was first brought to the fore by Adger et al., (2003), who suggested that there exists 
a clear “discrepancy between the conclusions of a global assessment and the past experience of 
societies living with environmental change” (Adger et al., 2003: 181). On the one hand, climate 
change has been established as a “global phenomenon” (Jasanoff, 2010:1). As a ‘global risk’, the 
UN General Assembly formally took up climate change in 1988. Following quickly on the heels of 
other ‘global’ environmental problems such as acid rain and the ozone layer, climate change was 
framed as another cross-border, international systemic issue that should be managed through 
international cooperation, to mitigate the causes of pollution ‘upstream’ (Ayers and Dodman, 
2010; Schipper, 2006). Discussions were dominated by the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions, and the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC was expressed in Article 2 of the UNFCCC as: 
 
The stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. (UNFCCC, 
1992, Article 2).  
 
The UNFCCC never explicitly defines ‘dangerous climate change’ but discusses it terms of 
breaching thresholds where, among other factors, ecosystems can no longer adapt ‘naturally’ 
(UNFCCC, 1992). Thus, adaptation emerged under global governance structures from discussions 
of climate change impacts and how the uncertain thresholds of ‘dangerous climate change’ could 
be managed, despite inherent uncertainty as to what these thresholds would be.  
 
Burton and colleagues suggest that the resulting UNFCCC was conceived as, 
 
A pollution control instrument at the global level, and only as an afterthought was the 
concept of adaptation included. (Burton et al., 2008:26).  
 
The purpose of adaptation, under this initial framing, is to respond to this uncertain risk - the 
impacts of this biophysical change - in order to bring the system back to its ‘original’ state. This has 
developed into an “impacts-based” approach to adaptation (Burton et al., 2002), which has 
resulted in what Klein defines as “technology-based” interventions such as dams, early-warning 
systems, seeds and irrigation schemes based on specific knowledge of future climate conditions 
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(Klein, 2008). Such an approach requires scientific, climate change expertise to identify and 
quantify the existing or predicted impacts of climate change, and then designing interventions to 
specifically target those impacts.  
 
On the other hand, many observers have pointed out that an ‘impacts-based’ framing of 
adaptation is problematic, because it is a response targeted at an uncertain risk (Boyd et al., 2009; 
Burton et al., 2008; Pelling and High, 2005). As will be described in chapter three, the uncertainty 
inherent in climate change impacts (see box 1.1) has resulted in problems assessing the extent to 
which adaptation assistance is needed, and how support should be provided.  
 
 
Box 1.1: Uncertainty and climate change risk  
 
Adaptation is underpinned by three areas of uncertainty:  
I. Uncertainty around what the UNFCCC means by ‘dangerous climate change’, and thus what 
‘thresholds of dangerous climate change’ need to be avoided. Who defines what is dangerous, 
and dangerous for whom?  
II. Uncertainty around the science of climate change projections. While there is scientific consensus 
that anthropogenic climate change is happening, uncertainty exists around defined future climate 
change scenarios and their biophysical impacts (see chapter three).  
III. Uncertainty around the complex interactions between climate change and the social-
development context of climate change impacts (Adger et al., 2009b). As noted by Boyd et al: 
 “Development futures are already unclear and difficult to plan, even before adding the trump of 
the uncertainty of climate change into the mix” (Boyd et al., 2009:60).  
 
 
 
Further, the concept of a paradox between globalised and localised perspectives of risk draws on a 
much deeper-rooted dichotomy between science/hazard and social science/vulnerability 
perspectives around risk management,  that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s in development 
studies and disaster risk reduction (Blakie, 1994; Handmer, 2009; Pelling, 2001). For example, 
Pelling (2001) describes how the early attempts to develop guidelines for mitigating disasters 
stemmed from human ecology theories that defined natural hazards as,  
“those elements of the physical environment harmful to man and caused by forces 
extraneous to him” (Burton and Kates, 1964, cited Pelling, 2001:174). 
 
 Such perspectives gave rise to a  “physicalist orientation *that+ has come to dominate disaster 
management policy” (Pelling, 2001:170), with policy recommendations for managing disasters 
focusing on narrowly technological engineering approaches to controlling the physical 
environment (Blakie et al., 1994; Pelling, 2001).  
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However, during the 1980s many observers from disaster risk reduction and development studies 
began to draw attention to the link between the risks people face, and the reasons behind their 
vulnerability to these risks in the first place (Sen, 1981). Such arguments noted that even if it were 
possible to isolate and assess the biophysical impacts of a hazard,  defining risks in physicalist 
terms ignores the ways in which local and wider contexts determine people’s vulnerability to these 
hazards (Blakie et al. ,1994; Boyd et al., 2009; Pelling, 2003; Smit and Wandel, 2006). Applied to 
climate change,  rather than assuming vulnerability is a function of the damage that climate 
change may do to a system (Watson et al., 1997) – i.e. contingent on the impacts of climate 
change -  this alternative perspective emphasises social dimensions of vulnerability (Kelly and 
Adger, 2009).  
 
Drawing on food security and natural hazards literature, a ‘social vulnerability’3 perspective on 
climate change has emerged that focuses on how climate risks are experienced locally.  This 
highlights the role of socio-economic and property relations in determining the risk posed by 
natural hazards (Blakie et al., 1994; Kelly and Adger, 2009). Blakie et al., (1994), suggest that 
resilience to hazards is shaped by an actor’s access to rights, resources and assets. For example, 
individuals and households that have reliable access to food and adequate food reserves, clean 
water, health care and education, will inevitably be better prepared to deal with a variety of 
shocks and stresses – including those arising because of climate change (Dodman et al., 2009).  
 
This access is not only constrained by physical factors related to the impacts of natural disasters, 
but also the social dimensions of access – or the ‘”architecture of entitlements” (Kelly and Adger, 
2009:161): the social, economic and institutional factors that influence levels of vulnerability, 
which can promote or constrain options for adaptation.  This perspective is closely tied in with a 
Senian capabilities approach4 - a ‘natural’ hazard only becomes hazardous when it affects a 
person’s capabilities to perform their desired tasks. In turn, other factors that constrain someone’s 
capabilities (be they financial, cultural, political, or physical) will impact on that person’s ability to 
cope with hazardous situations.  
 
A basic theoretical example would be where climate change is associated with increasing rainfall in 
an area. We might say that the impact of this change is “more people and more land get wetter”. 
However, this impact will not matter equally to everyone. Large landowners may have more 
efficient irrigation and drainage systems than small farmers; wealthier households may have 
                                               
3
 “Vulnerability” is of course complex and not uniform. Some key approaches to vulnerability are introduced here, 
but these are further unpacked and problematised in chapter three of this thesis.  
4
 This approach sees development not simply as improving income but decreasing the “deprivation of basic 
capabilities” (Sen, 1999:132). A person’s capabilities take into account his natural and learned abilities to perform a 
task. 
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secure housing structures, while poorer households may have low quality shelter that results in 
increased exposure to storms and floods. This is summed up by Ribot in the following statement:  
 
The poor and wealthy, women and men, young and old, and people of different social 
identities or political stripes, experience different risks while facing the same climatic 
event…the inability to manage stress does not fall from the sky.  (Ribot, 2010:49).   
 
A social vulnerability perspective therefore focuses on how vulnerability to ‘global’ climate change 
impacts is determined ‘locally’: The way in which vulnerability is experienced is determined not 
only by the globally generated impacts of climate change, but also the local contexts that 
determine people’s resilience to these impacts in the first place. The interaction between basic 
development and the social, economic, cultural and political factors that can underpin 
vulnerability has led many observers to conclude that poverty, rather than predicted climate 
change impacts, is one of the most salient indicators of climate-related vulnerability (Cannon et 
al., 2003;Huq et al., 2004; Ribot, 2010). 
 
Assessing climate change “risk”  
 
The way in which climate change risks are defined – as ‘impacts-based’ or ‘vulnerability-based’ - 
has significant implications for how those risks are assessed, and therefore how adaptation policy 
decisions are made. An impacts-based perspective implies a particular type of scientific or 
technological expertise is needed to assess climate risks for policy making. This would involve 
codifying future climate change hazards into defined climate impacts, and producing calculated 
responses to these impacts (Pelling and High, 2005). For example, Klein (2008) describes a 
scenario where an impacts-based risk assessment suggests that the primary climate risk in an area 
is increasing drought, impacting on domestic and agricultural water supplies. An ‘impacts-based’ 
adaptation response would be to install a water management system, to address the specific 
problem of water scarcity in that area.  
 
However, Klein suggests that this scheme would only be effective in as far as everyone has equal 
access to the system. If the unequal distribution of water rights or the price of water excludes 
certain users from the system, the most vulnerable people will remain vulnerable to drought, and 
to other stresses, regardless of the adaptation intervention (Klein, 2008). Further, the uncertainty 
inherent in climate change impacts makes impacts-based risk assessments problematic. 
 
 17 
Taking a ‘social vulnerability’ based perspective on climate change risk shifts the emphasis of risk 
assessment away from climate change impacts and towards the local circumstances of 
vulnerability. Focusing on vulnerability, rather than impacts, to some extent overcomes the issue 
of how to respond to uncertainty, because vulnerability is addressed to a range of imagined and 
unimagined possible future scenarios resulting from complex social and environmental 
interactions (Pelling and High, 2005). As such, many proponents of a ‘social-vulnerability’ approach 
to adaptation argue that ‘impacts-based’ risk assessments, and the resulting adaptation measures, 
can only be partially effective if they do not also address non-climatic factors that are the 
underlying drivers of vulnerability (Ayers and Dodman, 2010; Burton, 2004; Ribot, 2010; Schipper, 
2007).  
 
However, there are different approaches to assessing vulnerability. For example, in her 
assessment of vulnerability to “global change”, Susan Cutter (1995) introduces her assessment by 
stating that, 
 
Women and children….are the forgotten causalities…continually overlooked in the global 
change literature, yet as a group they often have the greatest social and biophysical 
vulnerability. (Cutter, 1995:181).   
   
From this assessment of vulnerability to “global change”, “women and children” are therefore the 
starting point of the vulnerability assessment. Yet, identifying such essentialist categories a priori 
to the assessment of vulnerability to ‘global change’ overlooks the complex ways in which 
vulnerability is locally experienced and determined. As discussed, at the local level vulnerability is 
underpinned by structural processes that are not linked to such predefined categories. Proponents 
of a social-vulnerability approach to adaptation suggest that there is a need to move beyond 
essentialist discussions around vulnerability and risk in the assessment of ‘global’ risks, towards 
assessments that identify the local and context specific factors that drive highly differentiated 
vulnerability at the local level (Few et al., 2007; Huq et al., 2004; Tompkins et al., 2008). Climate 
change impacts will exacerbate these existing inequalities.  
 
This recognition has led proponents of a ‘social vulnerability’ approach to argue that risk 
assessments that inform adaptation policies need to be more locally responsive, and therefore 
inclusive (Dodman and Mitlin, 2011; Few et al., 2007; Huq et al., 2004 Dodman and Mitlin, 2011).  
Few et al., (2007) suggest that understanding these ‘local’ contexts of vulnerability requires a 
different kind of knowledge and expertise to the scientific and technological approach to impacts 
and vulnerability assessments conducted under globalised risk assessments.   The authors suggest 
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that if the factors that determine vulnerability are context-specific, designing adaptation 
interventions to address these factors requires a knowledge base that is tailored to local settings, 
and therefore argue for ‘local inclusion’ in climate vulnerability assessments on both ethical and 
practical grounds (Few et al., 2007:48). Thus such perspectives suggest that to address 
vulnerability, the localised contexts of vulnerability need to be understood; and such 
understanding comes from risk assessments that are inclusive of local perspectives (Dodman and 
Mitlin, 2011; Few et al., 2007;Huq et al., 2004 Dodman and Mitlin, 2011).  
 
However, this thesis proposes that a paradox is generated by adaptation arising as a response to a 
global environmental problem, creating challenges for enabling such locally inclusive adaptation 
policy making.  Framing climate change risk as global promotes scientific assessments of climate 
change impacts that are based on universalist assumptions of risk and vulnerability. Such an 
impacts-based approach to risk assessment tends to overlook the complex and disaggregated 
nature of vulnerability on the ground. This is evidenced by three decades of work in disaster risk 
reduction that have highlighted the ways in which technological approaches to risk management 
have focused consultations on expert judgement to the exclusion of the project or programme 
beneficiaries (Pelling, 2001). For example, in relation to the United Nations’ International Decade 
for Natural Disaster Reduction, 1990-2000 (IDNDR), Pelling (2001) notes:  
 
The *IDNDR’s+ focus displayed an environmentally deterministic worldview that 
downplayed the human dimension and overemphasised the naturalness of 
disasters...there is repetitious mention of technological response...and little mention of 
vulnerability reduction...Such an approach begs the question: were the real target 
beneficiaries those vulnerable to hazard and disaster...? Certainly, vulnerable people were 
largely absent from the discussions that set the agenda. (Pelling, 2001:175) 
 
This thesis therefore suggests that the ‘adaptation paradox’ raises a key challenge for adaptation 
policy making: How can local inclusiveness be achieved in the context of global environmental 
risk? And, what kind of institutional designs allow global risks to be reassessed in locally 
meaningful terms?  
 
This thesis will address this challenge, by seeking to answer the following questions: 
1. What is the evidence that conflicting definitions of risk across scales inhibit inclusive 
adaptation policy making?; and 
2. Under what circumstances is local inclusiveness achieved under international climate 
change policy frameworks?  
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1.2 Achieving ‘local’ inclusiveness in ‘global’ environmental problems: Perspectives from 
the social sciences.  
 
This global governance/local reality paradox predates debates about climate change adaptation. 
Many social science critics have pointed to ways in which globally uniform approaches to 
managing environmental (and other) risks have overlooked the diverse ways in which risk can be 
experienced, depending on the contextual nature of risks, and the factors that make people 
vulnerable (Bassett and Zeuli, 2000; Blakie et al., 1994; Sen, 1999; Wynne, 1994; 1996).  Such 
critics have argued that globalised approaches to environmental risk can both obscure and 
disempower alternative, localised environmental explanations of vulnerability. The result can be 
environmental risk assessments that do not reflect the concerns and experiences of vulnerable 
people; and environmental policies that may not be the most effective means of addressing local 
experiences of risk (ibid).  
 
For example, Brian Wynne discusses the case study of a risk assessment carried out in response to 
post-Chernobyl radioactive fallout on sheep farming in the Lake District in the north west of 
England (Wynne, 1996). Wynne describes how after the Chernobyl disaster of 1985, the isotope 
Cesium 134 was deposited via rainfall on the land used by sheep farmers. Government scientists 
visited the region to assess the risk that these deposits could have on food production in the area. 
Basing their assessments on uniform, scientific assumptions about how the radio-active fallout 
would impact on the environment, they provided a range of advice to farmers, for example 
suggesting that farmers feed their sheep hay instead of grass. However, such advice was rejected 
by farmers, on the grounds that the external scientists knew little about the local practicalities of 
actually implementing their advice; for example, farmers pointed out that sheep rarely, if ever, ate 
hay.  
 
Wynne suggests that the uniform approach taken to risk assessment gave rise to generalised 
policy recommendations that did not match the complexity of the problem at the local scale 
(Wynne 1994). Further, Wynne shows how risk assessments can serve to define and propagate 
power dynamics between “experts” and “lay” people where risks are seen as universal: The 
supposedly neutral language of science and risk assessment reinforced the role of external, state 
experts in defining policy solutions, subjugating the more contextualised knowledge of the farmers 
and generating mistrust in, and ultimately failure of, the policy-making process.   
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Such universalist approaches to assessing risks have also been applied to the assessment of 
climate change vulnerability. For example, in her paper “Exploring the invisibility of local 
knowledge in decision-making: The Boscastle Harbour Flood Disaster”, Tori Jennings discusses the 
policy responses to a major flooding event that took place in Boscastle, a small town off the 
Cornish coast in the South West of England, in 2004.  Jennings argues that from the perspective of 
Cornish residents, the 2004 flood was the result of inept government land management practices 
as much as extreme weather events. Cornish residents suggested that a recent drive to support 
the local tourism industry through subsidies had resulted in over-dependence on an otherwise 
unsustainable industry, which itself was extremely weather-sensitive (Jennings, 2009). 
 
Government and Environment Agency officials, however, framed the event as an indicator of 
climate change that could have severe implications for the future of the tourism industry. While 
local residents acknowledged the role of extreme weather events on their local livelihoods and 
economy, they felt that assumptions about the role of climate change overshadowed the more 
important historical and institutional factors that had led to their dependency on a climate-
sensitive industry (Jennings, 2009:247). Jennings suggests that despite apparent widespread 
efforts to ensure participation in decision making around policy responses to the event, 
knowledge perceived as ‘local’ was subordinated in favour of externally generated expertise 
related to hydrological and climate systems. The resulting policy response was an expensive, 
highly technical engineering solution: the ‘Valley Flood Defence Scheme,’ which Jennings suggests 
many locals viewed with scepticism and even derision.  
 
These cases support the numerous examples from political ecology that have revealed similar 
disparities between local and global perceptions of the same environmental issues (Bassett and 
Zeuli, 2000; Leach and Mearns, 1996; Tiffen et al., 1994). In each case, authors have demonstrated 
how risk assessments based on globalised, universalist statements of environmental problems 
resulted in policy solutions that did not meet the needs of people vulnerable to those risks. On the 
contrary, the authors show how greater attention to ‘lay’ experiences can reveal locally embedded 
understandings of perceptions and experiences of risk that can allow a more locally relevant risk-
reduction solutions. Such cases have resulted in calls for environmental risk assessments to better 
reflect the realities of how risks are experienced on the ground, to inform policies that support 
provide locationally and culturally appropriate technical and economic options in environmental 
planning (Bassett and Zeuli, 2000; Wynne, 1994).  
 
These calls have given rise to many directions in the social sciences related to making ‘global’ 
environment and development policy-making more ‘locally inclusive.’ This thesis will draw on 
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three interrelated concepts from this growing body of work: (i) Participation, drawing from 
development studies; (ii) Expertise, drawing from Science and Technology Studies (STS); and (iii) 
Deliberation, drawing from political science.  
 
Participation 
 
The importance of local participation in decision-making around development interventions arose 
from a recognition that the managerialist approaches of the 1970s and 1980s, dominated by 
professional expertise and bureaucratic control, were failing to achieve significant improvements 
in the livelihoods of the world’s poor (Cornwall, 2002). Many academics and development 
practitioners began to attribute such failures to a lack of attention to the local contexts of poverty 
(Chambers, 1997; Scott, 1998). Such observations gave rise to a “participatory turn” in 
development studies and practice, emerging from the NGO community but rapidly being taken up 
by government and international development agencies (Williams, 2004). The trend towards more 
participatory approaches to development has resulted in decades of research and advocacy into 
locally inclusive approaches to doing development (Blackburn and Holland, 1998; Chambers, 1983, 
1997; Castells, 1984; Korten, 1980).  
 
The appeal of participation is based on the rationale that involving citizens in the decisions that 
affect them means those decisions will better reflect citizen needs, resulting more widely accepted 
interventions, and more effective and sustainable outcomes (Cornwall, 2002). As noted by Robert 
Chambers, one of the first and leading exponents of participatory approaches in rural 
development:  
 
[The] poor and exploited people can and should be enabled to analyze their own reality.  
(Chambers, 1997:106)  
 
More recently, this logic of inclusiveness has been applied to environmental policy making in 
general, and climate change adaptation in particular (Dodman and Mitlin, 2011; Few et al., 2007;  
Tompkins et al., 2008Dodman and Mitlin, 2011); if adaptation is to address social vulnerability, 
then information is needed about the highly contextual socio-economic, cultural and political 
factors that contribute to their vulnerability. The best source of this information, is vulnerable 
people themselves, who are best placed to say why they are vulnerable, how they experience 
vulnerability, and what changes could help them adapt to climatic and other stresses.  
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For example, a recent study by Doria et al., (2009) reviewed ‘expert opinion’5 on how to define 
“successful adaptation” (see chapter thee for further discussion on this issue). The authors note 
that while there was some disagreement over exactly how to define adaptation and its indicators 
of success, there was general agreement that “successful adaptation to climate change may be 
best evaluated by those adapting or affected by the adaptation measures” (Doria et al., 2009:818). 
As such, “participation” has not only become a standard practice across development (Cornwall, 
2000), but is also now a stated objective in most sectors of environmental policy making (Few et 
al., 2007) and, more recently, also adaptation policy making (see chapter three). 
 
However, the value of participation, and attempts to access and include ‘local’ knowledge, have 
been questioned  and much work has been done on problematising participatory processes 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Cornwall, 2000; Leal and Opp, 1998; Mohan and Stokke, 2000; Nelson 
and Wright, 1995 ). This work has coalesced around two themes (Cooke and Kothari, 2001); first, 
critiques of the methods of participatory practices, that seeks to improve the technical limitations 
of participation (IIED, 1995; Nelson and Wright, 1995); and more recently, a deeper critique of 
participation that focuses on the power effects of participatory discourses (Cooke and Kothari, 
2001; Mohan and Stokke, 2000; Williams, 2004). This section will focus on the latter of these 
criticisms, which overlap strongly with those of ‘impacts-based’ approaches to environmental risk 
assessments discussed in section 1.1.  
 
Perhaps one of the most influential criticisms of the power politics of participation, is Cooke and 
Kothari’s edited volume, The Tyranny of Participation (2001), in which the contributing authors 
suggest that participation can be used as a form of political control. The authors in this volume 
present various ways in which participation has ‘depoliticised development’, showing how the veil 
of participation has been used as a way of obscuring local power differences; uncritically 
homogenising ‘the community’; and using a language of emancipation to mask other means of 
regaining political control over development (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Williams, 2004). Such 
criticisms mirror those of globalised and ‘impacts-based’ approaches to assessing environmental 
risks, around adopting universalist approaches to ‘local’ and ‘risk’ that overlook the diverse ways 
in which vulnerability is actually driven and experienced.  
 
Drawing these insights together, Cooke and Kothari (2001) lay out three ways in which 
participation can functions as a “tyranny”: First, the “tyranny of decision-making and control”, in 
which participatory facilitators override existing legitimate decision-making processes. The 
                                               
5
 This study used the Delphi methods to elicit expert opinion on a definition of successful adaptation to climate 
change. “Experts” were defined as those actively working with or studying climate change adaptation. This study is 
further discussed in chapter three of this thesis.  
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authors are primarily referring to the way in which conveners of participatory exercises, 
particularly donor agencies, influence and control the dynamics of participation, given that 
significant investments depend on the outputs of participatory processes.  
 
Second, the “tyranny of the group”, in which the group dynamics of participatory exercises 
inevitably favour the most powerful. Any process of participation has a social side, and the outputs 
of participation can be significantly affected by, for example, compliance with group norms 
(Cohen, 2007; Cornwall, 2000; Mendelberg and Karpowitz, 2007). Participatory spaces are not 
neutral, but created spaces that provide opportunities for agency and inclusion; and also 
exclusion. The group dynamics of participation specify whose knowledge and meanings count, 
reinforcing power dynamics through the production and then replication of power relations. Any 
participatory exercise will therefore reflect the power dynamics between different actors that 
influence what is said, by who, and who is listening.  
 
Third, the “tyranny of method”, in which participatory methods themselves may be overwhelming 
and potentially drive out alternative approaches to ‘doing development,’ that in some cases may 
generate preferable outcomes to participation alone (Dodman and Mitlin, 2011).  For example, 
Kothari (2001) suggests that although participatory programmes do draw in marginalised groups, 
the act of doing so binds participants to structures of power that they are not able to question.  
 
These criticisms, focusing on the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ of participation, are valid and well supported 
by examples from development studies of how engagement in participatory practices has not 
necessarily resulted in more participatory outcomes (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Cornwall 2000, 
2006; Mohan and Stokke, 2000). Consequently, simply arguing for ‘more participatory’ approaches 
to conducting climate risk assessments is not necessarily the solution to ensuring more inclusive 
adaptation policy making.  
 
Further, it is suggested here that such ‘tyranny of participation’ critiques themselves run the risk 
of being rather uncritical in their treatment of the power politics within participatory spaces, that 
are equally important for inclusive governance of environmental risks. As Williams (2004) 
suggests, critiques of participation can, 
 
Suffer almost as much as Chamber’s own work from a reductionist view of power… while 
participation may appear to be all-pervasive, this account of its operation is in danger of 
ignoring the fact that any configuration of power and knowledge opens up its own 
particular spaces and moments for resistance.  (Williams, 2004:565).  
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This thesis builds on the agenda proposed by Williams for the ‘re-politicisation of participation’, 
and suggests that in seeking opportunities for the inclusion of ‘local’ perspectives in addressing 
‘global’ risks, closer attention is needed to the power politics of participatory spaces.  Specifically, 
while  “tyranny of participation” debates have usefully focused on the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ of 
participation, this thesis proposes that equally important (and interconnected), is the ‘what’ of 
participation; how does the framing of the content of participatory exercises impact the dynamics 
of participatory processes (including the ‘who’ and the ‘how’), and what impact does this have on 
the potential for participation to produce inclusive outcomes?  
 
It is suggested here that the issue of ‘what’ is the focus of discussion in participation is particularly 
relevant to the inclusive governance of issues such as climate change that have come to be framed 
as ‘expert’ and ‘global’; and therefore consideration needs to be given both to the politics of 
expertise, and the politics of scale.     
 
 
The politics of risk and expertise 
 
In relation to the ‘what’ of participation, scholars from the fields of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) have begun to critically examine ‘expertise’ in participation, especially in relation to 
the assessment of technical or scientific issues (Leach et al., 2005; Martello and Jasanoff, 2004:16). 
In particular, STS perspectives highlight the way in which problems framed as ‘global’, ‘scientific’ 
or ‘technical’ risks tend to elevate technocratic expertise in risk assessment, resulting in the 
inherent subjugation of ‘local’ and ‘lay’ knowledge in the generation of global expertise.  
 
For example, this chapter has described how the dominant approach in environmental governance 
to assessing risks, is a ‘science speaks to policy’ approach (as illustrated by the studies presented 
above from Jennings, 2009 and Wynne, 1994).  Such risk assessments are used as a tool by 
scientific networks to answer policy relevant questions and communicate technical advice to 
decision-makers (Farrell, et al., 2001). The ‘expert networks’ that define for policy makers what 
the risks are, and how they should be addressed, have been described by Peter Haas (1992) as 
“epistemic communities”, defined as: 
  
A network of professionals with recognised experience and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or 
issue area.  (Hass, 1992:3).  
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Such networks have been described as positive developments, particularly for the promotion and 
legitimating of “global” environmental problems. For example, many observers have suggested 
that IPCC has helped consolidate a global climate change epistemic community, helping to 
mobilise science in support of climate change campaigns (Gough and Shackley,2001;  Hulme and 
Mahony, 2010; see also chapter three).  
 
However, as demonstrated by the cases presented in this chapter (Jennings, 2009 and Wynne, 
1994), there are different kinds of ‘expertise’, and knowledges labelled as ‘lay’ can provide useful 
insights into how to manage ‘global’ problems in local contexts.  Yet strong epistemic communities 
tend to promote one framing of the issue in order to gain politically powerful consensus around 
that issue, rather than be open to alternative, less powerful perspectives. Lay knowledge is 
perceived as being ‘unscientific’, or ‘untechnical’; as noted by Lahsen, while scientific knowledge is 
commonly associated with universal, objective ‘truth’,  
 
Only knowledge that cannot and does not aspire to the status of science is labelled local 
or indigenous, as against science itself, which remains putatively universal and free from 
local coloration. (Lahsen, 2004:13).  
 
This is not taken into account by advocates of epistemic communities who suggest that the spread 
of the community is the progressive conversion of more people to the normative judgement, and 
the greater number of people within the community, the more likely it is to represent ‘correct’ 
beliefs which should in turn be further promoted (Haas, 1992). Yet as highlighted by Litfin (1994) 
and others (Jasanoff, 1996; Lahsen, 2004), rationalising a single approach to managing risk 
overlooks the messy politics behind how risks are defined, and the implications this has for power 
and inclusion in the making of those risks. For example, the IPCC has faced criticisms of 
“epistemological hegemony” (Mayer and Arndt, 2009), with implications for exclusion and 
inclusion of alternative types of expertise, that will be further analysed in chapter three of this 
thesis.  
 
More critical approaches have therefore emerged that draw attention to the social conditions that 
cause “universal” perceptions of risk to become fixed in the first place. One important concept 
that examines how expertise are defined, established, and transferred, is the “immutable mobile” 
put forward by Bruno Latour (1987). According to Latour, immutable mobiles are socially 
identified objects, representations, or processes, which are unchallenged when moved between 
different social or cultural settings. In terms of environmental risks, biophysical risks such as global 
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warming can be seen as ‘immutable mobiles’ in that they are now perceived as globally 
problematic regardless of social context. Framing issues as ‘objectively’ scientific or technical in 
the eyes of those promoting science as objective, increases their status as immutable mobiles 
because there seems little reason to question their legitimacy: they are presented as objectively 
‘true’. In turn, the status of an issue as an immutable mobile means it is more likely to be analysed 
in scientific terms that focus on universal, biophysical properties . 
 
Applied to adaptation, this has implications for inclusive governance. The ‘impacts-based’ 
approach to adaptation stems from ‘global’ concepts of climate change as a universal, systemic 
problem, requiring an understanding of the possibilities of current and future climate changes that 
are both intangible and very difficult to predict. Hence, the ‘expertise’ required to manage 
adaptation from an impacts-based perspective is even more exclusive than many other, more 
tangible, environmental problems. As Taylor and Buttel (1992) note:  
 
We know we have global environmental problems because, in short, science documents 
the existing situation and ever tightens its predictions of future changes. (Taylor and 
Buttel, 1992:405).  
 
Thus, ‘the science tells us so.’ This is even more the case with atmospheric problems, because we 
cannot ‘see’ the atmosphere. Miller and Edwards (2001) therefore suggest that, 
 
The meanings attached to the climate and weather are often highly ‘black-boxed’ (i.e., 
they are complex, socially mediated concepts that are generally taken for granted). (Miller 
and Edwards, 2001:7).  
 
From this perspective, ‘lay’, knowledge about vulnerability Is not valued.   
 
The framing of adaptation as a response to specific, ‘global’, climate risks has led observers such as 
Few et al., (2007) to suggest that, “where the pursuit of adaptation to climate change is the pre-
determined goal”, engaging the pubic in adaptation decisions is not necessarily productive, 
because, 
 
Lay stakeholders cannot be ‘trusted’ to decide on an adaptation path because of competing 
priorities and short term interests, so what would be the result of the participation process? 
(Few et al., 2007: 52).  
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Yet, as highlighted by Jennings (2009) and others (Lahsen, 2004; Martello and Jasanoff, 2004; 
Wynne, 1994 ), it is precisely this lay knowledge that can be useful in informing sustainable and 
realistic adaptation policies in the face of uncertain climate change impacts. That is not to say that 
‘all knowledge is expert’, or that every viewpoint on a problem is equally valid. Clearly, not every 
possible opinion on every problem can be taken into account for policy-making to be inclusive. 
However, many observers have argued that, especially in relation to scientific or technical 
problems that have come to be seen as ‘uncertain’ or publicly controversial, encouraging wider 
public consultation in policy decision-making can improve the legitimacy of the policy-making 
process.   
 
For example, building on the seminal work of Kuhn (1962) who introduced the concept of “normal 
science,”6 Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990, 1993) argue that achieving “normal science” necessarily 
forecloses alternative problem framings and expertise. This is illustrated by the way that 
adaptation ‘science’ is approached, which is becoming a paradigm where it is normal to do 
scientific research on climate change impacts, and lay or ‘local’ knowledges are excluded from the 
status of expertise.   
 
Instead, Funtowicz and Ravetz suggest that where issues are ‘high risk’ or ‘highly uncertain’ (as is 
the case with climate change), a “post-normal” science develops, which incorporates ‘extended 
facts’ – those that are introduced into the scientific debate on policy but are not ‘scientific’ in the 
traditional sense. These include people’s beliefs and anecdotes circulated verbally, which do not 
make claims about scientific certainty but are nevertheless “technically competent but 
representing interests outside the paradigm of official expertise” (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990:20). 
Therefore rather than subjugating all lay knowledge as unscientific and therefore invalid, post-
normal science allows for a “plurality of legitimate perspectives” (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993), 
where certain types of lay knowledge are in fact legitimate on the basis of their value as ‘extended 
facts’. 
 
Locating post-normal science in relation to more conventional ‘normal science’ problem solving 
strategies, Funtowicz and Ravetz propose a framework comprised of two axes: “system 
uncertainties” and “decision stakes” (see figure 1.1):  
                                               
6
 Kuhn (1962) introduced the concept of “normal science” as the routine work of scientists done within an agreed 
scientific paradigm. Normal science is part of this theory to describe the way in which scientific knowledge 
progresses through socially constructed “paradigm shifts”. Paradigm shifts occur when “normal science” which 
refers to routine puzzle solving, cannot resolve a problem. This gives rise to “revolutionary science” in which 
important scientific rules are called into question, and new rules are developed that can solve these contradictions. 
The paradigm then shifts to a new “normal science” where new rules are accepted and science once again returns 
to problem solving under this new paradigm (Kuhn, 1962).   
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According to this framework, where uncertainty and decision-stakes are both low, ‘normal’ or 
‘applied’ science will provide legitimate information to inform risk assessments and policy 
decisions.  Beyond this level, the application of routine scientific techniques is not enough, and the 
skills and judgement of new participants need to be consulted in order to resolve policy dilemmas. 
Where risks cannot be quantified, or when possible damage is irreversible, then ‘traditional’ sorts 
of expertise and problem solving approaches cannot be relied upon, and ‘experts’ may need to 
share enquiries with ‘lay’ stakeholders to either reduce the decision stakes or the broad 
uncertainty (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). But, over time, complex problems become increasingly 
‘certain’ through the application of these broader types of expertise, and thus more applied 
scientific approaches are once again the norm.  
 
Applying this framework to climate change adaptation, climate change emerged as a hugely 
complex and varied subject in the 1980s, but has over time become dominated by a “normal 
science” approach to mitigation: measuring carbon emissions, allocating values to these 
emissions, and modelling the impacts of these emissions. But as this chapter has shown, taking 
such an applied “impacts-based” approach to adaptation is problematic because of the high levels 
of uncertainty around climate change risks (see box 1.1). Under a ‘post-normal’ framework, 
vulnerability-based knowledge is important in justifying action on adaptation where scientific 
uncertainty justifies inaction: While the science cannot currently provide accurate information on 
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what climate change impacts will be (risking potentially mal-adaptive investment), ‘extended facts’ 
related to existing vulnerability (to climatic and other stresses) justifies investments in building 
resilience to an uncertain range of impacts. This model is also useful in helping to explain how 
barriers are created to public inclusion in policy making around ‘expert’ problems; for example, 
why the dominance of a global, impacts-based approach to policy-making restricts the relevance 
of these ‘extended facts’ of vulnerability.  
 
However, the framework of post-normal science has been questioned from STS perspectives 
because it assumes that uncertainty and decision stakes are independent of each other; and also 
because it assumes that a reduction in uncertainty would automatically reduce the decision stakes 
(Forsyth, 2003; Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; Mackenzie, 1990).  Yet, in the same way as perceptions 
of ‘risk’ differ between different groups and across different scales, so it follows that perceptions 
of ‘certainty’ and the decision-stakes of the risk in question will also differ. For example, an 
impacts-based framing of climate change risk gives rise to a high level of uncertainty around what 
the potential impacts of climate change will be, and how they should best be adapted to. On the 
other hand, vulnerable people may have a high level of certainty around the factors that make 
them vulnerable to a range of uncertain risks.  
 
“Uncertainty” is therefore not simply the statistical probability of successful explanation achieved 
via science, but is also dependent on the degree to which different perspectives have been 
incorporated into the initial definition of risk. From this perspective, uncertainty around a policy 
problem is not uniform but depends on how a problem is defined, and by whom, which in turn is a 
function of public participation in the formation of risk. Thus, as highlighted by the Bostcastle 
example above, efforts to reduce uncertainty by asserting and privileging the role of ‘expert’ 
science may paradoxically increase other uncertainties for different groups. Such approaches 
could serve to reinforce barriers between experts and lay people, and the subordination of lay 
knowledge that is important for understanding vulnerability to a range of uncertain risks.  
 
This thesis therefore takes a more political approach to the construction of uncertainty in risk, and 
the implications for who participates in the analysis of risk and decision-making around risk-
reduction policies. In doing so, this thesis questions the extent to which uncertainty in climate 
change risk is a function of participation in the generation of knowledge about that risk.  This 
requires a deeper analysis of the politics of participation around ‘global environmental risks’, 
which examines how concerns about risks and uncertainty are communicated between science, 
policy, and lay arenas.  
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The politics of scale 
 
The discussion above also brings to light the politics of spatial scales on the potential for 
participation to achieve inclusiveness. Any attempt at doing ‘local’ deliberation for ‘global’ risks 
carries assumptions about scale. Many models of participation that strive for ‘local inclusiveness’ 
are based on assumptions that scales are part of a pre-existing conceptual hierarchy, useful for 
ordering social or political units. Under such an approach, ‘global’ is defined by the geographic 
boundaries of the earth; ‘local’ is a spatial resolution smaller than ‘regional’; which in turn is 
smaller than ‘national’, and so on. Yet, as this thesis will show, scales such as ‘the local’ and ‘the 
global’ are also socially constructed and continuously contested.  
 
Criticisms of this normative approach to scale stem from Marxist approaches to materialism, and 
suggest that scales are not fixed, uniform and static arenas, but processes that are continually 
being remade by social actions (Herod, 2003:233). For example, in relation to adaptation, Pelling 
et al., (2008) and Adger et al., (2005) suggest that adaptive behaviour emerging at one scale can 
be the result of learning that has been ongoing amongst a range of actors, that are networked 
across a range of spatial or temporal scales. As Pelling et al., argue:   
 
Adaptation at one spatial (or temporal) scale can impose externalities or constrain 
adaptive capacity at other scales. In short, the system-hierarchic scale where adaptation is 
or is not enacted is a sociopolitical construction. (Pelling et al., 2008:871).  
 
Herod (2003) and Herod and Wright, (2002) suggest that taking for granted normative approaches 
to scale can have implications for the politics of participatory spaces. For example, as noted earlier 
one criticism of participatory approaches is that they assume that the communities being 
consulted are homogenous, ignoring the structural inequalities within communities (Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001; Rose, 1997).  In the case of ‘globally’ governed problems, this issue is exacerbated 
because the objective of undertaking participation is to achieve ‘local’ inputs, in ‘global’ problems. 
This strengthens the binary categories of ‘global’ and ‘local’, and results in both being 
homogenised.    Homogenisation of the category ‘local’ under global environmental strategies 
means the ambition of deliberative processes stops at consulting ‘the local’ for ‘its’ view on a 
globally defined purpose. This not only ignores differentiation within communities, but also 
between communities and any other units that have been packaged under the label of ‘local’.  
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For example, in the case study of flood management in Boscastle, Jennings (2009) discusses the 
difficulties with labelling knowledge as either ‘local’ or ‘external’ in the consultation exercises 
undertaken by the Environmental Agency. Jennings states that ‘local’ was interpreted as 
‘residential’, and so ‘local’ consultations were undertaken with all residents and did not 
differentiate between them.  However, Jennings suggests that the knowledge and experience at 
the ‘local’ level was in fact highly differentiated, and included both ‘in-comers’, who the author 
describes as new residents or residents with second homes, and those who have been ‘local’ for 
generations.  Jennings suggests that the two groups had very different knowledge and values that 
affected their opinions on how the floods should have been managed in Boscastle. Yet this 
diversity of opinion was not adequately reflected in consultation outputs. This is well illustrated 
through one of the author’s interviews with an elderly ‘local’ Cornish resident, who in response to 
the flooding of many second-homes in the disaster, stated: “proper Cornish would know better 
than to put their houses at the bottom of the valley” (Jennings, 2009:248). Jennings suggests such 
a comment is both an implicit statement about the notion of ‘local’ and its relation to knowledge 
of place; and also reveals the depth of diversity of ‘local’ environmental knowledge versus that of 
‘incomers’.   
 
Further barriers are presented where definitions of risk also differ across scales. For example, 
where the global discourse on climate change promotes an impacts-based approach to 
adaptation, the ‘expert’ nature of the risk is reinforced because, as STS scholars point out,  ‘global’ 
knowledge is located higher up the knowledge hierarchy, while local knowledge tends to be 
subjugated and perceived as ‘inexpert’. Agrawal (1995) notes that the definition of any social 
group as ‘local’ often implies that such groups are less powerful than their ‘global’ counterparts. 
Framing such groups, or the knowledge of such groups, in this way can serve to reinforce the 
impression of these groups as subaltern and reiterate these power relations, decreasing the value 
of ‘local’ knowledge in ‘global’ arenas (Argrawal, 1995). This makes access to the adaptation 
debate even more difficult for actors who are not ‘global’ and not considered ‘expert’, i.e. local 
actors whose knowledge is based on vulnerability, rather than impacts.  The implications of the 
politics of scale for deliberation are well summed up by Martello and Jasanoff, who state:  
 
The construction of both the local and the global crucially depends on the production of 
knowledge and its interaction with power… And which issues are defined as meriting the 
world’s attention has everything to do with who has the power and resources… to press 
for them. (Martello and Jasanoff, 2004:5) 
 
 32 
In terms of adaptation, adaptation priorities will vary across scales depending on how risk is 
interpreted and weighted by different groups; but the criteria for defining successful adaptation at 
one scale may influence or obscure indicators of adaptation and vulnerability at another. For 
example, Lemos and Boyd (2009) show how the global level politics of adaptation shape the ways 
in which local level adaptive decisions are made. At the global level, support is provided for 
adaptation that is conceived as ‘additional’ to development. Yet, as noted above and further 
elaborated in chapter three, at the ‘local’ level vulnerability to climate change impacts is 
inseparable from the development context of vulnerable people.  The authors suggest that the 
need to meet the ‘additionality’ criteria of the international adaptation funding frameworks 
creates a tension between domestic and international accountability for national-level adaptation 
decision makers, and constrains the kinds of local level adaptation options that can be developed. 
The result is that national and local level decision makers are encouraged by an international 
climate change discourse to segregate ‘adaptation’ from more general ‘development’, when in 
fact the most appropriate means of addressing vulnerability may be to take the two together 
(Lemos and Boyd, 2009).  
 
Thus, simply creating ‘participatory spaces’ is not sufficient for enabling meaningful ‘local’ 
inclusion in the governance of global risks. This is not to argue that there is no such thing as ‘local 
knowledge’, or that there is no point trying to incorporate it into policy-level decision-making. 
Rather these insights suggest that attention is needed to how the politics of scale influence the 
dynamics of inclusive decision making – of how inclusion is done, the power politics of 
participatory spaces, and how these influence the outcomes of participation. This thesis will pay 
greater attention to the politics of participatory spaces, which are influenced not only but the 
‘who’ and the ‘how’ of participation, but significantly, the ‘what’: What is the subject of 
participation, and how is it framed? This means paying closer attention to the dynamics of 
deliberation in participatory processes.  
 
 
Deliberation and inclusiveness  
 
The discussion above suggests that current approaches to participation in environmental policy-
making do not pay adequate attention to the ways in which normative approaches to risk, 
expertise, and scale can present barriers to achieving meaningful ‘local’ inclusiveness. As such, 
debates around participation are shifting towards creating opportunities in participatory spaces 
for democratising these normative concepts (see for example Cornwall, 2006).  
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One common approach from political science that seeks to democratise environmental 
explanations and decision-making, is “deliberative governance.” “Deliberation” literally means 
opening up a concept to “careful consideration or discussion” (Oxford dictionary), but in 
governance terms it has come to refer to: 
 
Debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which 
participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and 
claims made by fellow participants. (Chambers, 2003:309).  
 
Deliberation as an ideal implies rational, reasoned debate around a policy problem, which ideally 
can result in consensual decisions that are perceived by all involved as legitimate, rational, and 
just (Rosenberg, 2007). In relation to environmental governance, deliberative institutions have 
been proposed as a way of empowering environmental discourses to challenge oppressive states 
and industry (see Dryzek, 1987, 1990), and thus making environmental policy more inclusive. 
However, the dynamics of deliberation, and the potential for ‘reasoned discussion’, are debated.  
 
One of the earliest proponents of deliberation was Jürgen Habermas, who saw it as a means of 
bringing citizens together to discuss public policy in a setting that emphasises equal participation, 
mutual respect and reasoned argument, for the governance of complex and uncertain problems 
(Habermas, 1989). Habermas proposed that deliberation had the potential to democratise 
discourses through a process of ‘communicative rationality’, drawing from debates in Critical 
Theory around ‘instrumental rationality’: instrumentally rational agents will take the optimal 
course of action to achieve their desired ends, and thus during deliberation, consensus would be 
reached through rational argument.  
 
An alternative approach to deliberation follows the work of Michel Foucault7 (1976, 1980), who 
argues that all discourses are situated in wider knowledge systems, and thus support for a shared 
perception reached through deliberation, is often the result of diverse social and political 
influences rather than ‘reasoned argument.’ These differing perspectives on deliberation as a tool 
for inclusive policy making have given rise to varying perspectives on how deliberative governance 
can be achieved.  
 
                                               
7
 These approaches have been simplified for the purposes of this chapter, but in reality this debate is much more 
complex than this brief summary implies. More in depth discussions are presented in Hoy (1986, ed.) and Dews 
(1999, ed.) (critical readers on these debates) or  of course  in the original texts cited above.  
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 Habermas argued that institutional arrangements that enable meaningful deliberation are more 
likely to have the ability to respond to high levels of complexity and uncertainty (Dryzek, 1987; 
Habermas, 1989). As Smith (2001) suggests:  
 
When faced with high levels of uncertainty and risk [as is the case with climate change], 
deliberative institutions promise an ingenious mechanism through which the application 
of scientific and technical knowledge and expertise might be democratically regulated – 
an institutional setting within which the barriers between ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ knowledge can 
be challenged and reformed. (Smith, 2001:71).  
 
The intended outcome of a deliberative approach to governance is what Dryzek (2006) terms 
“deliberative democracy”, when all those affected by a decision are provided with the opportunity 
for participating meaningfully in the decision-making process; and every ‘reasonable’ argument 
relevant to the decision should be weighed up with a view to making a decision on the basis of 
that weighing  (Dryzek, 2006:27).  According to Cohen (2007), 
 
 The point of deliberative democracy is to subject the exercise of collective power to 
reason’s discipline, to what Habermas famously described as “the force of the better 
argument”, not the advantage of the better situated…deliberative democracy is about 
reasoning together among equals. (Cohen, 2007:220).  
 
Focusing on deliberative institutions, rather than participatory spaces, presents opportunities for 
governing discourses – spaces where stakeholders can create and contest powerful problem-
framings, and promote alternative ones. In terms of governing adaptation, in principle deliberative 
governance should provide arenas for ‘global’, ‘impacts-based’ and ‘local’, ‘vulnerability based’ 
adaptation discourses to come together and be resolved. “Inclusiveness” from a deliberative 
perspective is therefore more than participation: Participation implies people are brought 
together into one space to participate in the governance of a problem;  achieving deliberation 
depends on whether, and how, people make use of that space, and the impact this has on policy 
outcomes. There can be participation without achieving deliberation, but many critics argue that 
under such circumstances participation will not be meaningful; it will not be inclusive (Rosenberg, 
2007; Warren, 2007).  
 
But what do deliberative institutions look like, and how are they different from more traditional 
institutional theories of governance? For example, many ‘institutional’ approaches to inclusive 
governance point to decentralised institutional design principles. Ostrom (1990) discusses 
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“polycentric institutions” as a way of relating local and higher level authorities in decision-making. 
Under a polycentric system, resources are managed at different scales, under one, formal, set of 
rules, accepted by all parties, where each institutional scale is ‘nested’ under the level above 
(Ostrom, 1990). Polycentric institutions have been argued to facilitate ‘local inclusion’, and even, 
in some senses, deliberation, because actors from lower governance scales are brought together 
into governance units for “face-to-face” discussion and the achievement of common 
understanding (Ostrom, 2010:3). These units are incorporated into higher level decision-making 
scales, and thus opportunities are created for ‘local deliberations’ to ‘feed into’ higher level policy 
making. Ostrom suggests that a polycentric approach can be useful in explaining the multi-scale 
politics of climate change because: 
 
 While many of the effects of climate change are global, the causes of climate change are 
the actions taken by actors at smaller scales. The familiar slogan ‘‘Think Globally but Act 
Locally’’ hits right at the dilemma facing all inhabitants of the world. (Ostrom, 2010:2).  
 
However, such ‘inclusiveness’ is not the same as ‘deliberation’ as it is intended here.  First, 
polycentric institutions implies that deliberations take place within each scale and outputs of 
deliberation are ‘fed-upwards’ into the scales above, rather than there being incidences of multi-
scale deliberations.  Second, discussions at ‘local’ scales may be constrained by the decision-
making rules of the levels above. This leaves little room the kind of multi-level engagement of 
stakeholders, or for the creation of spaces for the deliberation of alternative definitions of risk, 
required for the deliberative governance of adaptation.  
 
Third, a ‘nested’ approach might impede deliberation where institutions are rooted in universal, 
positivist notions of risk and political behaviour; such a framework overlooks the ways in which 
risks are created, constructed, and contested, across and among scales (Bulkely, 2005). For 
example, Pelling (2008) discusses how competing definitions of vulnerability across scales can 
generate conflict in risk management. Discussing the measurement of vulnerability in an urban 
context, Pelling suggests that city level vulnerability assessments based on city-wide priorities, 
could lead to risk management options that have detrimental intended and unintended 
consequences for the assets and livelihoods used by local (Pelling, 2008). Pelling states:  
 
For one way of seeing the city or of constructing its vulnerability there are multiple 
stakeholders whose ways of measuring and acting on vulnerability are dictated by the 
sector and scale of their responsibilities. (Pelling, 2008:3) 
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Thus, the much-lauded concept of “think global, at local” for achieving sustainable development, 
is somewhat of an oxymoron.  
 
Deliberative institutions on the other hand require spaces that allow global risks to be reassessed 
in locally meaningful terms, across scales and political communities. Habermas (1989) proposed 
that institutions for deliberation need to create a ‘perfect public sphere’, in which discourses could 
be contested, deliberated, and agreed. For Habermas, the public sphere consists of a space in 
which independent, equal citizens can collect on a voluntary basis and undertake reasoned debate 
around an issue of common interest, for the public good (Dews, 1999; Habermas, 1989). 
Deliberative theorists have since taken up the concept of the public sphere as the cornerstone for 
designing deliberative institutions. Dryzek (1990, 2000) suggests that public spheres can operate 
across scales, from sub-national to international, and can be composed of a broad variety of actors 
deliberating on issues of common interest, from NGOs, individual activists, journalists, 
corporations, government members, and international government organisations.   
 
From this perspective, the questions that need to be asked about inclusive institutional designs 
centre on creating these conditions of equality within the public sphere: “Do all participants have 
equal voice”? (Rosenberg, 2007:13); and, “how can the conditions of equality, mutual respect, and 
rational, reasoned debate, be encouraged to ensure all participants have equal voice?” This may 
be a question of managing externally induced inequalities (such as class, caste, race or education) 
that may interfere with the full and fair contribution of individual participants to the debate 
(Rosenberg, 2007:13).  
 
 
Within the public sphere: The dynamics of deliberative processes 
 
However, this chapter has shown that the way in which environmental risks are framed, and the 
implications for how expertise and scales are defined, can have an impact on deliberation. This 
observation is more in line with a Foucauldian approach to deliberative institutions, which calls in 
to question the basis of environmental concerns and definitions of risk in the first place. Yet 
relatively less attention has been paid to managing the dynamics of the deliberative process itself; 
the factors that affect these dynamics; and the impact of deliberative dynamics for enabling truly 
deliberative outputs (Rosenberg, 2007). As Smith states:  
 
Equality is only one aspect of deliberative design. What about the fostering of deliberation? 
(Smith, 2001:87).  
 37 
 
For example, this thesis proposes that the politics of expertise and the politics of scale may be 
significant in enabling ‘climate risk’ to be democratised, influencing not only who has access to 
deliberative forums, but how those forums are managed, and whether deliberative outputs are 
seen as relevant to the policy problem.  
 
Such cases reinforce arguments from deliberative theorists influenced by the work of Foucault, 
who pay considerable attention to the power of discourses in shaping deliberative outcomes. 
Rather than accepting that different discourses equally reflect a ‘rational’ point of view, a 
Foucauldian perspective argues instead that certain discourses can become overly powerful, even 
hegemonic, stifling opportunities for alternative discourses to be of any influence at all. This 
approach views statements of scientific ‘truth’ as “storylines” or “narratives” which dominate 
hegemonic discourses. Maarten Hajer (1995) was significant in developing this approach with 
regards to environmental discourses, and proposed that narratives and storylines created around 
environmental problems are fundamental in dictating the discursive power of a concept, arguing 
that “the discursive construction of reality becomes an important realm of power” (Hajer, 
1995:21). 
 
Therefore in contrast to Habermas’ ‘perfect public sphere,’ these insights suggest that deliberative 
arenas are not neutral mediums, but can orchestrate how individuals are engaged with one 
another, the kinds of understandings and values they can collectively construct, and even the 
kinds of people the participants are likely to be (Rosenberg, 2007). The way a problem is framed 
(the ‘what’ of deliberation) has consequences for the ‘who’ and ‘how’ of deliberation around that 
problem. 
 
The implications of powerful and hegemonic discourses for designing deliberative institutions are 
fairly pessimistic; if discourses are so pervasive and powerful, they become unrecognisable as 
discourses and instead become part of the ‘natural order of things’, and so subverting the 
dominant approach is almost impossible (Dryzek, 2000:8). Other critics have pointed to the power 
dynamics that influence the formation of discourses of risk in the first place (Hajer, 1995). It is 
perhaps such perspectives that have resulted in a clustering of research on deliberation around 
either the goal of deliberative democracy, or the failure to achieve it; but very little on how 
institutions should be designed to achieve deliberative goals.  
 
This thesis proposes that rather than reject the task of designing deliberative institutions outright, 
it is possible to acknowledge the implications of power and knowledge on deliberative spaces, and 
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design deliberative institutions in light of them. The capacity for people to deliberate should not 
be taken as given, but something that needs to be facilitated by the deliberative process itself.   
 
Such insights could inform a future institutional design process that asks the questions posed by 
Rosenberg:  
 
Given these limitations, how can deliberation be structured so as to foster a more 
…deliberative and democratic form of cooperative decision-making? (Rosenberg, 
2007:14).  
 
Such questions give rise to institutional design considerations that focus on the dynamics of 
deliberative exchange, and how they can be influenced: the ‘who’, the ‘who’, and the ‘what’ of 
deliberative processes. In the case of climate change adaptation, this means: firstly, understanding 
the ways in which risks are perceived, especially at the ‘local’ level; secondly, considering the 
impact of alternative definitions of risk at other scales, and the ways these interact; and finally, by 
unpacking what we mean by scale itself. There is a need to re-think institutions for managing 
vulnerability, in a way that acknowledges the usual constructs of local/global; expert/lay; and 
hence the underlying discourses that need to be governed. 
 
This thesis therefore understands inclusiveness in adaptation policy to mean both a participatory 
approach to policy making – i.e. policy makers actively encourage the participation of vulnerable 
groups in the policy-making process; but also that this participation is deliberative – the 
participatory process enables stakeholders across scales to deliberate common objectives and 
practices for developing policy. The next section of this chapter will show how attempts have been 
made to operationalise concepts of inclusive policy-making in environmental governance, 
revealing challenges for achieving deliberative inclusiveness in the governance of risk.  
 
 
1.3 Policy orientated approaches to managing ‘global’ risk 
 
This section will discuss three levels of attempts to operationalise inclusiveness in global 
environmental risks: through international governance structures; national planning; and 
decentralised governance.  
 
International governance of global environmental risks 
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One case that is often held up by both academics and the NGO community alike as a successful 
model of how to ‘do’ global environmental governance, is the case of international ozone 
governance under the 1987 Montreal Protocol (see for example Action Aid, 2007; Benedick, 1991). 
For example, in his book Ozone Diplomacy, Benedick (1991) suggests ozone governance is a 
laudable example of positive international political action, informed by evidence-based scientific 
research, that resulted in the global adoption of environmental policies under the Montreal 
Protocol to limit ozone-depleting substances (Benedick, 1991).  
 
However, many scholars have also shown how ozone governance exemplifies many of the issues 
raised in the discussion above, around how universalist framings of environmental problems as 
‘global’ and ‘scientific’ can result in ‘closed’ approaches to governance that create barriers to local 
inclusion (Eden, 1996; Litfin, 1994; Miller and Edwards, 2001). These issues will be discussed in 
turn.  
 
First, like climate change, the ozone layer was framed as a policy problem of ‘global’ and 
‘scientific’ nature. Eden (1996) discusses the emergence of international ozone policy, which she 
describes as a problem derived from modernisation (the new chemical compounds, 
chlorofluorocarbons or CFC’s); constructed in atmospheric chemistry (observations taken from a 
small number of scientists); communicated to the public and other groups in the environmental 
debate; and finally recognised as a global problem in the Montreal Protocol, the international 
agreement to control CFC emissions.  The author suggests:  
 
It is not too simplistic to say that without the science of atmospheric chemistry, we would 
not see any ozone problem. (Eden, 1996:187).  
 
Such statements are echoed by Miller and Edwards (2001):  
 
Expert knowledge was a sine qua non of the Montréal Protocol on ozone depleting 
substances and its successors. (Miller and Edwards 2001:3). 
 
Second, and in turn, Litfin (1994) shows how such an ‘expert framing’ supports an “epistemic 
communities” explanation for ozone governance: scientists convened around the problem and 
developed a convincing evidence base on ozone depletion to present to policy makers as a 
decision making tool.  However, while Litfin does not contest the role of scientists in facilitating 
political agreement, she argues that the orthodox ‘epistemic communities’ explanations of 
‘science speaks to policy’ overlook the role of politics in defining the science. For example, Litfin 
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shows how the influence of science on policy making was mediated by powerful “knowledge 
brokers” drawn from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), NASA, and UNEP, who 
selected, interpreted, and communicated scientific findings to policy makers. Further, Litfin points 
to the role of public pressure on defining policy, particularly following the discovery of the 
Antarctic ozone hole and the high level of media attention given to this (Litfin, 1994). Thus, Litfin 
presents a powerful criticism of “epistemic communities” as an explanation for how ‘global’ and 
‘expert’ problems are governed, stating,  
 
Epistemic community approaches underestimate the extent to which scientific 
information simply rationalizes or reinforces existing political conflicts (Litfin, 
1994:184,186). 
 
Third, Eden points to the implications of such orthodox ‘science speaks to policy’ assumptions for 
inclusive governance. Eden shows that, although the public were active in lobbying for policy, 
boycotting CFC-containing spray cans (a move primarily orchestrated by Friends of the Earth in 
1998), the expert framing of the ozone problem inhibited public participation in policy 
development. This is not surprising; as Taylor and Buttel (1992) argue:   
 
The science of global environmental change continues to reflect, and in turn reinforce, the 
moral-technocratic formulation of global environmental problems…*there is+ inattention 
to the national and localised political and economic dynamics or socio-environmental 
change (Taylor and Buttel, 1992:409).  
 
It is only this understanding of the localised social and political dynamics of environmental 
problems that would warrant local participation and make it meaningful; without it, attempts at 
local inclusiveness in global environmental problems can at best contribute to policy 
implementation, but not policy design.  
 
Climate change echoes these governance patterns of other ‘atmospheric’ environmental 
problems, framed as an issue of: 
 
Scientific construction…a global scale environmental problem caused by the universal 
physical properties of greenhouse gasses. (Demeritt, 2001:307).  
 
As will be shown in chapter three, framing climate change as a scientific and technical problem has 
made public participation in both mitigation and adaptation governance especially problematic. 
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But, as this thesis will show, climate change, and adaptation in particular, presents specific 
challenges: 
 
First, the continuing scientific controversy, and an absence of simple, politically non-contentious 
solutions, render relations between ‘expert knowledge’ and environmental governance far more 
contested (Miller and Edwards, 2001:3).  Second, adaptation under other atmospheric issues such 
as the ozone layer or even acid rain, has not been a major policy option; both have been managed, 
fairly successfully, by mitigation alone. However, the failure to effectively mitigate the causes of 
climate change means that adaptation must now be managed under this same global governance 
framework as mitigation.  
 
Yet, as shown in the literature analysis presented above, many scholars have suggested that if 
adaptation is to effectively address local vulnerabilities, then it should be locally inclusive (Huq and 
Reid, 2007; Polack, 2008); adaptation is what grounds the intangible, global atmospheric problem 
of climate change in a local, tangible reality (Ayers and Huq, 2009a). But global risk assessments 
that reinforce the impacts-based approach to adaptation, present challenges for the exclusion o 
local level insights that could otherwise contribute to understanding and effectively responding to 
climate change risk. This thesis will consider the consequences of risk assessments that perpetuate 
an impacts-based approach to adaptation framing, on the inclusiveness of adaptation policy 
making at the international (chapter three), national and sub-national levels (Chapters four and 
five).  
 
 
National Planning for Environmental Risks 
 
A common tool used by international and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) for 
implementing ‘global’ plans ‘locally’, is the development of a national action plans. For example, 
all three Rio Conventions (the UNCBD, the UNCCD, and the UNFCCC) call for national plans to 
translate the global priorities of the various conventions into implementation actions on the 
ground. The development of national plans for environmental conventions all begin with 
environmental assessments, through which scientific networks are intended to communicate their 
findings to policy makers (Farrell et al., 2001).  
 
Yet, the outcomes of such international risk assessments described above can influence the ways 
in which nation states approach the national and sub-national management of ‘global’ risks. 
Where ‘global’ framings of environmental risk conflict with perceptions of risk at sub-national 
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scales, nation states are faced with the challenge of reconciling international and sub-national 
interests. This is particularly the case where international agencies are tasked with providing the 
resources and guidelines for undertaking national risk assessments. Under such circumstances, 
and often despite claims and attempts at ensuring local participation, national planning processes 
can end up replicating the assumptions and priorities of global risk discourses, rather than 
incorporating and responding to local realities of how those risks are being experienced (Ayers, 
2011; Forsyth, 2003).  
 
One case that illustrates well the consequences of unresolved tensions between competing 
definitions of risk across scales, is discussed by Bassett and Zeuli (2000). The authors describe the 
development of National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs), required by the World Bank in low-
income countries receiving its financial assistance. Taking the West African case study of the Cote 
d’Ivoire, they show that  globally uniform, ‘blue print’ methods of designing NEAPs resulted in the 
identification of a misconceived problem of desertification, that contrasted to the more wooded 
landscapes experienced by farmers (and confirmed by aerial photographs). The authors reveal 
that on the contrary, one of the problems experienced by local farmers was tree and bush 
encroachment that was hindering livestock development.  
 
Bassett and Zeuli (2000) show that, although the NEAP process claims to be participatory, the 
tensions between sub-national and regional risk discourses inhibited meaningful local 
deliberation. For example, the authors argue that the ‘problem’ of desertification identified by 
‘experts’ from the World Bank was in fact not based on reliable data, but instead on powerful 
“regional discursive formations”8 (Bassett and Zeuli, 2000:69). These gave rise to an idea of 
desertification that was so integral to the discursive environmental history of the region, it 
dominated the policy discourse to the extent that the actual dynamics of environmental change 
were overlooked (Bassett and Zeuli, 2000:69). The resulting NEAP was littered with images of 
desert-like conditions spreading into the Savannah, despite the findings of the authors to the 
contrary. The voices of the experienced farmers and herders whose understanding of 
environmental change were more nuanced and often contradicting the dominant narrative were 
largely excluded from the participatory process.  
 
The authors also show how assumptions about scale influenced the design of participatory 
processes. For example, ‘local’ inclusion was achieved through the “civilian phase” of NEAP 
                                               
8
 “Regional discursive formations” were originally theorized by Peet and Watts (1996:15), and described as “modes 
of thought, logics, themes, styles of expression, and typical metaphors run through the discursive history of a 
region, appearing in a variety of forms, disappearing occasionally, only to reappear with even greater intensity in 
new guises’’ (Peet & Watts, 1996: 16).   
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preparation. This phase involved holding regional meetings at which ‘”local” political leaders and 
government officials as well as “selected” farmers and herders were invited to give their views on 
regional environmental issues and the NEAP process. This group was identified as representative 
of ‘the local’. Yet, the authors state that:  
 
 This form of “participatory planning” did not involve consultations with ordinary men and 
women living in rural areas about what they considered to be the most important 
environmental issues. (Bassett and Zeuli, 2000:74).  
 
Thus, assumptions about who was considered local had implications for who was included, and 
resulted in the exclusion of “ordinary men and women.”  Further, the authors suggest that this 
aggregation of very different stakeholders into ‘the local’ affected the dynamics of the 
participatory process. They state that inviting a small number of peasants to a regional meeting 
that was dominated by civil servants meant that, unsurprisingly, peasants and herders were 
reticent to contribute freely under such circumstances (ibid).  
 
The resulting policy recommendations to combat the assumed reduction in tree cover, included 
coercive measures to reduce bush fires, wood cutting, and the promotion of village level tree 
planting. The authors suggest that not only were these measures a waste of limited resources, but 
also exacerbated the actual problem vegetation encroachment (Bassett and Zeuli, 2000:90). 
Combining their own case study analysis with similar examples that reveal disparities between 
local and global perceptions of the same environmental issues (Leach and Mearns, 1996; Peet and 
Watts, 1996; Tiffen et al., 1994), they argue for the need to provide locationally and culturally 
appropriate technical and economic options (Bassett and Zeuli, 2000;76). 
 
In light of such experiences, Farrell et al., (2001) suggests that greater attention needs to be paid 
to four aspects of the design of environmental assessments: first, to the initiation and context of 
the assessment – who called for the assessment and why? Second, to the science-policy 
interaction of the assessment – are scientists isolated from policy makers and how? Third, who 
participates in the assessment and under what conditions? And fourth, to the capacities of 
different stakeholders and arenas to ensure adequate participation in assessments, and effective 
communication between parties (Farrell et al., 2001).  
 
Such insights are helpful in highlighting how apparently ‘neutral’ environmental assessments are 
also themselves constructed through social processes. Yet, the case of the NEAP above suggests 
that questions remain over the extent to which assessments can actually offer avenues for the 
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inclusion of ‘local’ perspectives in policy making under ‘global’ environment agreements.  
 
Similar approaches to national planning have been adopted under the UNFCCC, which requires all 
Least Developed Countries that are Party to the Convention, to develop National Adaptation Plans 
of Action (NAPAs). As with NEAPs, the guidelines for developing NAPAs are uniform across all 
LDCs, and must be adhered to if the resulting plans are to meet the requirements for funding 
under the UNFCCC. However, NAPAs do place an emphasis on participatory approaches and 
community-level inputs as an important source of information to inform national and 
international adaptation policy (LEG, 2002). As such, NAPAs have been touted as the most 
promising opportunity for the participation of vulnerable groups in adaptation policy making 
(Ayers, 2008; Polack, 2008;). This thesis will examine the evidence for these claims related to 
NAPAs and consider the impact of competing definitions of climate change risk across scales on 
enabling local inclusiveness in national adaptation planning (Chapters four and five).  
 
 
Localising risk: Community-based approaches 
 
An alternative response to the critiques of ‘top-down’ management of environmental resources 
has been an increase in support for more localized, community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM). For example, Agenda 21 and the Desertification Convention strongly 
advocate the combination of community initiatives, decentralization, and devolution of 
responsibility for natural resources to local communities (Forsyth and Leach, 1998).  
 
This shift towards community-based approaches is discussed by Menakshi Ahiuwalia (1997), who 
describes how the social and environmental costs of earlier environmental policies in India that 
were based solely on state priorities and focused on large scale, technical projects, have 
stimulated a shift in focus towards more participatory and community-driven approaches to 
environmental management. Ahiuwalia provides the example of a community-based watershed 
management project in Rajasthan, India, the “Nayakheda Watershed Development Project” 
(Ahiuwalia, 1997:3), facilitated by the NGO Seva Mandir, based in Udaipur. One element of the 
project was the promotion of soil and water conservation on private lands. The author describes 
how the Nayakheda area had witnessed significant deforestation between 1975 and 1996, 
evidenced by aerial photographs and confirmed by oral histories. The common explanation was 
that such deforestation was induced by an increasing population of poor tribal people in order to 
meet their subsistence needs.  
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However, through participatory methods, the community-based Nayakheda project revealed that 
in fact the deforestation was a consequence of the delayed enactment of the 1995 land reform 
policies, which resulted in landowners exploiting timber and other resources on their lands in 
anticipation of government land seizures. Tribal people were indeed the ones to carry out the 
deforestation process; however this was in response to incentives provided by the landowners 
and not to meet their own subsistence needs. In response, in 1992 Seva Mandir intervened with a 
set of traditional soil and water conservation measures. The result was an overall increase in 
biomass and soil moisture, and a recharging of groundwater. The need for irrigation for local 
farmers was reduced, and crop yields increased. Thus, local farmers and labourers could gain more 
profit from farming existing lands reducing the pressure on forested land.  
 
Seemingly, then, unlike the NEAP example described above, the community-based approach was 
successful in revealing alternative environmental explanations to the dominant deforestation 
narrative, and addressing environmental resource management challenges at the local level.  
 
Learning from CBNRM experiences, “community-based adaptation” (CBA) is emerging as a key 
counter-proposal to UNFCCC-led processes for doing adaptation. CBA operates outside UNFCCC-
led processes, starting at the community level to identify, assist, and implement community-based 
development activities that strengthen the capacity of local people to adapt. Proponents of a CBA 
approach suggest that this kind of institutional design could enable local deliberations that can 
identify the diversity and complexity of local vulnerability contexts (Ayers and Forsyth, 2009; Jones 
and Rahman, 2007). Many examples of localised, community-based adaptation (CBA) can be 
analysed as examples of legal-pluralism, and indeed many parallels have been drawn between CBA 
and CBNRM, with some even questioning a distinction between the two (IISD et al., 2003).  In 
particular, the objectives of CBNRM - of poverty reduction, natural resource conservation and 
good governance – all contribute to building adaptive capacity and are therefore also the 
objectives of many adaptation strategies (Danida, 2007). 
 
However, many critics of CBNRM have pointed out that such approaches are often based on naive 
assumptions about ‘the community’ and ‘the environment’ that can ignore the localized politics of 
resource allocation, and the local dynamics of environmental change.  In the example above, 
Ahiuwalia points out that while the project achieved its target goals of recharging groundwater 
and improving agricultural lands, these benefits were not experienced equally by all members of 
‘the community’.  In particular, the author highlights the influence of the initial distribution of 
endowments in terms of location of wells and land holdings in relation to the micro-topography of 
the area, which significantly affected the social distribution of the gains from the project.  The 
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author notes: 
 
By making people sit on a common platform, one does not necessarily make them equal. 
(Ahiuwalia, 1997:34).  
 
Further, CBNRM approaches have often assumed that ‘the environment’ is a static resource that 
may have succumbed to degradation through its exploitation by ‘the community’, and thus needs 
to be restored to a previous, stable state through the restoration of harmony between community 
livelihoods and natural resources (Leach et al., 1999). Yet, since the 1970s, a ‘new ecology’ has 
begun to emerge that challenges the idea of ecological equilibrium, drawing attention to an 
understanding of variability in space and time; and also the importance of history on current 
ecological dynamics (Leach et al, 1999).  
 
Therefore simply ‘localising’ environmental management does not overcome problems of the 
politics of scale; in fact in many ways they become even more pertinent, because of assumptions 
that ‘local management’ will automatically result in ‘local inclusion’. In terms of adaptation, a 
community-based approach to adaptation based on fixed assumptions about what is ‘local’ and 
‘global’ does not address the adaptation paradox, but could serve to replicate it, albeit at a 
different scale. For example, as discussed in this chapter, the tendency to aggregate and 
homogenize the category ‘local’ is especially strong in the management of ‘global’ environmental 
problems, even where that management is decentralised. Further, assumptions about a stable 
ecological system are even less valid, given that the premise of adaptation is based on the need to 
respond to changing environmental conditions.  
 
CBA is still in its infancy, and much can be learnt from criticisms of CBNRM in considering how CBA 
approaches could be promoted as avenues for local inclusiveness in climate change adaptation. 
This thesis will examine local approaches to adaptation policy making and consider the evidence 
that CBA is learning from this literature on CBNRM. In doing so, this thesis will consider the 
evidence that CBA can indeed provide opportunities for more inclusive policy making; and what 
the circumstances are that could encourage this (chapter six).   
 
 
1.4 How can climate change adaptation be governed inclusively?  
 
Learning from these insights, this thesis suggests that current approaches to achieving ‘locally’ 
inclusive governance of ‘global’ risks do not pay adequate attention to the actual mechanisms of 
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how risks are deliberated, and the political processes that shape these.  These insights are 
particularly relevant for climate change adaptation, where the “Adaptation Paradox” has resulted 
in an inappropriate definition of climate change risk dominating the politics of climate change, 
which does not incorporate the locally and contextually specified nature of climate vulnerability.  
 
The basic hypothesis of this thesis is that the paradox presented by conflicting definitions of risk 
across scales presents new challenges for participation, because it results in ‘impacts-based’ risk 
assessments for informing policy that do not reflect how vulnerability to those impacts is 
experienced.  Thus, rather than examining methods of participation per se, this thesis will pay 
particular attention to how the arenas created for participation can restrict discussions of risk and 
create barriers to open and meaningful deliberation.  Following on, it is proposed here that 
achieving meaningful local inclusion in the governance of adaptation depends not on participatory 
intentions, but on: Firstly, understanding the ways in which risks are perceived across scales; 
secondly, considering the impact of alternative definitions of risk at other scales, and the ways 
they interact; and finally, by democratising what we mean by scale itself. These propositions will 
be tested by addressing the following questions:  
 
1. What is the evidence that conflicting definitions of risk across scales inhibit locally 
meaningful adaptation policy-making?  
2. Under what circumstances is local inclusiveness achieved under international climate 
change policy frameworks? 
 
Addressing these questions will contribute to debates in the social sciences around deliberative 
governance. Specifically, this thesis will aim to contribute to the following challenge for the policy 
makers and the social sciences more generally: 
 
3. How can local inclusiveness be achieved in the context of global environmental risk? And, 
what kind of institutional designs allow global risks to be reassessed in locally meaningful 
terms?  
 
 
Thesis overview 
 
These questions are addressed through the collection and analysis of a new set of data on the 
main avenue for the inclusion of vulnerable groups in adaptation policy making: National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action. This study examines the emergence of the NAPA process under 
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the UNFCCC as a policy guidance tool, drawing on primary interview data and the analysis of 
secondary data; and then also compares two “sub-cases” of the NAPA process ‘in action’, in two 
countries: Bangladesh and Nepal.  The purpose of this spatial comparison is to consider whether 
the different conditions in each country within which the NAPA process was undertaken, resulted 
in different outcomes for the inclusiveness of adaptation policy; and if so, what these conditions 
were.  
 
The next chapter of this thesis describes in detail the methods adopted by this study for data 
collection and analysis, including a justification of the NAPA process as a case study, and 
Bangladesh and Nepal as ‘sub-cases’. Methods adopted include key informant interviews at the 
international policy level and national level, as well as focus group discussions, household surveys 
and document analysis in Bangladesh and Nepal.  Data analysis adopts a “discourse analysis” 
framework.  
 
Chapter three of this thesis, “Understanding Adaptation”, draws on debates from the natural 
hazards and development studies literatures to break down definitions of risk, vulnerability, and 
adaptation. Data from key informant interviews with stakeholders actively engaged at the 
international level in the IPCC and UNFCCC, as well as the outputs of document analysis, are 
presented.  This data is used to trace the emergence of multiple interpretations of climate risk and 
the resulting approaches to risk assessment. The chapter goes on to show how these conflicting 
approaches to climate change risk have been operationalised in climate change governance 
arenas, looking at both the formal climate governance system of the UNFCCCC, and also 
development institutions that have taken up adaptation as part of their development agenda.  
 
The analysis of primary interview data as well as secondary data sources presented support the 
contention that  an ‘impacts-based’ approach to governing climate change risk does dominate 
UNFCCC frameworks, and that this has created barriers for the potential of UNFCCC mechanisms 
to address vulnerability on the ground. However, it is suggested that opportunities for managing 
climate change adaptation outside of the UNFCCC under development frameworks undermine 
core equity principles of adaptation finance; that adaptation finance must be additional to 
development finance. The chapter concludes that, given that it is important that climate change 
adaptation is managed under the UNFCCCC, National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) 
present the most promising avenue for the inclusion of vulnerable groups in adaptation decision 
making.  
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Chapters four and five examine the potential for inclusive adaptation planning under the NAPAs, 
drawing on the case study research undertaken in Bangladesh and Nepal. These chapters provide 
evidence against all three main research questions by addressing the same two sub-questions 
designed for the empirical case studies:  What is the evidence that the NAPA in each country 
achieved inclusive policy making? And, what were the circumstances that resulted in more or less 
inclusive policy-making processes?  
 
Chapter four analyses data collected through key informant interviews, focus group discussions 
and household surveys to assess the extent to which the NAPA process in Bangladesh meet the 
requirements of deliberative governance, focusing on the ‘who’, ‘how’ and ‘what’ elements of 
deliberative institutional design. The data shows that the inclusive intentions of the NAPA process 
in Bangladesh were promising, but that the approach taken to risk assessments was driven by a 
‘global’ and ‘impacts-based’ discourse. The analysis suggests that this discourse was reinforced by 
a national “environmental crisis” narrative, which served to strengthen the emphasis on large 
scale, technocratic approaches to defining environmental risks. These powerful discourses 
restricted the democratic potential of the participatory spaces created under the NAPA, affecting 
choices about who participated, how participatory exercises were structured, and what outputs of 
participation were considered ‘legitimate’.  The chapter concludes by questioning whether the 
task of ‘deliberative democracy’ in the governance of ‘global’ environmental problems is simply 
too ambitious?  
 
Chapter five takes up this question, by focusing on the task of deliberative institutional design. 
Through the analysis of key informant interviews and participant observation, this chapter pays 
detailed attention to the process (rather than outcome) of the NAPA development in Nepal. This 
analysis moves beyond debates about the attributes and criticisms of the deliberative democracy 
ideal, focusing instead on the conditions that might be conducive to more or less inclusive 
governance. The chapter critically examines the NAPA process in Nepal, and shows that although 
both Bangladesh and Nepal used the same guidelines for NAPA preparation, Nepal took a very 
different approach to NAPA preparation that focused more attention on creating deliberative and 
participatory forums.  The data suggest that a number of factors contributed to this difference in 
approach, including the history of environmental governance in Nepal; the lower availability of 
climate change data and ‘expertise’ in Nepal compared to Bangladesh; and the fact that Nepal was 
one of the last countries to develop its NAPA, creating an opportunity for lesson-learning. The 
chapter concludes that while it is still ‘early days’ for the Nepal NAPA, a greater focus on 
participatory practice in the design of the NAPA in Nepal presents more promising approach for 
achieving deliberative outcomes within the guidelines of adaptation planning under the UNFCCC.  
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Chapter six discusses the findings from these two case studies in relation to the empirical 
questions of this thesis. The chapter begins by considering the evidence that each NAPA was 
‘successful’ in achieving meaningful policy deliberation. First, the chapter compares the 
inclusiveness of deliberative processes, drawing on the three indicators of deliberative 
institutional design introduced here and expanded in chapters four and five: Who was included in 
policy deliberations; how were deliberative processes structured; and what was deliberated 
about. Second, based on the premise that for policy-making to be inclusive, the outcomes of 
deliberative processes must actually have an influence on policy, the chapter considers the extent 
to which deliberative outcomes influenced the final NAPA document in each country. Third, the 
chapter discusses the circumstances that resulted in more- or less-successful adaptation policy 
deliberation, focusing on the factors that influenced deliberative institutional design choices. This 
section expands debates from chapter 5 around the influence of environmental risk narratives; the 
role of expertise; and opportunities for lesson-learning.  
 
The discussion then moves to the consequences of these circumstances for deliberative 
institutional design. Returning to questions around the politics of scale, the chapter suggests that 
‘inclusive’ approaches to adaptation need to pay greater attention to a disaggregated ‘local’. With 
this in mind, the chapter considers two alternative institutional designs for adaptation planning 
that claim to be ‘more’ inclusive. First, the proposal of “community-based adaptation (CBA)” is 
discussed as one potential institutional design that proponents argue allows for a greater degree 
of ‘local’ inclusiveness.  However, it is suggested that CBA in its current form cannot meet the 
requirements of adaptation governance, which needs to be managed across scales and not just at 
the ‘local’ level. Further, simply decentralising adaptation planning does not necessarily overcome 
existing politics of scale. 
 
Second, paying greater attention to how inclusiveness is achieved, the chapter discusses the 
recent proposal from Nepal of “LAPAs”, or “Local Adaptation Plans of Action”. LAPAs are 
envisaged as a way of taking CBA a step further by using similar, detailed methods of local-level 
vulnerability assessments, but with a focus on the institutions at the local level that will play a role 
in the delivery of NAPAs. While the LAPA concept is still in the design phase, a key promising 
feature is the flexible approach taken to scale. ‘Local’ is not predefined as either community, 
household, district and so on; rather, local institutions are taken as the whichever formal or 
informal institutions are important in enabling vulnerable people to gain access to the assets they 
require to help them build their adaptive capacity.   
 
 51 
Chapter seven is the concluding chapter of this thesis. This chapter brings the empirical findings 
from the discussion chapter back to the title question of this thesis: Can global climate change 
adaptation policy be locally inclusive? The concluding chapter reiterates that achieving 
“inclusiveness” in the context of ‘global’ environmental risks requires, firstly, understanding the 
ways in which risks are perceived across scales; secondly, considering the impact these conflicting 
definitions of risk on the potential for ‘global’ risk assessments to be ‘locally’ inclusive; and finally 
by taking into account the scalar politics of inclusiveness, which means reassessing what we mean 
by ‘local’, ‘global’, and ‘inclusiveness’.   
 
This chapter then discusses the ‘contributions to theory’ of this study, in relation to the theoretical 
framework presented in this introductory chapter. First, it is suggested that this study supports 
‘tyranny of participation’ debates around the importance of paying attention to the ‘who’ and 
‘how’ of participatory practice in analysing inclusiveness. However, this study also presents 
evidence that the power politics of participatory spaces are perhaps more complex than ‘tyranny 
of participation’ debates assume, and attention is also needed to the ‘what’ of deliberation, which 
in turn is affected by the contexts in which deliberative institutional design choices are made.  
 
To explore the ‘what’ of participation, this study applies debates from science and technology 
studies that until recently had been reserved to an industrialised country context. This analysis 
shows that the framing of a problem in ‘global’ and ‘expert’ terms has implications for the 
inclusiveness of ‘local’ and ‘lay’ knowledge. But the evidence from the Bangladesh and Nepal sub-
case studies also suggest that the labelling of information as ‘global’ or ‘expert’ is influenced by 
external factors that drive assumptions about the problems being deliberated. These include the 
political and historical factors that influence assumptions of risk, expertise, and approaches to 
inclusion. Based on these insights, this thesis concludes that approaches to deliberative 
institutional design need to pay greater attention not just to the internal dynamics of participatory 
spaces, but also to the external historical, political and cultural circumstances within which 
deliberation takes place.   It is hoped that such insights can contribute to the under-researched 
area of deliberative institutional design.  
 
The concluding chapter then discusses the policy consequences of failing to take a ‘deliberative’ 
approach to inclusiveness, drawing on examples from the Bangladesh and Nepal NAPAs. These 
include, firstly, opportunities for targeting the key drivers of vulnerability could be missed. Second, 
resources for adaptation may not be put to the most effective use.  Thirdly, and perhaps most 
importantly, adaptation options could be implemented that exacerbate the vulnerability of the 
most vulnerable groups.  
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The thesis concludes by questioning the underlying normative assumption of this study; that 
‘inclusiveness’ is actually an important policy goal in the governance of climate change adaptation. 
The value of ‘inclusive policy making’ in general is discussed; but it is also proposed that engaging 
vulnerable people in policy making can itself be a way of building adaptive capacity, especially 
where vulnerability is compounded by social and political exclusion.  In line with shifts towards a 
‘rights-based’ approach to development, inclusive deliberative governance can provide a platform 
for improving social and political capital, that can in turn help people to better access the services 
and assets that can improve resilience.  
 
Note to reader:  
Some of the primary research conducted for the purposes of this project has been written up in 
other articles and consultancy reports during the course of this project. Not all of this material has 
been included in this thesis for the sake of ensuring clarity and focus to the arguments presented 
here.  However, throughout this thesis the reader will be directed to the relevant publications that 
enrich and add breadth to the material presented in this thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Methodology and Research design 
 
This study tests the hypothesis that the “adaptation paradox” presents challenges for inclusive 
adaptation policy-making, because impacts-based risk assessments under ‘global’ climate change 
frameworks do not reflect how vulnerability is experienced ‘locally’. This hypothesis is tested by 
asking: What is the evidence that definitions of risk across scales inhibit inclusive adaptation policy 
making? And under what circumstances can international climate change policy achieve 
inclusiveness?  Answering these questions contributes to the broader objective of this thesis, 
which is to identify whether and how local inclusiveness can be achieved in the context global 
environmental risk; and what kinds of institutional designs allow global risks to be reassessed in 
locally meaningful terms.  
 
This chapter describes the methodological approach adopted by this study for the collection and 
analysis of a new set of data to test the hypothesis of this thesis. In line with recommendations 
from Bauer et al., (2000), this chapter distinguishes between the three key methodological 
dimensions adopted for this study:  the design principles (the research strategy); the methods of 
data elicitation; and the process of data analysis.  This chapter will describe each of these in turn.  
 
 
2.1 Design principles   
 
Bauer et al., (2000) describe “design principles” as the underlying strategy of a research study, 
such as sample survey, participant observation, case studies, experiments, and quasi-experiments. 
The strategy chosen depends on the type of research question being asked. For example, 
experimental, quasi-experimental, or survey approaches are useful for measuring the ‘how much’ 
or ‘to what extent’ of a policy problem, when the relationship between cause and effect factors is 
established and needs quantifying. Alternatively, this study is concerned with exploring what the 
cause-effect relationship is between ‘risk’ (including the politics of scale and expertise), 
‘uncertainty’, and ‘inclusion’, and whether, to what extent, and why, there is any relationship 
between these factors; and what the circumstances might be that have influenced this 
relationship. A more flexible approach is therefore needed, to enable the investigation of the 
complex relationship between these variables; to incorporate the context of the relationship; and 
to be open to other factors that might also be important in answering the questions proposed by 
this thesis.  
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Case study approach 
 
The research strategy that best meets the requirements of this study is case study analysis. As a 
research strategy, a case-study approach is defined as: 
 
 An empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context; when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used. (Yin, 1989:22).   
 
A “case” in this context refers to: 
 
A phenomenon of scientific interest, such as …types of government regimes…that the 
investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory (or “generic knowledge”) 
regarding the causes or similarities or differences among instances (cases) of that class of 
events. (George and Bennet, 2005:17). 
 
Case study research can include single and multiple case studies, and as a strategy can use 
multiple sources of evidence including quantitative evidence. George and Bennet (2005) identify 
four advantages of a case study strategy for social science analysis, that make it appropriate for 
investigating the hypothesis of this thesis: Fist, case studies can achieve “high conceptual validity”. 
Many of the variables of interest to social scientists are difficult to measure, such as power, 
democracy, or political culture; indeed their very interpretation may vary in different contexts. 
The same can be said for trying to understand ‘vulnerability’; as shown above, perceptions of 
vulnerability differ according to how risk is defined, which is not the same across contexts. A case-
study approach allows researchers to carry out “contextual comparisons” that evaluate 
“analytically equivalent phenomena” across different contexts (George and Bennet, 2005:19).  
 
Second, the analysis of case studies can foster new hypotheses in a way that statistical analyses 
cannot.  For example, George and Bennet propose that “when a …researcher asks a participant 
“were you thinking X when you did Y” and gets the answer “no I was thinking Z” then this could 
give rise to a new variable” that may result in the development of new theories (George and 
Bennet, 2005:20). The ability to absorb unpredictable research outputs is important in enabling us 
to look beyond an ‘impacts-based’ approach to risk and allow people to redefine how and why 
they experience vulnerability which may or may not be related to climate change impacts. Thus, a 
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case study approach enables the analysis of different perceptions of risk, some of which may be 
expected, others of which may not be.  
 
Third, case study analysis can closely examine the operation of a number of causal mechanisms in 
detail, and observe any unexpected aspects of a particular causal mechanism or identify what 
conditions activate any one causal mechanism over another. Statistical studies, on the other hand, 
necessarily leave out many contextual and intervening variables at the expense of studying those 
variables selected for study (George and Bennet, 2005:21).  This is useful for considering the 
circumstances that may result in more inclusive adaptation policy making, which in this study are 
by no means predetermined.  
 
Finally, case study analysis can accommodate complex causal relations; although George and 
Bennet note that this advantage is relative, and case studies require substantial process tracing to 
document complex interactions, while statistical methods are able to model several kinds of 
interactions, albeit only at the cost of requiring a large sample size (George and Bennet, 2005:22). 
Ragin (2007) suggests that this justifies the “small N” approach of case examination; a small 
number of cases allows the researcher to analyse a large number of historically, socially and 
culturally significant variables, hence as Ragin points out: “Fewer cases are often better. After all, 
with large N’s, in depth knowledge of cases must be sacrificed” (Ragin, 2007:65).  As this study is 
explicitly concerned with the processes of participation, and understanding how, and why NAPAs 
achieved inclusiveness (or not), it is important that ample space is given to analysing these 
processes in detail. It therefore makes sense to have a ‘small N’ and focus on conducting a 
detailed study.  
 
For the purposes of this study, the “case” selected for analysis is the process of National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs). It is acknowledged that there are currently other 
avenues for local inclusion in adaptation policy-making. For example, the UNFCCC allows non-
negotiators as ‘observers’ to the climate change negotiations. Active participation of observers in 
the climate change negotiations is limited, often to carefully crafted NGO statements on behalf of 
all registered NGOs, although observers are able to stage ‘side events’ and lobbying activities to 
influence the negotiations. Another example is the design of the recently established “Adaptation 
Fund”, which has a ‘window’ for community-based adaptation projects, although at the time of 
writing this is not yet operational.   
 
However, NAPAs have been selected because they are designed under the UNFCCC specifically to 
provide a direct avenue for the participation of vulnerable groups in adaptation policy making 
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(LEG, 2002:1). NAPAs are therefore a useful unit of analysis for examining the evidence that 
adaptation policy-making achieved this goal of inclusiveness. This also makes the research strategy 
of case study analysis suitable; the different ways in which ‘inclusiveness’ is approached under the 
UNFCCC are not numerous, and are also not comparable, with each of those listed above having 
very different objectives. As this study is primarily concerned with the inclusiveness of ‘local’, 
vulnerable stakeholders in the policy making processes that affect them, NAPAs are currently the 
most direct avenue for this purpose and therefore a suitable case study choice.  
 
 
The selection of sub-cases  
 
This study examines the emergence of the NAPA process under the UNFCCC as a policy guidance 
tool; and then also analyses two ‘sub-
cases’ of the NAPA process ‘in action’, in 
two countries: Bangladesh and Nepal (see 
figure 2.1).  The purpose of these sub-
cases is to examine the different 
approaches taken to NAPA preparation in 
the two countries; the ways in which each 
NAPA approached inclusiveness in NAPA 
preparation; and the circumstances that 
resulted in more or less inclusive 
outcomes in each case.   
 
Bangladesh and Nepal have been selected as appropriate case studies firstly because they are 
both identified by the United Nations as Least Developed Countries, and were therefore obliged 
under the UNFCCC to develop NAPAs. However, while both countries were committed under the 
Convention to adhering to the same NAPA development guidelines, each country took different 
approaches. Bangladesh was one of the first countries to develop its NAPA, submitting a draft to 
the UNFCCC in 2005. Nepal is one of the last countries to develop its NAPA, with the draft NAPA 
completed in July 2010 and still under review at the time of writing. As such, Bangladesh adhered 
fairly rigidly to the NAPA preparation guidelines, and was forced to adopt a ‘learning by doing’ 
approach to NAPA preparation. Nepal on the other hand had the experience of over 40 other 
NAPAs to draw from, and could learn from many of the lessons of good practice as well as 
common criticisms (especially around participation in NAPA processes) of NAPAs in other 
countries.  
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A comparative approach 
 
This thesis takes a broadly comparative approach to analysing the NAPA processes in Bangladesh 
and Nepal. “Comparative analysis” can be interpreted in a number of ways in both quantitative 
and qualitative research. This thesis interprets comparative research in line with Ragin and Strand 
(2008), who suggests that the goal of comparative analysis is “to identify the different 
combinations of causally relevant conditions linked to an outcome” (Ragin and Strand, 2008:431). 
Applied to this study, this selection of sub-cases - the first and last NAPA countries – enables a 
comparative analysis of the initial barriers the NAPA guidelines may have presented to public 
participation in national planning for adaptation; whether or not these were able to be overcome 
within the constraints of the NAPA guidelines; and if so, under what circumstances. Specific 
elements of the sub-cases that can be compared include the ways in which each country 
interpreted the NAPA guidelines, the design of consultation strategies, and the types of 
participatory technologies employed.  
 
However, this thesis does not present a straight forward comparison of the two NAPAs.  Firstly, 
the outcomes of the two NAPA processes cannot be strictly compared, given that the NAPA 
process in Nepal is not complete.  Therefore the focus of comparison is on the NAPA process in 
both Bangladesh and Nepal, and not the NAPA outcomes. Secondly, as will be shown below, the 
approaches taken to data collection in each country were different. In Bangladesh, because the 
NAPA had already happened, information around the NAPA processes was gleaned retrospectively 
– to find out ‘what did happen’, and ‘what were the outcomes’? In Nepal, the NAPA process was 
studied from start to finish in real time, so the assessment was based on ‘what is happening’, and 
it was too early to assess the NAPA outcomes.   Therefore this investigation does not yield two 
strictly comparable data sets. These limitations on enabling straightforward comparison are 
acknowledged in the discussion of results and the conclusions that this study gives rise to.   
  
 
2.2 Methods of data elicitation 
 
A case-study strategy can utilise multiple research methods. One of the most popular frameworks 
for organising data elicitation for case studies to meet these objectives is “process tracing”. 
Process tracing “attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes” 
(George and Bennet, 2005:6). Discussions around process tracing have been ongoing for some 
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time (George, 1979; George and Mckeown, 1985), but the approach has been most 
comprehensively developed in George and Bennett’s 2005 text, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences, in which the authors suggest:  
  
In process-tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview 
transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or 
implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables 
in that case.(George and Bennet, 2005:6) 
 
In line with the principles of process tracing, this study uses multiple research methods to elicit 
data against the two empirical questions of this study, where “possible causes” include conflicting 
framings of risk; and “observed outcomes” relate to the level of inclusiveness achieved in the 
policy process. Data collection therefore focused around the emergence of the adaptation agenda 
under international climate change governance structures, including the development of NAPAs; 
the emergence of adaptation discourses in development arenas; and the process of NAPA 
formulation at the national level in the two sub-cases of Bangladesh and Nepal.  An explanation of 
each of the methods adopted for this study is presented in Box 2.1. This section will describe how 
each of the methods described in box 2.1 was adapted for the purposes of achieving the thesis 
aims.  
 
 
Box 2.1: Research methods adopted for study 
Adapted from Becker and Geer, 1957; Gaskell, 2000; and Bauer et al., 2000.  
 
Participant observation 
Participant observation is a “method in which the observer participates in the daily life of the people under 
study…observing things that happen, listening to what is said, and questioning people, over some length of 
time” (Becker and Geer, 1957:28). The value of participant observation is that the researcher is able to 
better understand perspectives of those being studied because, without assuming this to fully be the case, 
they have to some extent engaged in a common process: they have observed common events and their 
aftermath, and explanations of the meanings of events by participants and spectators, before, during, and 
after its occurrence (ibid).  The researcher is open to a wide breadth and depth of information compared to 
other qualitative approaches, and is able to triangulate different impressions and observations, and to 
follow-up emergent discrepancies in the course of the fieldwork (Gaskell, 2000:44). As such, Becker and 
Geer describe participant observation as “the most complete form of sociological datum” (ibid). While the 
degree to which any ‘observation’ can be said to be ‘participatory’ has been questioned (indeed, some argue 
all observation is in some way participatory – see Atkinson and Hammersley, 1994), it is generally accepted 
that the researcher is, to some degree, engaged in the activities of the people or process being studied. 
 
Semi-structured interviews  
Qualitative interviewing is based on the assumptions that different individuals or groups actively construct 
the social world differently. The purpose of the qualitative interview is to understand the respondent’s life-
world and how this may differ from others. Gaskell states: “the qualitative interview provides the basic data 
for the development of an understanding of the relations between social actors and their situation” (ibid). 
Semi-structured interviews involve four key stages: first, developing a ‘topic guide’; second, selecting 
respondents; third, undertaking the interview and finally, introducing interpretive frameworks to 
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understand the actor’s accounts in more conceptual terms, often in relation to other observations. The topic 
guide is intended to act as an interview prompt only, to create a framework for discussion; however, when 
issues beyond the guide are raised by the respondent these should be recorded and encouraged by the 
interviewer. In terms of selecting respondents, Gaskell (2000) highlights that the purpose of qualitative 
research is not counting opinions but rather exploring a range of opinions; thus, it is important when 
selecting respondents to consider how a social milieu might be segmented on a particular issue, and 
attempt to cover the different perspectives adequately.  
  
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
 Focus-group discussions are a kind of in-depth interview with a group of people, and so have similar 
advantages and constraints as semi-structured interviews. Again, the broad content is structured by the 
topic guide, but discussion should be allowed to flow freely. The main difference is that FGDs allow 
respondents to interact with one another to build consensus or conflict around different points of view, a 
process which is itself interesting to the qualitative researcher in understanding how social dynamics can 
shape deliberative outcomes. The interviewer takes more of a moderator role, allowing participants to 
speak to one another, compare experiences and react to one another, giving rise to perceptions and ideas 
that may not come out of a one: one situation of semi-structured interviews alone. However, participants in 
FGDs tend to be somewhat self-selective. Not all those invited turn up, and some target groups are difficult 
to recruit. Further, the dynamics within an FGD can be dominated by one or two vocal individuals, although 
careful moderation can avoid this to some extent.   
  
Household Surveys 
The household survey used for the purpose of this study was not a large-scale survey for quantitative 
analysis. Instead, the objective of the household survey was to maximise the opportunity to understand the 
different positions taken by members of the social milieu; and to collect enough data on HH survey 
respondents to be able to see patterns between social indicators such as wealth and gender, with 
perceptions of risk, that could be elaborated on during FGDs. Thus, the HH survey was not undertaken to 
provide quantifiably defendable set of outputs, but get a broader idea of the range of views, and indicators 
of priorities, that could be used to guide FGD and key informant interview discussions. A sample HH survey 
is presented in Annex 5. 
 
 
Understanding the international agenda on adaptation  
 
First, to explore the adaptation discourses and the inclusiveness of adaptation policy making at the 
international level, between September 2007 and September 2009, I attended three UNFCCC 
meetings as an ‘observer’9 and tracked discussions on matters related to adaptation. These 
meetings were: 
 December 2007: Thirteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Bali 
 June 2008: 28th meeting of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, 
Bonn.  
 December 2009: Fourteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Poland 
 
Major workshops on Community-based Adaptation were also attended, to understand the CBA 
agenda and its relationship with the UNFCCC. The meetings attended were: 
- Dhaka 2007: Second International Workshop on Community-Based Adaptation 
                                               
9
 In my capacity as a research consultant for the Climate Change Group at the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED), London 
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- London, 2008: UK workshop on Community-Based Adaptation 
- Dhaka 2009: Third International Workshop on Community-Based Adaptation  
 
As well as undertaking participant observation, key informant interviews were undertaken with 
the Least Developed Country Expert Group Chair and members (who were responsible for 
developing NAPA guidelines), IPCC scientists (particularly those from working group II on Impacts 
and Adaptation) non-governmental partners, and donor agencies. A full list of interviewees can be 
found in Annex 1.  The aim of interviewing these different groups of stakeholders was to: 
 Gain a detailed understanding of how adaptation emerged in the international climate 
change discourse. By interviewing a range of actors I was able to triangulate different 
perspectives and get a good picture of key events that marked the progress and 
classification of adaptation as a climate change policy discourse.    
 Get an understanding of whether, and if so how, different actors perceived adaptation in 
different ways and whether the promotion of different approaches to adaptation could be 
linked to any particular group (see chapter 3).  
 
These two objectives shaped the analytical approach taken to both interviews and documentary 
work.  
 
Interviews were semi-structured and the topic-guides for interviews were tailored according to 
the interviewee, and the objective of the interview. All interviews however were based around the 
same framework questions, including how interviewees understood adaptation; their recollection 
of how adaptation became a prominent part of the negotiations; whether they felt due attention 
was given to adaptation; whether adaptation should be inclusive; and if so, whether this was being 
achieved and any barriers to this. Depending on the experience of the interviewees, further 
specific questions were asked around the negotiation processes that resulted in the development 
of the NAPA funds and NAPA guidelines, and perception of the adequacy of these.  
 
 
Sub-case studies in Bangladesh and Nepal  
 
Second, the process of NAPA formulation in Bangladesh and Nepal was examined, focusing on the 
extent to which each NAPA process achieved inclusiveness, and the circumstances that influenced 
more- or less-inclusive institutional designs. Fieldwork was undertaken in both countries, although 
for opportunistic reasons a different approach was taken in each.  
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In Bangladesh, a two-phase study approach was adopted. First, four months were spent in Dhaka 
city identifying and interviewing stakeholders involved in the NAPA process including from the 
Ministry of Environment, and all lead NAPA working group members; as well as other climate 
change stakeholders not directly involved in NAPA preparation, including from NGOs, research 
institutes, as well as independent consultants (see Annex 2).  During this time, climate change 
planning documents were also identified, collected and reviewed.  
 
Second, to better understand local perceptions of risk, causes of vulnerability, and reactions to the 
NAPA project proposal, fieldwork was carried out in Noakhali, one of the sites for the first 
proposed project to be implemented from NAPA. Two field visits were undertaken to Noakhali, in 
November 2008 and February 2009. During these visits, research activities included key informant 
interviews with local stakeholders including government, NGOs and community-based 
organisations; household (HH) surveys of 50 households each in two Upazilas (sub-districts) of 
Noakhali; and transect walks.  
 
HH surveys included data on gender and occupation of head of household; main and seasonal 
household income generating activities; education level of household members; asset holdings 
(evaluated through information about land ownership, livestock ownership, housing type, other 
relevant holdings); and access to basic services. Short, semi-structured questions were also 
included which focused on three main areas: Perceptions of general risks (including for income 
security; food security; health and personal safety; security of assets); perceptions of 
environmental risks; and perceptions of climate-related risks. Further questions included 
perceived changes to risks; the adequacy of government and non-government services; coping 
strategies under times of stress; and required support. The project proposal for the coastal 
afforestation programme was also raised and discussed.  
 
The short-answer findings from the HH surveys were used as the basis for more open and detailed 
discussions about climate risk and vulnerability through focus group discussions (FGDs). FGDs took 
place with the three main livelihood groups of the area as categorised by the District 
Commissioners Office (agricultural farmers (small landowners); agricultural/other day labourers 
(landless); and fishermen). A separate FGD discussion was also held with women, as the livelihood 
categories focus groups were exclusively made up of men. It should be noted that livelihood 
groups are not exclusive, and many of those interviewed fell into more than one category, often 
varying livelihood activities seasonally.  
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In Nepal, a different approach was taken in response to an opportunity offered to me in April 
2009, to spend 9 months working alongside the NAPA team preparing the Nepali NAPA. This 
opportunity enabled me to follow the NAPA preparation process as an observing participant from 
project inception in May 2009, through the design phase, and until the completion of the 
vulnerability and risk assessment data collection (the draft NAPA was completed in July 2010).  
Thus, the research strategy for Nepal was based around a detailed participatory observation 
study. I was based in the NAPA office inside the Ministry of Environment, and assisted the NAPA 
team in the design of the NAPA strategy; fieldwork; and preparation of the document itself. 
 
In addition, independent and supporting key informant interviews were undertaken in my capacity 
as a PhD student with a wide range of stakeholders engaged with the NAPA preparation process. 
These included government officials, non-government agencies, academics, NAPA team members, 
donors, and implementing agencies (see Annex 3). The purpose of these interviews was to ensure 
a broad range of perspectives was gathered on the NAPA preparation process to complement my 
own. Interviews were semi-structured and questions were asked about impressions of the general 
NAPA process, but focused in particular on the adequacy of mechanisms for multi-stakeholder 
engagement.  
 
 
2.3 Methods of data analysis 
 
The methods of data collection gave rise to a broad selection of data types that required analysis, 
including transcripts from interviews and focus group discussions, household survey data, field 
notes, and numerous policy documents and grey literature. Given that the purpose of data 
analysis was to understand how risks are framed in different ways across different arenas, and the 
potential discursive barriers this may present to policy deliberation, an overarching framework of 
“discourse analysis” was decided on. “Discourse analysis” is a framework that covers a variety of 
approaches to the study of talk and texts, which have developed from diverse disciplinary 
traditions. Broadly, discourse analysis is a social constructivist approach to data analysis, which 
aims to identify the links between knowledge, social processes, and action (Jorgensen and Phillips, 
2002). Rather than challenging the validity of the statements arising from the data, discourse 
analysis seeks to identify the meanings, and the relationships and phenomena they reflect (Roe, 
1994).  
 
However, the term ‘discourse analysis’ is contested (as indeed are the terms discourse and 
deliberation, see chapter one). The approach taken to discourse analysis depends on the purpose 
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of the analysis, and how discourse is understood. Gill (2000) suggests that the various approaches 
to discourse analysis can be categorised into four main “themes” (Gill, 2000:174-176): 
i) A concern with discourse itself; discourse analysts are interested in the content and 
organisation of texts in their own right, rather than only seeing discourse as a 
pathway to some other reality; 
ii) Language as constructive – in line with a Habermasian approach to deliberation (see 
chapter one), discourse analysts focus on what language does not just what language 
says; language is not just a transparent medium;  
iii) Discourse as social practice – in line with a more Foucauldian approach to discourse and 
deliberation (see chapter one) discourse not happen in a social vacuum but is 
constantly orientated to and influenced by social contexts. Discourse analysts 
therefore pays attention to both the discourse itself and the interpretive context;  
iv) Talk and texts are organised rhetorically – much discourse is involved in establishing one 
version of the world in the face of competing versions, so attention is needed to the 
ways in which discourses are organised to be persuasive.  
 
All of the above are directly relevant to the study of deliberative processes. By studying discourses 
arising both during deliberation, and also as the products of deliberation, it is possible to gain 
insights into how discursive politics can restrict or facilitate inclusiveness in participatory spaces.   
 
Based on these themes, Gill suggests that the various approaches to discourse analysis can be 
categorised into three broad traditions, differing in how they indentify the relationship between 
power and knowledge. The first has been developed in critical linguistic work, and has an explicit 
concern with the relationship between language and politics (Fairclough, 1989; Fowler et al., 1979; 
Kress and Hodge, 1979). The second broad tradition is influenced by speech-act theory, and 
stresses the function or action orientation of discourse (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Garfinkel, 
1967;Myers, 2000 ). These approaches look in detail at the organisation of social interaction – at 
what interaction is designed to accomplish. The third body of work is associated with 
poststructuralists such as Foucault, and looks historically at discourses, rejecting the realist notion 
that that discourses have a single, coherent subject (Gill, 2000).  
 
The method of discourse analysis taken by this study draws on ideas from each of these 
approaches and respective themes, but focuses in particular the role of discourse as social 
practice; specifically, how deliberative outcomes are affected by social and political contexts, 
rather than only the ‘force of the better argument’ (Habermas, 1990). The primary method of 
discourse analysis adopted is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which focuses on: 
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Social effects of discourse…*and+ historical change: how different discourses combine 
under particular social conditions to produce a new, complex discourse.  (Fairclough 
1992:4).   
 
This is appropriate to gleaning an understanding of how and why certain discourses have come to 
dominate the climate change policy arena, and what impact this has had on enabling inclusive 
policy making. In order to undertake discourse analysis on the data collected, all interview data 
was fully transcribed, because, 
 
Tapes and public transcripts have three advantages compared with other kinds of 
qualitative data: tapes are public record; they can be replayed and transcripts improved; 
and they preserve sequences of talk. (Silverman, 1993:34).  
 
Further, the production of a transcript is the first step in the analysis of this material, as noted by 
Potter (1996),  
 
Some of the most revealing analytical insights come during the transcription because a 
profound engagement with the material is needed. (Potter, 1996:136). 
 
The next step in the systematic analysis of texts is “coding”, but there are various ways of 
approaching this, and then of analysing the coded text. Broadly, “coding” describes “the 
attachment of index words (codes) to unit segments of a record (e.g. an interview transcript or 
field protocol)” (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000:353). ‘Codes’ can have a referential function, 
representing “signposts” to certain text passages (Kelle, 2000:295); or they can have a “factual 
function”, to denote certain facts (ibid). This study adopts the first function for coding, using an 
inductive style of inquiry to explore the relationship between emerging codes and related 
contexts. This is different from a deductive style, such as that adopted in methodologies such as 
“classical content analysis”, (Bauer, 2000:132), that seek to quantify the outputs of discourse 
analysis. It is argued that for the purposes of this study a deductive approach to coding would 
diffuse the context in which certain statements or ‘codes’ appeared. These ‘contexts’ are critical 
for understanding the circumstances for when and how discourses of risk appear and change.  As 
noted by Rose, “meanings are not discreet…and cannot be counted” (Rose, 2000:258).  Instead, 
insights from the multiple research methods provides the empirical rigour to justify the 
conclusions drawn from this data.  
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The act of coding is commonly associated with the early methodological writings of Glaser and 
Strauss on “grounded theory” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) (see box 2.2). The analyst can do coding 
manually, by coding each incident in the data according to as many categories that emerge (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967). Alternatively, software programs can be used to support the process of 
categorising and comparing text segments through ‘code-and-retrieve’ facilities. 
 
Box 2.2 Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory is an approach developed by Glaser and Strauss in their seminal work The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory (1967). Grounded theory implies that a researcher enters their empirical field with no 
theoretical concepts, and the collection of empirical data and its subsequent coding leads to the emergence 
of ‘underlying patterns’ and the subsequent construction new theories.   
 
Grounded theory has been criticised by scholars of modern philosophy on the grounds that researchers 
never enter the field with no preconceptions. This is acknowledged by both Glaser, who proposes 
‘theoretical codes’ that represent the theoretical concepts that researchers have at their disposal 
independently from data collection and analysis (Glaser, 1978); and also by Strauss, who proposes a 
‘paradigm model’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), in which a ‘coding paradigm’ represents a general theory of 
action that can be used to build a skeleton or ‘axis’ of the developing grounded theory (Kelle, 2000).  
 
This study undertook manual coding rather than using computer assisted coding. A manual 
approach is more appropriate for the purposes of this study where a relatively ‘open’ style of 
inquiry is adopted. It is important that codes are flexible and analysed in their contexts to see if 
any other meanings simulataneously emerge that could inform the research conclusions. A 
manual approach allows the analyst to constantly work with the raw data sets, while computer-
assisted coding often leads to the alienation of the reseacher with their original data sets, and an 
over-emphasis on codes versus the contexts of codes (Seidel and Kelle, 1995). A manual apporach 
also allowed for greater flexibility to accommodate the challenges of coding data from translated 
interviews (see research challenges, below). 
 
Following insights from grounded theory, but learning from the more recent contributions of 
Glaser (1978) and Strauss and Corbin (1990) that acknowledge the contribution of an existing 
theoretical ‘skeleton’ to the development of codes (see box 2.2), this study coded data sets with 
categories emerging including: ‘Impacts’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘participation’, ‘indigenous knowledge’, 
‘scientific knowledge’; and then sub- or alternative categories emerging from the data as it 
became familiarised, for example ‘vulnerability as a function of poverty’, or ‘vulnerability as a 
function of impacts’. More specific categories also emerged, for example in Bangladesh, ‘impacts’ 
discourses were characterised by categories of ‘floods’ and ‘storms’, whilst in Nepal impacts 
focused on ‘glacial’ impacts and attention to ‘impacts on agriculture’ (see chapters four and five 
for the paradigm origins of these codes). In both sub-cases, ‘development-based’ discourses were 
coded by categories around ‘livelihoods’ and ‘poverty alleviation’.  From this, patterns could be 
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seen from the data that identified different approaches to adaptation, and different 
understandings of climate change risks, between and within different arenas.  
 
Different perceptions on adaptation were linked to different types of international actors (see 
chapter 3). The specific analysis of each data set from Bangladesh and Nepal is described in 
chapters four and five respectively.  
 
 
2.4 Research challenges and research ethics 
 
Research challenges 
 
One of the major challenges encountered in this research was addressing language barriers in 
Bangladesh and Nepal, particularly given the importance of analysing discourses in these two 
countries. This was addressed in part by taking language classes in both countries to familiarise 
myself with ‘the basics’ and to be able to communicate to some extent with key informants in 
Dhaka and Kathmandu. This was especially useful for when I was invited to stakeholders meetings, 
as I was able to follow the general train of conversation. However, my capacity was limited and I 
was not able record accurately everything that was said, often turning to other participants for 
translation. In addition, many of my key informant respondents in Dhaka and Kathmandu spoke 
excellent English, although I acknowledge that speaking a second language may have effected how 
respondents interpreted and answered questions.   
 
I faced a bigger challenge conducting field interviews, HH surveys and FGDs in the field sites in 
Bangladesh, and in accompanying the NAPA field studies in Nepal, as I was unable to communicate 
well in local dialects. In Bangladesh I enlisted the help of an excellent interpreter who was a 
student from Dhaka University, Mohammad Ashraful Haque, to assist in conducting interviews and 
FGDs. In the beginning I encountered some problems with the asking of ‘leading’ questions when 
the interpreter felt that he was not getting the ‘right’ answers. However, my Bengali was good 
enough to be able to recognise this early on,  and after clarifying the need to be open to a range of 
responses to all research questions, this problem was largely overcome. Another issue was that I 
often felt that I was not given the ‘whole story’ of what respondents said, with the interpreter 
often assuming much information was ‘irrelevant’; again I hope that clarification early in the 
research process addressed this to some extent.   
 
In Nepal, I was following the NAPA thematic working groups all of whom had excellent English so 
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between us we were able to communicate well and I was able to focus on what was going on. 
Observing their FGDs and interviews was challenging as I did not have an official interpreter, 
however I was almost always assisted by a different member of the field team, again 
acknowledging that some information would have been ‘lost in translation’.  
 
The issue of translation was raised again when it came to conducting discourse analysis on the 
transcribed interviews and FGD discussions. I tried to address this by ensuring that coding 
categories were basic, broad and flexible, to avoid miscategorising information.  Where I was 
unclear I asked for assistance from Bangladeshi or Nepali friends or colleagues about what terms 
actually meant. Asking a few people meant that I was fairly confident in the interpretations I 
arrived at.  
 
Another challenge I faced particularly during my fieldwork in Bangladesh, was that of being female 
and also a foreigner. On the issue of gender, Bangladesh is predominantly Muslim and I had to 
ensure that I was respectful of expectations for women to behave conservatively particularly in my 
field sites. I wore a salwar kameez and a headscarf at all times and ensured I was sensitive to other 
gendered expectations.  At the same time, I also faced the challenge of having a male interpreter, 
which may have impacted on the dynamics of FGDs and key informant interviews especially with 
women.  
 
It was also a challenge being a foreigner conducting research as my time in Noakhali raised many 
expectations of future donor investments, and I often felt people responded to questions with this 
in mind. I was careful to repeatedly state that this was a research project and that it would not be 
followed up with investment. However, I also acknowledged that people were giving up time to 
participate. As such I ensured that food and tea was provided including for respondents families, 
and tried to ensure that the timings of FGDs did not coincide with other commitments of 
respondents so as to minimise the costs of participation (see box 2.3) 
 
Box 2.3: Sampling challenges 
Internationally  
Selection of key informants at the international level was limited by time and availability of interviewees. 
The combination of attendance at the UNFCCC meetings and other international conferences on adaptation 
meant that I was able to encounter a diverse group of international adaptation actors.  However, the 
availability of different actors was limited by time,  and also interest. This may have added some bias to the 
kinds of responses: for example, those actors who wanted to contest a “dominant” adaptation paradigm 
had more interest in speaking to me. Those who may not have seen this as a relevant issue had less interest 
in being interviewed.  
 
In Bangladesh  
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At the national level in Bangladesh, I was able to access NAPA sectoral working group members by 
contacting them directly in Dhaka (their contact details are presented in the NAPA document itself). While 
all interviewees were busy, I managed to interview most NAPA sectoral working group members at least 
twice by being responsive to their availability. Over time, I developed a good relationship with many of the 
actors involved, who became interested in the study and welcomed the opportunity to air some of the 
frustrations they had experienced along the way.  
 
Gaining access to government stakeholders was more challenging. The MOEF members were extremely 
busy and also, at first, cautious about being interviewed on the process. My connections through the 
Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS) who hosted me for much of my time in Dhaka helped 
significantly in getting me introductions to MOEF members. However, I had to be opportunistic at getting 
Government time, ensuring I could be ready at short notice when they were available for interview. This 
meant a great deal of time spent in Dhaka and a number of cancelled appointments. Many of the interviews 
that were carried out took place in cars as I was able to accompany Government members as they travelled 
to and from much more important engagements!  
 
In Noakhali, many sampling challenges were encountered. Noakhlai is divided into six Upzilas (sub-district 
levels) and five municipalities (see chapter 5 for more details). Two Upzilas were selected as sites for 
detailed field work, Noakhali Sadar and Subarnochar. These Upzilas were selected because they were cited 
as the two priority sites for implementation of the NAPA priority project.   
 
Within each Upzila, “key informant” interviewees were selected based on recommendations from the local 
facilitating NGO, SDC, who were kind enough to link me with local government officials, other NGOs in the 
area, and key community-based organisations. This method of sampling of course carried limitations 
because those interviewees initially selected were those who were linked to SDC. However, with each 
interview I also asked about other “key informants” who should be interviewed in the area, and stayed in 
Noakhali long enough to be able to follow-up on all suggestions. This ensured I had adequate breadth of KI 
interviewees and was not only relying on one source for recommendations.  
 
HH survey selection was done according to “livelihood zones” that were fairly clearly marked in each Upzilla. 
This was on the suggestion of local district officers who suggested that I should ensure I get a balance of 
fishing and agricultural livelihoods in my sample. Within each livelihood zone, HH selection was random 
based on availability of HHs for interview. However, I was careful to ensure a balance of women (and a 
representation of female headed households) as well as landless. I was guided to these households by other 
members of the community.  
 
FGDs were facilitated by the local NGO who was helping me to facilitate my trip. This meant that selection of 
FGD discussants may have been biased towards those who were familiar to the NGO. I made specific 
requests to try to reach out to those who were not part of NGO programmes, and who were known within 
the community to be among the poorest and most excluded. Although by definition these were also the 
least well-known individuals in the community, after some ‘digging around’ people seemed to agree on who 
those individuals were and where they resided.   
 
To encourage attendance, FGDs were held at a time of day to minimise the inconvenience of participation 
for attendees. I gathered information about what different times would suit different groups and arranged 
FGDs accordingly. Food and tea was provided for FGD participants and, during the women-only FGD, for 
their families. This is because one of the major activities that women were taking time away from to 
participants was food preparation for their families.  
 
In Nepal 
 
In Nepal, the sampling challenge was different. As I was working within the Ministry of Environment, I was 
constantly in contact with key government, NGO, donor and multilateral agencies. This represented an 
extremely wide range of actors working on shaping climate change policy and discourse in Nepal. However, I 
had to actively seek out individuals who I was not in frequent contact such as those from other Ministries 
within Government or other members of civil society to ensure I got a balanced view of climate change 
policy in general, and NAPA in particular, and that my view was not biased only interviewing actors directly 
engaged in the process.  
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At the field level in Nepal my sampling approach was limited to that taken by the NAPA team. However, the 
Nepal study in this thesis examines the approach to fieldwork taken under the NAPA as the subject of the 
study itself, rather than focusing on the outputs of the fieldwork.    
 
 
Research ethics 
 
In Nepal my dual role as a researcher and also a consultant gave me unprecedented access to the 
workings of the NAPA team and the internal processes and politics of NAPA development. 
However, this also raised a range of complex ethical issues faced by many practitioners of active 
participatory observation. A key concern is that the researcher is open about their role and 
objectives as an observer of the processes in which they are participating. Earlier debates around 
the ethics of participatory observation centred around a contrast between the participant-as-
observer (playing an open observing role), and the complete participant (in which the role of 
observer is disguised (Bulmer, 1982:251).  
 
These concerns were taken on board from the outset of the case study research.   The main 
purpose of my presence in the NAPA team was to support the NAPA team, but my identity as a 
researcher was made clear from the beginning. Indeed, a prerequisite of providing support to the 
NAPA team was that I would also be acting in my capacity as a researcher and would be able to 
use material and information gleaned during the process for the purposes of this thesis. This 
approach yields information that otherwise would not have been available directly in such detail 
had more conventional research methods been used. However careful planning and an open and 
honest approach to the study ensured that this was an advantage for the purposes of this study, 
rather than presenting a conflict of interest.   
 
A second issue to raise is that my dual role as part of the NAPA team and also independent 
researcher, may have influenced the actual process of the NAPA development. My NAPA 
colleagues were aware of the nature of my study, and so may have been keen to ensure that my 
research showed Nepal to take a ‘more inclusive’ approach; further, I inevitably shared the lessons 
from my work in Bangladesh with colleagues, so my presence cannot be ruled out as a variable in 
the circumstances that may or may not have resulted in Nepal taking a more inclusive approach to 
adaptation policy making in Bangladesh. This potential influence is acknowledged in this study, 
and is incorporated into the discussion of results.  
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Finally, my role as both NAPA team member and researcher may have influenced the objectivity of 
my data analysis. I am aware of this and have made every effort to ensure objectivity in my 
research reporting. I nevertheless recognise this as a potential issue.  
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Chapter 3: Understanding Adaptation10 
 
“Adaptation’ has been taken out of the epistemological waste basket where it has lain as an 
unacceptable, even politically incorrect idea…The downside is that it may be overwhelmed by its 
own popularity and all meaning slowly leak out of it”.  
Burton, 1994:14.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate why the tensions between risks that have come to be 
defined as ‘local’ and ‘global’, matter for the effective and inclusive governance of adaptation. This 
chapter will take forward the themes introduced in chapter one around the politics of risk and 
expertise, and apply them to the governance of adaptation.   
 
First, this chapter will draw on debates from natural hazards and development literatures to 
explore the multiple interpretations of “vulnerability” and “adaptation”, that have given rise to 
different (and in some cases conflicting) perspectives on what constitutes climate change risk, and 
what adaptation to this risk looks like.  
 
Second, this chapter combines a review of the literature around climate change policy, with new 
data gleaned from the detailed analysis of climate change and development texts, and key-
informant interviews. This analysis examines how different approaches to climate change risk have 
been operationalised in the adaptation governance architecture, to address the questions:  
 What is the evidence that conflicting definitions of risk across scales inhibit inclusive 
adaptation policy making?; and 
Under what circumstances is local inclusiveness achieved under international climate change 
policy frameworks? This analysis looks at both at the formal climate change governance 
framework for the UNFCCC and its associated bodies; and also at development institutions which 
have started to take up adaptation as a policy agenda.  
 
 
3.2 What is adaptation? Dissecting the anatomy.  
 
“Adaptation” is now well established as a legitimate response to climate change; yet, there is little 
consensus within the climate change and development community over what adaptation means, 
and how it should be opertaionalised (Ayers and Dodman, 2010; Doria et al., 2009; Füssel, 2007; 
                                               
10
 Sections of this chapter have been adapted for inclusion in Ayers, 2009; and Ayers and Dodman, 2010. 
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Smit et al., 2000 ). In an influential paper for adaptation discourse and policy, “An anatomy of 
Adaptation to Climate Change”, Barry Smit and colleagues  (2000), suggest that while there is 
general agreement that interpretations of adaptation include,  
 
Adjustments in a system in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli … [different 
interpretations] also indicate differences in scope, application and interpretation of the 
term adaptation. (Smit et al.,2000:228).  
 
Variations include “adaptation to what?” Which can refer to simply climate, climate variability, or 
climate change; “Who or what adapts?” Which might be people, social or economic sectors, 
processes, or system structures; and how does adaptation occur? For example is adaptation 
planned or reactive, and what is the related outcome? (Ibid). This section will review the various 
definitions of adaptation from both the biological and social sciences. Particular attention will be 
paid to the assumptions (related to vulnerability, resilience, and adaptive capacity) that 
underscore different perspectives on adaptation, and the implications these have for how 
adaptation is understood and analysed.  
 
 
Defining adaptation 
 
The term “adaptation’ has been applied to both biological and social cultural systems. The Oxford 
English Dictionary (OED)  provides the following definitions: “Organic modification by which an 
organism or species becomes adapted to its environment”; and, “The process of modifying a thing 
so as to suit new conditions”.  
OED provide the following example of the latter definitions:“Man has unrivalled powers of self-
adaptation” (Kingsely, 1846, cited OED, www.oed.com).  
 
Adaptation is therefore a process of change in response to changing circumstances or situations, 
to become better suited to those new circumstances or situations. A central concept is one of a 
change in state (or behaviour) that takes place in response to a change in environment. Several 
authors have drawn parallels between biological and social adaptations in relation to climate 
change (cf. Burton, 1994; Kates, 2009; Moench, 2009; Schipper and Burton, 2009), which have 
been influential for understanding how adaptation to environmental risks could occur. For 
example, in the Origin of Species, Charles Darwin introduces the theory of “natural selection”, in 
which certain characteristics of organisms make them more likely to survive and reproduce, thus 
increasing the prevalence of those characteristics in the next generation. A change in the 
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environment brings about new ‘selection pressures’ that favour certain characteristics over 
others. Those organisms that have favourable characteristics in any particular environment are 
‘better adapted’, more likely to survive, and reproduce.  
 
Applying these principles to social systems, Moench (2009) suggests that, on a conceptual level, 
‘selective pressures’ exist that can drive adaptation. Moench argues that the nature of selective 
pressures in social systems and the ability of different entities (households, individuals, 
businesses) to adapt to them vary greatly. Entities that exist in contexts where they have access to 
either key financial or other resources, or key inputs (for example labour, energy, water, 
agricultural) can, 
 
Evolve in ways that maximise their ability to capture, minimise dependency on, or make 
efficient use of scarce inputs. Often this evolution involves proactive (agency driven) 
courses of action undertaken by individual agents in response to opportunities and 
constraints emerging from the selection pressures encountered.  (Moench, 2009:252). 
 
Such comparisons between biological and social adaptations are a convenient conceptual tool for 
understanding adaptive processes; however, they are also rather forced. Significantly, ‘natural 
selection’ is not directional; organisms do not ‘plan’ for or ‘manage’’ adaptations. Genetic 
mutations that mean one organism is better suited to an environment than another, are random 
and not pre-selected or accrued in anticipation of a changing environment. Biological adaptation 
therefore cannot be planned or proactive.  
 
By contrast, in social adaptation the capacity to respond is not ‘inherent’ but, as Moench indicates, 
a function of the social, political, economic and cultural circumstances that mean one has the 
resources to respond, and then chooses to do so in a particular way. Further, choices of how to 
respond are rarely influenced by calculations of the number of children a person wishes to have; 
this is another social choice that may be equally mediated by social, economic and cultural 
circumstances, but the two are not necessarily related. So, adaptive choices made by people do 
not necessarily result in more offspring surviving to the next generation; indeed, more affluent 
societies tend to show a preference for smaller family sizes.  
 
Acknowledging the biological evolutionary roots of the term ‘adaptation’ is, however, useful in 
some respects. For example, it highlights the importance of the characteristics of organisms in 
determining their capacity to adapt to a changing environment. This concept of ‘adaptive capacity’ 
will be returned to later in this chapter. However, drawing a distinction between biological and 
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social adaptation is important, not least because of the connotations of ‘social Darwinism’ and the 
associated social philosophy of ‘survival of the fittest’ for social governance (Burton, 1994). 
Schipper and Burton (2009) suggest that so negative were the connotations of ‘adaptation’ in the 
context of the social sciences, that Gilbert White rejected the term in favour of ‘human 
adjustment’, in his pioneering book Human Adjustment to Floods (White, 1945).  
 
Schipper and Burton suggest that in the years that followed, the concept of human adjustment 
became associated with other expressions such as ‘coping’, ‘risk management’, ‘vulnerability 
reduction’ and ‘resilience’. The authors state that it was not until 1992 that the text of the United 
Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), drafted at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 
settled once again on the word ‘adaptation’ (Schipper and Burton, 2009:1). Since then, adaptation 
to climate change has been interpreted in a variety of different ways. Box 3.1 presents some 
examples from the range of definitions that have emerged for climate change adaptation.  
 
Box 3.1 : Definitions of adaptation to climate change 
Source: Adapted from Smit et al., 2000: An anatomy of adaptation to climate change.  
 
Adaptation to climate is the process through which people reduce the adverse effects of climate on their 
health and well-being, and take advantage of the opportunities that their climatic environment provides. 
(Burton, 1992).  
 
Adaptation involves adjustments to enhance the viability of social and economic activities and to reduce 
their vulnerability to climate, including its current variability and extreme events as well as longer term 
climate change. (Smit, 1993).  
 
The term adaptation means any adjustment, whether passive, reactive or anticipatory, that is proposed 
as a means for ameliorating the anticipated adverse consequences associated with climate change. 
(Stakhiv, 1993).  
 
Adaptation to climate change includes all adjustments in behaviour or economic structure that reduce 
the vulnerability of society to changes in the climate system. (Smith et., al., 1996) 
 
Adaptability refers to the degree to which adjustments are possible in practices, processes, or structures 
of systems to projected or actual changes of climate. Adaptation can be spontaneous or planned, and 
can be carried out in response to or in anticipation of change in conditions. (Watson et al., 1997).  
 
 
As Smit et al., point out, all of the above definitions refer to adjustments in response to, or in light 
of, climatic stimuli. However, there are differences in scope and application; for example, 
returning to the earlier set of questions laid out by Smit et al., adaptation to what? Is interpreted 
as climate change (Watson et al., 1997), climatic variability, or just to climate (Smit, 1993); as well 
as in response to adverse effects (Stakhiv, 1993), vulnerabilities, or opportunities (Burton 1992 
and Smith et al., 1996).   
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These different definitions of climate change reflect the different ways in which global 
environmental changes can be interpreted more generally. For example, Turner et al., (1990) 
suggest that there are “two types of global environmental change”; “systemic global change”, that 
operates through the major changes in the geo-sphere/biosphere; hence climate change is the 
result of a globally emitted greenhouse gasses that will have a global impact as a direct 
consequence of these gasses. The second is “cumulative global change”, which represents the 
global through the accumulation of localised changes; in terms of adaptation, this perspective 
suggests that the impacts of climate change will be felt locally and should be managed locally. In 
terms of the definitions above, Watson’s definition draws from a systemic perspective; adaptation 
is a response to the specific impacts of climate change that are the result of global greenhouse 
gasses. Burton, on the other hand, takes a cumulative approach; the impacts of climate change 
will be felt differentially at the local level, and should be managed as such (Burton, 1992).11  
 
Thus, as Pelling (2008) suggests, it depends who you ask; how risk is understood depends on the 
risk paradigm of the person doing the defining. For example, in the study by Doria et al., (2009) 
discussed in chapter 1, which uses “expert elicitation” to develop a definition of “successful 
adaptation”, the authors state that “expert respondents”12 coalesced around the following 
definition based on risk and vulnerability: 
 
Successful adaptation is any adjustment that reduces the risks associated with climate 
change, or vulnerability to climate change impacts, to a predetermined level, without 
compromising economic, social, and environmental sustainability.  (Doria et al., 
2009:810).  
 
However, the process of arriving at this raised many issues among respondents. For example, 
Doria et al., noted that there were significant differences in the backgrounds of respondents who 
felt that ‘mitigation’ should be included in the definition of adaptation (only 50% of economists 
felt mitigation was relevant, but 80% of environmental scientists thought this was). Respondents 
also questioned who should determine the “predetermined level”, and how it could be possible to 
ensure that any adaptive action taken by any one social unit, did not compromise the economic, 
social and environmental sustainability of another (Doria et al., 2009).  
 
                                               
11
 Although Burton has gone on to point out that the “adaptation is local mantra” is decreasingly valid as climate 
change impacts, and ways of governing them, cross localities (Burton, 2008).   
12
 Doria et al., (2009) state the “expert group” was identified using a sampling procedure to identify experts working 
with or studying climate change adaptations. 54% of the group described themselves as environmental economists, 
27% as environmental scientists, and 19% in other occupations.  
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By extension, defining adaptation also depends on who the intended “adaptors” are (Doria et al., 
2009:816), which in return may be constrained by the definition. For example, a focus on climate 
impacts would point towards those most exposed to climate hazards as the targets of adaptation 
support; whilst more vulnerability-focused criteria may target ‘the poorest’ as ‘the most 
vulnerable’. And indeed, who gives “the experts” the right to decide, and how are these “experts” 
selected? The Delphi approach taken by Doria et al., is one possible approach; other influential 
groups of “definers” include the IPCC; the Secretariat of the UNFCCC; those financing or managing 
the adaptation finding streams who may lay claims to a rite to decide how their money is spent.  
Yet as discussed in chapter one and will be further elaborated in section 3.3, all “expert bodies” 
hold their own assumptions about risk, and implications for inclusion and exclusion. The key point 
is that any definitions of adaptation, and its consequences for how adaptation is operationalised, 
are highly politicised decisions that are not taken based on neutral assessments of vulnerability.  
 
Thus, while there is a seemingly broad consensus that adaptation to climate change, should 
reduce vulnerability to climate change risks; assumptions around “adaptation to what?” differ 
widely and depend on how vulnerability is understood, and therefore what is meant by climate 
change ‘risk’.  
 
 
Vulnerability, resilience, and adaptive capacity: Insights from disaster risk reduction 
 
The term “vulnerability” is equally loaded with conflicting interpretations that have implications 
for how adaptation – or ‘vulnerability reduction’ - is realised. The field of disaster risk reduction 
has paid a great deal of attention to defining vulnerability and adaptation to hazards, and the 
relationship between them. Drawing on these insights, “vulnerability” is broadly understood as 
“being prone to or susceptible to damage or injury” (Blakie et al. 1994:9); but beyond this, 
vulnerability analysis is often polarised into hazard-risk, or social constructivist frameworks (Ribot, 
2010).  
 
From a ‘hazard-risk’ perspective, people are vulnerable when they are exposed to a hazard. 
“Hazard” here refers to biophysical risks, for example in the case of climate change, rising sea 
levels, drought, increased frequency of storms of cyclones. A hazard-risk perspective takes the 
hazard as the starting point of vulnerability analysis, and targets vulnerability reduction strategies 
specifically at the hazard in question. Vulnerability is therefore taken as a function of the extent to 
which a system is exposed to a hazard (Watson et al., 1997). Such hazard-specific approaches to 
risk management have in many cases been successful in terms of saving lives and reducing 
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property damage in light of ‘natural’ hazards. Handmer (2009) points to the success stories of 
shelters built in response to sea flooding that have saved thousands of lives in Orissa, India 
(Sparrow, 2001).   
 
However, Handmer also points out that the success of hazard-specific interventions depends a 
great deal on both adequate resources and appropriate governance arrangements to channel 
these resources. Handmer suggests that such measures often do not tackle the ‘underlying causes’ 
of vulnerability – why people need such interventions, why they are so exposed to the hazard in 
the first place. As Blakie et al., (1994) point out, it is social systems that create the conditions in 
which hazards have an impact on various societies and different groups within a society. For 
example, the Netherlands and Bangladesh are ‘exposed’ to a similar hazard of sea-level rise under 
climate change, both being flat and low-lying countries. Yet, the Netherlands has an extensive and 
well-developed dyke network to protect its coastal shoreline, while Bangladesh, being one of the 
Least Developed Countries, does not have the resources or capacity to build adequate sea 
defences to protect its population in the same way.  
 
An alternative ‘social constructivist’ model of vulnerability has emerged from the food insecurity 
and natural hazards literature. In their seminal work, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's 
Vulnerability and Disasters, Blakie et al., argue that biophysical hazards do not present a uniform 
risk to everyone; vulnerability is determined not by the nature of the hazard, but by the social, 
economic, and political processes that determine how hazards effect people. The authors argue 
that “vulnerability” involves a combination of: 
 
Factors that determine the degree to which someone’s life and livelihood is put at risk by 
a discrete and identifiable event in nature or society…*key characteristics include+ class, 
caste, ethnicity, gender, disability, age, or seniority. (Blakie et al., 1994:9).  
 
This definition of vulnerability differs significantly from a hazard-risk approach; the ‘risk’ is not 
determined by the hazard itself, but by the social factors that make people vulnerable to that 
hazard. Interestingly, Kelly and Adger (2009) emphasise the role of social factors in determining 
vulnerability by tracing back the linguistic roots of the term “vulnerable” to “vulnerabilis”, the 
term used by the Roman to describe a wounded soldier ‘vulnerable’ to further attack. In this 
classic sense, vulnerabilis is defined primarily by the prior damage done to the soldier (the existing 
wound), and not by the future stress (the risk of further attack); thus, by extension, a person is 
vulnerable not because of the risk of future stress, but because of their capacity to manage that 
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stress (Kelly and Adger, 2009:163). The authors therefore reinforce Blakie et al.’s interpretation of 
vulnerability, defining it as: 
 
The ability or inability of individuals and social groups to respond to, in the sense of cope 
with, recover from or adapt to, any external stress placed on theory livelihoods and well-
being. (ibid).  
 
This interpretation of vulnerability that places an emphasis on the characteristics of a person and 
their situation to cope with an existing or expected hazard, is closely tied in with the concept of 
‘adaptive capacity’. Adaptive capacity has been defined as: 
 
The ability of a community (or country) to adapt to climate change…the inherent or 
existing capacity of a community or country as a whole to cope with climate impacts.  
(Huq and Reid, 2009:315).  
 
From this perspective, adaptive capacity is the inverse of vulnerability; the greater the adaptive 
capacity, the less vulnerable people will be to climate change risks, and the easier they will be able 
to respond. Similarly, Anderson and Woodrow discuss “capability”, as the ability to protect one’s 
home, family, and community, and to re-establish one’s livelihood.  Importantly, underlying 
adaptive capacity is not something that has been developed in response to climate change risks; 
going back to the earlier comparison between biological adaptation, and adaptation to climate 
change, adaptive capacity is not directional. However, hazards that may or may not be associated 
with climate change expose areas of low adaptive capacity. Thus, enabling adaptation to climatic 
and non-climatic risks means paying attention to and addressing the factors that undermine 
adaptive capacity. From this perspective,  
 
[In supporting adaptation] we need to consider what is undermining adaptive capacity or 
making people more vulnerable. Without doing this we may be attempting to provide a 
solution to the wrong problem. (Handmer, 2009:218).  
 
These concepts of adaptive capacity and capability are underpinned by ‘resilience’: the more 
resilient a unit, the greater its capacity to adapt, and so the less vulnerable to any existing or 
impending hazard; by extension, if adaptation is about reducing vulnerability, then adaptation 
needs to improve adaptive capacity in order to build resilience to climatic, and other, hazards.  
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However, like ‘vulnerability’, both ‘resilience and ‘adaptive capacity’ have also been used by 
different actors with varying degrees of focus on hazard-risks and social-vulnerability.  For 
example, in their paper Building Resilience, Dodman et al., (2009) show that when applied in 
engineering, resilience means the ability of a material to return to its original state after being 
subjected to a force; similarly in ecology it often means the time taken for a system to return to a 
state of equilibrium. Both of these meanings have been applied to human systems, in an analysis 
that focuses on the ability of individuals, households, and nations to return to ‘normal’ after 
disrupting events. The legacy of these definitions can also be seen in the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC, that defines resilience as, 
 
The ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances while retaining the 
same basic structure and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-organisation, and the 
capacity to adapt to stress and change. (IPCC 2007:880) 
 
But, as Dodman et al., ask, is resilience of this type really desirable? Is adaptation simply a return 
to the “same basic structure” in which those who are vulnerable to climatic hazards still vulnerable 
to future hazards? Indeed, other critics have argued that such strategies are more ‘coping’ than 
‘adaptation’ (Davies, 1993; Schipper and Burton, 2009). As Davies (1993) points out, ‘coping’ is 
based on short-term responses to environmental stresses that eventually prove to be 
unsustainable, through the depletion of assets, ultimately increasing long-term vulnerability and 
potentially proving ‘maladaptive’.13 With this in mind, the Dodman et al., suggest it is more 
appropriate to consider resilience as a process, as a way of functioning, that enables not only 
coping with added shocks and stresses, but also addressing the myriad challenges that constrain 
lives and livelihoods (Dodman et al., 2010).  
 
 
Frameworks for integrating hazard-risks and social-vulnerability approaches 
 
A ‘risk hazards’ approach and a ‘social-vulnerability’ approach describe two aspects of 
vulnerability: the hazard itself (or exposure to that hazard); and the factors that make a person 
vulnerable to that hazard. This is summarised by Blakie et al., 1994:  
 
                                               
13
 Sattherthwaite et al.,  (2009) defines Maladaptations as: “actions or investments that enhance rather than reduce 
vulnerability to impacts of climate change. This can include the shifting of vulnerability from one social group or 
place to another; it also includes shifting risk to future generations and/or to ecosystems and ecosystem services. In 
many cities, investments being made are in fact maladaptive rather than adaptive. Removing maladaptations is 
often the first task to be addressed, even before new adaptations.”  
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There is no risk if there are hazards but vulnerability is nil; or if there is a vulnerable 
population but no hazard event (Blakie et al., 1994:21).  
 
For example, Füssel and Klein, state that vulnerability to climate change has: 
 
An external dimension, which is represented…by the ‘exposure’ of a system to climate 
variations, as well as an internal dimension, which comprises its ‘sensitivity’ and its 
‘adaptive capacity’ to these stressors.  (Füssel and Klein, 2006:306).  
 
Some authors from the fields of natural hazards and also climate change adaptation have 
therefore called for a more integrated model of vulnerability assessment that links the social-
constructivist models of the factors that determine vulnerability, with the hazard-risk concepts of 
the threat of biophysical risks on social systems (Blakie et al., 1994; Füssel and Klein, 2006;Ribot, 
2010 ).  
 
One model for integration discussed by Blakie et al., (1994) is the “Pressure And Release” (PAR) 
model. The basis for PAR, is that a disaster is at the intersection of two opposing forces: processes 
that generate social vulnerability on the one side; and the physical exposure to the hazard on the 
other. If either one force is increased, the pressure builds up and the severity of the impact on 
people – the ‘risk’ – is correspondingly exacerbated.  Targeting actions at reducing vulnerability 
would therefore release the pressure, and reduce the risk of the hazard.  
 
However, as Blakie et al., (1994) point out, such models create a false separation of hazards from 
the social system, and the outcomes of such analyses depend entirely on how boundaries are 
drawn around the hazard-aspects and vulnerability-aspects of the system under analysis (Ribot, 
2010).  Instead, Blakie et al., suggest that hazards are deeply intertwined with human systems, 
affecting the patterns of livelihoods and assets that in turn determine vulnerability to hazards. To 
avoid drawing such false dichotomies between ‘hazards’ and ‘vulnerability’, Blakie et al., propose a 
livelihoods-based framework, which has since been taken up and further developed by a range of 
scholars in the natural hazards literature (see Cannon, 2000; Adger et al., 2009; Ribot, 2010; Sen, 
1999 ). By livelihoods, the authors mean: 
 
The command an individual, family, or other social group has over an income and/or 
bundles of resources that can be used or exchanged to satisfy its needs. This may involve 
information, cultural knowledge, social networks, legal rights, as well as tools, land, or 
other physical resources. (Blakie et al., 1994:9).  
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Blakie et al., further develop a livelihoods approach by emphasising the importance of “access” to 
resources  and assets that determine livelihoods, defining “access” as:  
 
The ability of an individual, family, group, class or community to use resources which are 
directly required to secure a livelihood. Access to these resources is always based on 
social and economic relations, usually including the social relations of production, gender, 
ethnicity, status, age…less access to resources, in the absence of other compensations to 
provide safe conditions, leads to increased vulnerability.  (Blakie et al., 1994: 48).  
 
For example, Pelling and High (2005) and Pelling (2008) highlight the role of social capital14 as a 
key asset that people are able to draw upon in times of stress to protect their livelihoods. Where 
social capital is weak, the authors argues this can impact directly on livelihood recovery. Pelling 
(2008) cites the example of the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, in which widespread looting, on top 
of disaster losses, has been used to explain the slow rate of formal labour market re-entry in 
Nicaragua and Honduras (Delany andShrader, 2000; cited Pelling, 2008:7). Social capital is also 
vital for enabling access to other assets, for example strong social ties enable people to call on 
others for assistance such as loans or shelter to prevent them having to ‘cash-in’ material capitals 
that would be essential for livelihood recovery; strong social engagement with formal and 
informal governance structures to access social safety nets.  
 
Building on livelihoods and asset-based approaches, scholars from DRR and development studies 
have described an “entitlements” approach, (Adger and Kelly, 1999; Kelly and Adger, 2009; Sen, 
1990), which describes the extent to which individuals, groups, or communities, are ‘entitled’ to 
make use of resources. This entitlement in turn determines the ability of that particular population 
to cope with or adapt to stress.  Both ‘livelihoods’ or ‘entitlements’ approaches analyse the 
underlying sensitivity and resilience of individuals, households, livelihoods systems, or, sometimes, 
linked human-biophysical systems. From this perspective, vulnerability is the risk that a 
household’s commodity bundles will fail to buffer them against hunger, dislocation, or other losses 
(Ribot, 2010). Vulnerability is therefore lower when livelihoods are adequate and sustainable. 
Kelly and Adger (2009) suggest the factors that shape livelihoods and entitlements include 
poverty; inequality; and institutional context (see box 3.2).  
 
 
                                               
14
 Social capital is the power that exists in myriad social relationships and is normalised through and 
contingent on social context (Pelling and High, 2005:2).  
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Box 3.2: Key characteristics that shape livelihoods and entitlements  
Source: Adapted from Kelly and Adger, 2009:166.  
 
Poverty is directly related to access to resources and the process of marginalisation (though wealth itself is 
not a guarantor of security as resources are mediated through property rights and so on) 
 
Inequality within a population can heighten collective vulnerability, all other things being equal. Greater 
inequality may be associated with a reduction in communal resource allocation and in the pooling of risk 
and other social phenomena. There are also strong links between inequality and a lack of diversification of 
income courses as well as with poverty. 
  
Institutional context. Poverty, the use of resources, and the distribution of wealth, are all institutionally 
determined. For example, formal political institutions devise and implement the legal enforcement of 
property rights, and all economic structures can be viewed as dependent on the institutional structure that 
frames them.  
 
Assessing „risk‟ and doing adaptation 
 
The different frameworks for understanding risk determine how vulnerability is analysed, and how 
adaptations to risk are assessed. A hazard-risks model for climate change risk takes climate change 
impacts as the starting point of vulnerability analysis, giving rise to the ‘impacts-based’ to 
adaptation introduced in chapter one. An ‘impacts-based’ approach specifically seeks to address 
the existing and future impacts of climate change. An impacts-based approach is often the basis of 
‘planned adaptation’, which is a proactive response to anticipated climate change, in response to 
externally generated information about specific climate change impacts that is used to plan for 
and review the suitability of current and planned adaptive practices, policies and infrastructure 
(ISET, 2009).   
 
Conceptually, a ‘purely’ impacts-based approach to adaptation would give rise to “stand-alone 
adaptation” (Ayers and Dodman, 2010), or “discrete adaptations” (McGray et al.,2007): actions 
specifically targeted at climate change impacts only, for example coastal infrastructure in response 
to sea level-rise; irrigation systems in response to increasing drought, with no bearing on risks that 
stem from any other factors. In practice, however, an impacts-based approach does acknowledge 
some role for social vulnerability in shaping risks, because it is practically impossible to separate 
out completely a hazard from its context. As such, the starting point for analysis is the climate 
change hazard, and social vulnerability analysis is one of a number of factors assessed further 
down the line, which determine the extent of the impact (see figure 3.1).  As Ayers and Dodman 
suggest, an ‘impacts-based’ approach to integrating adaptation and livelihoods approaches can be 
understood as “adaptation plus development”: The role of livelihoods in vulnerability is 
acknowledged; but ‘adaptation’ is an additional need to already existing development needs, 
caused by the ‘additional’ stressors of climate change on development.   
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Figure 3.1: Impact analysis approach to risk assessment 
Source: Ribot, 2010 
 
 
 
This approach to risk assessment requires information about the current and expected nature of 
climate change risk; and the additional risk climate change presents to existing vulnerabilities. As 
shown in chapter one, an impacts-based risk analysis requires specific technical and externally 
generated information and expertise on existing and future climate change impacts.  
 
On the other hand, a livelihoods model takes social vulnerability as the starting point for any 
impact analysis. So it is these underlying factors that would need to be assessed, analysed, and 
addressed in order to reduce vulnerability to climate change and other stresses (see figure 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.2: Vulnerability analysis approach to risk assessment 
Source: Ribot, 2010 
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As described in chapter one, assessing the factors that make people vulnerable requires a more 
participatory approach to risk analysis, in order to understand patterns and constraints of resource 
entitlements and access to these. Many scholars have pointed to the importance of understanding 
“autonomous adaptations” as part of adaptation analysis. Autonomous adaptations are actions 
that people would be expected to take in response to changing environmental stresses regardless 
of external (financial or technical) assistance; ‘what people do anyway’. Adger et al., (2009) discuss 
a ‘paradox’ that although people in developing countries are cast as ‘victims’ of climate change, in 
the past they have shown the greatest resilience to floods and droughts, and have coped with 
these climatic challenges. The authors argue:  
 
Since climate is inherently variable for quite natural reasons, human societies have always 
and everywhere had to develop coping strategies in the face of unwelcome variations 
including climate or weather extremes (Adger et al., 2009:296).  
 
The authors therefore call for a new research agenda for adaptation that builds on existing coping 
strategies, and strengthens these in relation to climate change impacts. 
 
Outcomes of a livelihoods-based risk analysis would inevitably involve adaptation interventions 
that overlap strongly with development approaches. Burton (2004) suggests that analysing 
vulnerable communities would reveal an existing “adaptation deficit”, which is the existing 
capacity of many vulnerable countries and groups to cope with and adapt to existing climate risks. 
Burton suggests that any climate change adaptation programme would need to reduce this deficit 
to increase people’s resilience to climatic variation more generally, before they can adapt to 
future climatic changes. Such insights have led some scholars to conclude that much adaptation 
simply represents a practical means of achieving sustainable development. As stated by Huq and 
Ayers (2008), 
 
Good (or sustainable) development (policies and practice) can (and often does) lead to 
building adaptive capacity. Doing adaptation to climate change often also means doing 
good (or sustainable) development (Huq and Ayers, 2008:52).     
 
For example, in relation to a case study of reducing the risk of storms and cyclone hazards for 
vulnerable groups in Vietnam, Kelly and Adger (2009: 180) propose that possible adaptive 
outcomes from a social-vulnerability analysis might include: making poverty reduction a priority 
(bearing in mind the need to also address issues of access); risk spreading through income 
diversification; and addressing land and common property management rights. Such interventions 
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could well be part of a development programme irrespective of climatic risks. Ayers and Dodman 
(2010) describe this development-based approach to doing adaptation, as “adaptation as 
development”: there is little distinction between vulnerability reduction measures undertaken for 
climate change versus those undertaken to fulfil basic development objectives.  
 
This latter perspective has been criticised by some climate change scholars who suggest that the 
role of hazards in defining risk could become too marginalised, proving problematic particularly for 
practical issues of governance and finance (as will be demonstrated later in this chapter) (Khris 
Ebi, IPCC, personal communication, February 2009). If climate change adaptation is simply good 
development, what makes it adaptation? Significantly, it is argued that much existing 
development will become unsustainable under changing climatic conditions, so ‘development as 
usual’ is not enough in light of a changing climate context. For example, where the rate of change 
or extent of climatic stress is unprecedented and new information or expertise is necessary; or 
where large-scale technological or infrastructural solutions may be required that are beyond the 
capacity of development institutions to manage. Undertaking ‘business as usual’ development that 
does not take into account potential climate change impacts on those interventions may prove 
maladaptive in the long term. For example, investing roads and communication infrastructure in 
coastal areas would encourage settlement in those areas; however, sea-level rise may mean that 
such settlements will untenable in the long term.   
 
Other scholars have argued that treating adaptation as development places too great an emphasis 
on autonomous adaptation strategies risks undermining the agenda for much needed additional 
support for adaptation. In relation to the claim that “poor people adapt anyway”, Kates argues;  
 
Yes, but with great difficulty and much pain…the social costs of adaptation have been 
enormous. (Kates, 2009:292)  
 
Burton argues that under climate change, the ‘adaptation deficit’ will be exacerbated; so although 
there is evidence to support claims that adapting to current climate variability will increase 
adaptive capacity to future climate change, existing adaptations still need to be ‘climate proofed’ 
against future eventualities.  
 
Following on, Manuel-Navarrete et al., (2009) suggest that attention is needed to what kinds of 
development and ‘development for whom’ need to be considered. The authors show that with the 
widely acknowledged need to integrate climate change and development, come assumptions 
about development trajectories that are often based on “monolithic claims about development 
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constructed from the status quo of global capitalism” (Manuel-Navarrete et al., 2009: 1). The 
authors suggest that approaches to integrating adaptation into development need to consider not 
only uncertain climate change futures, but also alternative development discourses that may give 
rise to different adaptation and development priorities for different groups.  
 
Thus, differing interpretations of ‘vulnerability’ translate into different approaches for assessing 
climate change risk, which in turn give rise to alternative approaches to adapting to that risk. Ayers 
and Dodman (2010) suggest that different perspectives on climate change risk have given rise to 
three broad approaches to adaptation: “stand-alone” adaptation, where ‘risk’ is interpreted as 
climate change, and adaptation targets specific climate change impacts only; “adaptation plus 
development”, where climate change impacts are the starting point of risk assessments, but the 
role of development in reducing vulnerability is acknowledged later as one of several other factors 
that are taken into consideration later in the risk assessment process; and finally, “adaptation as 
development”, where the vulnerability of livelihoods is the starting point of any impact analysis, 
and climate change is considered as one of many additional stressors.    
 
The following sections of this chapter will explore the implications of climate change vulnerability 
and risk discourses for the governance of adaptation. This section draws on the analysis of key 
informant interviews and documentation review to consider whether the interpretation of climate 
change risk under the UNFCCC and its associated mechanisms has had implications for the 
potential of the UNFCCC to address social vulnerability; and to be inclusive.  
 
 
3.3 Adaptation under Global Climate Change Governance  
 
First, I will explore how the adaptation discourse has evolved under the UNFCCC: 
 
The evolution of adaptation discourse in global climate change frameworks  
 
Over the last two decades adaptation has gained gradual prominence in both climate change 
science and policy alongside mitigation.  Huq and Toulmin (2006) suggests we may track this 
progress through three “eras” of climate change and development discourse, which run from 
1990s-2000; 2001-2007; and 2007 onwards. The first era is marked by the establishment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change by the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) and World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) tasked to evaluate the risk of climate 
change. The IPCC published its first report in 1990, which established climate change as a global, 
 87 
long-term environmental problem that necessitates action. This stimulated the creation of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted in 1992 at the Earth 
Summit. The UNFCCC sets the overall framework for intergovernmental efforts to manage climate 
change.  The “ultimate objective” of the UNFCCC is the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions to 
prevent “dangerous”15 climate change (see box 3.3). 
 
Box 3.3: The UNFCCC objectives 
Source: Article 2, UNFCCC, 1992 
 
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the 
Parties may adapt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a  level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” 
 
 
Schipper (2006) suggests that in the early years of the drafting of the Convention text, discussions 
of ‘adaptation’ were highly political, and the concept was initially sidelined in negotiations of how 
to manage climate change in favour of mitigation approaches. Adaptation was viewed as the 
‘defeatist’ option, an admission that mitigation would not be enough. Burton (1994) argues that 
engaging in discussions around adaptation might be seen to demonstrate a country’s lack of 
commitment to the mitigation agenda. Further, in the early days of high levels of uncertainty over 
the extent and rate of climate change, confirmation of the need to adapt was taken as a 
premature testament to the extent of the climate change problem, a level of certainty that did not 
exist at the time (Schipper, 2006). This early reluctance to commit to an agenda on adaptation is 
evidenced by the lack of any firm definition of adaptation in the Convention text.   
 
Adaptation is noted as a policy response to climate change in the UNFCCC, but relative to 
mitigation is paid scant attention (adaptation is mentioned only 5 times in the actual Convention 
text), and is variously associated with different aspects of climate change policy rather than as one 
coherent approach. Burton et al., (2002) suggest there are two main ways in which adaptation is 
discussed in the UNFCCC: First, in terms of how it can contribute to the ultimate objective of 
preventing dangerous climate change. In this respect, adaptations are hypothetical or assumed, 
and considered for their potential to shift the margin of what is considered ‘dangerous’ – i.e. the 
higher the adaptive capacity of a system, the higher the threshold of what could be considered 
‘dangerous’, and thus the less mitigation would be needed (Burton et al., 2002; Smithers and Smit, 
2009). Burton (2002) refers to this approach as “adaptation research for mitigation policy”.  
 
                                               
15
 A discussion on the implications of ‘dangerous climate change’ for adaptation can be found in chapter 1 
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The second way in which adaptation is discussed in the UNFCCC, is in relation to developing policy 
responses to assist developing countries in managing the impacts of climate change: “adaptation 
for adaptation policy” (Burton et al., 2002:147). Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC commits countries to 
formulate and implement measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change. Article 
4.4 of the UNFCCC commits developed countries that are Party to the UNFCCC to “assisting the 
developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change in meeting the costs of adaption to those effects” (UNFCCC, Article 4.4). Both these articles 
shift the emphasis from questions of ‘net’ climate change impacts (resulting from ‘trade-offs’ 
between mitigation and adaptation) towards policy-orientated questions about vulnerability, and 
how and where to deploy adaptation resources (Burton et al., 2002).  
 
At first glance, ‘adaptation for mitigation policy’ analyses would give rise to an impacts-based 
approach to assessing climate change risks; the key question here being how far can adaptation 
buffer the impacts of climate change and reduce the need for mitigation? Whilst ‘adaptation for 
adaptation policy’ seems to require vulnerability analyses: which countries are ‘particularly 
vulnerable’? What is the extent of their vulnerability and how can this be assessed?  
 
However, closer consideration of the way in which the text of the UNFCCC justifies the direction of 
funding streams for adaptation – from developed to ‘particularly vulnerable’ developing countries 
- shows that ‘adaptation for adaptation policy’ under the UNFCCC also gives rise to an impacts-
based approach to assessing climate risk. The UNFCCC sets out a principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibility” for managing the impacts of climate change, which is realised in 
Article 4.3 that commits developed countries to pledging money to the Convention Funds based 
on their capabilities and historical responsibility. By this principle, funding for adaptation should 
be ‘additional’ to development assistance, because climate change is an ‘additional’ burden, on 
top of development, that developing countries bear but are not responsible for creating. But, in 
order to fulfil this principle, adaptation itself must be taken as ‘additional’ to development: 
analysis is needed of the additional impacts of climate change on development, rather than of the 
drivers of vulnerability which, as shown above, are often taken as synonymous with development 
needs. So, ‘adaptation for adaptation policy’ also results in an impacts-based approach to climate 
risk assessment.  
 
The first ‘era’ also includes the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 
1997 at the third Conference of the Parties (COP 3) to the UNFCCC, and defines obligations for 
developed countries to commit to mitigation targets. However, as Adger et al.,(2009) highlight,  
the Kyoto Protocol and its related mechanisms have authority only to focus on environmental 
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impacts and adaptation to climate change. Adger et al., suggest that this narrow interpretation of 
adaptation as specific to climate impacts, creates a fundamental dilemma:  
 
The need for reductionist identification of the climate-related part of global social and economic 
trends, versus the desire to see climate change as another important dimension of global 
environmental threats to development.(Adger et al., 2009:307).  
 
It is the first ‘era’ of climate change governance that shapes the Adaptation Paradox. The second 
era began with the third report of the IPCC, which recognised climate change as a development 
problem. It was shown that the efforts to reduce GHGs had not been able to ‘solve’ climate 
change, so impacts would occur, and the developing countries and particularly the Least 
Developed Countries would be most vulnerable. Adaptation therefore began to be associated with 
developing country interests. Following the publication of the third assessment report, an agenda 
item taking up adaptation was introduced in the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice, and a work programme on adaptation was adopted.  
 
This was translated into policy at the seventh Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP7) 
held at Marrakech in Morocco in 2001 where the “Marrakech Accords” were established. These 
included three new funds, the “Marrakech Funds”: The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), 
established under the Convention, to support the 49 least developed countries to adapt to climate 
change, and initially used to support the design of National Adaptation Programmes of Action 
(NAPAs); the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) to support a number of climate change activities 
including mitigation and technology transfer, but intended to prioritise adaptation; and the Kyoto 
Protocol Adaptation Fund (AF) to support concrete adaptation projects in developing countries 
that are Party to the Protocol. This fund sits under the Kyoto Protocol and is financed from a levy 
on the Clean Development Mechanism. Decision 6 of the Marrakech Accords further requested 
that the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC with 
responsibility for the transfer of funds from developed to developing countries, should fund: 
 
...Pilot or demonstration projects to show how adaptation planning and assessment can 
be practically translated into projects that will provide real benefits.(UNFCCC, 2001).   
 
This led the GEF to establish the Strategic Priority “Piloting an Operational Approach to 
Adaptation” (SPA) under the GEF Trust Fund (see figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3: UNFCCC Adaptation Funding Framework 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
At COP 8 in Delhi in November 2002, the “Delhi Declaration” reinforced the importance of 
adaptation, and linked it to the participation of the developing world in mitigation of emissions to 
action and funding on adaptation to the impacts of climate change (Adger et al., 2009). The 
second era, then, took steps to strengthen action on adaptation, and began to associated 
adaptation with developing country interests and thus lay the seeds for framing of adaptation as a 
development issue.  
 
We are now in the third era, which is shaped by the IPCC’s fourth assessment report, published in 
2007, and moving towards the fifth assessment report, currently in the early stages of 
preparation. The fourth assessment report has shown that climate change impacts are already 
happening, because for the first time the IPCC has used observations over the last ten years rather 
than only working on predictions. The outcomes with regard to policy saw COP 13 in Bali in 2007 
finally bringing adaptation onto equal footing with mitigation by highlighting it as one of the four 
‘building blocks’ to come out of the negotiations alongside mitigation, technology cooperation and 
finance.  
 
Preparations for the IPCC fifth assessment report demonstrate a further shift towards a 
‘vulnerability-based’ understanding of adaptation, at least within the IPCC. For example, 
interviews with authors engaged in working group II of the IPCC responsible for reporting on 
“Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability”, revealed that debates are ongoing within working group 
II around the terminology of the group. The debate centres on the name of the group, which 
currently has “impacts” ‘up front’. Many of the IPCC Working Group II authors have argued for 
vulnerability to be put before ‘adaptation, so that the group becomes “Vulnerability, impacts, 
Adaptation" (Personal communications with the following lead and coordinating lead authors for 
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the IPCC fifth assessment report: Ian Burton, September 2010; Saleemul Huq, June 2010 ; and 
David Dodman, August 2010; Muyeye Chambwera, September 2010).The authors suggested that 
this would facilitate a move away from looking at impacts first in vulnerability assessments.  
 
However, as noted by Kris Ebi, executive director of the IPCC Working Group II Technical Support 
Unit, the implications of this shift from impacts-first to vulnerability-first depend on how you 
define vulnerability. As discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter, vulnerability can be 
defined from a social-vulnerability perspective; or a hazards-risk perspective. Ebi suggests that, at 
the time of writing, there is still some debate within Working Group II over how vulnerability is 
understood (Ebi, personal communication, June 2010); thus, although there is a shift towards a 
vulnerability-based perspective within the IPCC, this shift is not necessarily indicative of a shift 
away from a ‘hazards-based’ understanding of vulnerability towards a social-constructivist one.    
 
As adaptation gained prominence in the negotiations and policy, its context has shifted from being 
tied into discussions over impacts thresholds (the more that adaptation can be used to reduce 
impacts that might be considered dangerous, the higher impacts threshold of greenhouse gas 
concentrations can be accepted) (Burton, 2004) to being increasingly branded as a developing 
country issue and reflective of the profound global inequality of climate change; that those that 
will suffer the most from the impacts of climate change are least responsible. Nevertheless, the 
initial the framing of adaptation in the original text of the UNFCCC as an impacts-based issue of 
significance only in relation to mitigation, has left a legacy on the way in which adaptation to 
climate ‘risk’ has been governed under UNFCCC frameworks.  
 
The following sections will look at the implications of this framing of adaptation under the UNFCCC 
in relation to the potential of adaptation mechanisms under the UNFCCC to address social-
vulnerability.   
 
 
The implications of an „impacts-based‟ approach for addressing vulnerability under 
the UNFCCC 
 
Many critics have pointed out that an ‘impacts-based’ approach to adaptation as promoted under 
the UNFCCC and associated IPCC guidelines, has contributed to confusing and inadequate finance 
and governance structures for adaptation that are not conducive to addressing the ‘drivers’ of 
climate change vulnerability (Ayers et al., 2010; Burton et al., 2002; Schipper, 2006). This section 
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will consider the consequences of an impacts-based approach on the fiscal and institutional 
arrangements for adaptation under the UNFCCC, and the implications for addressing vulnerability.  
 
First, some critics have pointed out that an impacts-based approach to adaptation has discouraged 
commitment to the adaptation agenda because of the inevitable uncertainty tied into measuring 
and predicting climate change patterns (Ayers et al., 2010; Ayers and Huq, 2009b; Schipper, 2006). 
Chapter one showed that there are three areas of uncertainty around climate change impacts; 
first, around what the UNFCCC defines as ‘dangerous’ climate change impacts, i.e. the ‘thresholds’ 
that adaptation needs to avoid; second, around climate change projections; and third, around the 
interactions between climate change impacts and uncertain development trajectories. Such 
uncertainty has resulted in a historic reluctance to commit to action on adaptation on the basis 
that if we are adapting specifically to climate change, then we do not yet know exactly what we 
are adapting to. So the argument follows, pre-emptive action against an uncertain threat could be 
maladaptive.  
 
The lack of commitment to the adaptation agenda is reflected by relative institutional attention 
given to adaptation compared to mitigation. If we compare mitigation to adaptation, mitigation 
has a clear definition, baselines and targets. There is no adaptation baseline and little attention to 
how progress against adaptation should be measured. There are no targets for adaptation, and 
whereas mitigation has very clear funding regimes, adaptation is funded through many different 
funds (see figure 3.3), all of which receive voluntary rather than mandatory contributions from the 
Parties to the UNFCCC (Burton 2004). Adaptation is variously associated with other ‘developing 
country issues’ such as technology transfer and finance, resulting in a piecemeal approach to 
discussions and policy-making on adaptation under the Convention, and a failure to produce any 
firm definition or guidance on actually doing adaptation. As noted by Schipper (2006),  
 
The lack of specific definition of adaptation, even more confused by its association with 
other aspects of the UNFCCC, posed a significant constraint to furthering policy on 
adaptation (Schipper, 2006: 90).  
 
A comprehensive formal proposal consisting of all issues on adaptation under the climate regime 
is missing (Ayers et al., 2010).  
 
Some observers have also shown how confusion over what does and does not constitute 
adaptation has also resulted in confusion over the costs of adaptation funding, and how these 
costs should be met (Ayers, 2009).   An ‘impacts-based’ approach to adaptation suggests that the 
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costs of adaptation will be the additional expenses incurred as a result of the impacts of climate 
change on development. This is the approach taken in a World Bank study, which equates the 
costs of adaptation to the costs of ‘climate proofing’ development investments in developing 
countries. The report suggests that such figures will be between US$ 10 billion and US$ 40 billion 
annually (World Bank, 2006).  However, this figure has been criticized by the development 
community for not taking into account the costs of climate proofing existing supplies of natural 
and physical capital where no new investment is planned; the costs of financing new investments 
specifically to deal with climate change; or the costs to households and communities to fund their 
own adaptation needs (Action Aid, 2007; Oxfam, 2007).  
 
More recent estimates by Oxfam that do acknowledge these factors put the costs of adaptation 
closer to US$ 50 billion annually. Yet even this Oxfam estimate has since been criticized as 
conservative, because part of the calculation is based on an extrapolation of the costs of some 
NAPA projects. As noted in the next section of this chapter and in chapter four, NAPAs have 
tended to present projectised costs of adaptation as ‘additional’ to development, underestimating 
the costs of more strategic resilience building (Fankhauser, 2009). Similarly, estimates from the 
UNFCCC for adapting infrastructure worldwide, suggesting figures of US$ 8–30 billion in 2030, 
have been criticized for basing its calculations solely on adapting existing infrastructure to future 
change. Instead, Sattherthwaite et al., (2007) suggest any evaluations of adaptation costs also 
need to take into account the large deficit in basic infrastructure in most urban centers developing 
countries (Sattherthwaite et al., 2007) – existing vulnerability, or the ‘adaptation deficit’ (Burton, 
2004).  
 
Estimates of the costs of adaptation therefore vary significantly, and attempting to separate out 
‘impacts’ from more general vulnerability reduction have resulted in further confusion over how 
to calculate costs. However, there is at least one consensus in adaptation funding debates: the 
failure of funding streams for adaptation to come close to meeting any of these cost estimates 
(Action Aid, 2007; Ayers, 2009; Oxfam, 2007; Klein and Persson, 2008). For example, two of the 
“Marrakech Funds” for adaptation described above - the LDC Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate 
Change Fund (SCCF), as well as the GEF Trust Fund (GEF SPA) - are based on development 
assistance-type voluntary pledges and bilateral contributions from donors. This type of 
contribution is unlikely ever to be able to generate the required levels of funding, especially given 
that contributions are meant to be additional to development assistance, when many high-income 
nations are failing to meet their 0.7 per cent aid commitments in the first place. As of May 2010, 
the total resources pledged to the LDCF, the SCCF and the SPA totalled US$ 419 million 
(climatefundsupdate.org). Further, donors are delaying on meeting their pledged commitments 
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because of an alleged lack of adequate and accountable mechanisms in developing countries for 
receiving and disbursing money. This means that the actual funds deposited amount to 329.67 
million in total (ibid). Inadequate institutional attention to adaptation has translated into 
inadequate fiscal commitments for adaptation. 
 
The Adaptation Fund, which sits under the Kyoto Protocol, has the potential to generate more 
significant sums, because it is funded by a 2% levy on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 16 
transactions; the revenue generated from the CDM levy alone is projected to be between $160 
million and $950 million. (Müller, 2007). There is also talk of applying the levy to international air 
travel, which itself has the potential to generate $4-10 billion annually (ibid.). However, these 
mechanisms do not meet the responsibility-based principles of adaptation funding; that 
adaptation funds should be additional ‘compensation’ from rich nations to poor nations, not a 
‘tax’ on the CDM. Indeed, some have argued that the adaptation fund levy could potentially 
discourage ‘pro—poor’ CDM investments, because the levy increases the costs of CDM 
transactions (ibid; Ayers, 2009). As such, it is unlikely that using the Adaptation Fund to generate 
all funding for adaptation will be politically feasible.  
 
Second, the impacts-based framing of adaptation has been adopted by the mechanisms for 
disbursing adaptation funds. This is well exemplified by the criteria on adaptation funding imposed 
by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC (see box 3.4).  
 
Box 3.4: The Global Environment Facility 
Source: Adapted from GEF (no date) and  www.gefweb.org 
 
The GEF was established by donors 1991 following the Earth Summit, to provide a mechanism to fund 
projects and programs that protect the ‘global environment’. The environmental problems of concern to the 
GEF are global and inter-connected in nature - biodiversity, climate change, international waters, ozone, 
land degradation, and persistent organic pollutants. The GEF is a designated financial mechanism to the 
international environmental conventions of these six focal areas, with the mandate to support the 
generation of ‘global environmental benefits’ under each. Global environmental benefits is defined as 
directly or indirectly contributing to mitigating climate change, conserving biodiversity, protecting 
international waters, preventing ozone depletion, eliminating persistent organic pollutants, or preventing 
land degradation.  
 
 
The GEF manages three of the four funds for adaptation under the UNFCCC: the GEF Trust Fund 
Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA); the SCCF; and the LDCF (see figure 3.3). As the GEF was 
established to address global environmental issues, part of its mandate is to deliver ‘global 
environmental benefits’ (see box 3.4). The delivery of these benefits under the GEF is assured by 
                                               
16
 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a carbon trading mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol that allows 
countries with GHG reduction targets to generate emissions reductions by investing in clean development in low- 
and middle-income countries. 
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the criteria of the GEF, to fund only the “incremental costs” of a project or programme. 
Incremental cost refers to the cost differential between a baseline action to address a national 
need and the additional cost of an action that generates “global benefits” (GEF guidelines, no 
date). 
 
Lemos and Boyd (2009) point out that the criteria of generating ‘global environmental benefits’ 
and the calculation of ‘incremental costs’ are problematic for funding adaptation, which yields 
locally generated benefits (Lemos and Boyd, 2009). This has been recognised by the GEF, which 
has instead created the concept of “additional costs”, defined as the costs of actions required to 
make development activities climate resilient in light of climate change: the difference between 
the baseline (development activities pursued in the absence of climate change) and the alternative 
adaptation scenario (Möhner and Klein, 2007:10). However, Burton and colleagues (2006) argue 
that, 
 
Guidance from the Parties [to the UNFCCC] is not explicit on the point…*although+ the 
GEF’s position is that the “global environmental benefits” test does not apply to these 
funds *the LDCF and SCCF+…there remains a widespread perception among potential 
recipients that it does. (Burton et al., 2006:14).  
 
Thus, the legacy of climate change as a global environmental problem, with adaptation emerging 
from a mitigation agenda, is extremely powerful in shaping the governance of adaptation.  
 
Further, replacing ‘incremental costs’ of ‘global environmental benefits’ with ‘additional costs’ of 
‘climate change’ is not much better: it is difficult to clarify the additional cost element, because 
this raises the question which part of a project concerns adaptation (funded by the GEF) and 
which part is development (which is the recipient country’s own responsibility). Lemos and Boyd 
(2009) suggest that this ‘additionality’ criteria creates three hurdles for developing countries in 
terms of being able to use adaptation funds effectively:  First, vulnerable countries often lack the 
technical and administrative capabilities to respond to these additionality requirements, and so 
have to spend scarce financial, human and technical resources on doing so.  Second, governments 
may be tempted to prioritize policies that meet the additionality requirement rather than policies 
that best promote the sustainability and well-being of vulnerable ecosystems and populations. 
Third, additionality requirements could obstruct synergies between adaptation and development 
at the policy level, especially in countries where structural inequality and a lack of resources shape 
vulnerability in the first place (Lemos and Boyd, 2009:97).  
 
 96 
In addition, many countries cannot afford to meet the baseline development costs so the offer of 
funding for the additional cost is futile. For example, Ayers and Huq (2009b) cite the example of 
one of the projects identified by the NAPA of Tuvalu, which is a coastal infrastructure project to 
protect the shoreline from erosion, a problem regardless of climate change (and so an existing 
development need), but one exacerbated by climate change (so also an additional cost). The NAPA 
project team, even with the help of a UNDP consultant to assist, had extreme difficulties 
calculating the ‘adaptation’ component of the infrastructure needs. In any case, being a poor 
country, the ‘baseline’ infrastructure is not in place, and funding is not available to pay for it. The 
authors state:  
 
 The offer to fund, as it were, the ‘top section’ of the infrastructure required to respond to 
‘additional’ impacts of climate change, is absurd in light of the fact that co financing to pay 
for the lower section cannot be found. (Ayers and Huq, 2009:679).  
 
Thus, the framing of adaptation as impacts-based carries implications for the potential of 
adaptation policy and finance under the UNFCCC to address social-vulnerability to climate change. 
Some critics have argued that, for adaptation policy to target vulnerability more successfully, the 
framing of ‘risk’ under the UNFCCC needs to be ‘democratised’ (Ayers et al., 2010; Lemos and 
Boyd, 2009). As discussed in chapter one, opportunities for democratising the risk on adaptation 
lie in creating spaces for the dominant impacts-based approach to adaptation to be contested by 
actors from a social-vulnerability perspective. This requires an inclusive approach to adaptation 
policy-making; but, what is the evidence for inclusive policy making in adaptation governance 
under the UNFCCC, and what is the influence of an impacts-based approach on facilitating 
meaningful inclusion?  
 
 
3.4 Opportunities for democratising ‘risk’ under global climate change frameworks  
 
This section will analyse the opportunities for the deliberative governance of adaptation, firstly, in 
the ‘risk-assessment’ arenas of the IPCC, where climate change risks are assessed and therefore 
defined (IPCC); and secondly, in ‘policy arenas’, where climate risks are translated into adaption 
policy. Drawing on discussions from Science and Technology Studies (see chapter one) this section 
will highlight the interrelationships between scientific risk assessments and policy arenas, and the 
ways in which discourses of risk are coproduced between them. 
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Inclusiveness in adaptation „science‟  
 
Chapter one showed how the assessment of problems that have come to be defined as ‘global’ 
and ‘scientific’ tend to be based on the establishment of independent expert bodies to inform 
policy makers (Farrell et al., 2001; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990). Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) 
suggested that high uncertainty, high risk problems warrant higher levels of public participation in 
the definition and assessments of risks, and under such circumstances risk assessments could be 
opened up to a broader range of non-scientific expertise. Thus, in principle risk assessments could 
be one avenue for increasing public participation in science and policy.  
 
However, chapter one also suggested that “certainty” and “expertise” are not neutral terms, and 
the construction of both depends on how risks are framed, which in turn is highly politicised. This 
section will consider these suppositions in relation to the inclusiveness in the IPCC, the 
international body tasked with providing the UNFCCC and its Parties the latest science on climate 
change risk, focusing on three aspects: the way in which the IPCC defines risk and expertise; the 
explicit approach taken by the IPCC to inclusion; and the claims of political neutrality of science 
made by the IPCC. 
 
First, in line with the initial objectives of the UNFCCC - the prevention of dangerous climate change 
- the original ‘adaptation remit’ of the IPCC was in relation to calculating tradeoffs between 
mitigation and adaptation: ‘Adaptation for mitigation policy’ (Burton et al., 2002). Accordingly, the 
IPCC Second Assessment Report (IPCC SAR) published in 1995 defines vulnerability as ‘the degree 
to which a system will respond to change in climatic conditions’. The first guide for conducting 
assessments of climate change risk for adaptation was written under the authority of the IPCC in 
the early 1990’s (Carter et al., 1994; Parry and Carter, 1998), and has come to shape the “standard 
approach” to risk assessments for adaptation (Burton et al., 2002). Burton et al., (2002) describe 
the ‘standard’ approach to adaptation laid out in the IPCC guidelines in seven steps: 
1. Define problem (including  study area and sectors to be examined);  
2. Select method of problem assessment; 
3. Test methods/conduct sensitivity analyses 
4. Select and apply climate change scenarios; 
5. Assess biophysical and socio-economic impacts; 
6. Assess autonomous adjustments; 
7. Evaluate adaptation strategies 
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The focus of these steps on the assessment of the impacts of biophysical change using 
technological approaches such as climate modelling, has helped shaped the international 
adaptation discourse as a problem of biophysical risk that can only be assessed through 
technological and ‘expert’ means. In order to follow these steps of risk-assessment, a high level of 
climate change science and access to climate change modelling is required. This excludes non-
experts from access to debates around defining climate change risk. Indeed, as Demeritt (2001) 
notes, in engaging in debates around climate change impacts, not only the lay person, but also the 
politicians and even many climate scientists themselves “are forced to put their faith in technical 
expertise that they do not fully understand” (Demeritt, 2001:309). Thus, alternative ‘knowledges’ 
that may promote a more vulnerability-based perspective, are excluded from policy deliberation 
around climate change risk. Burton et al., argue: 
 
Because the standard approach has been developed for scientific purposes of 
understanding impacts it pays less attention to the policy context of adaptation or to the 
key actors or stakeholders involved. The focus of the analysis is a top-down effort to 
understand impacts, rather than to find ways of reducing vulnerability…in association with 
stakeholders including those at risk. (Burton et al., 2002:155).  
 
Secondly, by promoting an impacts-based, science-based, approach to understanding adaptation, 
the IPCC have legitimised the explicit exclusion of non-technical approaches to defining and 
responding to climate change risk. For example, only scientifically peer-reviewed literature is 
included in IPCC Assessment Reports, the main assessments used by policy makers in assessing 
climate change risks. This automatically excludes many developing country scientists who face 
significantly greater challenges in getting their work through such channels (Huq, personal 
communication, June 2010).  Such observations have led observers such as Mayer  and  Arndt 
 (2009)  to warn of the ‘epistemological   hegemony’  of  the  IPCC; indeed,  Bruno  Latour, a critic 
of the epistemic communities approach (see chapter one), describes the IPCC as   an   
‘epistemological  monster’  (Latour, cited  in  Dahan-Dalmedico,  2008). 
 
Attempts are being made to open-up IPCC reports to reviews of more ‘grey’ and ‘unpublished’ 
literature. Further, efforts are underway by the authors of Working Group II ahead of the fifth 
assessment report to hold “writeshops” for developing country authors to try to ‘upgrade’ grey 
literature to publishable, citable material. However, this effort may only serve to reinforce the 
subordinate position of ‘grey’ literature in the eyes of the IPCCC. Further, the recent uproar over 
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the discovery of non-peer reviewed material related to inaccurate reporting on glacial melt17 may 
to increase caution in allowing non-peer reviewed material.  
 
Further, Farrell et al., (2001) suggest that even the participation of developing country scientists in 
the IPCC was seen initially as a source of potential disruption. The authors state: 
 
Of course, there are also reasons to limit participation…participation should be designed 
to achieve the objectives of the assessment (Farrell et al., 2001:319).   
 
 This statement is reflective of the attitude taken to participation in the IPCC; in line with 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990), participation should build consensus, and reduce uncertainty around 
policy problems, not increase it. Such an approach takes little account of how the framing of a 
problem as ‘expert’ and risks as ‘technical’ restricts inclusion, or that including knowledge in 
policy-making processes that contests these dominant paradigms could actually be of value to the 
policy-making process.  
 
Finally, the IPCC was established to provide ‘the science’ on climate change and not to engage in 
‘the policy’. Much emphasis has been placed around enforcing this separation, for example, 
scientists involved in carrying out the IPCC Assessment Reports are disallowed from writing the 
IPCC’s “Summary for Policy Makers”, the most influential of the IPCCC outputs on policy 
formation. The use of the IPCC by the UNFCCC promotes the powerful notions that science is 
neutral, expert networks are benign and representative, and governments act rationally according 
to expert advice (Ayers and Huq, 2008). This apparent separation between ‘the science’ (IPCC) and 
‘the policy’ (UNFCCC) overlooks the lessons from Science and Technology Studies (STS) related to 
how science and politics are mutually constructed.  
 
For example, some authors have noted that the IPCC has influenced the coproduction of science 
and politics through its focus on the General Circulation Model (GCM) as a method for assessing 
atmospheric changes (Demerit, 2001; Forsyth, 2003). Similarly, the decisions of the IPCC around 
methods of climate change risk assessment have resulted in the domination of an ‘impacts-based’ 
approach to adaptation policy making, and the significant exclusion of alternative approaches. This 
promotion of the IPCC as an agency that is scientific, neutral, and independent, has had important 
epistemological implications for the causal statements and responses to climate change risk 
                                               
17
 In 2009, the IPCC was exposed for making a false claim in its Fourth Assessment Report about the threat of 
Himalayan disappearance “by 2035”. Following investigation of these claims, it was revealed that the IPCC had cited 
data from non-peer-reviewed material from a 2005 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) report. This controversy is 
explained in more detail in chapter five.  
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adopted under the UNFCCC. This is well illustrated by the following statement from Dr. Atiq 
Rahman, former IPCC author who has been active in the climate change negotiations both as a 
Bangladesh Country Delegate and as an NGO activist:  
 
In the early days of the IPCC and the negotiations, the environmental movement from the 
North was mostly to do with the chemicals of gasses. For us [representatives of Least 
Developed Countries], it was a survival issue. I remember when I first raised these issues  
of climate change affecting poverty, I was told not to bring these issues into the 
discussions because climate change was about molecules, it was about science. Poverty 
was seen as irrelevant. (Atiq Rahman, personal communication, February 2008).  
 
Rahman’s statement reflects the barriers presented by a “systemic” approach to global 
environmental problems (Turner et al., 1991) for local inclusion. As discussed in chapter one, 
globalising discourses subjugate alternative ‘local’ framings as ‘inexpert’ and irrelevant to the 
debate.18 Thus, the establishment of the IPCC, and the resulting approach to assessing the risk of 
climate change, has reinforced the ‘impacts-based’ approach to adaptation and legitimised the 
need for ‘experts’ in framing adaptation. This has been to the exclusion of alternative approaches 
to adaptation, based on developing country perspectives and sub-national context-specific 
knowledge on the reality of climate change vulnerability on the ground.  
 
 
Inclusiveness in adaptation policy 
 
As laid out in chapter one, there are, in principle, various avenues under the UNFCCC for the 
inclusion of alternative, development-based perspectives on adaptation from vulnerable 
developing countries. This thesis will focus on one particular avenue, that of “National Adaptation 
Plans of Action” (NAPAs) under the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), because the LDCF and 
NAPAs were specifically designed under the UNFCCC to give a direct avenue for the participation 
of vulnerable groups in adaptation policy making (LEG, 2002).  
 
As noted, the LDCF, along with the other funds for adaptation, was established at COP 9 in 
Marrakech. A specific fund for LDCs was established because this group of countries were 
recognised as especially vulnerable due to their development status, and so adaptation in LDCs 
was taken as more urgent than in other countries (Desai, 2003). Correspondingly, an LDC Expert 
                                               
18
 Which is ironic in this case as Dr Rahman pointed out that he has a PhD in chemistry! 
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Group (LEG) was established “to serve in an advisory capacity to the LDCs, for the preparation and 
strategy for implementation of National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPA)” (Decision 29/CP.7).  
 
The establishment of the LDCF was seen by many as a ‘coup’ on behalf of the LDCs, signifying a 
change in approach towards a more development-focused vision of adaptation, and an 
acknowledgement of the role vulnerable countries would play in defining the adaptation agenda 
(Huq, personal communication, May 2008). However, other interpretations suggest that the quick 
development of adaptation funds was a form of appeasement to vulnerable developing countries, 
who were voicing frustration at the lack of success in achieving binding commitments from 
developed countries for mitigation targets (Burton, personal communication, December 2008).  
Desai (2003) suggests that, for developing countries,  
 
 The creation of … new funds and the promise of certain Annex I Parties  *developed 
country parties] to contribute money to these funds, was in essence a quid pro quo for 
their acceptance of a watered down Kyoto Protocol. While developing countries wanted 
binding contributions to be made to these funds, it was only possible to agree that 
“predictable and adequate levels of funding shall be made available to Parties not 
included in Annex I.” (Desai, 2003:298).  
 
Nevertheless, the establishment of the LDCF marks a significant turning point in the recognition of 
the UNFCCC to include vulnerable groups in decision-making on adaptation. The intention behind 
the NAPAs is to serve as a direct channel of communication of information relating to the 
vulnerabilities and adaptation needs of the LDCs. The NAPA process is designed to be a country 
driven, bottom-up process to generate a list of priority activities for adaptation in LDCs. The 
process involves the assembly of a national multidisciplinary team, composed of lead stakeholder 
and agency representatives. Each NAPA, once developed, is exposed to public review and 
comment, endorsed by the relevant national government, and then published. NAPAs therefore 
represent a unique opportunity for democratic decision-making around adaptation.  
 
However, the extent to which community participation is incorporated into the NAPA depends on 
both effective participation during the NAPA process in-country; and secondly, to this being fed up 
to the international forum. In relation to the evidence that NAPAs are adequately reflecting on-
the-ground development issues in the design of adaptation plans the example of Tuvalu’s NAPA 
above provides a case in point; it seems that the legacy of an ‘impacts-based’ approach remains 
strong in the NAPA guidelines, and that this is affecting the potential for the inclusion of  non-
expert, development-based perspectives. Chapters four and five of this thesis will further evaluate 
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the potential for NAPAs to be locally inclusive, through the country case studies of Bangladesh and 
Nepal. 
 
 As far as the next step of ensuring developing-country representation in the international forum 
of the UNFCCC, this depends on the inclusiveness of democratic processes under the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF)19 which manages the LDCF (see figure 3.3 and box 3.4). Under article 11 
of the UNFCCC, the GEF is required to have “...an equitable and balanced representation of all 
Parties within a transparent system of governance” (UNFCCC, 1992: Article 11); so, in principle, 
such a system should be equally inclusive of developed and developing country perspectives on 
adaptation, and the resulting decisions on adaptation funding should reflect the priorities of all 
engaged Parties.  
 
However, many critics, particularly from the NGO community, have pointed out that the 
governance of the adaptation funds under the UNFCCC, especially those managed by the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), are not inclusive (Action Aid, 2007; Müller, 2006). For example, 
decisions of the GEF Council are taken by consensus of all Parties to the convention to the 
UNFCCC, seemingly adhering to the principle of balanced representation of all Parties. However, if 
no consensus is available, then the decision falls to a vote. But, a vote cannot be passed unless 
there is a majority of both countries and donations. Given that developed countries are the largest 
donors to the GEF funds, this automatically disempowers developing nations from engaging in the 
decisions that affect them, because those countries that make the largest contributions carry the 
most weight (Streck, 2001). This essentially gives veto power to the group of the five largest donor 
countries (Ayers, 2009).  
 
This obvious power imbalance has raised concerns, particularly from the developing countries, 
regarding the decision making procedures of the GEF, which have eroded its political acceptability; 
there is a lack of any ‘feeling of ownership’ from developing countries over the GEF in smaller, 
poorer, and politically weaker developing countries (Müller, 2006). Müller suggests that there 
exists a “democratic deficit” in the GEF, which inhibits the meaningful inclusion of developing 
countries in decision-making around adaptation. 
 
Therefore, despite a move under the UNFCCC towards an association of adaptation with 
‘developing country issues’, and a recognition of the role of development and poverty in driving 
                                               
19
 It should be noted that the governance structure of the Adaptation Fund is much more promising; the Adaptation 
Fund is not managed by the GEF but has its own independent board with representation from the five UN regions 
as well as special seats for the LDCs and Small Island Developing States. The Adaptation Fund Board has only 
recently become operational.  
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vulnerability, an impacts-based approach continues to dominate adaptation science and policy 
under the Convention. An impacts-based framing of adaptation has had implications for both 
attention to the adaptation in general, and more specifically the potential for adaptation action 
under the UNFCCC to address vulnerability on the ground. Further, at the international level, few 
opportunities are created for democratising climate change risk in favour of a development-based 
approach. Thus, some critics of the UNFCCC have suggested that adaptation may be better 
managed outside the Convention (Ayers et al., 2010; Schipper, 2006), and that, given the close 
relationship between adaptation and development, development frameworks may be better 
placed to address vulnerability to climate change. The next section of this chapter will explore the 
potential for international development governance frameworks for addressing climate change 
vulnerability.  
 
 
3.5 Adaptation under development frameworks20 
 
This section will begin be reviewing the emergence of adaptation in development discourses; and 
consider the potential for development governance structures to manage adaptation 
independently of the UNFCCC.  
 
 
The evolution of climate change adaptation in development discourse 
 
The link between climate change and development was drawn in the development arena as early 
as 1987, when the Brundtland Report Our Common Future cited climate change as a major 
environmental challenge facing development (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987). In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
produced the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, both of which made explicit connections between 
environment and development (UN, 1992). These themes were taken up by the research 
community, who began to apply theories of vulnerability to climate change adaptation. 
Development was seen as making an important contribution to climate change adaptation 
through strengthening entitlements and boosting the resilience of individuals and communities 
(see Cohen, 1998; Sen, 1999; Smit, 1993).  
 
                                               
20
 Some of the material from this section has been adapted for inclusion in Ayers and Huq, 2009; and 
Ayers and Dodman, 2010.  
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However, the dominance of the mitigation agenda in the climate change discourse of the 1990s 
meant that development practitioners were initially slow to adopt climate change in practice. For 
example, in 2002 the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) began to 
organise “Development and Adaptation days” at the climate change negotiations. Saleemul Huq, 
who has been coordinating the days since their inception, states: 
 
Since the beginning the aim of the Development and Adaptation Days was to get the 
development community on board with adaptation, to make them realise it was an issue 
of poverty. Before then, it was mostly environmental NGOs that attended the 
negotiations. Development NGOs saw it as an environmental issue, not a poverty one 
(Huq, personal communication, April 2007).  
 
This is reflected by the absence of any clear reference to climate change in the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) drafted in 2001.  
 
In 2002, a report released by 10 leading development funding agencies – Poverty and Climate 
Change: reducing the vulnerability of the poor through adaptation – stated that climate change 
was a threat to development efforts and poverty reduction, including the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals, and that pro-poor development was key to successful adaptation. 
The report reflects many of the themes emerging in the academic literature on vulnerability at the 
time (for example Huq et al., 2002; Kates, 2009; Smit et al., 2000), including recommendations to 
support sustainable livelihoods, improve governance, and make institutions more accountable and 
participatory (Klein, 2008; Sperling, 2003). 
 
Since 2002, development agencies have increasingly recognised the implications of climate change 
for development; and the potential for development to address vulnerability to climate change. 
For example, Levina (2007) highlights the potential for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
for reducing vulnerability:  reducing poverty, providing general education and health services, 
improving living conditions in urban settlements, and providing access to financial markets and 
technologies will all improve the livelihoods of vulnerable individuals, households and 
communities, and therefore increase their ability to engage in adaptive action. An analysis of the 
categories of ODA activities reported by the OECD DAC countries demonstrated that more than 
60% of all ODA could be relevant to building adaptive capacity and facilitating adaptation (Levina, 
2007).  
 
Furthermore, there are incentives for the development community to take up this role, because 
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climate change will compound the existing vulnerabilities of developing countries and threaten 
the achievement of the MDGs, for example combating hunger caused by droughts and floods; 
providing access to water and sanitation; and preventing and treating malaria. Climate change 
poses a threat to the sustainability of development investments; the World Bank estimates that up 
to 40% of development financed by overseas assistance and concessional loans is sensitive to 
climate risk (Burton et al., 2006). 
 
Finally, failing to take adaptation into account in development practice can result in 
maladaptation, where actions or investments enhance rather than reduce vulnerability to the 
impacts of climate change. For example, investment in an irrigation scheme that does not take 
account of the possible changes in rainfall variations under climate-change scenarios may not be 
sustainable in the long term. On the contrary, irrigation may actually increase dependence on 
water and water-reliant practices (such as the persistent use of water-dependent crops) in the 
short term, when in fact ways of increasing the efficiency of water usage or changing cropping 
patterns may be a more useful way of spending limited resources to make development 
investments climate-resilient and contribute towards adaptation. 
 
Given these synergies between adaptation and development, and the risks of maladaptation in 
development, supporting adaptation through development assistance makes sense (Dodman et 
al., 2009). Development assistance has the remit to address a wider range of vulnerabilities than 
those included in the narrow definition of adaptation considered by the UNFCCC, and so could 
complement Convention approaches by addressing the underlying causes of vulnerability, thus 
increasing the effectiveness of climate-specific adaptations. For these reasons, adaptation has 
been embraced not only by the climate change community, but also by the development-
assistance community (Ayers and Dodman, 2010; Schipper, 2007; see also Sperling, 2003).  
 
 
Responding to adaptation through development 
 
Many development agencies have therefore sought to incorporate adaptation into their 
development portfolios. One approach being undertaken by many donors and intergovernmental 
development agencies is “mainstreaming’. Mainstreaming involves the integration of information, 
policies and measures to address climate change into ongoing development planning and 
decision-making. It is seen as making more sustainable, effective and efficient use of resources 
than designing and managing policies separately from ongoing activities (Klein et al., 2003). In 
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theory, mainstreaming can avoid the problem of trade-offs between development and adaptation 
and create ‘no regrets’ opportunities for achieving both (Klein, 2008). 
 
Klein (2008) discusses two types of mainstreaming in development: First, a ‘technology-based 
view of mainstreaming’ is a consequence of an ‘impacts-based’ approach to adaptation; 
projections of climate change are considered in the decision-making of relevant government 
departments and agencies, so that technologies are chosen that are suitable for a future climate. 
This has also been referred to as ‘climate-proofing’ development and, in the context of 
development assistance, can involve the screening of development portfolios through a climate-
change lens. Portfolio screening involves the systematic examination of an agency’s set of policies, 
programmes or projects, with the aim of identifying how concerns about climate change can be 
combined with the agency’s development priorities (Klein et al., 2007). Such screening helps in 
identifying both the existing development projects that are particularly threatened by climate 
change, and the opportunities for incorporating climate change more explicitly into future projects 
and programmes. 
 
This type of mainstreaming falls foul of many of the criticisms of a UNFCCC approach to 
adaptation; namely, that the impacts of climate change are taken as separate to development. As 
Ayers and Dodman suggest (2010), this reflects ‘adaptation ‘plus’ development’, rather than 
‘adaptation as development’. The risk with this approach is that it produces a sense of a new set 
of ‘conditionalities’ being attached to development assistance; enforcing climate change priorities 
on development programmes where they did not exist as underlying development priorities. 
Further, this approach would decrease stakeholder engagement in the development of ‘climate-
proofed’ priorities, because of the small pool of expertise required to calculate the potential 
climate change impacts on any development intervention. As such, some observers have 
cautioned that a ‘climate-proofed’ approach to mainstreaming could undo much progress made 
against the OECD DAC principles of development finance that include country ownership and 
public participation (Klein, 2008). 
 
The second type of mainstreaming takes a ‘development-based view of adaptation,’ which 
ensures that, in addition to climate-proofing, development efforts are deliberately aimed at 
reducing vulnerability by including priorities that are essential for successful adaptation, such as 
ensuring water rights to groups exposed to water scarcity during a drought. This latter option 
takes a more holistic approach to adaptation, seeing responses not as stand-alone or discrete 
climate-specific options, but as also addressing the underlying drivers of vulnerability that expose 
people to climate-change impacts: ‘Adaptation as development’ (Ayers and Dodman, 2010).  
 107 
 
However, despite the obvious potential for supporting vulnerability reduction to climate change 
through development, this is contentious at the international level. Firstly, not all adaptation is 
development; for example, adaptation interventions adopted by donors may not equate with the 
development priorities of recipient countries. Likewise, not all development reduces vulnerability 
to climate- change adaptation, particularly where investments do not take account of the long-
term climate-change implications for the project area or sector, resulting in development 
interventions that are ultimately maladaptive. 
 
Secondly, and significantly, supporting adaptation through development ignores the crux of the 
‘adaptation paradox’; that developed nations are responsible for climate change, and so 
assistance for adaptation should be additional to development assistance. As noted by Action Aid 
(2007), financing for adaptation is not owed to poor countries as ‘aid’ but, rather, as 
compensation from high-emission countries for those that are most vulnerable to the impacts 
(ActionAid, 2007). This distinction between development assistance and adaptation funding was 
supported by developing countries at the June 2008 meeting for the subsidiary bodies to the 
UNFCCC, where they called for the measurable, reportable and verifiable use of new and 
additional funding for climate change-specific activities (as opposed to more general resilience 
building) (Klein, 2008) in order to prevent industrialized countries from incorporating adaptation 
funding into development assistance.  Many observers have noted the importance of this principle 
in maintaining the trust between developed and developing countries in the international 
negotiations (Boyd et al., 2009; Müller, 2006). As such, Boyd et al., (2009) note:  
 
 The jury is still out on how official development assistance and adaptation funding can be 
brought together.  (Boyd et al., 2009:662).  
 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined the various interpretations of adaptation in both climate change and 
development discourses. It has suggested that there are two broad approaches to adaptation, 
which in turn depend on how ‘vulnerability’ to climate change is defined and assessed: First, an 
‘impacts-based’ approach to adaptation, which takes climate change impacts as the starting point 
for vulnerability assessments, and gives rise to technological adaptation solutions that target the 
specific impacts of climate change: ‘stand alone’ adaptation, or ‘adaptation plus development’. 
Second, a ‘development-based’ approach to adaptation, based on insights from the food security 
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and natural hazards literature, that takes a livelihoods-based approach to assessing vulnerability, 
and results in adaption interventions that target the underlying drivers of vulnerability: 
‘adaptation as development’. Table 3.1 below summarises these approaches and the implications 
for operationalising adaptation:  
 
Table 3.1: Summary of approaches to adaptation  
Definition of 
adaptation  
Adaptation addresses 
the impacts of climate 
change 
Adaptation reduces 
vulnerability to climate 
change and climate 
variability 
Adaptation increases the 
capacity of people to adapt 
to climate change and 
other stresses  
Assumptions 
about 
vulnerability 
Vulnerability is a 
consequence of 
exposure to climate 
change hazards 
Vulnerability is a 
function of exposure, 
sensitivity, and adaptive 
capacity  
Vulnerability is directly 
dependent on adaptive 
capacity, which in turn is  
determined by factors 
related to development  
Target 
population 
Countries and 
communities most 
exposed to climate 
change impacts 
The climate-vulnerable 
poor in  countries and 
regions exposed to 
climate change impacts 
The poorest and most 
marginalised people in 
developing countries  
Approaches to 
adaptation  
Specific adaptation 
interventions 
 
Adaptation “plus” 
development: “Climate 
proofing”, “climate-
resilient development” 
Adaptation “as” 
development: 
Development as usual  
Main actors 
promoting the 
approach 
21
 
UNFCCC, some IPCC 
actors, some donor 
agencies 
IPCC, some donor 
agencies  
Development NGOs 
 
It should be noted that no single approach is consistently promoted by any one set of actors. First, 
as described above and summarised below, interpretations of adaptation are changing rapidly. We 
have moved from adaptation not being a priority at all under the UNFCCC, to adaptation being 
placed on equal footing with mitigation and being associated with “developing country” interests 
within the UNFCCC.  
 
Further, different sets of actors are not necessarily wedded to one particular approach. For 
example, we can say that a “development-based” discourse was more likely to be promoted by 
development actors such as NGOs and some donors. However, it is also true that actors change 
may change their approach depending on the context they are in. NGOs have been among the 
strongest opposition to the global requirement of demonstrating that adaptation is “additional” to 
development, highlighting that good adaptation starts with good development in the first place 
(see for example Action Aid 2007). At the same time, within international forums NGOs have 
lobbied on behalf of increasing funding for adaptation in international arenas, and in particular 
supporting the argument that adaptation funding should be additional to development (again, see 
Action Aid 2007). If this argument is followed through, adaptation itself is additional to 
                                               
21
 Predominantly but not exclusively  
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development. The same actors are supporting both the “adaptation as development” and also the 
“adaptation plus” development agendas.  
 
It is nevertheless important to consider the implications of these different perspectives on 
defining adaptation, for how adaptation is operationalised, and for the potential for adaptation 
planning to be ‘locally inclusive.’ Reviewing the evolution of adaptation under the UNFCCC, this 
chapter has shown that the initial remit of the UNFCCC – to mitigate greenhouse gasses in order to 
prevent the impacts of climate change – meant adaptation was initially conceived in relation to 
mitigation: the greater the potential for adapting to the impacts of climate change, the less the 
need for mitigation. This gave rise to a framing of adaptation under the UNFCCC as impacts-based. 
This has left a legacy on the way in which adaptation to climate ‘risk’ has been governed under 
UNFCCC frameworks.  For example, in the way in which risks are assessed by the IPCCC, which 
takes climate change impacts as the starting point; and the separation out of ‘baseline 
development needs’ and ‘additional adaptation needs’ for assessing and meeting the costs of 
adaptation.  
 
Opportunities for the reframing of climate change risk, through more inclusive and deliberative 
governance processes, are currently limited at the international level. The ‘expert’ nature of an 
impacts-based approach provides limited opportunities for vulnerability-based perspectives that 
may be classed as ‘non-expert’. Further, the ‘democratic deficit’ that exists in many of the forums 
for the negotiation of adaptation funding guidelines presents barriers to the meaningful inclusion 
of developing country concerns.  
 
The chapter then looked to the role of development institutions in addressing adaptation. It was 
shown that the development community has recognised the many synergies between 
development objectives, and, with adaptation emerging out of a development discourse, may be 
better placed to address the social-vulnerability concerns of an ‘adaptation as development’ 
approach. However, it was also highlighted that ‘mainstreaming’ adaptation into development 
does not necessarily lead to a more integrated, or ‘development-first’ approach to doing 
adaptation. Particularly in the case of ‘climate-proofing’, climate change impacts are assessed as 
separate and additional to development needs.   
 
Further, the ‘adaptation paradox’ is based on the principle that adaptation funding should be 
additional to development assistance. Upholding this principle is important for maintaining trust 
between vulnerable developing countries and industrialised nations in the climate change 
negotiations. Thus, it is important that climate change adaptation is managed under the UNFCCC, 
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and not simply ‘mainstreamed’ into development.  But, can adaptation policy frameworks under 
the UNFCCC address social-vulnerability?  
 
It is suggested here that, despite the dominance of an impacts-based approach to adaptation 
under the UNFCCC, over time the context of adaptation has shifted and come to be associated 
with developing country issues. This has led to an increasingly development-orientated discourse 
on adaptation, that has become manifest in some of the principles of adaptation funding and 
policy, most notably around the LDC Fund, and the associated National Adaptation Plans of Action 
(NAPAs). NAPAs have therefore been touted as the most promising opportunity for the inclusion 
of developing country concerns on adaptation under the UNFCCC. The next two chapters of this 
thesis will explore the evidence that NAPAs have indeed achieved a more inclusive and 
development-based approach to adaptation.  
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Chapter 4: Analysing the inclusiveness of adaptation policy making under 
National Adaptation Plans of Action: A case study of Bangladesh22 
 
“Planning should ensure that indigenous knowledge of the most vulnerable communities are given 
due recognition during NAPA preparation. All local experience and culturally specific knowledge within 
LDCs…is a critical resource”   
 (Huq and Khan, 2006:189) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapters one and three have suggested that effective adaptation depends on understanding the 
local context of vulnerability, which requires deliberative and participatory approaches to 
adaptation policy-making. But, this thesis has questioned, where conflicting definitions of risk exist 
across scales, how can meaningful inclusiveness be achieved, and what sorts of institutions are 
needed? Chapter one discussed “deliberative governance” as one proposal for ensuring that all 
those affected by a decision are provided with the opportunity for participating meaningfully in 
the decision-making process. Chapter three suggested that under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the most promising opportunity for the participation of 
vulnerable groups in adaptation policy making is through National Adaptation Programme of 
Action (NAPAs) (Ayers, 2008; Polack, 2008).  
 
The following two chapters critically assess these claims of inclusiveness under NAPAs in two sub-
case studies of the NAPA process in Bangladesh and Nepal. Both studies collect and analyse 
evidence to address the questions: What is the evidence that the NAPA in each country achieved 
inclusive policy-making? And what were the circumstances that resulted in more or less inclusive 
policy-making processes? Assessing the case study data against these two case-study sub-
questions questions will provide empirical evidence to answer the main research questions of this 
thesis around what kinds of institutional design enable local inclusiveness; and what 
circumstances facilitate or inhibit locally inclusive approaches under global climate change policy 
frameworks (see section 1.4).  
 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of this data analysis from the Bangladesh sub-case 
study.  
 
To address the question, “how inclusive was the NAPA process in Bangladesh”? It is necessary to 
consider what is being assessed; what makes participation deliberative, and what aspects of 
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 This chapter has been adapted for publication as Ayers, 2011. Resolving the Adaptation Paradox. Global 
Environment Politics 11(1).   
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inclusive institutional design should be evaluated?  The first section of this chapter therefore 
reviews and expands debates from chapter one, that demonstrate the need to analyse not only 
the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ of participatory practice, but also the ‘what’: whether and how the 
content and context of deliberations influence the potential of deliberative practices to achieve 
inclusiveness. The second section of this chapter presents a brief analysis of the general NAPA 
preparation process and guidelines under the UNFCCC, highlighting the emphasis that is placed on 
‘inclusiveness’ and ‘indigenous knowledge’ in NAPA design. 
 
The third and main section of this chapter considers the extent to which the NAPA in Bangladesh 
achieves these inclusive aims, based on the fieldwork conducted in Bangladesh over a total period 
of nine months (see chapter two). This case study will be presented in two parts: First, in line with 
earlier discussions in this thesis around how the interactions between hazards, vulnerability, and 
environmental discourses can shape environmental policy making processes, this section analyses 
the data from key informant interviews and document analysis to understand these aspects of the 
Bangladesh NAPA context, and how these may have shaped climate change policy discourses in 
Bangladesh.   
 
Second, this section presents the findings of a field study conducted in Noakhali, one of the sites 
of a proposed NAPA priority project. This field study used focus group discussions, key informant 
interviews, and a household survey (see chapter two) to better understand local perceptions of 
risk, drivers of vulnerability, and reactions to the NAPA project proposal. This section considers the 
results of this study against the NAPA ‘outputs’ in Bangladesh; the risks and adaptation priorities 
identified in the NAPA document.  
 
Finally, this paper assesses the relationship between the NAPA outputs and the NAPA process, 
looking at the three elements of deliberative institutional design – ‘who’ was included, ‘how’ were 
they included, and ‘what’ was the content of deliberations. These findings are then discussed in 
relation to the implications for theory and policy.  
 
 
4.2 Assessing deliberative inclusiveness: The who, how, and what of participation.  
 
Aspects of inclusive institutional design: „who‟, „how‟, „what‟  
 
Chapter one showed how a recognition of the need for ‘inclusiveness’ in development planning 
has resulted in the emergence “participation” in the last two decades as a key way to do 
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development (Chambers, 1983, 1997).  However, chapter one also showed how participation has 
been criticised as presenting a “new tyranny” for development (Cooke and Kothari, 2001), and 
suggested that these criticisms coalesced around the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ of participation.  
 
In terms of the ‘who’, such criticisms have shown how participatory activities especially around 
‘global’ problems, can uncritically homogenise the ‘local’ (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Cornwall, 
2000; Williams, 2004). This can limit the ambition of participatory processes to stop at consulting 
‘the community’ for ‘its’ view on a globally defined purpose. In terms of achieving ‘local’ 
inclusiveness in ‘global’ risks, such an approach overlooks the need for detailed consultations with 
different members of ‘the local community’ to understand who are the most vulnerable, why, and 
what their priorities would be in addressing risk. Further arguments that fall under the ‘who’ of 
participation centre on the “tyranny of the group”: the group dynamics of participation often 
favour the most powerful (Cohen, 2007; Cornwall, 2000; Mendelberg and Karpowitz, 2007). The 
outcomes of any participatory exercise will therefore reflect the power dynamics between 
different actors, which influence what is said, by who, and who is listening.  
 
In terms of the ‘how’ of participation, Cooke and Kothari (2001) suggest that there can be “tyranny 
of method”, in which participatory methods can bind participants to structures of power that they 
are not able to question (Kothari, 2001).   Other scholars have shown how participation techniques 
define who is included or excluded, and control the extent of inclusion. For example in relation to 
‘local’ inclusion in ‘global’ problems, Cornwall (2000) suggests that perceiving the ‘local’ as an 
aggregate category results in “invited participation” techniques where ‘community 
representatives’ are invited to speak on behalf of their communities, with little attention paid to 
the extent to which these representatives can actually be said to be representative (Cornwall, 
2000). Cornwall (2000) and others (Bassett and Zeuli, 2000; Kothari, 2001) suggest that those 
consulted are likely to be those with access to political assets, who as shown in chapter three are 
also likely to be among the least vulnerable of any group.  
 
However, this thesis has suggested that a focus on the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ of participation does 
not pay adequate attention to how problem framings – the ‘what’ of participation – can impact on 
the discursive dynamics of deliberation. Chapter one drew on debates from Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) that have shown how the construction of expertise and the politics of 
scale can influence deliberation around problems that have come to be framed as ‘global’ and 
‘expert’, through the discursive exclusion of ‘local’ and ‘lay’ stakeholders. During participation, it is 
the ‘experts’ who define the problem and therefore what is a legitimate contribution to the 
solution; any alternative ‘lay’ approaches that reveal different problems or frame them in a 
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different way are taken as illegitimate in the ‘expert’ arena (Jasanoff, 2003). STS scholars suggest 
that as a result, the knowledge generated by consulting ‘local’ opinion on solutions to globally 
defined technical problems, is viewed at best as a form of “contributory expertise”, and even then 
only taken into account when it fits the answer that the problem framing would inevitably give 
rise to (Jasanoff 2003:397) 
 
Applying these debates to climate change, an ‘impacts-based’ approach to adaptation requires an 
understanding of the possibilities of current and future climate changes that are both intangible 
and very difficult to predict, resulting in an especially small pool of ‘expertise’ compared to other 
environmental problems. This starting point limits the selection of adaptation options to 
responses to predefined impacts, adding an instrumentalism to any participation process that is 
exacerbated by the ‘expert’ nature of the problem. An expert-driven, impacts-based perspective 
on adaptation actually makes inclusiveness problematic because it, 
 
Run[s] a high risk of encountering elements of local opposition, especially under 
conditions of scientific uncertainty and long-term risk. (Few et al., 2007:57).  
 
On the other hand, discussions in chapter one suggested that a ‘social-vulnerability’ approach to 
adaptation opens up the debate to a much broader range of expertise that actually necessitates 
the inclusion of local stakeholders who can provide information on the causes of vulnerability. 
From a vulnerability perspective, it is precisely these “elements of local opposition” that would 
lead to a better understanding of how vulnerability is actually experienced and can be addressed. 
Many observers have therefore tried to draw attention to the fact that ‘expert’ or ‘scientific’ 
knowledge is also constructed and situated, and that a failure to acknowledge this will have 
detrimental consequences for enabling effective, deliberative policy making. 
 
Chapter one therefore proposed that in assessing ‘inclusiveness’, analysis needs to look not only at 
the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ of participatory activities, but also at the ‘what’; the way a problem is 
framed and the influence this has on the content and quality of deliberation. For ‘inclusiveness’ to 
be achieved, participation has to enable meaningful deliberation. This requires an analysis of not 
only how problem framings impact on the dynamics of participatory spaces; but also how and why 
such problem framings have emerged.  
 
Assessing successful deliberation; deliberative process and outcomes 
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Assessing deliberative inclusiveness however, is not straightforward. As discussed in chapter one, 
there is much debate over precisely what constitutes ‘meaningful deliberation’. Dryzek (2007) 
discusses several positions, for example, those who follow “Rawlsian”23 approach suggest the 
content of any deliberative situation is based on “public reason”, carried out by all citizens, for the 
good of all, through open procedures that are accessible to all. Gutman and Thompson (1996) 
advocate for the principle of ‘reciprocity’, so arguments are made in the terms that others with 
different perspectives would nevertheless accept and be able to reason with. A Habermasian 
perspective is based on the concept of “communicative rationality”: that all discourses have a 
purpose or goal, and people affect that goal through rational argument (see chapter one). The 
validity of a claim to normative ‘truth’ depends upon a mutual understanding achieved by the 
individuals during the argument (thus ruling out coercion, deception, strategising and 
manipulation). Finally, Dryzek points to a more expansive view of deliberation that sees any kind 
of communication as valid provided that it is non-coercive, capable of inducing reflection, and of 
connecting the conversation to more general questions and principles (Dryzek, 2007:241).  
 
There is, however, general agreement that deliberation “produces something rather than 
nothing”) (ibid), so deliberation around a policy issue must produce an outcome in relation to that 
policy. Further, a pre-requisite for all of the perspectives outlined above is that everyone within 
the deliberative arena is equally capable of, and willing to, produce a rational argument; and 
equally capable of, and willing to be, ‘reasonable’ – i.e. open to changing their minds and 
preferences in light of reflection induced by the deliberative process (Dryzek, 2000).  So for 
participation to be deliberative, participants must be reasoning, and that reasoning must have an 
impact on the exercise of power in a democratic way. 
 
Thus, this discussion suggests that an assessment of the extent to which policy making can be said 
to be ‘inclusive’ (meaning deliberative, rather than just participatory) needs to consider the ‘who’, 
‘how’, and ‘what’ of deliberative participatory processes; and then also whether the outcomes of 
deliberation had an impact on policy-making.  
 
This approach is well exemplified by Fung (2007) in his assessment of deliberative governance in 
the creation of the 1990 Oregon Health Plan (Fung, 2007:175). Fung describes how during 
healthcare planning reforms, the Oregon Health Services Commission was required by the Health 
Care Act to undertake a participatory, community-based planning process. The choice of 
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 Stemming from John Rawls seminal work A Theory of Justice (1971), that discusses “justice as fairness” based on 
the principles of ‘fairness for all’.  
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deliberative institutional design adopted by the Commission included a decentralised participatory 
advisory panel to solicit public input from various public assemblies.  
 
Fung proposes that the institutional design features of selection (who participates?) and subject 
(what do people participate about?) skewed participation in the participatory assemblies towards 
a narrow band of professionals and citizens of high socio-economic status, because meetings were 
voluntary and little effort was extended towards recruiting from disadvantaged communities, so 
attendance was overwhelmingly from educated middle classes; and also, because the forum 
addressed healthcare, 70% of participants were healthcare professionals (Fung, 2007:175). 
However, Fung shows that the processes of deliberation – the ‘how’ of participation - were well 
structured; participants were actively engaged in discussions given the high stakes and high 
knowledge of the resulting audience on the subject matter; participants were given information 
materials and briefings to re-orientate them; and decisions were based on group consensus of the 
relative importance of various health-care values. Fung states that the rankings of health-care 
values from the deliberative forums were reflected in the resulting health-care policy decisions 
(Fung, 2007:176) 
 
On the one hand, this institutional design was relatively successful, in that the deliberative outputs 
of the assemblies were reflected in the policy-making process; the outcomes deliberation had an 
impact. However, it is unclear from Fung’s description whether the ‘orientation’ of participants 
presented any opportunities for participants to contest of reframe the problems under discussion, 
or whether this was a straightforward “expert teaches lay” approach. This thesis has argued that 
how participants reach a common platform for discussion is a significant factor in enabling 
meaningful deliberation. Further, the choice of ‘who deliberates’ and ‘what is deliberated about’ 
meant that there was little opportunity for non-healthcare experts and lower socio-economic 
groups to access the debate in the first place, which has significant implications for the democratic 
quality of the policy deliberation. These design choices are important when it comes to 
deliberating around climate change adaptation policy. It could be argued for example that it is the 
poorest and disenfranchised for whom public healthcare policy is most relevant, because they are 
the least likely to have access to private alternatives. Thus, it is important these groups are 
adequately represented in policy debates.  
 
This case study of the Oregon healthcare plan supports the discussions above that that choices 
around ‘who’, ‘how’, and ‘what’ of deliberation have significant implications for the inclusion of 
vulnerable people in the decision-making; and also that both deliberative processes, and 
deliberative outcomes, need to be included in assessments of deliberative governance. This 
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chapter will therefore assess these elements of deliberative institutional design in the NAPA 
process in Bangladesh. This analysis will be used to address the question: What is the evidence 
that the NAPA process in Bangladesh was inclusive?  
 
However, chapter one also showed how existing debates in deliberative politics do not pay 
adequate attention to the influence of external contexts and discourses in shaping deliberative 
processes. Taking an environmentally determinist perspective, the types of hazards and indicators 
of vulnerability are likely to be influential in shaping the adaptation priorities proposed in the 
NAPA. These will be factored in to this chapter, which will describe the key environmental 
characteristics of Bangladesh and the climate change impact projections for the country. However, 
chapter one also showed that such normative judgements on hazards and vulnerability can 
themselves be shaped and influenced by discursive contexts. For example, Maarten Hajer (1995) 
discussed how environmental “storylines” or “narratives” can dominate hegemonic discourses and 
influence the behaviour of actives within deliberation.  Similarly, Peet and Watts (1996) describe 
“regional discursive formations” as strong themes that can dominate the discursive history of a 
region and influence policy making. This chapter will therefore also examine the environmental 
narratives that have dominated environmental policy making in Bangladesh, and if and how these 
may have influenced climate change discourses in the region.  
 
Thus, the empirical section of this chapter (section 4.4) will begin with an analysis of the 
background and context to the NAPA preparation process to answer the question: “What were the 
circumstances that resulted in more or less inclusive policy-making processes?” Before using field 
study analysis to address the question: “What is the evidence that the NAPA process in 
Bangladesh was inclusive?” But first, this chapter will present the general NAPA preparation 
process, focusing on the guidance for achieving ‘local’ inclusiveness.   
 
 
4.3 The NAPA Process 
 
The NAPAs were born out of the seventh Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 7), held in 
Marrakech in 2001. COP 7 saw the establishment of specific funds for assisting the Least 
Developed Countries in managing the impacts of climate change (the LDC Fund), and the first step 
of this assistance was the funding of National Adaptation Plans of Action (see chapter three 
section 3.4 for a full discussion on the establishment of the LDC Fund and NAPAs). Guidance for 
NAPA preparation was developed by the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG) (see box 
4.1).   
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Box 4.1: The Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG) 
Source: Adapted from www.unfccc.int 
 
The LEG was also established as part of the Marrakesh Accords, and is composed of 12 “experts”, including 
five from African LDC Parties, two from Asian LDC Parties, two from small island LDC Parties, and three from 
Annex II Parties (OECD member countries). Both Bangladesh and Nepal are currently members. The 
objective of the LEG is to provide advice to LDCs on the preparation and implementation of national 
adaptation programmes of action. The LDC expert group meets twice a year.  
 
 
The LEG defines the purpose of NAPAs as a vehicle for LDCs to communicate their most “urgent 
and immediate adaptation needs” to the UNFCCC for funding from the LDC Fund. “Urgent and 
immediate needs” are defined as those for which further delay in implementation would increase 
vulnerability or increase adaptation costs at a later stage (LEG, 2002:1). Guidelines for NAPA 
project preparation prepared by the LEG recommend four key steps for NAPA preparation. These 
include:  
1. The synthesis of available information on the adverse effects of climate change and coping 
strategies, which needs to be collated and reviewed;  
2. A participatory assessment of vulnerability to current climate variability and extreme events 
and of areas where risks would increase due to climate change;  
3. The identification of key adaptation measures;  
4. The identification of prioritization criteria for selecting NAPA activities for inclusion in the 
NAPA document and for submission to the LDC Fund.  
 
Based on these steps, each country produces a NAPA document that lays out this list of priority 
project activities, which then need to then be developed into full project documents, and can then 
be submitted for funding under the LDC Fund, or to other funding sources. 
 
The annotated NAPA guidelines explicitly recognise the underlying factors related to development 
that exacerbate vulnerability, and the need to address these to build resilience to climate change 
(LEG 2002: 1) and also seem to expand the definition of adaptation beyond that of the UNFCCC by 
including adaptation to climatic variability as well as climate change. The guidelines state:  
 
Strategies to cope with current climate variability and extremes exist at the community 
level. Hence one of the functions of the NAPA is to identify urgent action needed to expand 
the current coping range and enhance resilience in a way that would promote the capacity 
to adapt to current climate variability and extremes, and consequently to future climate 
change. (LEG 2002: 1).  
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There are several key principles on which NAPA preparation should be based: Preparation should 
be ‘country driven’; NAPAs should be developed through participatory processes involving a 
variety of stakeholders across relevant government, civil society and private sectors; prominence 
given to community-level input as an important source of information; and they should be 
complementary to and build on existing development and environmental plans and programmes 
(LEG 2002:2). The NAPA guidelines emphasise the importance of participation of vulnerable 
communities in NAPA preparation, stating:  
 
The participation of men and women at the grassroots-level is essential for two reasons. 
First, they are able to provide information on current coping strategies that the NAPA seeks 
to enhance. Second, they will be affected the most by climatic impacts and hence will 
benefit the most from the actions prioritized in the NAPA…Early engagement of people at 
the grassroots level will be important in ensuring successful implementation of NAPA 
activities. (LEG, 2002: 2).  
 
In terms of the NAPA guidelines, then, NAPAs go beyond the narrow definition of adaptation 
adopted by the UNFCCC, explicitly recognising the need to address the underlying factors related 
to development that exacerbate vulnerability to climate variability and climate change; and also 
stress the importance of including vulnerable communities in the adaptation decisions that affect 
them. 
 
However, some critics have suggested that the approach taken for developing NAPAs is not 
necessarily compatible with a ‘social-vulnerability’ approach to adaptation (Schipper, 2007). For 
example, Schipper suggests that in taking a projectised approach to adaptation, adaptation is 
automatically taken as an objective or outcome, rather than a process. This contradicts a 
vulnerability-based perspective on adaptation, which involves a process of building adaptive 
capacity by creating the enabling conditions for adaptation to take place. Indeed, the notion of 
meeting ‘urgent and immediate’ needs reveals that adaptation is something that can be done in 
the short term, and not part of a longer term planning process. As noted by Schipper, from a 
vulnerability perspective,  
 
Adaptation to climate change is not as simple as designing projects, drawing up a list of 
possible adaptation measures and implementing these. It requires a solid development 
process that will ensure that the factors that create vulnerability are addressed. (Schipper, 
2007:6).  
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Therefore while seemingly expanding the framing of adaptation under the UNFCCC, in practice the 
guidelines for NAPAs appear to be constrained by it. The next sections of this chapter present the 
findings from the sub-case study of the NAPA process in Bangladesh. This study will be presented 
in two parts: First, the background and context of the NAPA process will be reviewed; second, the 
findings from the field study conducted in Noakhali, one of the sites of a proposed NAPA priority 
project, will be presented and discussed.  
 
 
4.4 Country case study part one: The context of the NAPA in Bangladesh 
 
This section presents the data collected from key informant interviews and document analysis 
undertaken in Bangladesh between 2007-2009 (see chapter two), on the contexts of hazards, 
vulnerability, and environmental policy discourses, against which the Bangladesh NAPA was 
prepared.  The section then gives a brief overview of the key features of the Bangladesh NAPA.  
 
Hazard and vulnerability context 
 
Bangladesh is frequently cited as one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change (Huq, 
2001; Huq and Ayers, 2007; Rahman and Alam, 2003; UNDP, 2007). Drawing on Blakie et al.,’s 
(1994) model of vulnerability as outlined in chapter 3, which emphasises both social and 
biophysical elements of vulnerability, Bangladesh is vulnerable to climate change both because 
its geography makes it physically exposed to climatic hazards; but also because of the socio-
economic factors that make people vulnerable to those hazards. Following on, not everyone in 
Bangladesh is equally vulnerable: some are more ‘exposed’ than others, some are more socially 
vulnerable, and social-vulnerability often drives physical exposure, which in turn can 
exacerbate social vulnerabilities.   
 
In terms of geography, Bangladesh is a coastal country on the Bay of Bengal with a flat and low-
lying topography, exposing it to major storm and cyclone events as well as coastal flooding. 
Most of Bangladesh is less than ten metres above sea level, with almost ten percent of the 
country below 1 metre. For example, between 1960 and 2002, Bangladesh experienced over 40 
cyclones with up to half a million human causalities per event (Huq and Khan, 2006). In 
November 2007, Bangladesh was hit by the tropical cyclone Sidr, with a 100 mile long front 
covering the breadth of the country and with winds up to 240 km per hour. 30 districts were 
damaged, with the 11 districts closest to the coast damaged most severely. The infrastructure 
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of more than half a million homes was affected with nearly one million all or particularly 
destroyed.  
 
Further, Bangladesh is one of the largest deltas in the world, formed by a dense network of the 
distributaries of the rivers Ganges, Brahmaputra, and the Meghna, and more than 230 major 
rivers (see map 1). 80 percent of the land is floodplain, and only in the extreme northwest do 
elevations exceed 30 metres above mean sea level. This topography makes the majority of 
Bangladesh (with the exception of the far west ‘highlands’) prone to flooding at least part of 
the year, with the floodplains of the north western, central, south central and north eastern 
regions subject to regular flooding (MOEF, 2005). The extent of flooding is exacerbated by the 
sediment loads brought by the three major Himalayan rivers, coupled with a negligible flow 
gradient, which increases congestion (Agrawala et al., 2003).  
 
 
 Map 4.1: Map of Bangladesh showing river network. Source: Adapted from 
map provided by BCAS, Dhaka.  
 
N 
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In terms of climate, Bangladesh is characterised by high temperatures, heavy rainfall, high 
humidity, and fairly marked seasonal variations.  Bangladesh experiences a heavy monsoonal 
rainfall from June to October, which amounts to two thirds of the annual rainfall, often 
resulting in severe flooding in urban areas. In the dry season, droughts are common, 
particularly when monsoonal rainfall patterns are disturbed; for example, between 1960 and 
1991, a total of 19 droughts occurred in Bangladesh (Agrawala et al 2003). The Southwest and 
Northwest regions are particularly susceptible to drought. 
 
Many of the projected impacts of climate change on Bangladesh are expected to exacerbate 
these existing environmental hazards. For example, the impacts of climate change are likely to 
include increased frequency and intensity of cyclones and extreme precipitation events; 
increased moisture stresses in the dry season; exacerbate flooding and cause salinity of 
freshwater supplies; and result in greater temperature extremes  (see box 4.2). 
 
Box 4.2 Climate change impacts in Bangladesh 
Source: Huq and Ayers, 2008 
 
Many of the projected impacts of climate change will reinforce the baseline environmental, socio-
economic and demographic stresses already faced by Bangladesh.  Climate change is likely to result in: 
 
Increased intensity of cyclone winds and precipitation 
Evidence presented in the IPCC suggests that projected increases in wind speed by the end of the 
century will contribute to enhanced storm surges and coastal flooding, and also project a 20 percent 
increase in intensity of associated precipitation that would contribute to flooding (IPCC, 2007). Cyclone 
winds are likely to increase in intensity because of the positive correlation with sea surface temperature. 
The IPCC FAR also note that climate change will be associated with greater precipitation extremes, which 
includes more intense monsoonal rainfall.  
 
Increased moisture stress during dry periods 
Climate change will exacerbate drought in Bangladesh both in terms of intensity and frequency linked to 
higher mean temperatures and potentially reduced dry season precipitation. Greater precipitation 
extremes associated with climate change also mean less rainfall in the dry season, which will increase 
water stress on those areas that already experience water shortages. This may be worse for those areas 
that depend on glacial melt water for their main dry-season water supply, as glaciers recede with rising 
temperatures.  
 
Increased flooding 
Precipitation extremes will result in increased rainwater flooding, both because of the increase in 
monsoon rains, and also increased incidences of flash floods associated with increased intensity of 
precipitation. Sea level rise will directly result in increased coastal flooding. Sea level rise in Bangladesh is 
higher than the mean average rate of global sea level rise over the past century, because of the effects 
of tectonic subsidence. (Rahman and Alam, 2003). Sea level rise is also associated with increased riverine 
flooding, because it causes more backing up of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna rivers along the delta 
(Argrawala et al., 2003). Higher temperatures may result in increased glacier melt, increasing runoff from 
the neighbouring Himalayas into the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers.  
 
Increased salinity 
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The availability of freshwater will be reduced by increased salinity intrusion into fresh water sources 
during the low flow conditions. In the coastal regions this is brought about by sea level rise resulting in 
saline water intrusion in the estuaries and into the groundwater. The effects are exacerbated by greater 
evaporation and evapotranspiration of freshwater as temperatures increase, coupled with a greater 
demand for fresh water in times of water stress.   
 
Greater temperature extremes  
Climate change is associated with hotter summers and colder winters. Temperatures in Bangladesh have 
increased about 1°C in May and 0.5 °C in November between 1985 and 1998, and further temperature 
increases are expected (Reid and Sims, 2007).  However, although the overall climate is warming, 
temperature extremes are increasing, and winter temperatures as low as 5°C have been recorded in 
January 2007, reportedly the lowest in 38 years (ibid).   
 
 
In terms of defining vulnerability to these hazards, many of the socio-economic characteristics 
of Bangladesh make it both vulnerable to environmental hazards associated with climate 
change, and limit its adaptive capacity. For example, chapters one and three both highlighted 
poverty as one of the most salient indicators of vulnerability (Ribot, 2010). Bangladesh remains 
defined as one of the “Least Developed Countries” because of its poverty indicators. These 
include a GDP per capita (PPP US$) of 1,241; a life expectancy at birth of 67.5 years; and an 
adult literacy rate of 53.5 percent (UNDP, 2009a).  The Human Development Report ranks 
Bangladesh number 140 of 177 nations, with an HDI24 value of 0.543 (UNDP, 2009). Further, 
Bangladesh’s GDP is severely threatened by climatic hazards because of its dependency on 
climate sensitive resources. Bangladesh is predominantly agricultural, with two thirds of the 
population engaged in farming activities (although more than three quarters of Bangladesh’s 
export earnings come from the garment industry) (Huq and Ayers, 2008).  
 
Everyone in Bangladesh is not equally vulnerable to climate change. For example, in a review of 
studies on vulnerability to climate change in Bangladesh, Reid and Sims (2007) suggest that the 
urban poor have been highlighted as especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, 
because of the fragility of the infrastructure of slums and squatter settlements, and the lack of 
employment security in urban areas. In the rural areas, the authors suggest that those with 
insecure land tenure, particularly the lower Adivasi castes, are also particularly vulnerable. The 
authors also suggest that the inherent gender inequalities in various social, economic and 
political institutions make women more vulnerable than men. For example, land access is 
particularly problematic for women because it is often obtained on a limited usufruct basis 
through marriage, which can leave women landless on divorce, and denies them collateral 
(Reid and Sims, 2007).  
 
                                               
24
 Human Development Index (HDI) looks beyond GDP t a broader definition of well-being. The HID provides a 
composite measure of three dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy life (measured by life 
expectancy); being educated  (measured by adult literacy and education enrolment); and having a decent standard 
of living (measured by purchasing power parity).  
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This gender aspect of vulnerability in Bangladesh was highlighted during many interviews with 
donor and NGO agencies in Bangladesh undertaken for this study (Action Aid, personal 
communication, February 2009; DfID, personal communication, February 2009; Practical 
Action, personal communication, February 2009). However, as noted in chapter one, caution is 
needed in identifying essentialist categories of vulnerability a priori to the vulnerability 
assessment, as this can overlooks the complex ways in which vulnerability is locally 
experienced and determined (see chapter one).  
 
 
Environmental narratives and policy-making in Bangladesh 
 
The environmental hazard and vulnerability context of Bangladesh has led to a strong 
environmental and development policy history centred on flood and cyclone management. 
Lewis (2009) describes how concerns about flood control rose up the international 
development agenda following disastrous floods of 1987 and 1988, which environmentalists 
had associated with increasing Himalayan deforestation upstream in the mountainous regions 
of Nepal. Lewis suggests this resulted in Bangladesh’s long standing ‘flood problem’ suddenly 
becoming a donor priority and high profile international cause, in much the same way as we 
are seeing climate change moving up the donor agenda in Bangladesh now. Lewis discusses the 
resulting high profile Bangladesh Flood Action Plan (FAP), a large scale, multi-donor project 
formally approved following international discussions around the plight of Bangladesh’s 
flooding problem at the 1989 G-7 summit. The primary pillar of the FAP was the construction of 
tall embankments alongside Bangladesh’s three main rivers, at an estimated cost of $US5-10 
billion. This mega-project was to be one the largest development projects ever undertaken 
(Lewis, 2009).   
 
However, Lewis suggests that the FAP quickly became a controversial project. First, the plan 
was conducted in a ‘top-down’ manner, where the main content of the Plan was developed in 
London under World Bank guidance, raising important issues of accountability, ownership, and 
public participation. Second, the FAP’s primary emphasis was on technical and engineering 
solutions, paying little heed to the ‘soft’ solutions that built on existing, often community-
centred, means of flood management embedded in generations of learning from dealing (or 
not) with flooding problems. For example, little attention was paid to historical experiences 
from colonial times that demonstrated how the building of embankments could actually lead 
to the silting of rivers and increase flooding problems. Third, the project relied predominantly 
on donor-country expertise from foreign contexts such as lowland water management in the 
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Netherlands, “potentially out of step with Bangladesh’s own distinctive ecology and society” 
(Lewis, 2009:6). Finally, Lewis argues that the project began to dominate the donor landscape, 
subordinating other equally pressing development priorities that may actually have been more 
conducive to reducing vulnerability to flooding. As a result of these controversies, by 1993 the 
FAP had lost momentum, and the Dhaka embankment and another built in Tangail were the 
only tangible results (Lewis, 2009).  
 
Lewis proposes that many lessons can be drawn from this history of environmental policy-
making in Bangladesh that are relevant for the climate change policy processes currently 
underway. First, Lewis draws our attention to the “crisis narratives” on environmental hazards 
that can perverse the logic of environmental policy-making. Such narratives around flooding 
are well exemplified by the communiqué from the G-7 summit in July 1989, which gave rise to 
the FAP: 
 
Bangladesh…is periodically devastated by catastrophic floods…*there is a] need for 
effective, coordinated action by the international community…to find solutions to this 
major problem which are technically, financially, and economically sound. (World 
Bank, 1989; cited Lewis, 2009:5).  
 
The case of the FAP in Bangladesh demonstrates how environmental ‘crisis’ narratives can 
dominate environmental policy-making, subverting the importance of the historical and 
contextual factors that drive vulnerability, as well as the often localised and non-technical 
solutions to environmental problems that already exist. However, similar essentialised crisis 
narratives have begun to emerge around climate change in Bangladesh. Ayers and Huq (2009a) 
suggest that climate change has become the new environmental-crisis ‘face’ of Bangladesh, 
with a new climate discourse coming to dominate the development agenda. In much the same 
way as Lewis’ description of flooding subsuming donor priorities in the 1980s and 1990s, since 
2000 climate change adaptation has become the new holy grail of development in Bangladesh. 
Ayers and Huq state: 
 
Having previously been the ‘face’ of environmental fragility, Bangladesh is fast 
becoming the example…in climate change adaptation, used by many donors to 
showcase action and investment in adaptation.  (Ayers and Huq, 2009a:760) 
 
Much of the climate change narrative in Bangladesh focuses around coastal flooding and 
cyclone management, with far less attention in the international agenda – both politically and 
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in the media – being paid to, for example, the implications for drought in the Far West regions. 
This is likely because climate change is in many ways building on existing the environmental 
problem discourses of cyclones and flooding.  For example, Lewis describes a ‘climate refugee’ 
narrative as a case in point, which describes the landlessness that will be caused by sea-level 
rise, potentially displacing millions people around the coastal belt of Bangladesh. This narrative 
has become a popular tag-line for highlighting the urgency with which Bangladesh needs to 
adapt to the impacts of climate change, exemplified by various newspaper articles with 
headlines such as “Bangladesh faces climate refugee nightmare” (Reuters news agency, April 
14th 2008, cited Lewis, 2009).   
 
It is true that sea-level rise and an increase in frequency and intensity of storms and cyclones 
associated with climate change, is likely to increase coastal land erosion and increase pressure 
on infrastructure and livelihoods of coastal residents. Nevertheless, the new ‘climate refugee’ 
narrative suggests that people relocating in light of environmental stresses is somehow a new 
phenomenon only associated with climate change, rather than a result of the inherent fragility 
of people’s livelihoods in relation to a constantly changing landscape of eroding rivers and 
shore lands. As Lewis suggests: 
 
There is a danger that the crisis discourse of climate change is beginning to obscure 
other deep-rooted  causes of insecurity, and the policy efforts to address these 
problems. (Lewis, 2009:7).  
 
As such, Lewis cautions that climate change policy should build on the lessons learned from 
cases such as the FAP, and ensure that the emergence of ‘crisis narratives’ does not obscure 
the importance of the factors driving vulnerability to these crises.  
 
 
Overview and key features of the Bangladesh NAPA 
 
The Bangladesh NAPA was developed against this contextual backdrop. Bangladesh was one of the 
first countries to complete its NAPA in 2005. NAPA preparation was led by the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests under the Government of Bangladesh, with the United Nations 
Development Programme as the implementing agency. The final NAPA document was based on 
background papers prepared by 6 sectoral working groups, each coordinated by either a 
government or non-government lead agency. These were: i) Agriculture, Fisheries and Livestock; 
ii) Forestry, Biodiversity and Land-use coordinated; iii) Water, Coastal Zone, Natural Disaster and 
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Health; iv) Livelihood, Gender, Local Governance and Food Security; v) Industry and Infrastructure; 
and vi) Policies and Institutes. During the course of NAPA preparation, four sub-national and one 
national public consultation workshops were held, the outputs of which were incorporated into 
the final NAPA document.  
 
The Bangladesh NAPA identified coastal communities in Bangladesh as particularly vulnerable to 
the impacts of climate change, including salinity intrusion and inundation of coastal lands as a 
result of sea level rise as well as exposure to more frequent extreme climatic events. Without 
adaptation, the NAPA suggests that low lying deltaic floodplains of Bangladesh are likely to 
experience a submergence of 17.5 percent of the country’s land mass associated with climate-
change induced sea-level rise in coastal regions by approximately 2030, which could result in the 
displacement of 6-10 million people by 2050, and 20 million by 2100 (MOEF, 2005). 
 
The Bangladesh NAPA proposes 15 projects that would contribute towards meeting Bangladesh’s 
‘urgent and immediate’ adaptation needs (see box 4.3). One priority project has so far been 
submitted to the GEF for funding from Bangladesh, targets coastal communities, and is entitled, 
“Community-Based Adaptation to Climate Change through Coastal Afforestation in Bangladesh”. 
The fact that only one project has gone forward for funding illustrates an ongoing frustration by 
LDCs who have completed NAPAs. Despite NAPAs highlighting “urgent and immediate” adaptation 
needs, global responses to these identified needs are far from “immediate”. Indeed, many 
observers have remarked how there is not in fact enough funding in the LDC Fund to fund all NAPA 
priorities (Mace,2006). This supports the proposition put forward in chapter three that the LDC 
Fund was developed more to appease LDCs in the climate change negations, rather than a sincere 
attempt to ensure a ‘bottom-up’ and inclusive adaptation planning in the most vulnerable 
countries.   
 
 The objective of the Bangladesh NAPA priority project is to improve the resilience of coastal 
populations, settlements and ecosystems in areas exposed to coastal hazards.  The proposed 
project is based on the priority intervention highlighted in the NAPA, namely the “reduction of 
climate change hazards through coastal afforestation with community participation” (MOEF, 
2005:24). The core components of the project are presented in Box 4.4. The first component of 
the project focuses on a coastal afforestation programme through a community-led mangrove 
plantation programme (MOEF, 2008:2).  
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Box 4.3: The final list of NAPA priority projects 
Source: MOEF, 2005 
 
1. Reduction of climate change hazards through Coastal afforestation with community participation 
2. Providing drinking water to coastal communities to combat enhanced salinity due to sea level rise 
3. Capacity building for integrating Climate Change in planning. Designing of infrastructure, conflict 
management and land water zoning for water management institutions 
4. Climate change and adaptation information dissemination to vulnerable community for emergency 
preparedness measures and awareness raising on enhanced climatic disasters 
5. Construction of flood shelter, and information and assistance centre to cope with enhanced 
recurrent floods in major floodplains 
6. Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change into policies and programmes in different sectors. 
7. Inclusion of climate change issues in curricula, at secondary and tertiary educational institution 
8. Enhancing resilience of urban infrastructure and industries  to impacts of climate change 
9. Development of eco-specific adaptive knowledge (including indigenous knowledge) on adaptation 
to climate variability to enhance adaptive capacity for future climate change 
10. Promotion of research on drought, flood and saline tolerant varieties of crops to facilitate 
adaptation in future 
11. Promoting adaptation to coastal crop agriculture to combat salinity 
12. Adaptation to agricultural systems in areas prone to enhanced flash flooding – North East and 
Central region 
13. Adaptation to fisheries in areas prone to enhanced flooding in North East and Central Region 
through adaptive and diversified fish culture practices 
14. Promoting adaptation to coastal fisheries through culture of salt tolerant fish special in coastal 
areas of Bangladesh 
15. Exploring options for insurance to cope with enhanced climatic disasters 
 
 
Box 4.4: Core components of coastal afforestation project (Source: Adapted from MOEF 2008:ii) 
 
1. The project “Community-Based Adaptation to Climate Change through Coastal Afforestation in 
Bangladesh Government” proposes a project to reduce the vulnerability of coastal communities to 
climate change-induced risks in 5 coastal districts (Barguna, Patuakhali, Bhola, Noakhali, and Chittagong) 
under 4 coastal forest divisions. The project is based on the following components:  
2. Enhancing the resilience of coastal communities and protective ecosystems through community-led 
adaptation interventions, focusing on coastal afforestation and livelihood diversification;  
3. Enhancing national, sub-national, and local capacities of government authorities and sectoral planners to 
understand climate risk dynamics in coastal areas and implement appropriate risk reduction measures;  
4. Reviewing and revising coastal management practices and policies with a view on increasing community 
resilience to climate change impacts in coastal areas; and  
5. Developing a functional system for the collection, distribution and internalization of climate-related 
knowledge. 
 
 
 
The next sections of this chapter will assess the extent to which the Bangladesh NAPA reveals and 
communicates the reality of how risk is experienced at the local level; and whether the coastal 
afforestation project represents the most appropriate response measure for facilitating 
adaptation amongst the most vulnerable groups. These outcomes are then discussed in relation to 
the participatory processes used under the NAPA, under the three aspects of deliberative 
 129 
institutional design identified by this thesis: The who? How? And what? Of participation and 
deliberation.  
 
4.5 Country case study part 2: Outputs from the field study: Does the Bangladesh NAPA 
reflect the diversity of vulnerability experiences at the ‘local’ level?  
 
Overview of field study  
 
This section addresses the question: What is the evidence for inclusive adaptation policy-making in 
Bangladesh? By considering whether the NAPA project document25 reveals the disaggregated 
ways in which risk experienced at the local level. This section presents and analyses the findings 
from a field study carried out in Noakhali, one of the sites for the first proposed project to be 
implemented from NAPA (see map 4.2 and box 4.5). The details of the methodology for this study 
are described in chapter two, but are briefly summarised here.  
 
The purpose of the field study in Noakhali was to better understand the diversity in local 
perceptions of risk, causes of vulnerability, and reactions to the NAPA project proposal. Noakhali is 
a coastal district in the South-eastern part of Bangladesh.  The coastal side of Noakhali is 
protected by a coastal embankment, although the land that has accreted beyond the 
embankment is increasingly being settled, largely by migrants from the nearby island Hatiya, who 
have lost their land due to erosion.  
 
Fieldwork was undertaken to Noakhali, with research activities including key informant interviews 
with local stakeholders including government, NGOs and community-based organisations; 
household (HH) surveys of 50 households each in two Upazilas (sub-districts) of Noakhali; and 
transect walks which crossed and extended beyond the embankment. Four sets of focus group 
discussions were held: three with the main livelihood groups of the area as categorised by the 
District Commissioners Office (agricultural farmers (small landowners); agricultural/other day 
labourers (landless); and fishermen); and one female only group, as the other three groups were 
exclusively men (see photographs 4.1 and 4.2). The purpose of the fieldwork was to glean 
information around for example asset holdings and gender/occupation of respondents; 
perceptions of ‘risk’ (environmental and other risks); coping strategies; and opinions on the NAPA 
project proposal (see chapter 1 for full details of research methodology). Given the small sample 
size of respondents, it should be noted that these findings are intended to reflect the opinions of 
respondents only, which may or may not reflect patterns across the community. This section 
                                               
25
 From here, the “NAPA” will refer to the NAPA coastal afforestation project document. 
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considers the results of this study against the NAPA ‘outputs’ in Bangladesh; the risks and 
adaptation priorities identified in the NAPA document. 
Box 4.5: Contextual background of Noakhali District  
Source: Matin, 2007. Risk Assessment and Evaluation of Probability of Extreme Hydrological Events and 
Recommendation on Subsequent Disaster Management for Noakhali Sadar and Subarno char thanas: Final 
Report. Unpublished report obtained from IUCN, Bangladesh.  
 
Noakhali district itself has a population of approximately 2,500000, (the population of Noakhali Town 
75,000) and is divided into six Upzilas and five municipalities. The Upzilas are Noakhali sadar, Begumganj, 
Chatkhil, Companiganj, Hatiya and Senbagh; the municipalities are Begumganj (Chawmuhani), Companiganj 
(Bashurhat), Noakhali Sadar, Chatkhil, and Kabirhat (Sadar). The coastal side of Noakhali is protected by a 
coastal embankment, although the land that has accreted beyond the embankment is increasingly being 
settled, largely by migrants from the nearby island Hatiya, who have lost their land due to erosion.  
 
Key facts and figures for Noakhlai:  
 The literacy rate among the town people is 60.7%. 
 Main occupations:  
 Agriculture 30.27% 
 agricultural labour 16.99% 
 wage labourer 2.86% 
 commerce 12.23% 
 service19.39% 
 transport 2.46% 
 fishing 1.4% 
 Land-use:  
 Total cultivable land 229385 ha,  
 fallow land 17136 ha. 
 Land control: 
 21% landless 
 41% marginal 
 21% small holding 
 14% intermediate 
 Main crops: Paddy, peanuts, pulses, chilly, sugarcane, potato 
 Main fruits: Mango, jackfruit, papaya, coconut, banana, litchi, betel nut, palm 
 Fisheries, dairies and poultries: Dairy 62, poultry 129, fishery 60, hatchery 32, artificial breeding centre 
1, government breeding centre 1.  
 Communication facilities: Roads: Metalled 804 km, semi-metalled 485 km, earthen road 2274 km; water 
ways 30 nautical miles, ferry ghat 1, railways 28 km, rail station 7. 
 
 
Box 4.6 Other government, NGO and CBO activities in the district 
 
Other government, NGO and community activity in Noakhali was investigated in order to better understand 
patterns of social organisation and mobilisation. This analysis was driven by the premise that the least 
vulnerable are likely to also be the least socially organised groups, and that building adaptive capacity 
should learn from existing patterns of social organisation and autonomous adaptive practices already being 
undertaken. An institutional mapping exercise was undertaken with a local IUCN office and local NGO, the 
Socio-economic Development Organisation (SDO), and supplementary information was gleaned from 
interviews with all local stakeholders. 
 
In terms of government activities in the district, government is organised according to (in decreasing 
hierarchy): District, Upazila (sub-district), Union (village clusters), and village. Central government 
programmes in the area related to climate change included an Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
Programme (ICZMP), which covers the whole of the coastal belt. At the Upzila level local government 
officers including for land, agriculture, engineering and fisheries, are responsible for implementing central 
government decisions. For example, the Government Engineering and Development Officer (LEGD) 
implements district-wide structural programmes including construction and maintenance of roads, cyclone 
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shelters, and market places.  District level officers work in partnership with donors and NGOs on 
implementation.  
 
Local priorities are set by the Union Chairman, the local elected official who is directly accountable to the 
electorate. In the Noakhali Union of Char Clarke, the Union Chairman stated that the Union office worked 
directly with donors, but did not think that NGOs were relevant partners. The Chairman also described a 
disconnect between the Union level and central government.  
 
Direct donor-funded activities in the area included the Danida
26
 funded “Regional Fisheries and Livestock 
Development Component” (RFLDC) of the Agricultural Sector Programme Support in Bangladesh. This 
programme worked in partnership with Union level of government and other donor/government 
collaborations such as CDSP [get more details], as well as local community-based organisations, the 
strengthening of which was one of the objectives of the programme.  
 
International NGOs active in the area included IUCN, Care, Oxfam, Action Aid and the Red Crescent. These 
worked through local NGO partners (for example, SDO is the implementing partner for IUCN, while Care and 
Oxfam fund the activities of Sagarika) and coordinated with local government, for example Red Crescent 
implements awareness raising programmes for storms and cyclone warnings in collaboration with the 
Union-level government. The majority of the national NGOs (such as Grameen and BRAC) and local NGOs 
provide micro-credit services. Many respondents were critical of the role of microcredit in building the 
capacity of the most vulnerable, because of the size of loans and the ability to pay back that would be 
required.  
 
There was notably little government, NGO or donor funded work beyond the embankment. Evidence of 
social organisation here was also poor, with no community-based organisation or community ‘hub’.  
                                               
26
 There is a long history of Danish support to the Noakhali region dating back to the 1970s 
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 Map 4.2: Noakhali District, Bangladesh. Source: Author. 
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Photograph 4.1: Focus group discussion with a group of women in Noakhali. November 2008. 
 
 
 
Photograph 4.2: Focus group discussion with a group of farmers in Noakhali.  November 2008. 
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Data analysis: Perceptions of risk and vulnerability from respondents in Noakhali 
 
The first area of investigation was around local perceptions of risk, and how these compared to 
those identified in the NAPA project document. The NAPA project document highlights four key 
physical effects of climate change for the coastal belt of Bangladesh: increasing salinity trends in 
coastal freshwater resources, growing drainage congestion, dynamic changes in coastal 
morphology, and a decline in the functioning of protective ecosystems (MOEF, 2008:ii). In the 
target district of Noakhali, the specific problems of cyclones, tidal bores, river erosion and 
drainage congestion were prioritised.  
 
HH survey data was used to get an overview of the types and extent of climate-related impacts 
that were felt to present a risk and prioritized by residents in Noakhali. Each impact mentioned by 
HH survey respondents was recorded, and the most popular impacts were grouped into three 
‘hazard categories’ according to how they were discussed by respondents. Respondents tended to 
discuss storms, cyclones and tidal bores as one type of climatic hazard; salinity intrusion and 
waterlogging as a second; and river erosion as a third. Other hazards mentioned were either only 
mentioned once or twice or did not relate to climatic factors (for example, arsenic contamination 
in drinking water was also a concern for many people but could not be related to climatic 
conditions). These impacts were then ranked according to the number of times they were 
mentioned in the HH survey by different respondents: 
1 = Mentioned by 46 /50 respondents 
2 = mentioned by 40/50 respondents 
3 = mentioned by 32/50 respondents 
 
Table 4.1 presents the results from this analysis: 
 
 
Table 4.1: Impacts and risks prioritised by HH survey respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact Rank 
Waterlogging and 
salinity intrusion 
 
1 
Storms and cyclones; 
tidal bores 
 
2 
River erosion 
 
3 
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Table 4.1 shows that the impacts of greatest concern did overlap strongly with those identified by 
the NAPA document, with the addition of salinity intrusion, which the NAPA document does raise 
as a priority in neighboring regions.  
 
However, further analysis of the HH survey data showed that the priorities given to impacts 
differed among respondents, and that these differences correlated closely with the asset base of 
respondents. Each time a hazard was mentioned, respondents were asked to rate it as ‘high’, 
‘medium’, or ‘low’, in relation to the other hazards that they raised. “Asset base” was calculated 
through information contained in HH surveys relating to land ownership, livestock ownership, 
housing type, other relevant holdings. Asset base has been categorised as follows (the categories 
are relative to each other and are intended to reflect general patterns within the study group  
rather than be accurate indicators of wealth and poverty, which is beyond the remit of this study): 
 
High: Land (over 5 acres) 
 Livestock (over 5 cattle/goats; over 10 ducks/chickens; other) 
House owned; and has some of the following features: solid structure; over 3 rooms; 
separate toilet; separate cooking area 
Other assets: Might include ponds; boats; savings (although this was a sensitive question) 
 
Medium: Land (between 1-5 acres) 
 Livestock (2-4 cattle/goats; 5-10 ducks/chickens; other) 
House owned; and has some of the following features: 2 rooms or over; fairly solid 
structure 
 Some other assets, as above 
 
Low:  Less than the above.  
 
Other issues of access were also taken into account when categorising respondents. These 
included: Access to education (children in school, highest education grade of family member); 
access to healthcare; access to electricity/communications; microfinance (access to loans; ability 
to repay loans).  
 
The data analysis took an average of “highs”, “mediums”, and “lows” of risk perceptions and 
compared them to the asset base of respondents. The results are presented in table 4.2:  
 
Table 4.2: Impacts and risks prioritised by asset base 
Impact Perceived level of risk 
 High asset base Medium asset base Low asset base 
Storms and cyclones; tidal 
bores 
Low Medium High 
Waterlogging and salinity 
intrusion 
 
High High High 
River erosion 
 
Medium Medium High 
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Table 4.2 shows that the priority given to different risks differs according to asset base. It should 
be noted that the data presented in table 4.2 is intended to reflect perceived risks only for 
different groups.  This is problematic for comparing risk perceptions across different groups. 
Therefore rather than ranking risks across groups, this analysis ranks risks within groups, relative 
to other risks. It is this ranking that is then compared across groups. So, for example, while we 
cannot say that lower income groups perceived storms as a greater risk than high income groups, 
we can say that for lower income groups, storms presented the greatest relative risk, while for 
high income groups storms were perceived as a low risk relative to other perceived risks.  
 
  Significantly, low asset groups rated all risks as “high risk”, while higher asset groups felt 
themselves to be less ‘at risk’ in general, supporting the contention that poverty is a salient 
indicator of vulnerability. Further in depth discussions with some respondents revealed that one 
of the reasons for this was that higher asset groups resided on more expensive land that was 
protected by an embankment and had more secure housing structures; and has established 
systems in place for managing water-related hazards, including irrigation systems and rainwater 
collection for drinking water. Thus, higher asset groups were more resilient to climate-related 
hazards and had the resources to adapt; lower asset groups, did not (see photos 4.3-4.7).  
 
In addition, high asset respondents felt that waterlogging and salinity intrusion presented a major 
risk. Further discussion revealed this was because the income of most high asset respondents 
came from privately owned farmland, so salinity and waterlogging presented a significant threat 
to their livelihoods.  
 
The ‘impacts’ categories gleaned from HH surveys were used as the basis for more open and 
detailed focus group discussions (FGDs). During these discussions, groups were asked why they 
felt the climate change hazards presented a risk (see photos 4.1 and 4.2).  
 
The results from these discussions have been combined with HH survey data and summarized in 
table 4.3, and show that the reasons given for why impacts presented risks differed between 
groups. For example, women raised salinity intrusion as a problem for health; where as farmers 
discussed it in relation to agricultural productivity of the land. Interestingly, women respondents 
perceived all climate change impacts as ‘high risk’ regardless of their asset base, and when 
questioned further said this was because each hazard either presented a risk to their families or 
the livelihoods on which their families depended. They were seen as deeply interconnected for 
family wellbeing.   
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During more detailed discussion in FGDs, all groups placed emphasis on the non-climatic factors 
that made people vulnerable, rather than the impact itself. Table 4.4 summarizes the range of 
comments made during HH surveys and FGDs related to why impacts presented a risk; the 
underlying vulnerabilities which underpinned the risks; and suggestions for adapting to the risks.  
For example, waterlogging was mentioned as a major problem in some areas, but was attributed 
to government-facilitated polder development projects that reduce water flows and encourage 
the siltation of waterways, rather than in climatic terms.  
 
The NAPA disaggregates vulnerability geographically, citing different climatic hazards in different 
target districts. In terms of ‘the most vulnerable’, the NAPA document considers the relationship 
between livelihoods and adaptive capacity, and identifies key vulnerable groups as small-scale 
farmers and rural wage labourers. The vulnerability of wage labourers is discussed in terms of the 
secondary impacts of: 
 
Physical vulnerabilities, such as lack of cultivable land and climate stressors, [that] affect 
agriculture and therefore employment opportunities available to wage labourers. (MOEF, 
2008:12). 
 
During the FGD with wage labourers, respondents confirmed that they felt extremely exposed and 
vulnerable to climatic stressors, rating all climate-related risks as “high risk”  (see table 4.3), but 
for different reasons: these groups were the poorest, and so resided on the cheapest or free land 
that was beyond the embankment. While these groups were therefore the most ‘exposed’ to 
climatic risks, the focus of discussions was on the lack of access to government goods and services, 
very little NGO attention, little social organization or potential for social mobilisation, high poverty 
rates, low literacy rates, and insecure land tenure. The lack of NGO and government activity 
outside the embankment was evident, and attributed by some NGO workers to the need for them 
to demonstrate results: the situation outside the embankment was seen as too difficult to tackle 
(see photos 4.3-4.7 and box 4.7).  
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Table 4.3: Impacts and risks prioritised by community subgroup
Impact Agricultural farmers (small 
landowners) 
Agricultural/other day labourers 
(landless) 
Fishermen Women 
Type of risk Perceived 
level of 
risk 
Type of risk Perceived 
level of 
risk 
Type of risk Perceived 
level of 
risk 
Type of risk Perceived 
level of 
risk 
Storms and 
cyclones; tidal 
bores 
Risk to agricultural 
productivity (destroys 
crops; erodes land; 
leaches soil); risk to 
income security 
Medium Risk to personal safety; 
risk to personal assets 
High Sometimes risk to income 
security as prevents ability 
to fish (although can also 
increase catch); high risk to 
personal safety 
Medium Risk to personal safety 
(women less likely to 
use cyclone shelters 
than men); risk to 
household assets 
(infrastructure and 
livestock); risk to food 
security (where storms 
destroy subsistence 
crops) 
High 
Waterlogging 
and salinity 
intrusion 
 
Risk to agricultural 
productivity; risk to 
long term income 
generation  
High Risk to income 
generation as less work 
available 
High Risk to subsistence 
farming/alternative 
livelihood sources (most 
fishermen also seasonal 
farmers/day labourers) 
Low Risk to health when 
salinity infiltrates 
drinking water 
High 
River erosion 
 
Risk to loss of land Medium Risk to homesteads High Risk to homesteads Medium Risk to homesteads and 
personal assets; risk to 
familial wellbeing as 
frequent moving 
uproots families 
High 
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Table 4.4: Risks, vulnerability and adaptation options to climate change impacts as defined by respondents in Noakhali  
Impact Types of risk Determinants of vulnerability Adaptation options 
Storms and 
cyclones; tidal 
bores 
 Risk to agriculture and 
livestock (risk to 
income security; food 
security) 
 Risk to infrastructure 
 Risk to health and 
personal safety 
 Risk to fishers (safety 
and income security; 
although often results 
in  increases in catch 
during turbulent 
weather) 
 Proximity of cheap or free agricultural/homestead land is 
in most exposed locations  
 Few government or NGO services in most exposed 
locations 
 Lack of agricultural and household insurance 
 Poor access to food markets when subsistence crops fail 
 Lack of secure food storage 
 Poor quality infrastructure 
 Few savings to assist rebuilding/aid financial recovery 
 Lack of/quality of cyclone shelters 
 Access to healthcare (distance to healthcare services; poor 
quality of those that do exist; lack of affordability) 
 Financial pressure for fishers to go out in stormy weather, 
pressure to meet loan repayments 
 Lack of alternative non climate-sensitive livelihoods 
 Accessible agricultural/household insurance schemes 
 Secure food storage 
 Improved roads to increase access to markets 
 Access to better microfinance/relief from loan repayments 
during times of stress 
 Reinforced housing infrastructure, access to better building 
materials 
 Reinforcement of embankment 
 Available/affordable land in less exposed areas 
 More and improved cyclone shelters so people can respond to 
early storm warnings 
 Provision for livestock in cyclone shelters 
 Increased access to better healthcare facilities 
 Sanitation infrastructure  
 Relief from microfinance repayments during times of stress 
Waterlogging 
and salinity 
intrusion 
 
  Risk to agriculture  
 Risk to health from 
saline drinking water  
 Government-facilitated polder development projects 
encourage the siltation of waterways 
 Lack of adequate drainage and water management  
 Reliance on freshwater crops, lack of alternative incomes 
so no employment/income during periods of waterlogging 
 Poor quality drinking water systems 
 Distance to/accessibility of healthcare 
 Saline resistant crops 
 Freshwater wells and ponds 
 Improved drainage systems 
 Improved access to better healthcare 
 Awareness raising about water management; better 
engagement with local government to voice concerns  
 Better microcredit systems  
 Access to alternative and seasonal livelihood options 
River erosion 
 
 Risk infrastructure 
 Risk to home security 
 Risk to subsistence 
farming 
 Few assets and savings result in difficulty in relocating  
 Relocation on newly accreted ‘char’ lands which are 
exposed, vulnerable, few government/NGO services 
 Problematic informal land tenure systems in place that are 
open to corruption 
 Poor soil quality makes homestead farming difficult 
  Reinforcing of charlands and homesteads to resist erosion 
 Savings/transferable assets 
 Secure land tenure systems  
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During the same FGD, river erosion was stated as a significant risk by those living on “Chars”. Chars 
are new lands created by accretion that quickly become inhabited with some of the poorest and 
most marginalised people, despite the increased vulnerability to storms and cyclones here (Huq 
and Khan, 2006). Land tenure issues on the chars are problematic, with the land being officially 
government owned, but with informal local land tenure systems in place. The major cause of 
vulnerability on the char lands was cited as a result of the minimal services provided to newly 
formed chars and poor soil quality. The NAPA also discusses the problem of land tenure issues on 
the chars, but in quite a different ‘risk’ context: the impact of Char settlement patterns on the 
‘natural barriers’ that mitigate the impacts of storms, rather than the relationship between 
settlement patterns and vulnerability to these impacts. The NAPA states:  
 
Local communities receiving the land [Char land from the Government] begin to build 
settlements, which lead to the destruction of coastal forest and exposure to cyclones and 
storm surges. (MOEF, 2008:12). 
 
Therefore both the NAPA and the fieldwork findings revealed similar ‘exposure’ of the 
communities in Noakhali to similar climate change impacts. However there were two significant 
differences in the way climatic risks were discussed. First, findings from the field revealed much 
more nuanced disaggregation of vulnerability beyond geographic terms, which was influenced by 
livelihoods, asset base, and gender. Secondly, the NAPA frames the risks presented by the climate 
change impacts in terms of the physical implications of the impacts, such as wage labourers being 
exposed to the secondary impacts of climate events on agriculture. During focus group 
discussions, however, risks were framed in terms of factors that led to vulnerability in the first 
place; wage labourers were vulnerable because of their inability to access services and resources 
that would allow them to better cope with climate events, or that would enable them to relocate 
to less exposed areas.  
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Photograph 4.3: The embankment to protect the land and residents of Noakhali from flooding and storm surges. 
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Photographs 4.4 and 4.5: Shelters beyond the embankment, very close to the shoreline, exposed to extreme weather events and with few 
government or Ngo services 
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Photographs 4.6 and 4.7: Example of a home inside the embankment. This house has been supported by the NGO IUCN – it has been raised off the ground to protect 
from flooding, and has been reinforced with wooden plinths to protect from storm damage. 
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Adaptation priorities of respondents in Noakhali 
 
In terms of adaptation options, the suggestions from both HH survey data and focus group 
discussions focused on interventions that would reduce vulnerability to climatic impacts, as well as 
interventions that would address impacts directly. Proposed adaptations included (see table 4.4): 
More and better cyclone shelters (prioritised by those living close to the coastline); crop insurance 
and better water management systems to manage waterlogged and salinated land (raised by 
farmers); improved housing; more schools and better access to healthcare (raised by women); 
improved roads; reinforcement of existing embankment, and a new embankment (highlighted by 
those living directly behind the fragile embankment); and lower interest microcredit; more 
government support; and seasonal labour options (raised by the landless labourers residing 
beyond the embankment, as well as fishermen).  
 
Coastal afforestation was rarely raised independently as a priority adaptation option; however, 
when prompted, coastal afforestation was generally considered a good idea, which could provide 
employment during planting and, through management, would have some impact on reducing the 
severity of cyclones, storm surges, and saline water intrusion. However, the sustainability of 
benefits from coastal afforestation was questioned. First, it was argued by the local Government 
offices and confirmed during the FGD with wage labourers, that planting mangroves beyond the 
embankment would displace many of the people who lived there, thereby actually exacerbating 
the vulnerability of the most vulnerable groups.  
 
Second, the experience of earlier government plantation schemes had shown that deforestation 
had followed. Several reasons were given, including a lack of local participation in forest 
management, few local benefits from the plantation, the need for land, and financial gain. It was 
suggested that any afforestation project must be accompanied by a livelihood diversification and 
resettlement programme for communities affected by the scheme. Finally, it was mentioned that 
afforestation would not make a significant difference to the risk of the embankment breaching, 
felt by those respondents residing behind it be one of the more significant threats related to 
climatic hazards.  
 
The proposed NAPA project also documents many of these issues, reviewing past coastal 
afforestation projects and noting the reasons for their failure that echo those cited above. The 
NAPA addresses these issues by ensuring that: 
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Coastal communities will be actively involved in mangrove afforestation, and the 
development of climate resilient livelihoods, which will improve the sustainability of 
ecosystems needed to protect against climate-change induced hazards. (MOEF, 2008:21).  
 
Other supporting project components include creating fresh-water reservoirs for dry season 
agriculture, clustering villages in raised lands, creating community ponds for domestic and small-
scale irrigation, harvesting rainwater, securing ground water provisions, intensifying brackish 
water aquaculture, and strengthening hazard early warning (MOEF, 2008:22). 
 
However, the emphasis of the NAPA document is on protecting the physical barrier to reduce 
climate change impacts, stating that encouraging alternative livelihoods would reduce land 
clearing and other threats to protective buffer ecosystems (MOEF, 2008:22). Again this frames the 
climate risk in terms of climatic impacts, resulting in prioritization of adaptation options that 
provide a physical barrier to increased storms, cyclones, and saline water inundation from sea 
level rise. This contrasts to the community responses that prioritised the need for livelihood 
diversification as an adaptive end in itself that would enable some of the most vulnerable groups 
to better cope with these impacts, and also reduce pressure on ecosystem services.  
 
The other supporting project components are similarly impacts focused. For example, when 
discussing the risks of storms and cyclones with fishermen, the proposal of more and improved 
hazard early warning systems was raised. However, the FGD with fishermen revealed that for 
some, provision of information was not the problem, as radios had already been provided to 
fishermen by a local Red Crescent programme to ensure storm warnings could be received. 
Rather, pressure to pay back micro-finance loans meant that fishermen were forced to go out to 
sea when conditions were bad regardless of storm warnings, because turbulent waters were more 
productive. One group of fisherman even described loan collectors confiscating radios to 
encourage fishermen to go out in bad weather, as this would increase the likelihood of timely loan 
repayments. The vulnerability of these fishermen was therefore caused by financial pressure to 
continue to fish regardless of the climatic hazards they faced. In this case, fishermen stated that a 
preferable adaptation option would be providing another, less risky, means of enabling them to 
pay back their debts.  
 
The adaptation options identified by the NAPA are therefore based on a framing of risk that 
prioritizes physical exposure to climatic impacts.  While many interviewees noted that these could 
be beneficial to the community in reducing exposure, the adaptation options prioritized by 
respondents that would reduce vulnerability were based on a different framing of risk that 
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focused on addressing the factors related to development that made people vulnerable to climatic 
impacts in the first place. Given that the NAPA claims to give precedence to “The participation of 
men and women at the grassroots-level”, (LEG, 2002:2) why should this discrepancy exist? The 
next section explores the participatory processes used in NAPA preparation.  
 
 
Participatory processes under the NAPA preparation in Bangladesh  
 
This section presents data from key informant interviews with members of the NAPA preparation 
team and other engaged stakeholders, together with document analysis from key NAPA 
documents, to assess the participatory processes undertaken in the design of the Bangladesh 
NAPA. This information will be analysed in terms of  ‘who’ was included in the NAPA preparation 
process; ‘how’ they were included; and ‘what’ the content of participatory processes focused on. 
A timeline of the key events in the NAPA preparation process is presented in Annex 4.  
 
First, in relation to ‘who’ was included in the NAPA consultations, the key avenue for ‘local’ 
inclusion in the NAPA preparation process in Bangladesh was through “regional consultation 
workshops”. ‘Local people’ are described as one of three groups of stakeholders (the other two 
being a high level steering committee of Government and non-governmental experts; and a 
multidisciplinary team of experts and sectoral working groups who had the responsibility of 
analysing vulnerability) (MOEF, 2005:43). Representatives of ‘the local people’ were drawn from 
the local government, local level non-government organisations, farmers, and women. These 
groups were defined by the NAPA preparation team, and no participants were invited from 
beyond the embankment, identified by this case study as one of the most vulnerable groups. The 
reason given was that the lack of social organisation of this group meant that accessing them for 
inclusion in such a workshop was logistically problematic.  
 
The workshops therefore did consult with ‘local’ people, however only a small number were 
invited to participate, of which some were (non-elected) local government officials. Those selected 
for participation were done so based on availability and ease of attendance, so they were also 
likely to be among the most socially included. As respondents identified social inclusion as a key 
factor for resilience, the invitees cannot be said to be representative of the most vulnerable, or to 
serve their interests in such a forum. In addition, experience suggests that the presence of 
politically powerful local stakeholders may affects the dynamics of participation, either resulting in 
attempts to serve vested interests of the participation process, or inhibiting discussions on the role 
of effective local institutions in enabling adaptation (Bassett and Zeuli, 2000). This evidence 
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around the process of NAPA development supports the contention that ‘globally’ governed 
problems tend to aggregate ‘the community’, resulting in representative and invited participation 
techniques (Cornwall, 2000). 
 
In terms of how workshops were structured, the workshops had firm objectives from the outset. 
One of the objectives of the regional level workshops was to identify existing problems related to 
variability, extremes and climate change; yet, the regional level workshops came late in the stage 
of NAPA preparation when the climatic risks had already been defined, with the key risks in the 
South-West region of Bangladesh noted as, 
 
Part of coastal area with salinity and freshwater availability problems. It is anticipated that 
salinity intrusion will increase and freshwater availability will decrease in these areas 
particularly in the dry season. (MOEF, 2005:43). 
 
 Interviews with members of the NAPA development team stated that the regional workshops 
involved the explanation of climate change risks to participants; and suggested adaptation 
options. When asked why the workshops did not present opportunities to discuss whether these 
risks were the same as those perceived by participants, one response from a lead NAPA team 
member was:  
 
There was no need. We had done the analysis and we had the information and we knew 
that these were the hazards… Everyone knows what the main problems are on the coast 
of Bangladesh. (NAPA Team member, personal communication, February 2009).  
 
 This approach gave limited opportunities for participants to internalise the new climate 
information provided and consider them in the context of adaptation priorities. Further, little 
space was given for participants to redefine which climate impacts they felt were important and 
why; or to disaggregate the risk that had been applied to the whole coastal region.  
 
Thirdly, in terms of ‘what’ was deliberated, the objectives of the regional workshops included the 
identification or problems related to climate variability and climate change (MOEF, 2005). 
However, interviews with members of the NAPA preparation team revealed that by the time the 
regional workshops took place, the ‘expert’ stakeholders had already considered climate change 
risks and potential adaptation options. The regional consultation workshops were used primarily 
to verify existing information and opinion, and the participation of local stakeholders was mostly 
in the prioritisation process. Further, prioritisation of adaptation options took place through a 
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voting system of pre-identified adaptation options, however the experts who had been involved in 
the development of options also had a vote on these options, with one NAPA team interviewee 
noting that the number of experts present at regional workshops actually outnumbered 
representatives from ‘the local community’. Framing vulnerability in climate change impacts terms 
exacerbated the instrumentalism of the process, by giving weight to ‘expert’ judgement.  
 
Therefore, the NAPA document and resulting project document did reflect many of the climate 
change risks identified by respondents; however, by framing risk in climate change terms rather 
than vulnerability terms, the adaptation options developed in the NAPA did not correspond with 
those prioritised by the community.  
 
 
4.6 Discussion: To what extent did adaptation policy-making in Bangladesh achieve 
meaningful deliberation? 
 
This chapter has presented some evidence that the NAPA achieved inclusive policy making to 
some extent. Certainly, the intention to make the NAPA in Bangladesh ‘locally’ inclusive was there; 
and some participatory technologies were employed, specifically through regional consultation 
workshops.  ‘Local’ people were engaged in discussions around adaptation priorities, and 
participated in the prioritisation of adaptation priorities.  Thus, the participatory process was 
inclusive to the extent that it took place, and some ‘local’ people did participate. 
 
Further, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that, to some extent, the outputs of 
participatory efforts were recognised and taken up by policy makers. The NAPA project document 
did echo local understandings and priorities around climate change impacts.  
 
However, this case study has also presented evidence in support of “tyranny of participation” 
debates, in relation to the “who” and the “how” of participation. For example, the process did 
create an aggregate category of “local”, with not only all the sub-groups presented in this thesis 
falling under that category, but also different geographical scales, for example local and district 
government, as well as national and ‘local’ NGOs. All were considered as part of the same ‘local’, 
despite their likely very different perspectives and interests. Instead, this chapter has shown that 
within “the local community”, what constitutes a risk, and why, is highly differentiated between 
different livelihoods groups, different asset holdings, and between genders.   
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Further, in terms of the ‘how’ of participation, the mechanisms used during consultations did 
serve to mask the power politics at play. This is well exemplified by the  ‘one-person-one-vote’ 
system used to develop priority adaptation options. By giving consultants, politicians, and ‘expert’ 
stakeholders the same vote as lay residents, and with often as many or more external 
stakeholders present at the meetings as local ones, this system does not give any ‘power’ or say to 
local people in the adaptation options that will impact on them. The participatory exercise gives 
the impression that ‘local’ stakeholders have a say in the policies that will affect them, but this is 
not the case in real terms.  
 
However, the evidence from this case study also suggests that the power dynamics within 
participatory spaces are more complex than ‘tyranny of participation’ debates assume. First, as 
noted, the data from interviews with NAPA team members, as well as the NAPA preparation 
guidelines and indeed the NAPA document itself, all point to a desire to be ‘locally inclusive’. 
Rather, the evidence presented here suggests that exclusion came from the framing of adaptation 
as an issue of impacts, rather than social vulnerability – the ‘what’ of deliberation – that in turn 
influenced not only who was included, but also the mechanisms of participation, and the 
information that was recorded. Framing adaptation as an issue of ‘impacts’ placed it in the realm 
of a product of a ‘global’ problem, requiring scientific and technological expertise. Thus, ‘local’ 
knowledge was taken as ‘other’ (resulting in the homogenisation of ‘local’); and not seen as 
relevant, or capable, of defining the problem.  
 
‘Local’ engagement was therefore limited to discussion around adaptation options to this 
predefined problem. However, because of the technical framing of the problem as ‘impacts-
based’, the approach to local engagement took an ‘expert-teaches lay’ framework; climate change 
experts described climate change impacts to stakeholders, and then asked for their opinions based 
on the information provided. As discussed in chapter one, this does not represent deliberation; No 
opportunities were given for participants to contest the knowledge presented, or to generate 
knowledge outside the boundaries of the information provided to them. Thus the barriers to 
inclusiveness were presented by  the way in which the problem of climate change risk was 
perceived by policy makers. 
 
What were the circumstances that resulted in more or less inclusive policy-making processes? In 
line with the above discussion, the circumstances of inclusive policy making are taken here to be 
the circumstances of how climate change adaptation came to be framed as a problem of impacts, 
and why this framing was so strong. This chapter has presented three contextual factors that have 
served to reinforce an impacts-based approach to climate change risk adopted under the 
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Bangladesh NAPA. First – the NAPA guidelines themselves. Bangladesh was one of the first 
countries to conduct the NAPA process, and so had little experience of adaptation planning 
elsewhere to draw from. Thus, the primary frame of reference was the international NAPA 
guidelines provided by the LEG under the UNFCCC.  
 
As discussed in section 4.3, the NAPA guidelines suggest that NAPAs do not interpret adaptation as 
‘impacts-based’, emphasising the need to build “resilience” to climatic variability rather than to 
climate change (LEG, 2002:1), as well as stressing the importance of “indigenous knowledge” 
around “existing coping strategies” (ibid).  However, as section 4.3 goes on to suggest, the 
approach taken to NAPAs – developing adaptation ‘projects’ to submit for funding under the 
UNFCCCC – is inconsistent with the reading of the NAPA guidelines, because a projectised 
approach suggests that adaptation is something new and additional, rather than something that 
should be integrated into development. Further, as noted in chapter three, when project 
proposals from NAPA documents go forward for funding to the LDC Fund, they have to show that 
they specifically address climate change. Thus, an ‘impacts-based’ approach is implicit in NAPA 
preparation.  
 
Second, this chapter has shown that Bangladesh as a long environmental policy history, centred on 
flood and cyclone management. The learnings from this case study suggest that this has had two 
consequences for reinforcing an ‘impacts-based’ approach to NAPA preparation. Firstly, the strong 
flood and cyclone hazards discourse of environmental policy making is consistent with the 
emerging discourse around climate change impacts. As exemplified in this case study, this has 
given rise to a strong sense of certainty around what climate change impacts are, and how they 
can be managed; consultants “knew” what the problem was, so what was the point in discussion?  
Secondly, and relatedly, the history of floods and hazards management in Bangladesh has left a 
legacy of a wide body of work and ‘experts’ on these issues that Bangladesh is drawing on in its 
management of climate change hazards. As shown in this case study, there is a strong sense of 
“we know how to do this”, which reinforces the impacts-based discourse and makes it harder to 
contest.  
 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
The evidence presented in this chapter supports the contention that the way in which risks are 
framed has significant implications for “inclusive”, deliberative governance. This chapter has also 
shown that in analysing deliberative dynamics, attention needs to be paid to the external 
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circumstances that can initiate or perpetuate definitions of risks, ‘fixing’ them in a way that may 
not necessarily seem rational within the deliberative sphere. For example, ‘climate change’ 
presents a new problem for Bangladesh, suggesting a high level of uncertainty and thus, in line 
with the arguments of Funtowicz and Ravetz, a greater likelihood of the ‘risk’ being opened up to 
wider consultation. However, consultations efforts around climate change risk were not 
deliberative or inclusive, because the ‘risk’ of climate change was considered certain, given that it 
echoed long entrenched hazards-based debates around national environmental management.   
 
This risk discourse was supported by the NAPA guidelines that implicitly reflected the ‘impacts-
based’ framing of climate change risk under the UNFCCC. Although the guidelines for NAPA 
development state the importance of “bottom-up, participatory approaches” in developing NAPAs 
(LEG, 2002:2) the focus on impacts resulted in a technical approach to identifying risks where the 
first step was dividing analysis into sectorally based working groups; then defining risks as climate 
change impacts by sector and geographically; and only then consulting the communities to verify 
this information.  
 
Such circumstances present an even greater need for ‘inclusive’ institutional designs to focus on 
the mechanisms of deliberation. Yet, as Warren (2007) points out, the very need for deliberation 
comes from a need to resolve some sort of discursive tension or conflict, likely to be owing to 
power differentials, cultural divisions, or other incapacities. Thus, the very circumstances that give 
rise to a need for deliberation, are not, as it were, ideal for deliberation (Warren, 2007:276). This 
makes deliberation a vulnerable ideal from outset, susceptible to inherent unequal power, cultural 
and linguistic differences and inequalities (ibid). Further, like any form of political process, all types 
of deliberation are embedded within complex politics of incentives and normative frameworks 
that will inevitably impact on the deliberative process and deliberative outcomes. While the 
proposal put forward by Fung (2007) of “participatory democratic governance” is a promising 
theoretical design for incorporating citizen voices into the determination of policy agendas, is this 
proposal simply too ambitious? Is deliberation as a policy goal, too fragile? (Warren, 2007). 
 
This case study has shown that deliberation as a policy ideal is difficult to achieve where there are 
competing discourses of risk, and where one discourse (in this case, an impacts-based discourse) is 
embedded with social, political, and historical authority. These discursive politics of the 
deliberative space skewed both the aims of deliberation, and the incentives to deliberate. 
However, rather than writing off meaningful policy deliberation as an unachievable ideal, more 
attention needs to be paid to designing deliberative spaces that take account of the potential 
dynamics of such discursive politics. This means that deliberation, rather than ‘participation’ needs 
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to be a goal in policy making, and incentives need to be structured for achieving deliberation both 
in policy processes, as well as in policy outcomes.  The next chapter of this thesis will consider an 
alternative approach to NAPA development in Nepal, where greater attention was paid to the 
actual mechanisms of deliberation.  
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Chapter 5: Analysing the inclusiveness of adaptation policy making under 
National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs): A case study of Nepal 
 
“The [NAPA] guidelines are not intended to be prescriptive. Depending on country circumstances, 
some LDCs may wish to address more elements.” 
(LEG, 2002:3) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an alternative approach to developing a National Adaptation Programme of 
Action (NAPA) taken by Nepal. The aim of this chapter is to compare the process of NAPA 
development in Nepal with that adopted by Bangladesh, and consider the impact of differences in 
approach, to the potential for achieving inclusive outcomes in adaptation policy making. This 
chapter therefore addresses the same question as the Bangladesh sub-case study: What is the 
evidence that the NAPA in Nepal achieved inclusive policy-making? However, given the different 
stages of NAPA development in both countries (Bangladesh completed its NAPA in 2005 and is at 
the stage of implementing NAPA projects; whilst Nepal has only just completed its draft NAPA), 
this chapter does not directly compare the same aspects of the NAPA as those in the Bangladesh 
study; this study will focus on NAPA processes, rather than outcomes (see chapters two and six for 
further discussion around the comparative and non-comparative elements of these two studies). 
 
Chapter four focused on the impact of competing definitions of risk, for achieving ‘deliberative 
democracy’ in participatory spaces. It was shown that creating avenues for public participation in 
policy making around environmental risks, does not necessarily lead to increased democratic 
governance of those risks. Particular attention was paid to the ways in which competing 
definitions of risk across scales create barriers for meaningful inclusion: The  ‘global’ discourse of 
adaptation as a problem of impacts, rather than vulnerability, dominated participatory processes. 
This impacts-based discourse was reinforced by the powerful image of Bangladesh as the ‘face’ of 
climate change impacts, often used as leverage for adaptation advocacy campaigns both 
international and nationally. These powerful discourses restricted the democratic potential of the 
participatory spaces created under the Bangladesh NAPA, affecting choices around who 
participated; how participatory exercises were structured; and the ‘legitimate’ content of 
participatory discussions. The conclusions of chapter four questioned whether, when discourses of 
risk conflict across scales, the task of ‘deliberative democracy’ in ‘global’ environmental 
governance is simply too ambitious; and if not, then what sort of institutional designs allow risks 
that have been framed as global, to be reassessed in locally meaningful terms?  
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In comparing the participatory processes and outcomes of the NAPA in Nepal to that of 
Bangladesh, this chapter focuses on the question of deliberative institutional design. To date, very 
little attention has been paid to institutional design in deliberative governance, with the majority 
of work on deliberative governance focusing on the attributes of ‘deliberative democracy’ (“why 
deliberation”?); or critiques of participatory processes that have not achieved deliberation (“why 
does deliberation fail”?) (Rosenberg, 2007; Smith, 2003). As noted in chapter four, such insights 
that set up deliberative ideals, and then show how they are not achieved, leads us to question 
whether deliberation as a policy goal is at best a theoretical ideal, too fragile to be achieved in 
practice (Warren, 2007). As Cohen (2007) rather pessimistically states:  
 
I do not think we have a strong case for the truth of the unhappy proposition [that 
deliberative democracy is unachievable+… but I wish we had a more compelling case for its 
rejection.  (Cohen, 2007: 235).  
 
This chapter proposes that the case for deliberative democracy lies in assessing the circumstances 
that are conducive to more deliberative processes.  Such an assessment will inform questions of 
how to design institutions to facilitate deliberative governance, making progress towards the 
‘deliberative democracy’ ideal, even if this ideal is difficult to achieve outright.  
 
This chapter will therefore begin by expanding debates from chapters 1 and four about 
participatory and deliberative approaches to the governance of environmental problems; but will 
pay particular attention to the task of institutional design of deliberative processes.  
 
The second and main section of this chapter critically examines the NAPA process in Nepal. This 
analysis is based on fieldwork conducted in Nepal over nine months (see chapter two), using 
participant observation and key informant interviews to understand the context and methods of 
NAPA preparation, and the circumstances that led to deliberative design choices. These findings 
from this sub-case study are presented in two parts:  
 
First, to give understanding of the environmental policy-making context in which the NAPA was 
conducted, data is presented on the hazard and vulnerability context of Nepal, paying attention to 
the uncertainties around climate change data in the Himalayan region. This section also presents 
an analysis of recent and current dominant environment policy discourses, and the emergence of 
climate change as an addendum to these. The second part of the Nepal sub-case study will present 
evidence around the immediate circumstances of the NAPA inception, and the NAPA preparation 
framework and process, focusing in particular on the avenues created for ‘local’ inclusion. This 
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section also examines the “outputs” of participatory processes under the NAPA in relation to their 
influence on the final NAPA document.  
 
Finally, this paper analyses the findings from the Nepal sub-case study in relation to the key 
aspects of deliberative institutional design identified by this thesis: ‘who’ was engaged; ‘how’ were 
they engaged; and ‘what’ was the content and context of deliberation? This analysis informs 
conclusions about the extent to which the Nepal NAPA achieved ‘inclusiveness’.  
 
 
5.2 Designing deliberative institutions 
 
This thesis has highlighted the value of deliberative policy-making in bringing about inclusive, 
equitable, and, ultimately, appropriate and effective policy outcomes (Cohen, 2007; Dryzek, 2000, 
2007; Rosenberg, 2007; Warren, 2007). Yet as discussed in chapter one, there has been little 
engagement from scholars of deliberative politics in “the messy task of institutional design” 
(Smith, 2001:73). Some scholars of deliberative governance have started to approach questions of 
institutional design.  For example, in Discursive Democracy, Dryzek (1990) discusses a small 
number of different mechanisms for facilitating deliberation, including mediation, and regulatory 
negotiation, that are “located in, and help constitute, a public space within which citizens 
associate and confront the state” (Dryzek, 1990:43). However, Dryzek does not pay significant 
attention to the conditions in which these mechanisms operate, which, as shown in chapter four, 
are significant in influencing their design, execution, and outcomes.  
 
Smith (2001) takes up the mantel of “mechanisms of transmission of public opinion” (Dryzek, 
2000:162) and discusses three ‘models’ for facilitating deliberation: mediation; citizen forums; and 
citizen initiatives; and referendum. In analysing the three models, Smith assesses the extent to 
which equality of voice is achieved; democratic deliberation is defended against strategic action on 
the part of powerful interests; and there is sensitivity to the scope, scale and complexity of 
environmental issues. (Smith, 2001:77). Smith’s approach is commendable in that he pays detailed 
attention to the tasks of fostering deliberative outcomes, to ‘managing the dynamics of 
deliberative spaces’; but, Smith does not engage with the actual deliberative design choices, which 
include the ‘what?’, ‘how’? And ‘who?’ of deliberation, decisions that chapter 3 has shown are 
significant in dictating deliberative outcomes.  
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Fung (2007) goes further in this regard and pays particular attention to the design choices of 
deliberative forums. Drawing on various case studies of what Fung describes as “minipublics”,27 
the author considers the following aspects of institutional design (Fung, 2007:166):  
- The ‘vision’ of the minipublic (for example to be an educative forum, or to achieve fully 
participatory democratic governance);  
- Participant selection;  
- The subject and scope of deliberation;  
- The deliberative mode;  
- The recurrence and iteration of deliberative processes;  
- The ‘stakes’ of deliberation (the extent to which the issue is meaningful or contentious to 
stakeholders);  
- The level of empowerment of the minipublic itself;  
- How the minipublic is monitored. 
 
Chapter four showed how these elements of institutional design are closely related. For example, 
in Bangladesh, the ‘vision’ of the participatory forum was to confirm climate change impacts and 
adaptation options with ‘the local community’. This vision created a homogenous category of 
‘local’, which meant participant selection was confined to representatives of ‘the local’ rather than 
attempting to include a wider cross-section of different sub-groups. The subject and scope of 
deliberation was focused on addressing specific climate change impacts, rather than being open to 
the redefining of climate change risks. This means the ‘stakes’ of deliberation were low, and the 
participants were not empowered to influence the policy-making decisions that would affect 
them.  
 
Chapter four also showed that showed choices around ‘who’, ‘how’, and ‘what’ of deliberation had 
significant implications for the inclusion of vulnerable people in the decision-making around 
adaptation. This analysis highlighted the significance of climate change narratives in affecting 
these institutional design choices; that while the dynamics of the deliberative sphere are of course 
important and extremely influential on enabling or constraining deliberative outcomes, these 
dynamics are themselves driven by factors beyond the deliberative space: the circumstances that 
lead to different institutional design choices in the first place.    
 
                                               
27
 Fung (2007) describes “minipublics” as “modest projects that attempt to create more perfect public spheres” that 
provide useful units of analysis for deliberation (Fung, 2007:166). 
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This chapter will therefore focus not only on the differences in institutional design of the 
deliberative processes adopted for NAPAs in Nepal compared to Bangladesh, but, more 
specifically, this chapter will pay attention to the politics of those design choices.  
 
5.3 Country case study part one: The context of the NAPA in Nepal 
 
This section is based on nine months of participant observation of the NAPA development process 
in Nepal, from the Inception Workshop in May 2009 until the end of ‘local stakeholder 
engagement’ processes in January 2009, as well as key informant interviews, and document 
analysis. A follow-up trip was conducted in August 2010 when the draft NAPA was available, to 
review the extent to which the outputs from local stakeholder engagement were taken into 
account in the drafting of the NAPA document. This first part of the case study presents findings 
around the background and context of the NAPA preparation in Nepal. The second part of the case 
study presents details around the NAPA preparation process and outcomes.  
 
 
Hazard and vulnerability context   
 
Like Bangladesh, Nepal has been designated as a Least Developed Country under the UNFCCC and 
therefore one of the “most vulnerable” countries to climate change. This section will discuss this 
vulnerability first in terms of ‘hazards’ (the extent to which Nepal is exposed to climatic impacts); 
and also social vulnerability (the social-vulnerability factors that make climate change impacts 
matter), acknowledging the close relationship between these two aspects of vulnerability.  
 
In terms of physiographic characteristics, Nepal is a land-locked, predominantly mountainous 
country situated in the central part of the Himalayas. The total area of the country is 147,181 km2 
and is divided into 5 physiographic regions: High Himalayas, Lesser Himalayas (High Mountains), 
Middle Mountains (the Mahabharat Range), Siwaliks (the Churia Range), and the Terai plains (see 
map 5.1) 
 
Each of the physiographic regions have distinct altitude and climatic characteristics, which vary 
from sub-tropical at the elevation of 67 meters above sea level, to Alpine conditions at  8,848m at 
the peak of Mt. Everest, all within a span of less than 200km (see table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1: Climate characteristics in different ecological belts of Nepal Source: WECS, 2005 
Physiographic 
zone 
Ecological belt Climate Average Annual 
Precipitation 
Mean Annual 
Precipitation High Himal Mountain Arctic/Alpine Snow/150mm-200mm <3 C - 10 C 
High Mountains 
Middle 
mountains 
Hill Cool/warm 
temperature 
275mm-2300mm 10 C - 20 C 
Siwalik Hills Terai Subtropical 1100mm – 3000mm 20 C - 25 C 
Terai 
 
 
Nepal’s climate is affected by two major features: the Himalaya mountain rage, and the South Asia 
Monsoon (ISET, 2009). Based on the temporal variation in the weather system (monsoon and 
westerly disturbance) the country’s weather falls into four distinct seasons per year: pre-monsoon 
(March-May), monsoon (June-September), post-monsoon (October-November) and winter 
(December-February). The average rainfall of Nepal is around 1,530 mm per year, but with sharp 
spatial and temporal variations both north-south and east-west. The monsoon rain is most intense 
in the east and declines westwards; while winter rains are heavier in the North West and decline 
Map 5.1: The five physiographic regions of Nepal.  
Source: Author 
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south-eastwards (NCSA, 2008). The temperature in Nepal varies with altitude and season: in 
general, the temperature decreases from north to south with decreasing altitude. The winter 
season is coldest, with the highest temperatures during pre-monsoon.  
 
Nepal has a long history of experiencing climatic hazards including floods, droughts, landslides, 
glacial-lake outburst floods (a phenomena that has come to be known as “GLOF”), “cloudburst” 
(an extreme form of rainfall often associated with landslides), and forest fires (NSDRM, 2008). The 
World Bank classifies Nepal as one of the global ‘hot-spots’ for geophysical and climatic hazards 
(Arnold, 2006), with an inventory of disaster-related deaths carried out for the National Strategy 
for Disaster Risk Management in Nepal (NSDRM) reporting that floods and landslides alone are 
associated with 211 lives per year (NRSDM, 2008).  
 
The varied geography of Nepal has led to the clustering of different types of natural disasters in 
different regions; forest fires constitute a particular hazard in the Tarai where the summer 
temperatures reach highs of 45 deg Celsius (NSDRM 2008). GLOFs and avalanches are more 
common in the high Himalayan regions. GLOFs occur when the moraine dam of a lake breaches, 
either because it is overtopped (caused by an increase in the volume of water in the lake itself) or 
when it is disturbed through tectonic activity. Several “dangerous lakes” have been mapped within 
the Nepali Himalayas, classified as ‘at risk’ of overtopping (NSDRM 2008) (although such 
classifications have proved contentious as will be discussed later in this chapter).  
 
In terms of climate change, existing data on current and future climate change trends is based 
largely on observed changes, rather than predicted changes, because until very recently the 
Himalaya was considered a ‘white-spot’ for climate change information (ISET, 2009). The IPCC 
suggests that there is a much greater range of uncertainty for climate change projections in the 
Himalaya compared to other regions (Christensen et al., 2007). Lamadrid and MacClune (2010) 
propose three reasons for this relative death of climate change information in the Himalayas: 
firstly, the extreme topography of the area means that downscaling of climate models is required 
to capture local variations not expressed in the large-scale models. Second, local variation in 
precipitation throughout the year causes significant uncertainty, with the balance between glacial 
melt and precipitation so far unpredictable. Finally, the availability of high quality observational 
data sets to ‘ground-truth’ climate models is limited, especially at higher elevations, making the 
validation of climate projections difficult (Lamadrid and MacClune, 2010).  The significance of this 
high level of uncertainty in climate projections for Nepal will be returned to later in this chapter.  
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Nevertheless, some observational data and more recent climate change modelling data does exist 
which suggests that the key climate change impacts on Nepal are likely to include (ISET, 2009): 
 Significant warming, particularly at higher elevations, leading to reductions in snow and 
ice coverage of the mountainous regions; 
 Increases in climatic variability and the frequency of extreme events, including floods and 
droughts; and 
 An overall increase in regional precipitation during the wet season but a decrease in 
precipitation in the middle hills.  
 
Box 5.1 presents the outputs of a recent set of climate change modelling data undertaken in 2009, 
which gives some idea of the range of climate change impacts expected on temperature and 
rainfall patterns in Nepal. In terms of the consequences of these impacts for Nepal, background 
studies carried out under the NAPA preparation process have categorised the impacts of climate 
change into five areas: water resources; agriculture and food security; forests and biodiversity; 
urban settlements and infrastructure; and health. These impacts are described in box 5.2.  
 
The broad socio-economic characteristics of the Nepal mean that, nationally, adaptive capacity to 
be able to respond to these climate change impacts is low. Nepal is ranked 144 among a total of 
147 poorest countries in the World by the 2008 Human Development Report (UNDP, 2009b). 
Nepal’s Human Development Index value is 0.553, and GDP per capita is US$ 1,049. The 
population of Nepal in 2008 was estimated at 28.6 million (World Bank, 2009), with 85% of the 
population Nepal residing in rural areas and directly reliant on ecosystem services for all or part of 
their livelihood. The agriculture sector employs 82% of the labour force and is primarily a 
subsistence activity28 (NAPA Case Study, 2003). This means that most people are in one way or 
another dependent on agricultural livelihoods as their main source of income, with few 
opportunities for livelihood diversification on less ecosystem-service reliant industries.  
 
The low socio-economic status of Nepal coupled with a fragile governance system has resulted in 
poor quality infrastructure and a high level of unplanned settlement, so extreme weather events 
have a significant impact on both urban and rural communications, services, and settlement 
infrastructure. Not all people are equally vulnerable to the impacts of climate change in Nepal; 
vulnerability is associated with social, economic, and cultural characteristics. For example, the 
poorest people live in the weakest infrastructure and most vulnerable zones making them 
particularly susceptible to hazardous events. The National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management 
                                               
28
 Agriculture contributes only 38 percent to GDP, compared to industry at 23 percent, and services at 39 percent 
(NAPA case study, 2003) 
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states that vulnerable groups are also exposed to damage post-disaster, when unplanned 
resettlement can further exacerbate environmental degradation and increase vulnerability 
(NSDRM 2008).  
 
Further, a gender sensitivity analysis was carried out for climate change impacts in Nepal as part of 
the background study to the NAPA. The study reports that men and women will experience the 
impacts of climate change differently; and that women are likely to suffer more because of their 
relatively low social status compared to men in equal income groups, particularly within family 
units. For example, the report notes that during times of food stress, women are more likely to 
suffer than men because they tend to ensure that the rest of the family has eaten before they 
themselves will eat (MOE, 2010c).   
 
Box 5.1: Climate change scenarios for Nepal  
Source: ISET, 2009 
 
Temperature: 
 Mean annual temperature across Nepal is projected to increase by: 
o 0.5 – 2.0 C, with a multi-model mean of 1.4 C, by the 2030s 
o 1.7 - 4.1 C, with a multi-model mean of 2.8 C, by the 2060s 
o 3.0 - 6.3 C, with a multi-model mean of 4.7 C, by the 2090s.  
 Increases in temperature are lower in the monsoon and post-monsoon season than in winter and 
pre-monsoon, by up to 1.6 C by the 2090s, partly due to projected increases in monsoon rainfall 
and cloudiness which will reduce incoming solar radiation and enhance cooling through 
evaporation.  
 Projected temperature increases are lower in Eastern Nepal than Western and Central Nepal. This 
difference is projected to be 0.7 C by the 2090s.  
 The frequency of “hot days”1 in the premonsoon period are projected to increase by 15-55% by the 
2060s; and 26-69% by the 2090s. 
 The frequency of “hot nights”1 are projected to increase most in the monsoon period 6-77% by the 
2060s; and 29-93% by the 2090s.  
 
Precipitation 
 Mean annual precipitation is projected to both increase and decrease, with no clear trend: 
o -34 - +22% with a multi-model mean of +0% by the 2030s 
o -36 - +67% with a multi-model mean of +4% by the 2060s 
o -43 - +80% with a multi-model mean of +8% by the 2090s 
 Monsoon rainfall projections vary widely but more models suggest an increase by 2100:  
o  -14 - +40% with a multi-model mean of +2% by the 2030s 
o -40 - +143% with a multi-model mean of +7% by the 2060s 
o -52 - +135% with a multi-model mean of +16%by the 2090s 
 Monsoon rainfall in Eastern and Central Nepal is projected to increase more than Western Nepal. In 
Western Nepal the model mean increase by the 2090s is only +6% 
 The multi-model mean for winter precipitation projects +14% although many models show a 
decrease.  
 Heavy rainfall is expected to increase slightly in the monsoon and post monsoon seasons; and 
decrease slightly in the winter and pre-monsoon seasons.  
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Box 5.2 Climate change impacts in Nepal 
Source: Draft NAPA Nepal, MOE 2010d 
 
Water and energy 
Climate induced water stress has impacts on agricultural productivity, malnutrition, health and 
sanitation. Too much water can cause flooding and drainage congestion problems that will affect human 
settlements, infrastructure, inundate agricultural land and create problems for sanitation. Nepal’s 
renewable energy sector is also heavily influenced by climate: changes in river flow will have direct 
implications for micro-hydro projects in the hill and mountain ecological zones; an increase in the 
number of cloudy days and changes in the form of precipitation (from snowfall to hailstones) has 
resulted in adverse impacts on solar power potential in the mountain ecological zone; and increases in 
the incidence of forest fires has adversely impacted already scarce fuel-wood sources.   
 
Agriculture and food security 
Cropping patterns depend on the timing of seasonal changes. Climate change in Nepal is affecting 
seasonal changes in different ways across different agro-ecological zones in Nepal. In the mid- hill and 
high-hill mountain regions, increasing temperatures are being associated with an expansion of agro-
ecological belts into higher altitudes, increasing the growing season and growing potential of some 
cultivated species. Conversely, high hill animal herders have reported declines in fodder and forage 
production, and an increase in the prevalence of livestock parasites, that have been linked to increased 
temperatures. In the mid hills, decreasing soil moisture (due to changes in rainfall patterns and 
increases in temperature) have resulted in the early maturation of crops, crop failures, and general 
reduced agricultural productivity. Changes to irrigation potential of run-off streams, ponds and 
reservoirs have also been reported. In the Terai, the recharging of groundwater has always limited 
irrigation potential and climate change is predicted to exacerbate this.  
 
Forest and biodiversity 
Impacts on forestry and biodiversity include climate-induced shifts in agro-ecological zones, increases in dry 
spells and increases in the occurrence of pests and diseases. These changes (amongst other drivers) have 
been identified as leading to species and habitat loss. Observations at the local level suggest seasonal 
changes are resulting in early sprouting, flowering and fruiting of plants. In some cases, these changes are 
bringing benefits to communities, increasing the ecological range of cultivation for certain crops. In other 
cases, climatic changes are having a negative impact, for example herbs like Bhase, Satu, panch aule, silajit, 
amala, ritha, timur, bel are declining and shifting to higher altitude ranges and green grass has declined 
sharply in the Himalayan region (Mustang).   
 
Urban settlements and infrastructure; and public health  
In the context of urban settlements and infrastructure, most impacts are cross-thematic in nature and 
are largely related to climate induced disasters. The impacts are concentrated around urban water and 
energy resources as well as impacts on infrastructure and health and the challenge of rapid urban 
planning due to an influx of climate induced rural-urban migration. In terms of public health & climate 
induced disasters, climate change has implications for sanitation; disease vector patterns; and morbidity 
and mortality from extreme events.  
 
 
Environmental narratives and policy making in Nepal.  
 
As shown above, the implications of climate change for Nepal are varied and complex. In 
particular, the extreme topography of the Himalayas coupled with complex local weather patterns 
has made climate modelling for the region problematic and difficult to ground-truth (Lamadrid and 
MacClune, 2010). Nevertheless, several powerful narratives around climate change have emerged 
in the Himalayan region, mostly centred on the threats of glacial melt. Ives (2009) suggests that 
the climate change narratives in the Himalayas, and in Nepal in particular, are coalescing around 
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two issues: First, the claims that climate change will cause the disappearance of the Himalayan 
glaciers within decades, accompanied by catastrophic floods and to be followed by devastating 
water shortage particularly for countries downstream of the mountain ranges; and second, as 
glaciers melt, there will be a rapid expansion of glacial lakes and disastrous glacial lake outburst 
flooding (GLOF) events will occur.  
 
These narratives run deeply not only through media reporting on climate in the Himalayas, but 
also through climate change work of academia, NGOs, donors, and government.  For example, Ives 
quotes an article from The Times in 2003 reporting on a scientific conference in Birmingham (UK) 
which states that: 
  
 Himalayan glaciers could vanish within 40 years…500 million people in countries like India 
could also be at risk of drought and starvation. (Times, July 2003, cited Ives, 2009:1).  
 
The same article quotes Professor Syed Hasnain as stating that “the glaciers of the region could be 
gone by 2035” (ibid).  Such statements are also echoed in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
change (IPCC), taken as the benchmark for scientific information on climate change (see chapter 
2). In its Fourth Assessment Report, the IPCC claims that: 
 
Glaciers in the Himalaya are receding faster than in any other part of the world and, if the 
present rate continues, the likelihood of them disappearing by the year 2035 and perhaps 
sooner is very high if the Earth keeps warming at the current rate. (Cruz et al., 2007:493).  
 
Yet, Ives (2009) suggests that such statements are lacking in supporting data. Ives compares these 
statements with detailed analysis of existing hydrological and glaciological data for the Nepal 
Himalaya. In relation to claims that the melting of the Himalayan glaciers will have a significant 
impact on the streamflow of rivers in the Nepal basin and downstream, Ives concludes that the 
contribution of glaciers to river streamflows of the Himalayan basin is only 4% of the annual 
volumes, with the majority of streamflow in the rivers of the Nepal Himalaya coming from rainfall 
associated with the southwest summer monsoon.   
 
Ives then goes on to examine the threat of GLOFs in the Himalaya. First, Ives suggests that the 
narrative is based on past catastrophic GLOF events that have caused loss of life and land. 15 GLOF 
events have been documented in Nepal, the most recent in 1985, when Dig Tsho, a lake in the 
headwaters of the Koshi River, breached after an avalanche slid into it, overtopping the dam. The 
event destroyed hydro-electricity projects, bridges, houses and farmlands worth four million US 
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dollars (ISET, 2009). While clearly a detrimental event to both human and energy security in Nepal, 
Ives suggests that media reports of the event provided figures of loss an order of magnitude too 
high. Ives suggests that the reporting of such events resulted in a large scale effort to identify 
other ‘dangerous’ lakes and reduce the risk of further GLOF events.  
 
However, Ives (2009) and others (Alton Byers, personal communication 2010; ICIMOD, personal 
communication 2010) have suggested that the identification of other ‘dangerous’ glacial lakes has 
been based on inadequate and sometimes flawed scientific data. Another major information gap 
in the field is the lack of any “on the ground” data and information on the people and 
environments of the Himalayan region. The Mountain Institute (TMI) have noted that almost all 
data that exists for GLOF threats in the Himalayas has been collected through remote sensing 
technology, with many influential statements and correlations based on data deficient modelling 
results, and there has been very little ‘ground-truthing’ of this data or the statements made.  
 
For example, The Mountain Institute recently launched a field expedition to the Everest region to 
assess the condition of 9 glacial lakes previously classified as “dangerous” by remote sensing 
technology. The expedition revealed that 7 of the lakes that were deemed “dangerous” by UN 
agencies were judged not to be; whilst one that had not been classified as so was judged to be 
“very dangerous;” and that a second lake, recently re-classified as “non-dangerous,” was growing 
so rapidly that serious monitoring and mitigation planning was called for.  TMI has suggested that 
only by systematically combining field and laboratory-based investigations, including the insights 
of local people, can the tools be acquired to enable the identification of real threats, non-threats, 
and feasible adaptation strategies for vulnerable communities (TMI, personal communication).  
 
Ives proposes that the emergence of such a ‘crisis’ narrative around climate change in the 
Himalayas, revealed as based on insufficient data and yet having gained significant ground in both 
media and policy climate change rhetoric, mirrors the progression of another “catastrophe myth” 
in the Himalayas; “The theory of Himalayan Degradation” (Ives, 2009:13), which dominated 
environmental discourses in Nepal between 1960s and 1990s. This narrative predicted the total 
loss of Himalayan forest cover in Nepal by the year 2000 (World Bank, 1979) and consequential 
devastating floods across downstream countries in the Gangetic plain (Ives and Messerli, 1989). 
The conventional theory for deforestation in the Himalaya was population growth leading to forest 
destruction and the terracing of steep slopes by ‘ignorant” Himalayan peasants, and an imminent 
“super-crisis” of deforestation would occur if environmental policy interventions were not staged 
(Ives, 2009; Ives and Messerli, 1989). However, in 1989, Ives and Messerli published a detailed 
historical study of deforestation in the region which showed that, contrary to reports of current 
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rapid deforestation, deforestation had actually occurred in the region two centuries earlier, and 
the practices of Himalayan farmers were doing much to conserve the land and control landslide 
events that were blamed on deforestation (Ives and Messerli, 1989). Their seminal study did much 
to reorientate environmental and development assessments in the Himalayan region.  
 
Similarly, we are now seeing a backlash against the climate change “catastrophe myth” of the 
‘disappearing Himalayas’. For example, in November 2009, the Indian Environment Minister made 
controversial statements claiming there is no evidence that climate change is related to shrinking 
Himalayan glaciers, and that it is premature to suggest that the glaciers are shrinking at all 
(Guardian, November 9th, 2009). These statements were based on a report commissioned by the 
Indian Environment Ministry entitled “Himalayan Glaciers: A state of the art review of glacial 
studies, glacial retreat, and climate change” (Raina, 2009), which argues is that it is impossible to 
make generalised statements claiming that all glaciers are retreating; or that glacial retreat can be 
directly linked to climate change.  
 
This report, coupled with a growing sense of uncertainty around the increasingly bold claims being 
made about the ‘disappearing Himalayas’, resulted in the questioning and then exposure as false 
the claims made in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report above, about the threat of Himalayan 
disappearance “by 2035”, which, as we approach the year in question, begin to look increasingly 
unrealistic. Following investigation of these claims, it was revealed that the IPCC had cited data 
from non-peer-reviewed material from a 2005 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) report. (Ironically these 
IPCC estimates were used by IPCC Chairman Pachauri to refute the earlier statements of the Indian 
Environment Minister in November 2009.) 
 
Such revelations, particularly against the IPCC, have resulted in somewhat of a backlash against 
the “disappearing Himalayas” narrative that has underpinned climate change storylines in Nepal 
until very recently.  
 
 
The circumstances of NAPA design and development in Nepal  
 
The NAPA process in Nepal is being lead by the Ministry of Environment (MOE) in the Government 
of Nepal, with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) acting as the implementing 
agency.  MOE took initial steps to access financial assistance from the UNFCCC Least Developed 
Country Fund (LDCF) for NAPA preparation in 2006, however the proposal for NAPA development 
was not agreed by the MOE and UNDP until November 2008; and NAPA preparation did not begin 
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until May 2009, when the “NAPA Inception Workshop” took place to initiate the NAPA preparation 
process.  
 
The delays in the initiation of NAPA preparation have been attributed to various factors, including 
a highly political relationship between the Government and UNDP. One factor that contributed to 
this delay was the slow recruitment of international consultants to assist the MOE in the NAPA 
preparation process. A second, significant factor was a broader approach taken to NAPA 
development that extended beyond the requirements of the NAPA guidelines (see section 5.4).   
 
Such setbacks have resulted in Nepal being one of the last countries to complete its NAPA, with 
the current completion date anticipated in August 2010. However, the delays in the 
commencement of the NAPA preparation process in Nepal have in many ways been to Nepal’s 
advantage, enabling Nepal to learn from other NAPA experiences. By the time Nepal began the 
process of initiating its NAPA, several evaluations and critiques of other NAPAs had been 
conducted. Influential assessments on various aspects of the LDCF Fund and NAPA processes 
included: those carried out by UN agencies that had acted as implementing agencies for NAPAs 
elsewhere (UNDP 2009; UNEP, 2009); the LDC Expert Group (LEG, 2009); sections of the 2010 
World Development Report (World Bank, 2009); a World Bank commissioned evaluation on the 
role of social institutions in UNFCCC adaptation supported processes (Agrawal, 2008); lobbying 
non-governmental agencies (CAN, 2008); and an independent evaluation of the LDCF Fund and its 
mechanisms commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one of the donors to the 
LDCF (COWI/IIED, 2009). Further, many countries had begun to internally review their own NAPA 
experiences, and indeed both Bangladesh and Bhutan were asked to present on these at the 
Inception Workshop of the NAPA Nepal in May 2009.  
 
These assessments gave rise to giving a number of criticisms of other NAPAs, and 
recommendations for future NAPA development (see box 5.3). 
 
Box 5.3:  Some lessons emerging from NAPA evaluations  
Lessons emerged around: 
 Inadequate mechanisms for comprehensive multistakeholder participation (CAN, 2008; COWI/IIED, 
2009);  
 A lack of attention to social vulnerability contexts, and locally differentiated vulnerability (CAN, 2008; 
Agrawal, 2008); 
 A national capacity deficit to manage adaptation projects and investments (IIED/COWI, 2009; UNDP, 
2009c; UNEP, 2009); 
 Overemphasis on technological solutions (UNDP Bhutan, 2009);  
 The need to take a more strategic (rather than projectised) approach to adaptation that is better 
aligned with other development and environmental investments (IIED/COWI, 2009).  
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There is evidence of transfer and uptake of these lessons at various stages of the NAPA design and 
implementation process. Specific sites of learning included, first, the meetings of the UNFCCC, in 
particular those of the LDC Group. The UNFCCC focal point to the UNFCCC is the Ministry of 
Environment, so the same members of Government directing and managing the NAPA process 
were also those who attended the UNFCCC meetings, receiving feedback – both in formal forums 
and informally – on the experiences of other LDCs NAPAs. Indeed, the Ministry of Environment 
personally invited NAPA team members from both Bangladesh and Bhutan to the NAPA Nepal 
inception workshop to share their experiences with a wider stakeholder group. During the 
presentation from Bangladesh, Mr. Reazuddin, former LDC chair who was Secretary of the Ministry 
of Environment when Bangladesh undertook its NAPA, stated that he was pleased to be able to 
share once again the experience of the NAPA process and challenges in Bangladesh, as he had 
shared with his “good friends” from the MOE Nepal on other occasions (authors notes, NAPA 
Inception Workshop, May 2009).  
 
Second, the UNDP had been selected as an implementing agency in many other NAPA processes, 
and were aware of the challenges and pitfalls that had been faced in other countries. The initial 
NAPA project proposal was written with support from a regional UNDP representative from South 
Asia, who brought knowledge and experience from other NAPAs including Bangladesh. UNDP were 
also under pressure to respond to the recommendations from the various evaluations of the NAPA 
and LDCF processes, particularly the UNDP evaluation and the independent evaluation conducted 
by the COWI/IIED, both of which had raised issues about the need for the NAPA to be more 
country driven, the need to build greater national capacity on climate change, and the need for 
more efficient and effective mechanisms to be put in place to implement adaptation priorities 
identified by NAPAs (COWI/IIED, 2009; UNDP, 2009c).  
 
Third, the main co-financier to the NAPA process in Nepal was DfID Nepal. At the time of NAPA 
inception, the Regional Environment and Water Advisor was based in Kathmandu and was leading 
on the process from DfID, and so again had knowledge of the NAPA processes in other South Asian 
countries. In addition, the (at the time recently appointed) national DfID Climate Change Adviser 
to Nepal had previously held a role as a “CLACC29 Fellow”, part of a network of international 
experts working on strengthening adaptation in the Least Developed Countries, and so who had a 
wealth of experience in advocacy around NAPAs elsewhere.  
                                               
29
 “CLACC” refers to “Capacity Strengthening of Least Developed Countries for Adaptation To Climate Change. 
CLACC is  network of fellows and international experts working on adaptation to climate change for least developed 
countries (www.clacc.net).  
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Fourth, the international consultants brought on board to assist the NAPA process were the same 
consultants who had worked on previous NAPA evaluations. First, for my part, I was involved in 
the COWI/IIED evaluation of the LDCF and its mechanisms, focusing particularly on the Bangladesh 
case study. I also of course brought with me my learning from my PhD research that had recently 
been undertaken in Bangladesh. Further, delays in the appointment of a formal Climate Change 
Specialist to the NAPA project resulted in IIED being recruited at the later stages of NAPA 
preparation on a draw-down basis to fulfil this role as and when required, again bringing with it 
significant learning from the evaluation process.   
 
Thus, the result of the delay in Nepal initiating and completing its NAPA presented a number of 
opportunities for Nepal to incorporate lessons from the critiques of others NAPAs into its design 
and implementation. Such learning from other NAPAs has been incorporated into the NAPA 
preparation process in two ways; first, through a broader framework adopted for NAPA 
preparation that includes the establishment of parallel institutional mechanisms to facilitate 
knowledge management and multi-stakeholder engagement under the NAPA programme of work; 
and second, by the particular participatory approaches adopted for the preparation of the NAPA 
document itself. 
 
 
5.4 Country case study part two: The NAPA Process in Nepal 
 
The framework for NAPA preparation in Nepal  
 
First, although Nepal was confined to the same LDCF guidelines adopted by all other LDCs, the 
Government of Nepal, in conjunction with UNDP and donor agencies, took a decision to develop 
an “expanded NAPA” process. This process embeds the preparation of the NAPA document within 
a much wider programme of work intended to support a more strategic and sustainable approach 
to NAPA development and implementation. Echoing many of the criticisms of the NAPA 
evaluations, the NAPA project proposal document states that a broader framework for the Napa is 
necessary because:  
 
An isolated approach to NAPA formulation…without consideration of how the NAPA process 
could strategically be used to create a sustainable support and knowledge infrastructure for 
climate-related activities in Nepal, would not warrant a swift and well-coordinated follow-
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up to the identified priorities. (MOEST30/UNDP, 2008:3).  
 
The intention behind expanding the NAPA is that the preparation of the NAPA document is not 
seen as an end in itself, to be all or partly funded from the LDCF, but instead acts as a catalyst for 
building broader institutional capacity, knowledge, and leveraging investment around long term 
adaptation planning. The goal of NAPA development in Nepal is therefore not simply the 
development of the NAPA document and adaptation project proposals, but instead, the NAPA 
proposal suggests a much broader remit:  
 
The project goal [of the expanded NAPA] is to enable Nepal to respond strategically to the 
challenges and opportunities posed by climate change. The starting point to identify these 
challenges and opportunities is the formulation of a National Adaptation Programme of 
Action (NAPA), which is the centrepiece of this project. In order to ensure that NAPA 
priorities can be effectively addressed, the project will develop a strategic framework of 
action for climate change in Nepal, based on the identified immediate priorities for 
climate resilient and low carbon development, behind which stakeholders can align their 
response. (MOEST/UNDP, 2008; original emphasis).  
 
To achieve this goal, a three-component framework was designed for the “expanded NAPA”: 
(MOEST/UNDP, 2008:4):  
 
 Component 1: Preparation and dissemination of a NAPA document. In line with the 
guidelines of the LDCF, the NAPA document identifies and prioritises the urgent and 
immediate adaptation needs for Nepal.  
 Component 2: Development and maintenance of a Climate Change Knowledge 
Management and Learning Platform for Nepal. This component is intended to act as a 
“clearing house” for climate change information and support services, and to facilitate the 
development of a “Climate Change Community  of Practice in Nepal”  
 Component 3: Development of a Multi-stakeholder Framework of Action for Climate 
Change in Nepal. This is intended to provide an institutional framework for climate-
change related policy advice and coordination of climate change, development, and 
environmental finance and policy.  
 
                                               
30
 MOEST refers to the “Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology”. Over the course of NAPA preparation, 
this Ministry was divided into two; the Ministry of Environment (MOE); and the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MST). MOE retained responsibility for NAPA preparation, and continuity was retained in the NAPA team and NAPA 
management.  
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The additional components of the NAPA – the Climate Change Knowledge Management and 
Learning Platform, and the Multi-stakeholder Framework for Action, were supported with 
cofinancing from DfID and Danida, so that while the budget for most NAPA preparation processes 
was limited to US$200,000 provided by the LDCF, in Nepal, the budget for the “expanded NAPA” 
was 1.325 million US$.  
 
Components 2 and 3 were put in place to facilitate information exchange, learning, and wider 
stakeholder engagement in both the NAPA process and also longer term climate change planning 
processes in Nepal (MOE, 2010c). The proposed key features of components 2 and 3 are presented 
in boxes 5.4 and 5.5. The aim of component 2 is to maximize the value of the process of NAPA 
development, and ensure that the information gathered and lessons learned are captured, 
codified, and made available for related processes and future planning exercises. It should also 
facilitate stakeholder access to vulnerability and climate-related information (MOE, 2010c).  
 
Component 3 aims to ensure that the programmes identified in the NAPA are implemented 
through coordinated multi-stakeholder action, and strategic donor financing (MOE, 2010c). The 
main feature of Component 3 has been the establishment of the Multi-stakeholder Climate 
Change Initiatives Coordination Committee, the key features of which are described in box 5.5.  
 
Box 5.4: Key features of NAPA Component 2  
Source: Adapted from MOE, 2010b; and MOE, 2010c 
 
The Climate Change Knowledge Management Platform will have the following components:  
1) Knowledge generation activities primarily to address the critical knowledge gaps in the NAPA process 
2) A web-based portal on climate and development that will serve as a repository of carefully selected 
information on climate science, impacts, mitigation, and adaptation. The portal aims to enhance 
evidence-based policy making and adaptation planning and guide the design of climate change actions, 
programmes and projects by connecting: (i) policy and NGO communities with the latest developments 
in the research communities and (ii) various research communities.  
3) A mailing list on climate and development topics will provide a channel through which information on 
NAPA developments, climate change-related activities, and climate resources will be exchanged and 
disseminated.  
4) Publicly-accessible climate change information centers (national and regional) will be also set up. The 
centers will house books, publications, journals, and other materials on climate change, and be 
established in existing climate and development institutions;   
5) Capacity building for knowledge intermediaries, primarily through media training to encourage greater 
outreach of vulnerability-related information 
 
Box 5.5 Key features of component 3 
Source: Adapted from MOE, 2010c 
 
The Multi-stakeholder Climate Change Initiatives Coordination Committee established under 
Component 3 of the NAPA has the following functions: 
1. Establish, maintain, and improve communication amongst institutions concerned with and working 
in the field of climate change; 
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2. Coordinate climate change response in Nepal to foster synergy and avoid duplication of efforts. The 
areas that have to be coordinated include policies, plans, strategies, financing, programmes and 
projects; 
3. Provide inputs for developing a national consensus in international climate change negotiations; 
4. Ensure strategic adaptation and mitigation financing by providing a venue where needs are 
identified, articulated, and taken into account in the formulation of adaptation financing strategies 
by development partners and by the Government of Nepal; 
5. Strengthen multi-stakeholder collaboration in responding to climate change; 
6. Facilitate to clarify any misunderstandings and/or confusion, if occurred, in any stages of the project 
cycle; and  
7. Provide inputs and monitor and evaluate the implementation of priority adaptation actions as 
identified in the NAPA and other climate change initiatives.  
 
The relationship between the three NAPA components is envisaged as follows: The process of 
developing the NAPA document (component 1) should provide the catalyst for the development of 
a multi-stakeholder framework for NAPA implementation, which is backed-up by dedicated 
knowledge management and learning support. In turn, the mobilization of multi-stakeholder 
support through components 2 and 3 should facilitate swift and coordinated implementation of 
the adaptation priorities identified in component 1 (MOE, 20010a) (see figure 5.1).  
In this way, the “expanded NAPA” framework was designed with the intention of creating: 
 
A forum for more inclusive adaptive management, by providing a space for stakeholders 
at different levels (government; donors; and local-level government and community-
based organisations) to interact, ensuring participatory decision-making; bottom-up and 
top-down accountability and transparency; and a flexible mechanism to review actions 
and investments. (MOE, 2010a).  
  
Figure 5.1: The expanded NAPA framework 
Source: MOE, 2010a.  
!
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In principle, then, this framework creates opportunities for multi-stakeholder deliberation; 
contains mechanisms for facilitating deliberation; and creates avenues for the outcomes of 
stakeholder participation to be built into policy making.  But, first, that participation must take 
place in the NAPA process. The next section will consider the extent to which these aims have 
been realised in the operationalisation of the “expanded NAPA” framework.  
 
 
Operationalising participation and stakeholder engagement in the NAPA process 
 
The NAPA Nepal project proposal document states that:  
 
A key strategy of *NAPA preparation+…will be to ensure comprehensive stakeholder input in 
all stages of the implementation process, involving national and local level government 
institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society groups, academia, 
international organisations and donor agencies. (MOEST/UNDP, 2008:5).  
 
The project proposal lays out four “levels” of action for achieving stakeholder participation: 
project management; professional services; consultations; and review, monitoring, and evaluation. 
This section will review the participatory processes first in relation to project management and 
services; and second in relation to consultation processes (monitoring and evaluation of the NAPA 
process has not yet taken place and so will not be discussed here).   
 
In relation to project management, the NAPA development is the primary responsibility of a 
“NAPA Project Team”, housed in, and led by, the Ministry of Environment but with national and 
international consultants provided technical guidance and support. The NAPA guidelines suggest 
that a multi-disciplinary team is established under the guidance of the central NAPA Team, to 
undertake many of the tasks required in the development of the NAPA. During the NAPA Inception 
Workshop, it was decided that the multi-disciplinary team would be made up of six, government-
led, multi-stakeholder Thematic Working Groups (TWGs) (MOE, 2010):  
 
1.Agriculture and Food Security (Chair: Ministry of Agriculture) 
2.Forests and Biodiversity (Chair: Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation) 
3.Water and Energy (Chair: Ministry of Energy) 
4.Climate Induced Disasters (Chair: Ministry of Home Affairs) 
5. Public Health (Chair: Ministry of Public Health) 
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6.Human Settlements and infrastructure (Chair: Department of Urban Development and 
Building Construction)  
 
Each group had 10-15 members drawn from government agencies, civil society, academia, and 
special interest groups, and was facilitated by a national consultant who supported the Chair to 
coordinate the group. The TWGs were seen to present the most direct opportunity for multi-
stakeholder engagement in the NAPA process, because it was the responsibility of the TWGs to 
undertake the information gathering (including vulnerability analysis), synthesis, analysis and 
prioritization of adaptation options relevant to their respective themes, the outputs of which 
directly informed the NAPA. The NAPA in Nepal has been noted as “unique” in having each of the 
TWGs as Government lead, with a Government-selected facilitator, with all other members of the 
TWGs playing relatively equal roles (MOE, 2010d). For example as shown in chapter four, similar 
‘sectoral working groups’ were set up in Bangladesh but were in some cases led by non-
governmental expert agencies or consultants, reducing Government ownership over the outputs 
of the groups.  
 
In terms of professional services, the project proposal document lays out provisions for two 
permanent international consultants to be assigned to the NAPA (a “Climate Change Specialist” to 
support Component 1; and a “Climate Change Network Facilitator” to support Component 2) 
(MOEST/UNDP, 2008). However, as noted above, there were significant delays in the hiring of 
international consultants. A Climate Change Network Facilitator was not formally hired until 
September 2009 (although interim arrangements were in place from May 2009); and a Climate 
Change Specialist until December 2009, the latter of which left the project in March 2010 at which 
point IIED was provided with a draw-down contract to support the process.  My own role, as 
Climate Change Consultant, to some extent back-stopped these two positions, however I did not 
have the remit nor the authority to provide the same extent of inputs, or to influence the project 
in the same way.  
 
The delays in the hiring of international consultants has been a source of contention between the 
Ministry of Environment and the UNDP, with a recent review report suggesting that such delays 
should have been anticipated by UNDP (Prasai, 2010:10). However, the project made significant 
progress without these international consultants, placing a much greater burden on the existing 
members of the NAPA team and the TWGs.  
 
In many ways, the additional responsibility given to the NAPA team and TWGs meant that 
additional national capacity was built and utilised; and there was a much greater degree of 
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Government ‘buy-in’ to the NAPA process across Ministries than may have otherwise been the 
case if international consultants had played a greater role.  The existing expertise from the TWGs 
that related to the familiar issues of thematic vulnerability (for example, water stress, or forest 
management) had to be given greater precedent over ‘climate change’ knowledge, which was 
lacking; many of the TWG members had not considered the impacts of climate change on their 
sectors before.   
 
A second avenue for “professional services” was provided through a “technical advisory group”, 
which was made up of a group of national and international consultants with climate change 
expertise, and expertise related to each theme. The services of the technical advisory group were 
available on a draw-down basis as and when inputs were required into the NAPA process. 
However, the use of the technical advisory group in some cases caused tensions with the existing 
TWG members. During interviews with TWG members, they expressed concerns that their 
(voluntary) services and expertise were undermined by the paid services of the other ‘experts’ 
who in many cases were peers of TWG members. Thus, the inputs of the technical advisory group 
were limited and only used to meet specific requirements at particular stages of the NAPA 
process, which tended to be for the quality assurance of NAPA reporting, rather than influencing 
the content of NAPA documents.  
 
In relation to consultation mechanisms, the NAPA guidelines require that NAPA teams conduct a 
 
Participatory assessment of vulnerability to current climate variability and extreme 
weather events, and assess where climate change is causing increases in associated risks. 
(LEG, 2002: 4).  
 
The guidelines also state that the engagement of “local communities” at the “grassroots” is 
“essential” for the successful development of a NAPA and the implementation of NAPA activities 
(LEG, 2002:2). Beyond these broad requirements, the NAPA guidelines remain non-prescriptive 
about how to achieve these aims, and as such very different approaches to ensuring local 
participation have been adopted across the LDCs. As was shown in Chapter four, in Bangladesh 
‘local’ participation was achieved through regional consultations workshops, however these 
proved limited in their capacity to achieve meaningful deliberation between local people and 
policy makers around climate change risk.  
 
In Nepal, discussion around how to conduct vulnerability assessments were initiated at the 
Inception Workshop in May 2009. Following presentations from Bangladesh, Bhutan, and UNDP 
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on the experiences of NAPAs elsewhere, participants discussed several lessons from other NAPAs 
around mechanisms for participation. Box 5.6 describes some of the statements made by 
participants in relation to participation and deliberation in the NAPA process, as summarised by 
the NAPA Inception Workshop Report. Photograph 5.1 Shows the NAPA Inception Workshop 
“breakout session” in which these statements were made.   
Box 5.6: Summarised statements from NAPA Inception Workshop participants in relation to 
participation and deliberation for the NAPA. Source: MOEST, 2009:26-27 
 
 Institutions responsible for policy making have to be linked to the local level  
 There is a need for national [adaptation] policies to be grounded in reality and practice  
 Policy processes in Nepal tend to be top-down, therefore there needs to be a link between frameworks 
from the top to the  bottom – the voice of civil society and communities should be incorporated in 
policy making processes. This is difficult to achieve, and shows a need to make policy makers aware of 
grass-roots realities 
 “NAPA without LAPA *Local Adaptation plans of Action+ means nothing” 
 How can local level voices and learning be brought up into policy making processes? 
 
 
 
Photograph 5.1: Participants at the NAPA Inception Workshop ‘brainstorming’ options for achieving local 
inclusion in the NAPA process. May 2009.  
 
The statements presented in box 5.6 show an understanding from workshop participants about 
the need to make adaptation policy making inclusive; but also the challenges in achieving this 
when most policy-making processes in Nepal are “top-down”.  In light of these challenges, various 
options for participatory processes for the NAPA were discussed.  It was noted that given the 
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highly variable geographic, economic and cultural conditions of Nepal, regional consultation 
workshops would not be enough to reflect the complex and highly varied climate conditions and 
vulnerabilities (author’s notes, NAPA Inception Workshop, May 2009; MOEST, 2009).  
 
Drawing on the presentations from the workshop, participants were keen that the NAPA in Nepal 
conducted “bottom-up” vulnerability assessments, stressing the vast experience amongst Nepali 
NGOs of participatory development particularly around vulnerability management but also 
disaster risk reduction that could be drawn upon (ibid). At the same time, it was noted that the 
NAPA process was a Government process and it was important that Government officials were 
involved in conducting vulnerability assessments. Yet, many NGOs and special interest groups 
stated that Government-led processes could be “Kathmandu-centric”; that the most vulnerable 
regions would be those hardest to reach outside Kathmandu, those that many Government 
services cannot reach (authors notes, NAPA Inception Workshop, May 2009).  
 
Following the NAPA Inception workshop, it was decided that one proposal that could meet the 
requirements laid out by participants (box 5.6) was “Transect Appraisal Exercises”.  This proposal 
involved TWG members (notably including Government officials) travelling from the high-hills to 
the Terai in the Far-West, West, and Eastern regions of Nepal, visiting communities along the way. 
The proposal was understood as a “macro-level” vulnerability assessment, to be complemented by 
literature reviews of local-level vulnerability assessments undertaken by non-governmental NGOs 
and research institutes; and to be further reinforced at a later date by more detailed assessments 
in specific pilot areas identified as ‘highly vulnerable’ during the transect exercises. The transect 
appraisal exercises would also serve to sensitise Government members of the TWGs about the 
cross-sectoral nature of vulnerability on the ground in the rural areas of Nepal, and could 
therefore help TWGs to conceptualise adaptation options that responded to vulnerability rather 
than sector-specific climate change impacts (NAPA team member, personal communication, June 
2009).   
 
In order to avoid the pitfalls of other NAPA vulnerability assessments, which had not created 
adequate space for vulnerable people to express their own risk and adaptation priorities (see 
chapter four), all TWG members attended an “Induction Workshop” in October 2009, with 
sessions on understanding vulnerability, vulnerability assessment methods, and the implications of 
climate change impacts for Nepal. Again the workshop presented on lessons from other NAPAs, 
this time focusing on the methods of vulnerability assessment, and emphasised the importance of 
a social-vulnerability based approach. In particular, while a set of recently generated climate 
change scenarios for Nepal was presented, the limits of the scenarios for understanding ‘on-the-
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ground’ vulnerability was stressed (authors notes, NAPA TWG Induction Workshop October 2009; 
MOE, 2009).  
 
Following discussions at the TWG Induction workshop in addition to the advice provided by the 
technical advisory group, it was agreed that a “Shared Learning Dialogue” approach would be 
taken by transect groups (MOE, 2010). This approach was proposed by members of the technical 
advisory group, who had been piloting the concept as a framework for climate change 
vulnerability assessments in Nepal for some time (Moench and Dixit, 2007). A “Shared Learning 
Dialogue” is based on the principles of good deliberation; forums are created for the exchange of 
information between ‘experts’ of   climate change impacts, and vulnerable people who are 
necessarily ‘experts’ on the factors that drive their own vulnerability. The aim is to develop 
mutually meaningful adaptation solutions that can address social vulnerability in light of climate 
change impacts (Moench and Dixit, 2007). The capacities required to implement a Shared Learning 
Dialogue include the facilitator’s ability and capacity to learn and understand from participants, 
being careful to ensure that their own perspectives do not dominate the dialogue or its 
interpretation (Moench and Dixit, 2007).  These requirements strongly echo those of deliberative 
governance; that all participants should be open to learning from all others, and revising their 
preferences in light of reasoned discussion (Chambers, 2003; Cohen, 2007) (see box 5.7). 
 
Box 5.7: The importance of a flexible approach to data collection 
I accompanied and observed part of the transect appraisal exercise that took place in the Western 
(Gandak) region.  In the planning of the transect appraisal exercises, various options were proposed for 
data collection. One option strongly advocated for by the TWG facilitator to the Water and Energy 
group, was the use of a pre-planned questionnaire to gather information against water resources (see 
box xx).  
 
However, the participants in the Gandak region transect decided that the use of a questionnaire with 
predefined questions about resource availability was not in line with the principles of a “shared learning 
dialogue” approach, in which all stakeholders should enter into dialogue with an open mind and without 
preconceived expectations. As a result, the Gandak transect participants decided not to use the 
questionnaire but instead adopted a more informal approach to information collection. This included a 
strong emphasis on unstructured interviews and small focus group discussions that were not guided by 
a focus on changing climatic trends. 
  
The result was a great deal of data generated around factors driving vulnerability in the Gandak region 
that were not related to climate change impacts. This information turned out to be extremely relevant 
for informing approaches to climate adaptation through informing vulnerability reduction. The following 
example documented in the Gandak Transect Report documents this well:  
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The above anecdote illustrates well the importance of acknowledging the political economy factors that 
contribute to vulnerability at the local scale. It shows that the people from Palpa are not only vulnerable 
because it rains. The rains caused flooding because of the existence of a bridge that blocks water flow in 
the rainy season. This bridge exists because powerful Maoist political actors in the vicinity ignored the 
requests of vulnerable people to consider removing or relocating the bridge. This reflects a situation of 
political exclusion and vested interests that do not serve the needs of those most vulnerable to climate 
and other risks.  
 
This demonstrates the importance of open and “shared learning” dialogue in assessing risks and 
vulnerability related to climate change. A predefined questionnaire about climate change trends and 
impacts alone is unlikely to capture the interrelated and context specific factors that drive vulnerability 
to those impacts.  A more deliberative platform that encourages the mutual exchange of information 
allows for information to emerge around the factors important to vulnerable people in shaping how 
they perceive climate risks, and why those risks matter.    
 
With these guidelines in mind, the NAPA team and TWGs took up the proposal of transect 
appraisals, based on the principles of shared-learning dialogue, and in November 2009 over 60 
Government and non-government TWG members travelled in three, mixed-theme teams from 
North to South over the major river basins in Nepal as part of the NAPA vulnerability assessment 
process. Using a shared-learning dialogue framework, the methods adopted across the transects 
varied, but included observations; focus group discussions; structured and unstructured interviews 
with individuals and local institutions; and district level workshops (see map 5.2; and photographs 
5.2 and 5.3). The information documented related to an overview of perceptions from the 
communities visited related to climatic changes; impacts; and existing coping strategies for 
climate-related hazards; and to consider how the NAPA could support realistic adaptation options 
on the ground (MOE, 2010a).  
 
In addition to transect appraisal exercises, the NAPA team carried out several multi-stakeholder 
consultation workshops arranged in Kathmandu with representatives of “special interest groups” 
Bad Decision Making Example (Culvert Bridge) 
Source: Gandak Region Transect Report (Unpublished report prepared by Usha Gautam, Climate 
Induced Disasters TWG Facilitator).  
 
“We had asked the Maoists to destroy this bridge but they did not. If they had then at 
least our khets would not be water logged/inundated", said the local resident of ward 
number 6 of Madan Pokhara.   
 
The bridge he was referring to is a culvert in the Tinau river and is located in the main catchments 
area of the Palpa district. During the rainy seasons it brings with it both water and residues from 
above. When there is heavy rainfall in the hills of Palpa district there is flood in the Tinau river, 
the water inundates the paddy khets thus affecting agricultural production. In addition there is 
sedimentation on the sides of the river and the culvert is designed using the him pipes in such a 
way that these do not facilitate the flow of the water. Furthermore the culvert is very low so 
flooding also affects the mobility of the vehicles. (There is an old wooden bridge near which is 
higher therefore, people can move). This case exemplifies how some technical interventions are 
not designed and are not flexible enough to respond to local conditions and needs. The particular 
technology used for culvert construction in this case has increased the occurrence of disasters. 
With the increase in cloudbursts it is most likely that there will be increased cases of floods but 
are our technology appropriately designed to cope and finally adapt to disasters?  
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(MOE, 2010a). These included youth groups; foresters groups; indigenous women’s groups; and 
disaster risk networks. Over 250 people have been engaged in these consultations. Regional level 
consultations were also undertaken, also being undertaken to ensure inputs from vulnerable 
regions beyond Kathmandu Valley (see map 5.2).  
 
 
 
In addition, “reference groups” were initiated around each thematic working group. Membership 
of reference groups was open and voluntary, and members were invited to comment on key 
outputs of the TWGs (for example, thematic working group reports) and in some cases were 
invited to attend the regular meetings of the TWGs.  
 
These consultative mechanisms were complemented by an outreach programme supported under 
Component 2 of the NAPA. This included media training on climate change, and regular interviews 
with national and local media about climate change planning in Nepal including NAPA progress. 
Map 5.2: Map of Nepal showing “transect appraisal exercise” 
routes. Source: Adapted from map provided by NAPA Team, 
September 2009.  
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Component 2 also included a moderated email list to which NAPA updates were regularly 
released. The expectation was that such outreach would encourage more effective and informed 
consultations.  
 
The outputs of the consultations, transect appraisal exercises and literature reviews were 
incorporated into thematic working group reports, so that each “theme” had a reference 
document that described impacts, vulnerability, and potential adaptation options that could be 
incorporated into sectoral planning, or be taken up by other adaptation planning processes. These 
outputs were summarised into a “Thematic Working Group Synthesis Report” which was made 
publicly available on the NAPA website and disseminated for review to interested stakeholders via 
the mechanisms created under Component 2. This report also formed the basis for the final NAPA 
document.  
 
Finally, the recurrent emphasis on participatory processes and a social-vulnerability approach is 
evident in the prioritisation process adopted for adaptation options to be included in the NAPA 
document. Describing the prioritisation process adopted in Nepal, the draft NAPA states:  
 
Reviews of other NAPA processes show that the prioritisation stage is often rushed. Multi-
criteria analysis has most often been used. In the case of Nepal the prioritisation process 
was carefully undertaken and was made as consultative as possible. (MOE, 2010c:29). 
 
The Nepal NAPA prioritisation criteria are presented in table 5.2. An analysis of these criteria 
reveals the following innovative approaches: 
 
 These criteria are based on the same criteria used by TWGs through the NAPA process to 
identify adaptation options, which were systematised and aggregated by the NAPA team.  
 The early calls from the Inception Workshop for the need for ‘locally’ appropriate 
adaptation options (author’s notes, NAPA Inception Workshop, May 2009) is reflected in 
the prioritisation criteria selected.   
 A comparison of the Nepal NAPA prioritisation criteria versus those in other NAPAs, show 
that the Nepal NAPA is unique in actively including deliberative qualities (inclusiveness, 
local ownership, ‘local’ involvement in project design) as key criteria for prioritisation.  
 Prioritisation criteria do include “the potential to reduce the adverse impacts on climate 
change”, but the “qualifiers” for these criteria are not based to climate-exposure 
indicators, but rather include “potential to help plan for climate change”, and “potential 
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to reduce climate vulnerabilities”, both of which relate to building adaptive capacity more 
generally.  
 Finally, livelihoods-based criteria are given equal weighting. 
 
 
Table 5.2: Aggregated prioritization criteria and qualifiers for NAPA projects 
Source: MOE, 2010c 
 
Proposed adaptation options under each theme were prioritised for inclusion in the NAPA 
document, using the criteria presented in table 5.2 above.  The NAPA document states that these 
criteria were developed based on insights from reviews of other NAPAs. 
 
Criteria Qualifiers 
Potential to 
reduce adverse 
impact of CC 
Potential to 
reduce direct 
exposure to 
CC 
Potential to 
help plan for 
climate 
change 
Potential to 
secure/enhan
ce ecosystem 
services 
Potential to 
reduce climate 
vulnerabilities 
Potential to 
reduce 
immediate 
impacts of CC 
 
Potential to 
support local 
livelihood 
Potential to 
create 
income 
generation 
avenues 
Potential to 
generate 
local  
employment 
Potential to 
ensure equity 
in access 
Potential to 
secure 
livelihood 
assets 
Potential to 
develop 
alternative 
livelihoods 
Potential to 
address 
urgent 
adaptation 
needs 
Synergy with 
national priorities 
Synergy with 
multilateral 
environment
al 
agreements 
Synergy with 
national 
development 
plans 
Synergy with 
sector 
development 
plans 
In line with 
institutional 
capacity to 
implement 
priorities 
Potential to 
co-finance 
 
People’s 
participation 
Involvement 
in design and 
implementat
ion 
Local 
ownership   
Social and 
cultural 
acceptance 
Local capacity 
building 
Inclusiveness 
(Gender; 
indigenous & 
Dalit 
communities) 
 
Cross-sectoral 
benefits 
Multi-
sectoral 
involvement 
Ease of 
governance 
Co-benefits 
(i.e. 
mitigation) 
Multi-
partnership in 
implementatio
n 
Geo-graphical 
and ecological 
coverage 
 
Cost-effectiveness Input output 
ratio 
Multiplier 
effects of 
investment 
Potential to 
mobilize local 
resources   
Sustainability 
(expansion 
potential) 
Potential to 
generate 
additional 
resources 
 
Ease of 
implementation 
Potential to 
use of local 
knowledge 
and 
technology 
Potential to 
enhance 
local/national 
skills and 
develop 
appropriate 
technology 
Local/nationa
l ownership 
(i.e. country 
driven and 
community 
led) 
Coherence with 
local urgent 
and immediate 
needs 
Address 
existing or 
potential 
resource 
conflicts 
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Photograph 5.2: Under Secretary, Ministry of Environment (far left) discussing perceptions of 
climate change with apple farmer (centre) in Mustang region during transect exercise 2.  
Photograph 5.3. Informal and small-scale discussion as part of village level consultation en-route of 
transect exercise 2, in the Mustang region.  The four people closest to the camera are part of the 
transect team. The rest (including speaker) are participants from the local village.  
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An assessment of NAPA outcomes  
 
This section assesses the extent to which the outputs of the deliberative mechanisms under NAPA 
described above were reflected in policy-making decisions.  The key ‘output’ of the NAPA process 
to date, is the draft NAPA document, which lays out the “most urgent and immediate” adaptation 
priorities for Nepal. The draft NAPA was completed in June 2010. This section considers whether 
the draft NAPA reflects the outputs of the deliberative processes conducted under the NAPA 
process (as summarised in the Thematic Working Group Synthesis Report, MOE 2010a); and if the 
emphasis of the NAPA process on social-vulnerability aspects of climate risk are also reflected in 
the final NAPA document. Three elements of the Nepal NAPA will be explored: the identified 
adaptation needs; the identified existing adaptation practices; and the proposed adaptation 
priorities. It should be noted that the document is a draft, and the development of project 
proposals from the NAPA could change significantly from the plans outlined in the NAPA itself.  
 
First, this study evaluates the relative emphasis given to ‘impacts’ focused versus ‘social-
vulnerability’ focused adaptation needs and existing adaptation options presented in the draft 
NAPA document. This evaluation is based on discourse analysis carried out on the relevant 
sections of the draft NAPA document, which involved ‘coding’ the adaptation needs and 
adaptation options as either “impacts-based” or “social vulnerability based” according to the 
relative emphasis placed on  each.  This emphasis was assessed by looking at the relative space 
given to ‘impacts-based’ versus ‘social vulnerability’ factors in the descriptions of adaptation 
needs and adaptation options; and the order in which these needs and options are discussed 
(assuming greater emphasis given to needs/options discussed first, less to those discussed second, 
and so on). The rankings indicate the following: 
 
I= Impacts-focused 
V= Vulnerability-focused  
 
0. No mention 
1. Mentioned but least emphasised 
2. Both mentioned and equally emphasised 
3. Primary emphasis 
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Table 5.3: Emphasis placed by different thematic working groups on impacts-based versus social-
vulnerability-based factors in defining adaptation needs and existing practices 
 
Thematic 
Working 
Group 
Water 
Resources 
and Energy 
Climate 
Induced 
Disasters 
Urban 
Settlements 
and 
Infrastructure 
Public 
Health  
Agriculture 
and Food 
Security 
Forests and 
Biodiversity 
Criteria I V I V I V I V I V I V 
Row 1: 
Identification 
of Adaptation 
Needs 
3 1 3 1 2 2 3 1 3 0 3 1 
Row 2: 
Identification 
of 
past/current 
adaptation 
practices 
1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 2 2 1 3 
 
Table 5.3 above shows that slightly greater emphasis is placed on impacts-based approaches in the 
identification of adaptation needs and existing adaptation practices: ‘impacts-focused’ options 
score a total of 24, versus 23 for ‘vulnerability-focused’. In relation specifically to the identification 
of adaptation needs (table 5.3, row 1), adaptation needs are discussed with reference to the 
potential climate change impacts for each theme, based on reviews of impacts-studies and general 
perceptions of anticipated climate change impacts.  This is the case for all working groups with the 
exception of Urban Settlements and Infrastructure. For example the climate induced-disasters 
group begins by referring to the most recent set of climate predictions carried out for Nepal:  
 
The recent ISET (2009) report postulates that the current frequency of hydro-
meteorological extreme events such as droughts storms, floods/inundation, 
landslides/debris flow, soil erosion and avalanches will increase due to projected climate 
change effects. (MOE, 2010c:31).   
 
Similarly, the Urban Settlements group begins: “Climate impacts on urban settlement in Nepal 
include…” and then details some of the direct impacts of climate change such as an increase in 
hazardous events impacting infrastructure and the resulting household asset bases.  
 
However, a closer analysis of the text shows that secondary emphasis is given to ‘social-
vulnerability’ factors in all groups except agriculture and food security, and these indicators are 
given equal emphasis by the Urban Settlements and Infrastructure Group. For example, the Urban 
Settlements group outlines the 
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Social, institutional political and economic factors, which may facilitate or impede 
progress towards adapting to the climate changes. (MOE, 2010c:31).  
 
The social-vulnerability needs identified include,  
 
The urban poor populations are more likely to live on marginal land that is prone to risks 
of flooding, storms, and landslides…the poorest residents lack social safety nets and 
…remain vulnerable.  (ibid).  
 
Some TWGs explicitly noted the limits to climate change impacts data in determining adaptation 
needs, for example the Forests and Biodiversity group stating:  
 
There are no adequate data to project direct climate change impacts on forests and 
biodiversity in Nepal (Ibid:32).  
 
This group does then go on to detail ‘likely’ impacts, such as an increase in forest fires, and shifting 
flora boundaries, and these statements can be clearly traced back to the outputs of the 
perceptions of changing environmental trends recorded during the transect appraisal exercises 
(see MOE, 2010a).  
 
In terms of the information used to assess adaptation needs, explicit reference was made to the 
outputs of the transect appraisal exercises in three groups (climate induced disasters; agriculture 
and food security; and forests and biodiversity). For example, the climate-induced disasters group 
describe,  
 
Factors that exacerbate vulnerability to climate-related hazards identified by the TWG 
(thematic working group) through local level dialogues. (MOE 2010c:30).  
 
Similarly, the agriculture and food security group state that, 
 
High hill animal herders reported declines in fodder and storage production. (ibid:32).  
 
The statements made by the urban settlements group and also the public health group also mirror 
the outputs of the summarised findings of the transect appraisal exercises. The water resources 
group does not make any reference to the outputs of the fieldwork, but instead relies on 
hydrological data to draw its summary conclusions in relation to adaptation needs.  
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Second, in relation to the specific assessment of past and current practices for adaptation (as 
opposed to current adaptation needs), table 5.3 shows that greater emphasis is placed on 
development-based or social-vulnerability focused options (a score of 17, versus a score of 7 for 
impacts-focused options). For example, the urban settlements and infrastructure group are 
explicit in the reliance of existing adaptive practices on socio-economic and political conditions:  
 
The possibilities of urban…entities having the basis for good climate change adaptation 
depends heavily on government provision of the legislative, financial and institutional 
basis to allow them to do so. (MOE 2010c:33).   
 
Some of the measures evaluated are very specific to addressing the impacts of past and current 
environmental hazards. For example, the Water and Energy group cite access to irrigation and 
water and sanitation systems as important in times of water stress. But, the same group also 
discuss the social and political factors affecting this access; for water-related systems to be made 
functional, appropriate legal frameworks also need to be functional (MOE 2010c:33).  
 
All groups either directly refer to, or echo, the transect appraisal exercise findings in their 
descriptions of existing adaptation practices. For example, the public health group describe, 
 
The encountered communities’ *the communities encountered during transects+ health 
related concerns…also noted *during fieldwork+ was the strong presence of traditional and 
indigenous health care institutions and practices. (MOE 2010c:34).   
 
This emphasis on development-based options in evaluating existing adaptation practices is 
perhaps not surprising; existing adaptation practices are less likely to target climate change or be 
limited to targeting hazards in isolation of their vulnerability context; as noted in chapters one and 
three, measures that address the hazards-only aspects of risk, are unlikely to be successful or 
sustainable.   
 
Third, table 5.4 presents the results of a similar discourse analysis applied to the identification of 
adaptation options in the NAPA document. This time, the primary goals of each proposed option 
were coded according to whether they were primarily “impacts-based” of “social vulnerability” 
based.  These categories reflected whether the aims of adaptation options presented were to 
target the impacts of climate-related hazards; or to address more general development goals that 
187 
 
would reduce social-vulnerability to those hazards. The values in table 5.4 reflect the number of 
projects that fall into each category according to this analysis.    
 
Table 5.4: The number of ‘impacts-based’ versus ‘development-based’ projects prioritised by each TWG 
 
Thematic working Group Impacts-based Development-based 
Water Resources and Energy 3 (one with development-based aspects) 0 
Climate-induced disasters 2 2 
Urban Settlements and 
Infrastructure 
2 (with development-based aspects) 1 
Public Health 2 1 
Agriculture and Food Security 1 (with development-based aspects) 3 
Forests and Biodiversity 1 3 
Total 9 10 
 
Table 5.4 shows a relatively equal balance of projects that primarily target climate change 
vulnerability, versus those more targeted at specific climate change impacts. For example, the first 
priority project identified by the Climate Induced disasters group is “Rehabilitation of vulnerable 
communities”, which focuses on the inability of people displaced by hazards to rebuild their lives 
“due to lack of resources and access”. The project focuses on assisting people in rebuilding their 
livelihoods “to reduce the detrimental impacts of climate induced disasters” (MOE, 2010c:36). The 
same group also proposes a project largely targeted at impacts (as third priority), a “Flood 
Management” project.   
 
The Urban Settlements and Infrastructure group present as a first priority an impacts-based 
option, “Construction of Water Retaining Structures” to address the potential impact of climate 
change on water resources in Kathmandu valley; similarly, the third priority project is the 
construction of a dam to prevent the drying up of a major lake. However, the second priority 
project of the urban settlements group is “Enforcement of building codes in municipal areas”. This 
project recognises that climate change will exacerbate an underlying development need, and 
adapting to that need does not require a new intervention, but addressing the political setbacks 
that have caused vulnerability in the first place.  
 
The above analysis is based on initial project proposals only and presents a crude overview of the 
main focus of projects and the analysis of adaptation needs. Nevertheless, three broad 
conclusions can be drawn: first, that the identification of adaptation needs is based largely on 
climate change impacts. Interestingly, none of the climate change impacts identified by the NAPA 
fit in with the “climate change crisis narrative” described by Ives and others as outlined in section 
5.3 of this chapter. Second, the assessment of existing adaptation options reveals many 
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development-based options that do not target specific climate change hazards. Third, the resulting 
adaptation priorities identified by the Nepal NAPA is a fairly equal blend of options that target 
both climate change impacts and also social-vulnerability to these impacts.  
 
In the identification of adaptation needs and existing practices, outputs from the transect 
appraisal exercises directly are both directly referenced and also echoed in many of the findings, 
which formed the basis for the development of adaptation priority projects.  
 
 
5.5 Discussion: To what extent did adaptation policy-making in Nepal achieve 
meaningful deliberation? 
 
This chapter has examined the process and outcomes of the NAPA in Nepal, paying particular 
attention to the opportunities created for deliberation, and the circumstances that led to these 
opportunities. Based on these insights, what is the evidence for inclusive adaptation policy-making 
in Nepal? This section will address this question in relation to the three aspects of deliberative 
institutional design introduced in chapters 1 and 4, namely: who is included? How are they 
included? And, what do people deliberate about?  Before considering the circumstances of these 
institutional design choices.  
 
 Chapter four suggested that the regional consultations conducted as the main participatory 
mechanism under the NAPA in Bangladesh were not representative of ordinary, vulnerable men 
and women on the ground. Such ‘invited’ participation forums resulted in the attendance of well-
connected community representatives who could not adequately represent the diverse reflections 
of disaggregated vulnerability realities within their communities.   
 
In Nepal, the limits of regional consultation mechanisms in revealing the diversity of vulnerabilities 
both geographically and socially were explicitly recognised in NAPA planning meetings (for 
example the NAPA Inception Workshop, see MOEST 2009). The result was that in addition to 
regional and ‘special interest group’ consultation workshops, the Transect Appraisal Exercises 
provided an opportunity to meet the needs highlighted by Basset and Zeuli in enabling meaningful 
deliberation; that is, direct dialogue between policy-makers, and, 
 
Ordinary men and women living in rural areas about what they considered to be the most 
important environmental issues. (Basset and Zeuli, 2000:74).  
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Of course, many of the methods adopted as part of the Transect Appraisal Exercises such as village 
or district consultations workshops, were open to the same sorts of participant selection bias on 
behalf of the local NGO organisers. However, such workshops were on a much smaller scale and 
were more informal than the regional consultation workshops; in most cases everyone in the 
village was invited to attend. Further, these workshops were complemented by village ‘transect 
walks’ in which members of the public encountered along the way were interviewed in an 
impromptu way, overcoming the biases of ‘invited participation’ techniques discussed in chapter 
four.  
 
Another opportunity for wider stakeholder participation is provided by Component 2 of the NAPA, 
the climate-change knowledge management platform. In principle, anyone can register with the 
platform and contribute to debates around the NAPA either online or through the regional climate 
change knowledge management centres. However, such forums are likely to be dominated by 
NGOs and those who have access to the internet; the ‘most vulnerable are unlikely to have access 
to such resources, although their situations may (or may not) be represented by engaged NGOs 
and community-based organisations.  
 
Second, in terms of how people were included, chapter four showed how in Bangladesh 
participatory exercises took the form of ‘experts’ explaining climate change impacts and 
adaptation needs to ‘community’ participants; and participants then being given the opportunity 
to confirm this information. No space was provided for redefining problems or solutions.  In Nepal, 
the transect appraisal exercises tool a “Shared Learning Dialogue” approach. Meetings and 
discussions began with explanations of the NAPA process and its purpose, but then TWG members 
and session facilitators were encouraged to listen to perceptions about climatic stresses including 
changes; reasons for vulnerability, including social and contextual reasons; and coping and 
adaptation strategies to existing environmental stresses.   
 
It is difficult to assess whether at all stages of the transects, TWGs were effective in adopting a 
shared learning approach. However, the transect reports for all three transects do show a heavy 
emphasis of meetings and discussion on social-vulnerability (rather than climate change 
information), and this is reflected to some extent in the outputs of the fieldwork that make it into 
the NAPA itself.  
 
Following on, the content of participatory exercises -  “what was deliberated?” - adopted a more 
flexible definition of climate change risk that allowed for the meaningful inclusion of social-
vulnerability indicators. This is evident from the very beginning of the NAPA process, with 
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discussions during the Inception Workshop focusing on the limits to climate change information in 
Nepal, and the need for the NAPA to be informed by locally generated, vulnerability-based 
perspectives (author’s notes, NAPA Inception Workshop, May 2009; see also box 5.6).  
 
In terms of deliberative outcomes, the analysis of the final NAPA document presented above 
shows that the influence of deliberation is greatest in the identification of existing coping 
strategies; but is more limited in terms of defining adaptation needs and adaptation priorities. In 
addition, space has been created through the Climate Change Knowledge Management Platform 
component of the NAPA for a wide range of stakeholders to continue to engage in the NAPA 
process, including its review and evaluation. However, as noted, engagement through component 
2 of the NAPA is likely to be limited to those with the resources to engage, for example those with 
internet access or with access to the regional climate change centres, who are not likely to be 
among the ‘most vulnerable’ sectors of the population.  
 
Overall, while ‘perfect deliberation’ was not achieved in the NAPA in Nepal, and an ‘impacts-
based’ discourse remains evident in the final NAPA document, the approach taken to the NAPA in 
Nepal can be said to be more deliberative than the NAPA process in Bangladesh. A greater 
emphasis was placed on the need for participation of vulnerable groups; and for that participation 
to be meaningful, which meant giving room to social-vulnerability based perspectives on climate 
change risk. This is evident from the time and attention to participatory processes during the 
NAPA process; and the evidence for the inclusion of (some of) the outcomes of this deliberation 
on the NAPA itself. But, what were the circumstances that resulted in a ‘more inclusive’ approach? 
This chapter suggests three factors that facilitated a more deliberative and open approach to 
adaptation policy making in Nepal. 
 
First, the history of environmental policy making in Nepal, and the de-legitimisation of an 
‘impacts-based’ approach to climate change risk. The lessons from the debunking of the 
“catastrophe myth” of “the theory of Himalayan degradation” (Ives, 2009) were echoed in the 
discrediting of the “disappearing Himalayas” discourse. Following the exposure of the IPCC for 
citing wrong information related to glacial melt in the Himalayas, climate change practitioners in 
the Himalayan region must be cautious at making climate change impacts claims that cannot be 
supported by rigorous scientific evidence. In the Himalayas, currently a ‘white-spot’ for climate 
change information, such evidence does not exist.  
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That is not to say that there is no demand for climate change information. Interviews with the 
NAPA project manager, who also has to prepare reports on NAPA progress to the LEG, suggested 
that the lack of climate change data in the NAPA could result in, 
 
Poor credibility for the Nepal NAPA, and after all the work that has gone into making this 
one of the best, it [a lack of supporting climate data] could really let us down. (Interview 
with Batu Uprety, NAPA Project Manager, September 2009).  
 
Indeed, as part of the NAPA process, studies on climate change impacts were commissioned in 
Nepal, although the results of these studies were too late to inform vulnerability assessments and 
adaptation priorities. As such, the NAPA had to be prepared based on the data that was available:  
that related to social vulnerability. A social-vulnerability-based approach to managing adaptation 
therefore better suits Nepal’s policy needs and information resources; and a vulnerability-based 
approach is more open to deliberative insights from vulnerable communities, which in turn 
reinforce the vulnerability-based perspective on adaptation.  
 
Second, and in relation to the point above, this study suggests that the availability of climate 
change expertise in general, and available to the NAPA project in particular was a key factor. As 
noted above, there is a general shortage of climate change information and expertise for the 
Himalayan region; but that is not to say it does not exist at all. In fact, many of the leading 
agencies for climate change modelling in South Asia have offices in Kathmandu (for example, ISET 
and ICIMOD currently have the most up-to-date downscaled regional circulation models for the 
region, and both agencies are based in Kathmandu).  
 
Yet, few climate change experts were used by the NAPA project. One reason was the delays in the 
hiring of a ‘climate-change specialist’ for the project, an international consulting position who in 
many other NAPAs took the lead in the NAPA process, despite claims of NAPAs being ‘country-
driven.’ A second reason was the internal politics of the NAPA team and the TWGs. TWGs were 
made up of government representatives and NGO representatives whose expertise lay in 
development and vulnerability relating to their sector, but not relating to climate change. The 
TWGs had the mandate to lead the NAPA process, and often rejected the need for additional, 
external technical expertise offered by the technical advisory group. One interview with the 
facilitator hired to support the Water and Energy TWG revealed that the environmental policy 
making history of Nepal played a role in the mistrust of external expertise, stating: 
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We have the knowledge, why do we also need more experts? And climate change 
experts? Nobody knows what is going on in climate change, and you just have to look at 
what happened before [with reference to poor advice on deforestation, see section 5.3] 
to see how consultants can drive things in the wrong direction.  (Interview with Dr Toran, 
TWG Facilitator for Water and Energy Group, September 2009).   
 
The result was an emphasis on existing climatic stresses, and an emphasis on knowledge of 
vulnerability and development, rather than projected climate change impacts.  
 
Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, was the timing of the Nepal NAPA, which enabled it to 
learn from the evaluations of previous NAPA processes. These evaluations repeatedly highlighted 
the need for a country-driven, participatory approach, and the importance of a vulnerability-based 
perspective. Opportunities for learning were both intentional, or example invitations to NAPA 
teams of Bangladesh and Nepal to share lessons from their experiences at the NAPA Inception 
Workshop; and also circumstantial, for example the opportunities created in the forums of the 
UNFCCC for the LDCs to interact; the role of regional agency representatives of the UNDP and DfID 
in shaping the NAPA framework; and the use of consultants who had previously worked on NAPA 
evaluation, in advising the Nepal NAPA team.  
 
Finally, there were significant politics within the NAPA preparation process itself that shaped 
outcomes in terms of how risk assessments were approached and how the results were 
interpreted. For example, the politics around the use of “professional services”, both in relation to 
the use of international consultants, and also a national “expert group” (see section 5.4), resulted 
in a lower uptake of climate change expertise in the Nepal NAPA preparation than in Bangladesh. 
In addition, the actors within the Thematic Working Groups themselves significantly shaped 
discourses and action around climate change risk assessment that heavily influenced the outputs 
of the TWG exercises. For example, the NAPA was prepared through 6 TWGs. However, initially 
the Government and donor stakeholders suggested that this should be five groups, with “Human 
Settlements” being merged with “Public Health”. This was based on the assumption that many 
climate-related vulnerabilities in cities would be related to health and sanitation. This was an 
attempt to move away from infrastructure-only adaptation solutions, towards more vulnerability-
based measures that acknowledged the interrelationships between technology, infrastructure and 
social vulnerability.   
 
However, soon after beginning work the Human Settlements and Health Groups divided. The 
Human Settlements Group felt that a focus on health-related issues was too narrow, whilst the 
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Health TWG expressed concern that health issues should be explored in rural settings as well as 
urban ones. This lead to some concern on behalf of the NAPA Team that the Human Settlements 
group would become too impacts-focused, and look only to infrastructure and technology-based 
solutions.  
 
On the contrary, the Human Settlements group were very sensitive to this concern, and so actively 
sought to ensure that they gave primacy to social vulnerability indicators in their vulnerability 
assessments. The result was that the Human Settlements Group was the only TWG that did not 
place an initial emphasis on impacts-based approaches in the identification of adaptation needs 
(see table 5.4).   Conversely, the Public Health TWG that we may have expected to take a more 
“social vulnerability” approach, placed a heavy emphasis on climate change impacts in the 
identification of adaptation needs (see table 5.4). The reason given by the TWG Health facilitator 
was that changes to patterns in health and diseases are notoriously difficult to ‘root cause’ to 
changes in climate. The Health TWG therefore felt there was a need to emphasise the climate-
related aspects of their findings in order to avoid common criticisms of ‘repackaging’ health 
concerns as climate change concerns (interview with Health TWG Facilitator, October 2009).  
 
The Water and Energy Group perhaps placed the strongest emphasis on climate-related factors in 
the identification of adaptation needs (see table 5.4) and proposed the greatest number of 
“impacts-based” to “development-based” adaptation projects (see table 5.5). One reason for this 
was the natural-sciences background of the Water and Energy TWG facilitator that was associated 
with a strong preference for technical risk analysis and questionnaire-based methods for 
vulnerability assessment, over and above more deliberative Shared Learning Dialogue approaches 
(see box 5.7).  One consequence of this is that the Water and Energy TWG highlight Glacial Lake 
Outburst Floods (GLOFs) as key climate change hazards, despite the fact that this risk did not 
emerge from local consultation exercises. Instead, the origin of the GLOF as a water and energy 
priority in the NAPA preparation exercise stems from the initial literature review conducted by 
each TWG and then summarised in thematic work group summary reports, and not on the 
collection of new data around social vulnerability from the transect appraisal exercises or other 
local consultations (see Ayers, 2011b).    
 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has shown that the choice of institutional design for the NAPA process in Nepal, 
specifically the three-component framework of the ‘expanded NAPA’, and the use of Transect 
Appraisal Exercises, led to a more deliberative approach to adaptation policy making, compared to 
194 
 
the same process in Bangladesh. The ‘success’ of deliberation is judged on both the democratic 
quality of the deliberative tasks, and the influence of deliberative outcomes.  
 
It is suggested here that the shared learning dialogue approach adopted for the transect appraisal 
exercises resulted in more democratic deliberative outcomes, because more people were able to 
be included in the consultation exercises; participation biases were reduced due to the more 
numerous and smaller-scale, informal consultation meetings and ‘chance encounter’ approach of 
interviewing local people encountered during transect walks, which also reduced the influence of 
politicised dynamics of the deliberative spaces.  
 
The transect appraisal exercises also increased the influence of deliberative outcomes on policy, 
because policy makers came down to the ‘grassroots’ and were exposed to the reality of 
vulnerability on the ground, rather than receiving feedback from consultants conducting 
vulnerability exercises, or from ‘local’ representatives at regional-scale meetings. The influence of 
the outputs of deliberation is evident in the draft NAAP document.  
 
Deliberation was not perfect; no deliberative space can be completely free of internal dynamics, 
and it is likely that the local consultations during the transect appraisal exercises suffered some 
degree of manipulation or bias. However, the circumstances of the NAPA in Nepal, specifically, the 
availability of climate change expertise, and the timing of the NAPA process that enabled it to 
learn from preceding NAPAs, resulted in a more deliberative approach. Significantly, these 
circumstances were intertwined with a more flexible and vulnerability-based approach to defining 
climate change risk in Nepal, which enabled the outputs of local deliberation to be meaningful to 
the climate change policy making process.  
 
The next chapter of this thesis will compare and discuss the findings from the Nepal and 
Bangladesh case studies, and assess whether this ‘more deliberative’ approach is simply a product 
of a greater use of participatory technologies in Nepal; or whether the circumstances of NAPA 
design facilitated more meaningful deliberation within participatory forums.  
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has argued that for adaptation policy to address vulnerability, vulnerable people need 
to be included in the decision-making processes that affect them. But, this thesis has also 
proposed that achieving inclusive adaptation policy is problematic because of conflicting 
definitions of climate change risk across scales, which present barriers to meaningful policy 
deliberation. This thesis has explored these hypotheses through the questions:  
1. What is the evidence that conflicting definitions of risk across scales inhibit inclusive 
adaptation policy making?; and 
2. Under what circumstances is local inclusiveness achieved under international climate 
change policy frameworks?  
 
In relation to the first question, this thesis has found evidence in support of the argument that a 
paradox is created by adaptation: In formal climate change governance arenas, climate change is 
perceived as a global, impacts-based risk; yet as highlighted by the evidence from the field study 
conducted in Bangladesh, vulnerability to climate change impacts is driven by a range of social and 
environmental factors that may or may not be climate-related. This evidence supports the 
hypothesis that the adaptation paradox creates a mismatch between the impacts-based risk 
assessments undertaken by the expert bodies of the formal climate change governing frameworks, 
and the experiences of vulnerable people on the ground.  
 
Chapters four and five considered whether these conflicting perceptions of risk have had an 
impact on the potential for climate change risk assessments - and the adaptation policies that they 
inform - to be inclusive. These chapters looked in detail at the case study of the National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), the main avenues for the inclusion of vulnerable 
people in adaptation policy decision making under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Drawing on two sub-cases of Bangladesh and Nepal, these chapters 
addressed the questions:  
 
1. What is the evidence that NAPAs are inclusive? 
2. What are the circumstances that either inhibit or encourage inclusive decision-making in 
NAPAs?  
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This chapter will discuss the findings from these cases in relation to these two questions. First, this 
chapter will compare the participatory processes undertaken as part of the NAPA process in 
Bangladesh and Nepal, and consider the evidence that each NAPA did – or did not – achieve 
meaningful policy deliberation. This analysis will draw on the three aspects of inclusive 
institutional design: Who was included in policy deliberations; how were deliberative processes 
structured; and what was deliberated about. Second, the outcomes of policy deliberation will be 
discussed, particularly the extent to which deliberative outcomes influenced the final NAPA 
document in each country. Third, the chapter will consider the circumstances that resulted in 
more- or less-successful adaptation policy deliberation. This section will focus on the factors that 
influenced deliberative institutional design choices, and the relationship between these 
circumstances and the dominant discourses of climate change risk.  Finally, this chapter will 
consider the lessons learned from these cases in relation to the task of institutional design.  
 
It should be noted that this discussion is not a straightforward comparison of the same aspects of 
the NAPA in each country, but an examination of different aspects of NAPA preparation in two 
different country settings. This is because of the different circumstances of data collection in each 
country; in Bangladesh, the NAPA preparation process was already complete, so the focus of the 
Bangladesh sub-case was on a comparison of adaptation priorities identified in the completed 
NAPA project document, with those identified through fieldwork with the NAPA target 
community. Data around the details of the NAPA preparation process itself, and the circumstances 
under which it took place, were gleaned from key informant interviews with actors engaged in the 
process. Factors that influenced design choices around the NAPA were inferred from these 
interviews.  
 
 In Nepal, a much more detailed data set around the NAPA preparation process was obtained 
because the investigation follows the NAPA preparation from the beginning. The circumstances of 
NAPA preparation were directly observed and so can be discussed in much more detail. However, 
it was not possible to carry out a similar comparison of between identified NAPA priorities and 
those identified through independent field study, because the NAPA process was not completed at 
the time of fieldwork completion. Therefore while some aspects of NAPA preparation in each 
country can be compared, for example the different participatory technologies employed, the 
different types of data sets used for each country place limits on the conclusions that can be 
drawn from these comparisons. Further, other aspects cannot be compared, for example the 
NAPA project proposal outcomes, because this data is not yet available in Nepal. This discussion 
acknowledges these constraints to making a straightforward comparison, but suggests that a 
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discussion of comparable elements of each study raises many interesting findings that inform the 
hypothesis and  conclusions of this thesis.   
 
 
6.2 Assessing inclusive policy making 
 
Before discussing the sub-cases in detail, it is useful to review what is meant by “inclusiveness”, 
and hence how “successful inclusiveness” can be assessed. This thesis has understood 
inclusiveness in adaptation policy to mean both a participatory approach to policy making – i.e. 
policy makers actively encourage the participation of vulnerable groups in the policy-making 
process; but also that this participation is deliberative – the participatory process enables 
stakeholders across scales to deliberate common objectives and practices for developing policy.  
 
As described in previous chapters, deliberation describes “reasoned debate”, and deliberative 
policy-making means making collective decisions in light of reasons emerging from deliberation 
(Cohen, 2007:222). Deliberative policy-making therefore goes beyond participation, ensuring that 
the participating stakeholders are able to engage equally in reasoned arguments around the policy 
debate.  The goal is “deliberative democracy”, when all those affected by a decision are provided 
with the opportunity for participating meaningfully in the decision-making (Dryzek, 2006:27). For 
participation to be deliberative, all participants must be able to engage in reasoned, rational 
debate, and do so on equal terms in an unconstrained way. 
 
Many scholars have proposed various pre-requisites for achieving deliberative democracy (Cohen, 
2007; Dryzek, 2000, 2006; Smith, 2001; Rosenberg, 2007), giving rise to a range of suggestions for 
indicators of successful deliberation. These indicators coalesce around three themes: First, 
“equality of voice” (Rosenberg, 2007:13; Smith, 2001); are all participating stakeholders able to 
engage in and contribute equally to the debate? Second, “equality of reason”; are all participants 
amenable to changing their minds and their preferences as a result of the reflection induced by 
deliberation (Dryzek, 2000:31)? This implies that the actors deliberating are both impartial and act 
rationally according to the outcomes of deliberation. Third, are the outcomes of deliberation 
reflected in decision-making processes? If the deliberative process does not result in policy 
outcomes, then the policy process cannot be said to be inclusive. Thus, in analysing the extent to 
which a process can be said to be deliberative (and therefore truly inclusive), it is necessary to look 
at whether and how participants are reasoning with each other (the deliberative dynamics of the 
participatory process); and whether that reasoning has any impact on the resulting policy 
decisions (deliberative outcomes).  
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Drawing on these insights, this section will first examine the evidence that the participatory 
processes undertaken as part of the NAPAs in both Bangladesh and in Nepal can be said to be 
inclusive (equality of voice, and equality of reason); and then consider the extent to which the 
outcomes of deliberation were taken into account in decision-making around the identified 
adaptation priorities (outcomes of deliberation). This section will pay particular attention to the 
dynamics of the participatory processes on enabling or constraining deliberative processes and 
outcomes.  
 
 
6.3 Assessing the evidence that the participatory processes undertaken under NAPAs 
achieved inclusiveness.  
  
This section assesses the extent to which the different approaches to participation adopted under 
the NAPAs in Bangladesh and Nepal, and asks: What is the evidence that each NAPA process was 
inclusive? This section will compare the key elements of deliberative institutional design as 
analysed in chapters four and five, namely: Who is included in the deliberative process? How are 
they included? And what is content of deliberation? These aspects of deliberative institutional 
design will be considered in relation to the pre-requisites for achieving inclusive processes 
described above: equality of voice, and equality of reason.  
 
 
Who is included?  
 
This question refers to which individuals were included in the participatory process undertaken for 
the NAPAs, and why.  In Bangladesh, the stakeholders invited to participate in the NAPA 
preparation process were drawn from three groups. The first constituted a high-level project 
steering committee, drawn from “noteworthy government agencies”, the key agencies that would 
need to be engaged in adaptation planning. Also on the Project Steering Committee were non-
government and international research institutes, to provide ‘expert guidance’ to the high level 
steering process. The second group of stakeholders constituted six multi-disciplinary sectoral 
working groups with the responsibilities of carrying out the functional tasks of NAPA preparation 
including vulnerability analysis and the identification of adaptation priorities.  These groups were 
intended to reflect the most appropriate ‘experts’ relevant to the particular sectoral theme drawn 
from government, civil society and academia, as well as climate change experts.  The engagement 
of these actors in NAPA preparation was intended to ensure that capacity in adaptation planning 
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could be built across sectors to try and ensure both ownership over the NAPA preparation process, 
and also longer term mainstreaming for adaptation into planning processes.  
 
The third group of stakeholders engaged in NAPA preparation, were “local level stakeholders”. 
This group was drawn from the “local and regional (divisional towns) level including people from 
the local government, local level non-government organizations, farmers and women” (MOEF, 
2005:43).  This group was engaged late in the NAPA planning stage in four regional multi-
stakeholder workshops, and the purpose their engagement was to contribute to the identification 
of regional climate change vulnerabilities, existing adaptation strategies, and adaptation planning 
priorities.  
 
Therefore in terms of who was included, vulnerable groups were included to some extent in the 
NAPA preparation process. However, this group was only engaged late in the NAPA planning 
process after regional climate change risks had already tentatively been identified.  Attendance 
records for these workshops were not available, however as discussed in chapter four, interviews 
with NAPA team members suggested that the number of “experts” (i.e. sectoral working group 
members and associated experts) outnumbered representatives from ‘the local community’ at 
these workshops. So while vulnerable people can be said to have been included in the NAPA 
process, their representation was small compared with the inclusion of ‘expert’ consultants and 
government officials.  
 
Further, in terms of who counted as ‘local’, this third group of “local level stakeholders” included 
district and regional level government representatives, as well as representative NGOs. While 
these individuals are ‘local’ in relation to the Dhaka-based sectoral working group members, 
steering committee members, and national and international consultants, they represent a very 
different social group to the “vulnerable farmers and women” with whom they were grouped. 
Where vulnerability is closely related to access to financial, social and political assets, district and 
regional level government representatives (some of whom were not elected) are unlikely to have 
the same experiences of vulnerability as low caste women and small-scale farmers.  
 
Finally, in terms of the selection process for the included “farmers and women”, this took place 
through local NGOs responsible for organising the workshops. Interviews with NAPA team 
members suggest that efforts were made to invite ‘the poor and vulnerable’; however as already 
noted, issues of access meant that one of the groups chapter four identified as ‘the most 
vulnerable’ – for example those residing outside the embankment in Noakhali – are not accessible 
to local community-based and NGO agencies; indeed this is one of the many factors that 
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compounds their vulnerability. Therefore in terms of ‘who’ was included in the NAPA process in 
Bangladesh, some ‘local’ people were included but relatively few compared to climate change 
experts, consultants, and policy makers. Further, the group defined as ‘local’ was not necessarily 
reflective of the most vulnerable groups most in need of adaptation support.  
 
In Nepal, a similar ‘tiered’ approach was taken to including different groups of stakeholders at 
different levels. An overarching steering committee was set up led by the Ministry of Environment 
but with representatives from NGOs and academia. The second ‘level’ of engagement took place 
through six “thematic working groups,” similar to Bangladesh’s sectoral working groups, made up 
of stakeholders from government, non government, private sector and academia. Again, these 
groups had the responsibility for carrying out the NAPA vulnerability assessments. However, one 
difference between the sectoral working groups in Bangladesh and the thematic working groups in 
Nepal, is that in Nepal the groups were led by the relevant Government agency, rather than by the 
relevant ‘expert’ agency as was sometimes the case in Bangladesh. This point will be returned to 
later.  
 
As with Bangladesh, the third ‘level’ of stakeholder engagement was with “local communities”; 
and, like Bangladesh, regional consultation workshops were organised to which representatives of 
‘local people’ were invited. However, these workshops were one component of a wider 
consultation strategy. This meant that there was less emphasis on these workshops, with fewer 
‘experts’ or NAPA team members attending. Indeed, the first regional consultation workshop in 
Lahan had over 100 participants from 7 districts, but was attended by only one centrally based 
NAPA team member. As with Bangladesh, the ‘local’ people who participated in this workshop 
were comprised of many district level government officials and NGO members as well as 
representatives of farmers and indigenous groups. This latter group was selected and invited by 
local NGOs to attend. Thus, it is again unlikely that the regional consultation workshop was able to 
reach ‘the most vulnerable’ to solicit their inputs. Yet, the more informal nature of the workshop 
and ‘lower key’ approach meant that it attracted fewer high-level officials and ‘experts’, with a 
greater proportion of local residents.  
 
Further, Nepal’s participation strategy included the transect appraisal exercises described in detail 
in chapter five. These involved the thematic working group members travelling across different 
watersheds and holding local stakeholder meetings at the village level en-route.  These meetings 
were small-scale – of around 30-50 village residents participating in each – and were organised by 
local community based organisations. Again, the issue of who could be accessed by the CBOs to 
attend these meetings is of note; the meetings were organised at short notice and so it is unlikely 
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that many efforts could be made to reach those who were ‘difficult to access’. Further, the small-
scale nature of these meetings meant that the ratio of thematic working group members to local 
residents was high.  
 
However, the more numerous meetings in a larger number of locations meant that more people 
were reached than in the regional consultation exercises in Bangladesh.  The transect appraisal 
exercises involved greater outreach to more locations than the four regional consultation 
workshops undertaken in Bangladesh. Further, one of the methods adopted was random and 
informal interviewing by thematic working members of people encountered en-route. This 
reduced the ‘selection bias’ for participation in meetings to those with social or geographic access 
to the relevant CBOs.  
 
Thus, in terms of ‘who’ was included, both Bangladesh and Nepal took steps to include ‘local 
vulnerable people’ in the NAPA process. Overall, the approach taken by Nepal achieved greater 
outreach than in Bangladesh, and the ratio of local residents to local government or agency 
officials was also greater in Nepal. However, both countries faced challenges of being able to 
include ‘the most vulnerable’, because this group is also the most socially excluded and therefore 
by definition the most difficult to include.  
 
Significantly, these findings also raise the question: What is meant by “local inclusiveness”? For 
example, in Bangladesh the ‘local’ stakeholder group also included regional and district level 
representatives, who are likely to have very different experiences of vulnerability compared to the 
famers and women who were also invited to participate. Further, the farmers and women selected 
were taken as representatives of groups within which there is likely to be extremely disaggregated 
vulnerability contexts. This is based on an essentialist assumption that “farmers” and “women” 
were among the most vulnerable. However, both categories obscure diverse differences in the 
vulnerabilities; indeed it is likely that those “farmers and women” who were invited to participate 
are least likely to be present the most vulnerable, because their very engagement with the process 
suggests a high degree of social and political engagement.  In Nepal ‘local’ included a more diverse 
cross-section of different vulnerable groups, but the participatory process still suffered problems 
of representation.  
 
These different interpretations of ‘local’ means that in answering the question of who is included, 
it is not enough to claim inclusion of ‘local people’. Both the Bangladesh and Nepal NAPA 
processes can be said to have achieved ‘local’ participation, yet these two processes have resulted 
in very different outcomes in terms of who was considered local, and therefore who was included. 
202 
 
To achieve meaningful ‘local’ inclusiveness in adaptation policy making, then, it is therefore 
necessary to question normative judgements about who is ‘local’ and why they have been 
included.  
 
These findings support the growing number of case studies from the social sciences that have 
shown how the ways in which ‘global’ risk assessments that claim to be locally inclusive, in fact do 
not adequately represent the diversity of local perceptions of risk. For example, the cases 
discussed in chapter one of National Environmental Action Plans (Basset and Zeuli, 2000); and 
flood management in Boscastle (Jennings, 2009) (see alsoStirling, 2005; Tiffen et al., 1994; Wynne, 
1996). This evidence therefore supports the proposal laid out in chapter one of this thesis, that 
there is a tendency for ‘globally’ governed problems to set ‘local’ against ‘global’, both as 
homogenous, binary categories in a scalar governance system. This issue of disaggregating ‘local’ is 
particularly pertinent in relation to climate change adaptation, because vulnerability contexts at 
the ‘local’ level are so diverse. 
 
But these findings also show how the labelling of people as ‘local’ or ‘global’ carry more complex 
implications for agency than the above examples from the social sciences suggest. This study has 
shown that those labelled as ‘local’ were included in the process, even if this inclusion was 
constrained by the very act of being labelled as local. This moves beyond the suggestion that 
knowledge framed as local is necessarily disempowering (Agrawal, 1995).  Being ‘local’ resulted in 
inclusion, while the most vulnerable – whose social exclusion meant that they had no access to the 
consultation processes at all – had no opportunities for inclusion. It is therefore important to look 
at who is labelled as local and how they are able to use the platform that this labelling provides.  
 
The issue of “who” is included is particularly important for adaptation policies that aim – or indeed 
claim - to reach and meet the needs of the most vulnerable at the ‘local’ level.  For example, 
Wynne (1996) showed how globalising risk assessments not only resulted in inappropriate policies 
for addressing poorly defined risks, but also in ‘local’ people losing respect for and trust in the 
policy making process. Where vulnerability is closely linked with issues of political access and 
engagement, such consequences can result in further disenfranchising of ‘local’ people from the 
political processes that should be supporting them. Therefore in designing deliberative institutions 
for climate change adaptation, it is important to take into account the scalar politics of ‘local 
inclusiveness’ and the impact these have on deliberative outcomes.  
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How were people included?  
 
This question refers to how deliberations were structured. As discussed above, in Bangladesh the 
format of deliberation was through regional consultation workshops. The objectives of these 
regional workshops included (MOEF, 2005:43):  
a) Identification of existing problems related to variability, extremes and climate change and 
rank them if possible; 
b) Identification of existing coping mechanisms and measures; 
c) Suggestion for improvement of existing measures; and  
d) Identification of new measures and idea to address anticipated future change in intensity and 
extent of present problems. 
 
Yet, the format of the workshop did not provide the space to fulfil all these objectives. For 
example, the workshops followed a presentation and feedback template, in which NAPA 
consultants and climate change experts first presented the purpose of the NAPA to participants, 
and then presentations were given that described the regionally relevant climate change risks. In 
the Northwest region drought was described as a recurrent phenomenon anticipated to increase 
under changing climate conditions, while in the South-west and south east regions salinity 
intrusion was reported as a key risk to freshwater availability set to increase under climate change 
with change precipitation patterns and sea level rise.  
 
Participants were invited to feedback on these problems, but were not provided with 
opportunities to provide new and different interpretations of climate change risks; their role was 
primarily one of verification. Similarly some potential adaptation options were presented and 
participants were invited to feedback on these, but there was little in the way of active participant 
inclusion in the development of existing or new adaptation options.  
 
Participants were most actively engaged in the prioritisation process of adaptation options, which 
took place via a voting system. However, this voting system was based on one vote per person 
present at the workshop, which included the workshop organisers, NAPA team and consultants. 
Therefore the influence of ‘local stakeholders’ on the choice of adaptation priorities was 
considerably diluted, with one NAPA team member interviewed suggesting that in one case the 
number of ‘experts’ actually outnumbered the local participants.  
 
In Nepal, deliberations were structured very differently. First, the regional consultation workshops 
occurred early on the NAPA processes, parallel to climate change information and literature 
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reviews being undertaken to assess climate change impacts on different areas and sectors. This 
meant that the regional workshops did not take place in light of climate change impacts 
information about the workshop regions.  The regional workshops were also much more informal, 
the purpose of them being less well defined but primarily to inform the community about the 
purpose of the NAPA planning process and to get feedback on local environmental stresses and 
any perceived changes to environmental risks (personal communication, Gyanendra Karki, NAPA 
team member and Lahan regional workshop facilitator, November 2009).  
 
Second, the transect appraisal exercises used a variety of methods to solicit information, including 
focus groups discussions, key informant interviews, informal interviews, and observations. 
Discussions took a ‘shared learning dialogue’ approach. Meetings and discussions began with 
explanations of the NAPA process and its purpose and then facilitators were encouraged to listen 
to perceptions about climate stresses; factors contributing to vulnerability; and coping and 
adaptation strategies.   
 
It is difficult to ascertain whether all transect appraisal exercise teams were successful in 
undertaking a shared learning dialogue approach. However, the aims of the shared learning 
dialogue approach are commendable. The more ‘open’ and less structured discussions, with 
greater opportunities created for participant dialogue, should in principle create opportunities for 
more meaningful deliberation than formal presentation-feedback structures. Therefore the steps 
taken in Nepal towards achieving the shared learning dialogue goals are a step towards more 
inclusive deliberation around climate change adaptation. 
 
These two different approaches to integrating scientific and lay perspectives around climate 
change risks reflect debates from social sciences around social learning. “Social Learning” 
describes a purposeful activity of linking knowledge (learning) to action (doing), where the 
knowledge of reality and practice mutually influence each other (Angeles, 2004). This process can 
involve “change” agents who bring specialised expertise to facilitate the learning process. In 
principle, these change agents and their clients change in an iterative process of co-leaning and 
action (ibid).  
 
However, as these cases show, ‘change agents’ can do shared learning in very different ways. In 
Bangladesh, an ‘expert teaches lay’ approach was adopted, in which the experts sought to bring 
everyone ‘up to speed’ on what climate change risks were, so that everyone could then engage in 
a debate around how these risks could be addressed. However, such an approach is not inclusive 
in the sense of being deliberative: This did not provide an opportunity for redefining the risks in 
205 
 
light of reasoned, equal debated between ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ participants.  
 
In Nepal, the ‘shared learning dialogue’ approach was an attempt at a more deliberative way of 
doing learning, with the ‘agents of change’ – the NAPA TWGs – aiming at an open dialogue with 
‘local’ people to define risks as well as explore solutions to them.  Such an approach was more 
conducive to mutual, ‘co-learning’, evidenced by the fact that many of the findings from the 
fieldwork around vulnerability experiences are reflected in the TWG reports and the drat NAPA 
document.  
 
Finally, the scale at which participatory processes are convened may also have an impact on 
deliberative dynamics. Dore and Lebel (2010) suggest that the scale of consultative processes can 
have a significant impact on both who is invited to participate, and also the content of 
deliberations. Drawing on insights from water governance in the Mekong regions, the authors 
show how the scale (by which they mean ‘governance level’) of consultations resulting in the 
privileging or subordination of actors and issues perceived as related to that scale. For example, 
water-related exchanges between watershed management groups negotiated about allocation 
practices and the causes of waters shortages, whilst national-level committees engaged in debates 
around sectoral or basin-wide management.  
 
Such observations are supported by the evidence from this thesis, and are significant in light of the 
previous discussions about what it means to debate ‘global’ issues at the ‘local scale’. In 
Bangladesh, the ‘local’ consultation workshops were conducted at the regional scale, whilst in 
Nepal, the transect appraisal exercises involved taking national policy makers down to the 
community level. The regional-level workshops were attended by a greater percentage of local 
government officials, and the emphasis was on finding commonly agreed solutions at the regional 
scale. During the transect appraisal exercises, policy-makers were in the minority and forced to 
confront the diversity of everyday vulnerabilities faced by different members of different 
communities between and within regions.  The dynamics of the deliberative processes were 
inevitably effected by the different administrative levels at which they took place, yet both sets of 
consultations were taken to be ‘local’ consultations, yielding ‘local’ outputs.   
 
What was deliberated about? 
 
The evidence from these sub-cases also support the argument that the content of deliberations is 
important in influencing who has access to discussions, and whose contributions are considered 
valid. The choice of subject to be deliberated, and the way in which it is framed, determines what 
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participants are able to contribute and whether their contributions will be taken up (Fung, 2007). 
In both Bangladesh and Nepal, while the purpose of the consultation processes was to include 
stakeholders in decision-making around vulnerability and adaptation needs, the approach taken to 
framing deliberations was very different.  
 
In Bangladesh, as stated, climatic risks for each region had already been defined by the time the 
consultation meetings took place. The project document describes four key climate change impact 
risks for the coastal belt of Bangladesh of increasing freshwater salinity, drainage congestion, 
changes in coastal morphology, and threatened functions of ecosystems (MOEF, 2008). These risks 
were “explained” to respondents with little opportunity to challenge these predefined threats. But 
how were these risks initially defined?  
 
The NAPA document shows that the initial conceptualisation of climate change risks was based on 
a wealth of data available in Bangladesh around environmental hazards and also specific climate 
change studies. As described in chapter four, Bangladesh has a strong environmental and 
development policy history centred around flood and cyclone management, and this knowledge 
base was drawn up on in defining climate change impacts. For example, the NAPA document 
states:  
 
Much of the future vulnerability due to climate change…will enhance the already well 
known *risks+…of floods, droughts, and cyclones. (MOEF, 2005:11).  
 
The presentation-feedback structure of deliberations and the preconceived notions of climate 
change risks, meant the content of deliberations did not focus on redefining “well-known” climate 
hazards, but instead on verifying adaptation options to respond to these pre-defined risks.  
 
An impacts-based approach to defining climate change risks, meant significant emphasis was 
placed on ‘expert’ climate hazard and climate change information over inputs related to social-
vulnerabilities. For example, the NAPA contains an impressive list of climate-hazard and climate 
change studies undertaken in Bangladesh that were used as the basis of the climate change impact 
assessment. This literature review process is in line with the guidelines of the LDC  Expert Group 
for preparing NAPAs, which suggest to “synthesise available information on adverse effects of 
climate change” (LEG, 2002:5).  
 
This emphasis on climate hazard and climate change data in defining climate risks limited the 
extent to which vulnerable community stakeholders could engage with and participate in debates 
207 
 
around adaptation priorities. The focus of the workshops on climate change impacts set 
boundaries around desired workshop outputs, and what was, and was not, considered a 
‘legitimate’ contribution to these outputs, and by whom.  
 
In Nepal, the content of deliberations around adaptation and vulnerability were much broader. 
Given the low level of climate change information available for the areas in which the appraisal 
exercises took place, coupled with a ‘shared learning dialogue’ approach that encouraged 
facilitators to be open to unspecified inputs from participants, a much wider range of issues 
related to social vulnerability and well as climate-related impacts were discussed. As such, a more 
flexible definition of climate change risk emerged during the consultations, which enabled a 
higher-level of engagement from different types of ‘experts’ – those who had expertise around 
vulnerability as well as climate, for example local community-based developed agencies, local 
government officials, and most importantly vulnerable people themselves. The shared learning 
dialogue approach meant that less emphasis was placed on concepts unfamiliar to participants, 
and a greater emphasis was placed on relating climate trends to local experiences, and discussions 
around why this mattered. The result was a greater degree of meaningful deliberation between 
policy-makers and vulnerable people about what climate risks meant at the ‘local’ level and how 
they could be addressed.    
 
Relating this discussion back to the key question of this section – what is the evidence that NAPA 
processes achieved inclusiveness – the above findings can be considered in the context of the first 
two indicators for ‘successful deliberation’ laid out at the start of this chapter: equality of voice; 
and equality of reason. Regarding the first indicator, equality of voice depends on all participating 
stakeholders engaging equally in, and contributing equally to, the debate. The above analysis 
shows that the ways in which the participatory processes were structured under NAPAs, and the 
ways in which climate change ‘risk’ was framed, had a significant impact on the potential for 
equality of engagement and contribution to the NAPA design process. Nepal can be said to have 
achieved greater ‘equality of voice’ for two reasons; first, more vulnerable people were engaged in 
the consultation process and the structure of the transect appraisal exercise meant that the 
politicised selection bias for who was included was smaller than in Bangladesh. Second, the 
broader framing of climate change risk meant debates around vulnerability and adaptation were 
accessible to a wider number of participants. However, ‘perfect deliberation’ was not achieved in 
either process.  
 
In terms of ‘equality of reason’, this refers to whether all stakeholders were amenable to changing 
their minds and their preferences as a result of the deliberative process. This indicator relates 
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closely to the content of deliberation – to what extent were debates flexible enough to enable 
meaningful deliberation? The very rigid and ‘instrumental’ approach to climate change risk 
adopted by the Bangladesh NAPA consultation process meant that there was little room for the re-
negotiation of perceptions around climate change risk. The more flexible definition of climate 
change risk under the Nepal NAPA process, coupled with the ‘shared learning dialogue’ approach, 
meant that greater opportunities were created for ‘reasoned debate’ between policy-makers and 
vulnerable groups engaged in the consultation processes. A summary of these findings is 
presented in box 6.1, below.  
 
Table 6.1: Summary of findings around “Who”, “How”, and “What” of inclusive processes in 
Bangladesh and Nepal NAPAs 
 
 Bangladesh NAPA process Nepal NAPA process 
Who was included 
in ‘local’ 
consultations? 
 “Local” interpreted as both 
regional and community 
 Local and regional government 
stakeholders 
 Local NGOs 
 “Farmers and women” identified 
by NGOs  
 High proportion of NAPA team 
and ‘expert consultants’, in 
some cases outnumbering ‘the 
local’ stakeholders 
Regional consultation meetings 
included: 
 Local government  
 Local NGOs 
 Residents from surrounding area 
identified by NGOs 
 Only one NAPA team member, no 
other climate change ‘experts’ 
Transect appraisal exercises  included: 
 Village level residents identified by 
NGOs, balanced representation of 
me and women 
 Interviews with randomly selected 
people encountered during 
transect walks 
How were they 
included? 
 National consultation workshops 
 Regional consultation workshops 
 National consultation workshops 
 National level workshops for 
‘special interest groups’ 
 Regional consultation workshops 
 Transect appraisal exercises 
What was 
deliberated about? 
 Climate change impacts verified 
through ‘expert teaches lay’ 
approach 
 Consultations focused on 
verification of climate change 
impacts and adaptation options; 
and prioritisation of options 
 Climate risks identified through 
“shared learning dialogue” 
approach 
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6.4  Assessing the evidence that the participatory outcomes undertaken under NAPAs 
achieved inclusiveness.   
 
The final indicator of ‘inclusiveness’ is whether the resulting policy documents actually reflect the 
outcomes of the deliberative processes. In Bangladesh, the climate risks identified by the NAPA 
project document did overlap with those prioritised by respondents during the fieldwork 
undertaken for this study.  As noted above, the project document lays out the four key climate 
change impact risks for the coastal belt of Bangladesh of increasing freshwater salinity, drainage 
congestion, changes in coastal morphology, and threatened functions of ecosystems (MOEF, 
2008). When the fieldwork respondents of Noakhali were asked specifically about climate-related 
risks, similar issues were raised (see section 4.5). This indicates that the outcomes of deliberation 
are reflected to some extent in the policy-documents.  Indeed, explicit reference is made to the 
regional consultation workshops in the identification of climate change risks: 
 
Recent studies and the regional stakeholder consultation workshops have revealed that 
the erratic nature of rainfall and temperature has indeed increased (MOEF, 2005:8). 
 
However, the priority given to these risks, and the reasons why they were of concern to 
respondents differed between the NAPA project document and the community respondents. In 
particular, community responses on risk priorities and reasons for risks were disaggregated by 
according to asset base, occupation, gender, and location (see tables 4.2 and 4.3). Part of this 
difference may be explained by the deliberative process outlined above. But, given that the same 
climate risks raised by communities are reflected by the NAPA document, do these subtle 
differences in risk priorities and reasons behind risk actually matter?  
 
The reasons behind why people feel ‘at risk’ are important in identifying the best way to help 
them adapt to that risk. In Bangladesh, the adaptation priority identified by the NAPA was a 
coastal afforestation project. This option was generally regarded by respondents as a good idea in 
terms of reducing the physical impact of storms and cyclones on the region and also for producing 
ecosystem services. However, respondents suggested other adaptation options would contribute 
more to helping them reduce their vulnerability to climate change risks (see table 4.4). Because 
the approach to ‘local’ consultation did not give room for people to reframe risks in terms of 
vulnerability, and therefore to articulate alternative adaptation options, the NAPA could not take 
these options up.  
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Another barrier for the potential of deliberative outputs to influence the final NAPA document 
came during the prioritisation process of adaptation options. As noted above, the NAPA 
consultations were used largely to verify adaptation options, and to some extent ‘rank’ them. 
However, significantly this did not include the actual process of prioritisation to determine which 
adaptation options made it into the final NAPA document, and in which order. Regarding the 
prioritisation process of the adaptation options, the NAPA document states that the prioritisation 
process took place during a national consultation workshop, using multi-criteria analysis based on 
the following criteria (MOEF, 2005:23): 
i. Impact of climate change on the lives and livelihoods of the communities; 
ii. Poverty reduction and sustainable income generation of communities; 
iii. Enhancement of adaptive capacity in terms of skills and capabilities at community & 
national levels; 
iv. Gender equality (as a cross-cutting criteria); 
v. Enhancement of environmental sustainability; 
vi. Complementary and synergy with national and sectoral plans and programs & other MEAs; 
vii. Cost effectiveness. 
 
The criteria used were not fixed but tailored to each individual case, and the final NAPA document 
states:  
 
Community-led decision-making, stakeholder preference, expert judgment, national goal 
and strategy etc. have been taken into consideration (MOEF, 2005:23).  
 
Seemingly, then, the inputs from community level consultations were taken into consideration in 
the prioritisation process of the NAPA projects. However, interviews with two NAPA team 
members revealed that, in fact, the prioritisation was very rushed and in the end came down to 
“expert judgement” on what the most appropriate options would be. The reason given was that 
there was significant time pressure from the implementing agency to submit the NAPA according 
to external deadlines, and further stakeholder consultations would have resulted in significant 
further delays to the process (interviews with NAPA team members, February 2009). Therefore in 
Bangladesh while the outputs for deliberative processes were to some extent reflected in the 
descriptions of climate change risks, there were significant barriers between deliberative 
outcomes and policy influence at the stage of prioritising adaptation options.  
 
To what extent did the outcomes of deliberative processes influence decision-making around risk 
and adaptation priorities in the NAPA in Nepal? It is not possible to consider both whether 
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deliberative outputs were taken into account in the NAPA document and also project documents 
as was done in Bangladesh, so this section will compare the extent to which the outputs from the 
‘local consultation’ processes influenced the draft NAPA document.  
 
First, explicit reference is made in the NAPA document to the outputs of the transect appraisal 
exercises for three of the six thematic working areas in relation to the identification of 
vulnerabilities, suggesting that the fieldwork undertaken as part of the NAPA consultation process 
did directly influence the NAPA document. Further, in the identification of existing adaptation 
practices, all thematic areas either directly refer to, or echo, the transect appraisal exercise 
findings. However, in the identification of adaptation needs, the data from Nepal revealed a small 
emphasis on ‘impacts-based’ information such as climate and environmental hazard data, versus 
the outputs of the consultation exercises.  
 
Second, in relation to the identification of past adaptation practices, there is a clear emphasis on 
the outputs of the transect appraisal exercises and other consultations. This is not surprising given 
the topic; although other sources of data were also used such as sector policy documents and 
secondary data.  
 
Third, in terms of proposed adaptation options, there is some evidence that the outputs of 
consultations were taken into account, with the identified adaptation options showing a relatively 
equal balance of projects that target the social-vulnerability factors identified during transects and 
other consultations, versus those that target climate impacts as identified by ‘expert’ judgement.   
 
In terms of the prioritisation of those adaptation options, particular attention was paid in Nepal to 
making the prioritisation process “as consultative as possible” (MOE, 2010c:29). Again, multi-
criteria analysis was used, but the criteria developed (as laid out in table 5.1) were drawn directly 
from the same criteria used by the thematic working groups to identify adaptation options, 
including during the fieldwork and group consultations. The criteria were aggregated and 
systematised, so in this sense they directly reflect the outputs of the deliberative processes. 
Further, the criteria themselves emphasise inclusiveness, with indicators against “people’s 
participation” and “potential to support local livelihoods” (see table 5.1). Indicators include 
“involvement in project design and implementation”, “local ownership”, “social and cultural 
acceptance”, “local capacity building”, and “social inclusion” (disaggregated according to gender 
and caste) (see table 5.1). It is impossible to say at this stage whether these criteria for 
‘inclusiveness’ will actually be applied to the design of adaptation projects. However, they indicate 
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that it is more likely that the resulting adaptation projects will better reflect deliberative outcomes 
than those in Bangladesh, where such criteria did not exist.  
 
The final NAPA document in Nepal was not a complete reflection of the outputs of the 
consultation exercises. However, there is evidence that the outcomes of deliberative processes 
were taken into account in decision making around defining vulnerabilities and designing 
adaptation options. Therefore on the basis of the evidence presented in these sub-cases, this 
thesis concludes that the NAPA process in Nepal was more inclusive than that in Bangladesh.  
 
 
6.5  What factors contributed to a “more inclusive” approach to adaptation policy 
making?  
 
This chapter has suggested that the NAPA in Nepal achieved a greater degree of inclusiveness than 
that in Bangladesh, in terms of three aspects of deliberative institutional design: who was 
included; how they were included; and the content of deliberations. But, given that both 
Bangladesh and Nepal were guided by the same set of NAPA guidelines produced by the LDC 
Expert Group under the UNFCCC, how and why did these differences in approach occur? From this 
preceding discussion above, the most direct answer to this question is that the NAPA in Nepal 
employed a wider range of participatory technologies, and was therefore able to reach a greater 
number of people, and a more diverse set of voices. 
 
However, this thesis has also generated evidence around the circumstances of deliberative 
institutional design, which shows that the choices of participatory technologies are themselves 
driven by assumptions about climate change risk, that influence how participatory processes are 
structured and why. This thesis has demonstrated that one significant factor in influencing the 
approaches taken to ‘being inclusive’, was the way in which ‘risk’ has been framed: the way in 
which climate change risk was framed during deliberations had an impact on who was invited to 
consultations; how consultations were managed; and how the outputs of consultations were used. 
A second, related factor, is the approach taken to scale; specifically, the way in which ‘local’ was 
interpreted in relation to other social and administrative scales.   
 
But what factors influenced the different approaches to the framing of climate change risks in 
Nepal and Bangladesh? Taking an environmentally determinist angle, this could be a function of 
the different types of climate-related hazards in Bangladesh and Nepal; Bangladesh is a low-lying 
coastal country that is exposed to storms, cyclones and prone to flooding. These are ‘high risk’ and 
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‘sudden onset’ hazards that occur at intermittent intervals.  Nepal is a land-locked mountainous 
country in the Himalayas. Key climate change hazards include the impacts of melting glaciers such 
as “Glacial Lake Outburst Floods” (GLOFs) (high risk, low frequency) and also changes to water 
systems (slow onset); and other ‘slow onset’ risks of changes to agricultural systems. In line with 
the arguments of Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990), ‘science’ draws in around high risk, low certainty 
problems in order to bring about a degree of certainty. The hazards in Bangladesh could be 
interpreted as ‘higher risk’ hazards than those in Nepal, resulting in attempts to reduce risk by 
increasing certainty by applying expert judgement.  
 
However, this thesis has shown that ‘risks’ are not defined by hazards, but are also constructed. 
This thesis has investigated some of the factors that influence certain constructions of risk over 
others, and how this in turn influences approaches to participation and deliberation in risk 
assessment. This analysis has given rise to three factors that have influenced the construction of 
climate change risks in Bangladesh and Nepal: histories of environmental policy making that have 
influenced environmental risk narratives in each country; the availability and legitimacy of climate 
hazard and climate change information and expertise; and finally, the timing of NAPA processes 
which enabled lesson-learning to occur between Nepal and Bangladesh, specifically encouraging 
Nepal to focus explicitly on vulnerability and participatory processes. A summary of these findings 
is presented in box 6.2. 
 
 It is acknowledged that a range of, particularly political, but also cultural, historical and economic 
factors influence the way in which different countries approach the design of the same policy 
processes, and public engagement in these processes. For example, both Bangladesh and Nepal 
have extremely fragile political systems with implications for political trust and engagement. At 
the time of the NAPA process in Bangladesh, a coalition government that was facing strong 
allegations of corruption was governing the country. 2004 to 2006 was also a period of heightened 
insecurity, with terrorist bombings and assassinations disrupting the political process (Eicher et al., 
2010). Interviews with the NAPA preparation team revealed that the preparation process was 
sometimes held up by violent public demonstrations and strikes against the Government (personal 
communication, Mr. Reazuddin, former Secretary of the Ministry of Environment: September 
2007). During the field study period for this investigation, an interim, non-elected military-backed 
“caretaker” government was in power following an attempt at a general election in 2006 that had 
failed on allegations of corruption.  
 
In Nepal, NAPA preparation began in the context of recent relative political stability. Following 
over a decade of violent Maoist insurgency, peace talks began in 2006 between the Government 
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and Maoist rebels that culminated in a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006.  
However, disagreements over the more recent formation of a Constituent Assembly in 2008 has 
seen Maoist protests forcing strikes and sometimes violence throughout Nepal but often centred 
on the Government in Kathmandu. Further, Maoist unrest in the rural areas combined with the 
presence of over three dozen armed groups operating in the Terai region, have resulted in violent 
conflict and political unrest in much of the Terai and also some parts of the Far West (FCO, 2010). 
These conflicts constrain development efforts in these regions, and also mean that policy 
participation tends to exclude these areas, as it did in the NAPA.  
 
This study acknowledges that such historical and political factors can both constrain participatory 
policy-making efforts, and also carry implications for public trust in the political process itself, and 
thus the willingness of people to engage and feel that their engagement is meaningful. In light of 
these contexts, this study focuses in particular in the NAPA processes in each country, and the 
factors that emerged from this research as key influences on the framing of climate change risk 
and adaptation governance.  
 
Different histories of environmental policy making 
 
This thesis has proposed that one factor that can significantly influence the way in which 
environmental policy problems are framed (and hence impacts on the deliberative process), is the 
presence of existing dominant environmental narratives. For example, chapter one describes the 
example of National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs) in the Cote d’Ivoire, where the problem 
framing of desertification by external ‘environmental experts’ stemmed primarily from powerful 
“regional discursive formations” (Peet and Watts, 2000:69), rather than on reliable, ground-
truthed data. Such narratives were taken as “received wisdom” (Forsyth, 2008) and resulted in 
overlooking other valid types of data that contradicted these discourses.   
  
Some scholars of discursive and deliberative politics suggest that where powerful narratives – or 
‘storylines’ (Hajer, 1995) - exist, it can be difficult to overcome them. For example, Maarten Hajer 
(1995) suggests that as storylines are accepted and propagated, they gain a ritual character and 
give a certain permanence to the debate (Hajer, 1995:63). Indeed, some interpretations of a 
Foucauldian perspective is even more pessimistic, and suggest it is difficult to work outside the 
dominant paradigm because alternative paradigms are seen as illegitimate, and a kind of ‘if you 
can’t beat them, join them’ mentality develops which propagates dominant approaches until they 
become hegemonic. As such, Byrant (2002) notes that,  
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The Foucauldian scholar has become…a prophet of entrapment who indices by indicating 
that there is no way out of our subjection (Byrant, 2002:271).   
 
However, this interpretation of Foucault’s work is pessimistic, and indeed Foucault himself 
suggested that the “insurrection of subjugated knowledges” is possible (Foucault, 1976). The sub-
cases presented in this thesis have explored this possibility, by examining the role of dominant 
environmental narratives in influencing how climate change risk has been governed. Has climate 
change been subjected to, and become part of, existing “hegemonic environmental discourses”? Is 
there any evidence that existing environmental discourses had an impact on the potential for 
climate change risk to be deliberated?  
 
There is evidence from the sub-cases that historical environmental narratives did to some extent 
serve to reinforce technical and impacts-based discourses around climate risk. Chapter four 
describes how the long history of environmental hazards in Bangladesh has resulted in a strong 
“crisis narrative” (Lewis, 2009) around the climate-related hazards of floods and cyclones. In the 
past such narratives have been shown to have contributed to subversion of the contextual factors 
that drive vulnerability, as well as local and non-technical vulnerability reduction strategies, in 
favour of large scale and technical solutions that target the specific climate hazards (Lewis, 2009). 
Chapter four proposed that the ‘crisis’ narrative of floods and cyclones seems to have been 
transferred to climate change, suggesting that having been the ‘face’ of flooding catastrophes, 
Bangladesh is fast becoming the pin-up for climate change impacts.  Indeed, far more donor, 
media and policy attention has been paid to the exacerbating influence of climate change on 
flooding and cyclone hazards than to other hazards such as slow-onset drought.  
 
Chapter five showed how Nepal’s environmental policy making history had also been influenced 
by a powerful “catastrophe myth”, which Ives (2009) terms “the theory of Himalayan 
Degradation” (Ives, 2009:13). This narrative centred on rapid and uncontrollable deforestation by 
indigenous groups, purported to result in devastating flooding downstream. The result was large-
scale investment in protecting forests against deforestation by local farmers. However, Ives 
suggests that there was a significant backlash against this narrative when it was shown that 
farmers in fact did more to manage forests than to destroy them. Consequently, Nepal now 
receives significant donor investment in “community-forestry management”.  
 
In relation to climate change, the “catastrophe myth” for the Himalayan region including Nepal 
has not been directly related to forestry, but as centred on melting glaciers, especially Glacial Lake 
Outburst Floods (GLOFs).  During the NAPA process, there was significant attention from outside 
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agencies, in particularly the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) who were acting as 
the implementing agency, to reflect ‘the GLOF issue’ in the NAPA. For example, Bhutan was invited 
to the NAPA Inception Workshop to present on the GLOF project that arose out of their own NAPA 
process.   
 
Yet, only two of the thematic working groups included GLOF projects in their list of adaptation 
priorities, and even then these projects were not considered high priority. Indeed, UNDP 
expressed surprise and disappointment at a NAPA follow-up meeting conducted after the release 
of the NAPA draft that there was not more attention to GLOFs. The response from the NAPA team 
was that GLOFs had not emerged as a priority from the consultative processes on which the NAPAs 
were based, and the only reason they were included at all was based on the knowledge of the 
importance of the issue by thematic working group members (notes from NAPA Project Executive 
Board meeting taken provided by NAPA Team Climate Change Consultant, August 13th 2010).  
 
Therefore the ‘catastrophe myth’ of melting glaciers in Nepal did influence the NAPA outcomes to 
some extent, but the discourse did not dominate the debate around climate risks and 
vulnerability. The evidence from this thesis suggests that one reason why the ‘catastrophe’ 
discourse on climate change in Nepal seems to have been less influential than in Bangladesh, may 
be that as shown in chapter five this narrative was significantly undermined at the same time as 
the Nepal NAPA was being prepared.  The results of GLOF ‘ground truthing’ studies had shown 
many GLOFs labelled as ‘dangerous’ were in fact not; and the evidence of glacial melt used in the 
IPCC reports had shown to be incorrect. India had been very vocal in contesting the ‘myth of 
Himalayan melt’, and this had been widely reported in the public press in Nepal. Thus, the 
evidence-base for the GLOF narrative was significantly undermined.   
 
Thus, in Bangladesh the environmental crisis narrative gained momentum with the climate change 
agenda; but in Nepal, the historical ‘environmental crisis’ narrative (around deforestation) was 
quite different to that promoted as the dominant climate change discourse for the region; and the 
latter was undermined at the same time as the development of the NAPA.   Hence, rather than 
view authoritative discourses as inherent and therefore impenetrable, it is important to question 
why and how discourses become authoritative knowledge in the first place; and the circumstances 
under which individuals exercise their own agency to challenge or operate outside dominant 
paradigms. In Nepal, these circumstances included awareness within Government and donor 
agencies related to the de-legitimisation of an environmental crisis narrative, resulting in the 
exercising of a degree of caution in the taking up of another; as well as some of the circumstances 
discussed below.    
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The availability and use of climate change „expertise‟ 
 
Chapter one raised the issue of ‘expertise’ in relation to enabling meaningful deliberation around 
policy problems; specifically, the way in which problems that have been framed as ‘scientific’, 
‘technical’, or ‘expert’ in nature immediately limit the potential for ‘local’ inclusiveness, where 
‘local’ knowledge is seen as ‘inexpert’. Scholars from the fields of Science and technology Studies 
have repeatedly demonstrated how ‘local’ or ‘indigenous’ knowledges are excluded from ‘global’ 
and ‘expert’ debates. This thesis has shown that an ‘impacts-based’ approach to defining climate 
change risk has been framed as a ‘global’, ‘technical’ issue requiring ‘expert’ inputs; while a ‘social-
vulnerability approach to climate risk is open to a different kind of expertise; from vulnerable 
people to provide information on the factors that make them vulnerable.   Almost by definition, 
the most vulnerable are unlikely to have access to the kinds of technical information required for 
them to be able to meaningfully contribute to impacts-based debates; therefore an impacts-based 
approach to defining adaptation is less likely to be ‘inclusive’ of vulnerable people.  
 
But, how and why are issues framed as ‘expert’? The evidence from this thesis shows that one of 
the factors contributing to a predominantly ‘impacts-based’ discourse around climate change 
adaption in Bangladesh was the availability and use of climate change information and expertise. 
First, as discussed above, Bangladesh has a long history of environmental policy making targeting 
similar climate-related hazards as those identified by the NAPA. Further, and perhaps because of 
this existing community of practice around managing climate-related hazards, Bangladesh has a 
relatively long history of engagement in climate change studies and adaptation interventions 
compared to other LDCs (Ayers and Huq, 2009a). As a result, there are a large number of 
organisations and agencies with knowledge, tools and capacity to assess climate related impacts.  
 
In addition, as stated above, Bangladesh has also long been the ‘face of climate vulnerability’ to 
the international community. This, coupled with its long history of engagement in international 
climate change fora, has made Bangladesh the focus of many international studies on climate 
change impacts. Therefore the climate change data and expertise available for and in Bangladesh 
at the time of NAPA inception was considerable.   
 
This is reflected both in the NAPA document and in the NAPA process. First, as noted, many of the 
sectoral working groups were led by national climate change consultants with particular expertise 
around climate change impacts, and also significant exposure to the UNFCCC processes, 
frameworks, and expectations. Second, a considerable amount of climate-related data was 
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available before the NAPA regional stakeholder consultation workshops took place. The NAPA 
document states: 
 
Over the last decade a number of studies have been carried out on impacts, vulnerability 
and adaptation assessment for Bangladesh to climate change and sea level rise. (MOEF, 
2005:7).  
 
The NAPA document also presents the outputs from global and regional circulation models, and 
states: 
 
The National Adaptation Programme of Action for Bangladesh has complied future 
impacts, vulnerability and adaptation based on existing model outputs. (MOEF, 2005:9).  
 
 This level of climate change information was, especially at the time when Bangladesh completed 
its NAPA, rather unprecedented, and enabled the NAPA team to evaluate climate change risks 
from an impacts-based perspective from the outset.  
 
In Nepal, the level and availability of climate change expertise and information was significantly 
lower. Indeed, there was much competition between development agencies investing in 
adaptation over “only a handful” of national climate change consultants (Asian Development Bank 
representative, personal communication October 2009).  This lack of obvious national agencies or 
individuals with expertise in specifically climate change gave more weight to the proposal for each 
thematic working group to be government-led by the relevant government sector. Each 
Government lead official obviously had considerable knowledge and experience related to their 
sectors, but very little experience, if any, at handling climate change data.  
 
Second, few international climate change experts were used by the project, despite provisions in 
the LEG NAPA guidelines for the inclusion of international consultants to help guide the NAPA 
process. This was a result of delays in hiring in particular a “climate change specialist”, so that the 
NAPA process began with the support of junior level consultants and was led by MOE Government 
officials (rather than driven by external consultants, as had been the case in many other NAPAs).  
  
Third, there was very little availability of climate change impacts data. Chapter five describes how 
the Himalayan region is considered a ‘white spot’ for accurate climate change modelling 
information, an assertion confirmed by the controversies over existing climate predictions for the 
region noted above. At the time of NAPA inception, only one rigorous climate change data study 
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had been conducted for the whole of Nepal, and the conclusions of that study were that there was 
insufficient certainty in the outputs of the climate change models to focus adaptation action on 
anticipated climate changes (ISET NCVST, 2009).  
 
Therefore, the information presented in chapter five shows that there was little choice but for 
Nepal to adopt a vulnerability-first approach to defining climate change risk; the information and 
expertise around development and social vulnerability were there, whist expertise related to 
climate change impacts were not. That is not to say that there was no demand for climate change 
information by the NAPA teams and their respective ministries. Throughout the process, many of 
the  thematic working groups sought guidance in how to differentiate what they were developing 
from standard developing projects, not wanting to be accused of ‘repackaging development’. In 
particular, the climate change focal point from the Ministry of Environment felt pressure 
(perceived or otherwise) from the LEG to present climate change data in the NAPA (Batu Uprety, 
LEG representative and NAPA Project Manager, personal communication, November 2009).  
 
The result of this demand for climate change information was that one of the proposals from the 
working and energy group to generate climate risk maps for Nepal was taken up and developed 
during the NAPA preparation process. Maps were produced that used existing climate-related 
hazards (such as flooding, water stress, landslides, GLOF threats and temperature extremes) as 
proxy indicators for climate change impacts. However, these maps are still under finalisation at 
the time of writing, and the NAPA has already reached the draft stage. Therefore it is too late for 
the climate hazard information to have much influence on the more ‘vulnerability-based’ 
approach taken in Nepal in developing its NAPA.   
 
Further, discussions at the NAPA follow-up meeting over how to incorporate these maps 
confirmed that the maps will not influence the overall NAPA outcomes or priority adaptation 
projects (notes from NAPA Project Executive Board meeting taken provided by NAPA Team 
Climate Change Consultant, August 13th 2010). The creation of the maps nevertheless show the 
perceived pressure felt by the NAPA team to conform to an ‘impacts-based’ approach to 
addressing climate risks promoted by the UNFCCC process.  
 
The timing of the NAPA process in Bangladesh and Nepal 
 
Finally, the evidence generated by the sub-case studies suggest that the factor that contributed 
significantly to the differences in deliberative institutional design adopted in the two countries, 
was the opportunity for lesson-drawing created by the time lag between the two processes. 
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Bangladesh was one of the first countries to complete its NAPA in 2005, and as such had only the 
LEG Guidelines as guidance on the process. Nepal is one of the last countries to complete its 
NAPA. In the interim period, a series of evaluations and critical writings on the NAPA process and 
its associated mechanisms had been carried out. Two issues were repeatedly raised in these 
evaluations and also in more general informal criticisms of the NAPA in NGO forums: First, that 
NAPAs should be country-driven yet in many countries had been led by expert consultants; and 
second, that the participatory mechanisms conducted under NAPAs were insufficiently inclusive 
(Agrawal, 2008; CAN, 2008; COWI/IIED, 2009; see chapter five box 5.3).  
 
The recommendations from these evaluations were taken on board in the design and 
implementation of the NAPA preparation process in Nepal both explicitly and implicitly. Explicitly, 
the NAPA document and supporting preparation reports make references to these criticisms, and 
the way in which the design of the Nepal NAPA has been adjusted accordingly. Implicitly, these 
criticisms put pressure on the implementing agency of the UNDP to ‘do things differently’; on the 
donors who had allocated significant co-financing to the NAPA in Nepal to show value for money 
in terms of showing how this additional funding could improve the highly criticised NAPA process; 
and on the Government of Nepal, who needed to report to the LEG Group at various meetings of 
the UNFCCC and show how they were using the delays in the NAPA process to their advantage.  
 
But, how influential was ‘lesson learning’ in defining the approach taken to NAPA development, 
versus other factors? The impact of “lesson-drawing” on public policy is debated (James and 
Lodge, 2003; Rose, 1993). Lesson drawing has been defined in political science as “a cause-and-
effect description of a set of actions that a government can consider in light of experience 
elsewhere” (Rose, 1993:27).  Proponents of lesson-drawing suggest that learning from experiences 
elsewhere in time or place provides an invaluable tool for creating better-informed policy (Rose, 
1993). Some critics of a lesson-drawing approach question how different it is from simply “rational 
policy-making”, where decisions are based on searching for the means to pursue goals in a 
systemic and comprehensive manner, and where reviewing policy in light of past experience is 
necessarily part of that process (James and Lodge, 2003:181).  
 
This thesis suggests that the case-study of lesson-drawing in Nepal does differ from rational policy-
making, precisely because the lessons that are taken up are not necessarily done so on a ‘rational’ 
basis. As shown in previous sections, many factors contributed to the decisions of Nepal to focus 
on a country-driven and inclusive approach. It is true that the lessons were there to be learnt, 
however the avenues created for lesson-learning, and the factors that led to decisions-makers 
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taking up these lessons, were both complex and political. When lessons present themselves, 
choices are made about whether, why and how to draw on them; as Rose notes,  
 
Lesson drawing cannot be politically neutral, because politics is about conflicting values 
and goals. A lesson is always a means to a political end. (Rose, 1993:22).  
 
For example, as discussed in chapter five, direct avenues for lesson-drawing were created 
between Bangladesh and Nepal when Nepal invited Bangladesh to present their NAPA experience 
at the Nepal NAPA inception workshop. However, there were many conditions that led to this 
invitation; to the acceptance of the invitation; and to the choice to acknowledge and take on 
board what was presented.  
 
First, from the point of view of the Government, Bangladesh was a previous Chair of the Least 
Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), and had a reputation among countries Party to the 
UNFCCC, as well as donors and intergovernmental agencies, as a ‘leader in the field’ on climate 
change adaptation for reasons discussed earlier in this chapter (around the long history of climate 
change policy making in Bangladesh). Thus the decision to invite Bangladesh may be taken as a 
rational decision to learn from the country with the most experience. However, added to this was 
the fact that Nepal, in lagging behind the other LDCs on its NAPA submission, was lacking in 
credibility in within the LDC Group, and yet had ambitions to take up the future Chair position.31 
The invitation to Bangladesh therefore both served to strengthen the allegiance between the two 
countries, but also to demonstrate to a ‘high ranking’ member of the LDC Group that action on the 
NAPA was taking place and that efforts were being made to turn the delays to an advantage; to 
learn the lessons from others.  
 
Second, from the implementing agency, UNDP in particular had faced considerable criticism both 
from evaluation processes of other NAPAs, and also for their role in delaying the process of the 
Nepal NAPA (Prasai, 2010).  Therefore by emphasising the uptake of lessons from other NAPAs, 
UNDP was both demonstrating that it was responding to the various evaluation recommendations, 
but that the delays in the Nepal NAPA process were in many ways justified because they 
presented an opportunity to learn from others. Statements to this effect were made by UNDP at 
the Inception Workshop and have been repeated ever since (MOEST, 2009).  
 
                                               
31
 At the time of writing – August 2010 – Nepal is currently making its case to take up the next Chair position of the 
LDC Group.  
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Third, as shown in chapter five, there was significant cofinancing from donors in the NAPA process 
in Nepal. Donors were therefore under pressure not to be seen to be investing a process that had 
been repeatedly criticised. Therefore to justify this cofinancing it was important to show how this 
funding was being used to make the NAPA in Nepal ‘innovative’ and ‘to succeed where others had 
failed’.  
 
Therefore, the evidence from the sub-case of the Nepal NAPA shows that the timing of the NAPA 
did present opportunities for lesson-learning, and the one of the strongest lessons taken from 
other NAPAs was the need for Nepal to demonstrate that they were being participatory and 
inclusive.  This contributed to the Nepal NAPA team actively emphasising ‘inclusiveness’ in the 
NAPA process. However, the uptake of this lesson was not only ‘rational’. It was borne from a 
need by all key stakeholders involved in the NAPA design process to demonstrate that Nepal was 
taking an innovative approach and that the delays in the NAPA process could be justified on 
account of the need to ensure that the NAPA in Nepal would have appropriate consultative 
mechanisms to make it truly inclusive.  
 
In thinking about the role of lesson-learning in facilitating a more deliberative process in Nepal, 
then, it is important to consider the hidden politics of how lesson are applied and learnt, and with 
whose input. As noted by Rose: 
 
A lesson is viewed as desirable only if it is consistent with the values and goals of those 
evaluating it. (Rose, 1993:45).  
 
Importantly, the trends identified in table 6.2 are a result of highly politicised decision-making 
process and are not only structural. For example, the use of climate change “expertise” in Nepal 
was not only because there was less knowledge available. This was also because of the politics of 
engaging the “experts” who were available to contribute to the process (see section 5.4). The 
capacity to “learn” in Nepal was not simply a result of timing. Spaces for learning also had to be 
created. These spaces were carved out both by the MOE, Government of Nepal, who were under 
pressure from the LDC Group to show that they could make use of the delayed NAPA process; and 
also multilateral and donor stakeholders who had to justify the ‘added value’ created by the 
process of co financing which had contributed to delays in the NAPA. This suggests that agency 
(rather than only structures) is significant in shaping discourse and policy trajectories.  
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Table 6.2: Summary of findings of the factors that influenced approaches to ‘doing inclusiveness’ in each 
NAPA process 
 
 Bangladesh Nepal 
Histories of 
environmental 
policy making 
 Long history of environmental 
policy making around climate-
related hazards 
 Strong “environmental crisis” 
around cyclones and flooding 
matched mapped well on to 
national climate change narrative 
 History of environmental policy 
making focused on forest and 
landslide management 
 Discredited “environmental crisis” 
narrative around deforestation did 
not match emerging “glacial melt” 
narrative around climate change 
 “Glacial melt” narrative undermined 
by the IPCC being exposed for a lack 
of credible data on the issue 
Availability and 
use of ‘expertise’  
 Strong base of knowledge around 
climate-related hazards. Large 
number of climate change studies 
already carried out.  
 High number of ‘climate change 
experts’ both nationally and 
internationally recognised 
 Many of the NAPA sectoral 
working groups ‘expert led’. 
Several international and national 
climate change consultants 
supporting the process.  
 Nepal a “white spot” for climate 
change information 
 Some Nepali glacier studies 
discredited (see above) 
 Shortage of national ‘climate change 
experts’.  
 Decision to have thematic working 
groups ‘government led’.  
 Shortage of international climate 
change experts available to support 
the NAPA process 
Timing of NAPA 
processes 
 Bangladesh one of the first 
countries to complete its NAPA. 
No previous experience to draw 
on.  
 Relatively little learning 
internationally on how to ‘do’ 
adaptation. International 
guidance offered through NAPA 
guidelines.  
 International debates on 
adaptation still leaning towards 
projectised, impacts-based 
approaches.  
 Nepal one of the last to complete its 
NAPA, able to draw lessons from 
others including Bangladesh 
especially around the need for 
improved mechanisms of ‘local’ 
stakeholder engagement.  
 Third assessment report published, 
international debate on adaptation 
moving towards programmatic  
approaches, greater recognition of 
social-vulnerability as key factor in 
determining climate risk. 
 
 
 6.6  What do these findings mean for deliberative institutional design?   
 
This analysis of the evidence generated by the sub-case study analysis supports the conclusion 
that, while neither Bangladesh nor Nepal achieved successful deliberation in terms of ‘equality of 
voice’, ‘equality of reason’ and ‘equality of outcomes,’ the NAPA process in Nepal was more 
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inclusive than that in Bangladesh. There are likely to be many reasons for this, but the key factors 
emerging form this analysis include the different histories of environmental policy-making 
narratives in Bangladesh and Nepal; the differences in the availability of climate change 
information and expertise relative to those on vulnerability; and the timing of the two NAPA 
processes, that enabled Nepal to learn from criticisms around inclusiveness of past NAPAs. This 
analysis suggests that these factors influenced the way in which climate change risks were framed 
in each country, and the relative emphasis placed on inclusiveness in each NAPA process.  
 
These findings support a conclusion that  a ‘more inclusive’ institutional design for governing 
adaptation requires greater attention to a disaggregated ‘local’; conducting ‘locally inclusive’ 
consultations at a scale that provides access to the relevant stakeholders and a forum in which 
they are able to contribute freely; and facilitating the deliberations in such a way as to ensure 
debates around risk are open to vulnerability perspectives (for example, through a shared learning 
dialogue approach).  
 
Taking these elements forward, what sort of institutions meet these requirements?   
 
Community-based adaptation32  
 
Chapter one discussed community-based approaches, especially around community-based natural 
resource management (CBNRM), as one alternative institutional design that could allow for a 
greater degree of ‘local inclusiveness’. Translated to adaptation, there is a growing proposal for 
“Community-based Adaptation” (CBA). Rather than starting at the national level and attempting to 
draw on ‘local’ insights to inform national policy on adaptation, CBA starts at the local level in 
vulnerable communities to identify, assist, and implement community-based development 
activities that strengthen the capacity of local people to adapt. Ayers and Forsyth (2009) suggest 
that CBA has the following characteristics:  
 CBA operates at the ‘local level’ (taken here to mean administrative level, for example 
neighborhood, settlement or village) in communities that have been defined as vulnerable 
to the impacts of climate change; 
 CBA practitioners work with “the local community” to identify and implement community-
based development activities that strengthen the capacity of local people to adapt; 
 CBA generated adaptation strategies through active participatory processes involving local 
stakeholders. Participation techniques such as Participatory Rural Appraisal commonly used 
in community-based development initiatives are often harnessed for CBA.   
                                               
32
 Some of the concepts  in this section have been expanded in Ayers and Forsyth, 2009 
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 CBA attempts to build on existing cultural norms and addresses local development concerns 
that underlie vulnerability. 
 
Many proponents of a CBA approach note that this kind of institutional design enables the local 
deliberations that can identify disaggregated development needs and cultural preferences that 
determine effective adaptation (Ayers and Forsyth, 2009; Jones and Rahman, 2007). But does CBA 
meet the needs of the governance of climate change adaptation?  
 
This thesis has shown that the governance of adaptation presents a paradox, based on the dual 
requirements of being part of a ‘global’ climate change problem, managed and financed through 
international administrative frameworks; and yet needing to respond to disaggregated local 
vulnerability contexts, where the factors driving vulnerability are often detached from impacts of a 
global climate change risk. This means adaptation has to be managed coherently across scales. 
Does CBA meet this requirement?  
 
First, as noted in chapter one, simply organizing participatory exercises at the level of ‘the 
community’ does not necessarily translate to an approach that reveals the disaggregated nature of 
vulnerability within communities. Going back to the earlier discussion around ‘who is local’, 
chapter one showed that not all ‘community-based’ participatory methodologies necessarily 
disaggregate ‘local’, or result in more deliberative outcomes. In relation to CBA, some critics have 
pointed out that when CBA is defined as an approach to adaptation alongside wider scale 
adaptation planning, the result is a ‘one-project, one community’ approach that actually 
encourages an ‘aggregated community’ discourse (Comments from the third CBA Workshop, 
Dhaka, 2009). Williams (2004) suggests that such a “naïve” approach to scalar dimensions can 
generate exclusion. The author states:  
 
Those  who don’t fit easily into demarcated and territorial “communities” can all too 
easily fall foul of visions of development” (Williams, 2004:561).  
 
This statement is supported by the analysis presented in this thesis, that showed how being 
framed as ‘local’ was both empowering in that it resulted in inclusion in participatory activities, 
but also disempowering in that the ‘local’ if often seen as subordinate compared to ‘global’ 
perspectives.  
 
Second, there has been much criticism of community-based approaches in terms of spatial and 
temporal limitations (Ribot, 2002), a particular problem for managing ‘global’ environmental risks 
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where there is a need to connect to higher level governance structures. As noted by Dodman and 
Mitlin (2010), while there has been much work on developing participatory tools and methods for 
enabling community-based development at the project level, relatively little attention has been 
paid to building up the links with political structures above the level of the settlement. 
 
This is problematic for addressing the governance of adaptation in particular, for two reasons. 
First, chapter three presented evidence that showed how adaptive capacity can be defined in 
terms of access not only to financial and material resources, but also, and significantly, social and 
political resources. Therefore while community-based projectised approaches may assist in 
building people’s ability to adapt autonomously, it is necessary to engage with the wider 
governance contexts that can both drive and also address vulnerability in order to make planned 
adaptation interventions effective, and to ensure people can adapt autonomously in the longer 
term. These observations are supported by Boyd et al., (2009) who argue that “stand-alone” 
projects cannot result in long term, sustainable adaptation, and that adaptation needs to be better 
integrated into broader planning frameworks across national, sectoral and local level.  
 
Second, debates around how to channel financial resources for adaptation have centred on 
country access and government ownership. While the recently active Adaptation Fund under the 
UNFCCC currently has a “direct access’ windows for non-government organisations, the majority 
of financial resources flowing for adaptation will be through existing national government systems, 
in line with the Paris Principles of Aid Effectiveness.33 Therefore, as stated by Dodman and Mitlin 
(2010): 
 
While a scale focus at the local is important to pro-poor political strategies, such 
strategies…are not credible unless they recognise that there is also a need to deal with 
institutionalised power relations above the level of the settlement (Dodman and Mitlin, 
2011: 15).  
 
Applied to adaptation, many observers have argued that ‘scaling up’ of CBA initiatives to influence 
climate policy is problematic because little attention is being paid to the wider policy making 
context of adaptation (Ayers and Dodman, 2010; Dodman and Mitlin, 2011). While CBA is proving 
useful in exploring the ground-reality of vulnerability, few attempts are being made to link these 
cases with the actual policy frameworks through which wider scale adaptation planning and 
delivery will operate.  
                                               
33
 These include enhanced national ownership; alignment with developing country planning priorities; and mutual 
accountability between donors and national governments on managing financial flows (OECD, 2005).  
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On the one hand, the Bangladesh case suggests (and other NAPAs confirm) that the ‘top-down’, 
impacts-based approach to adaptation planning encouraged under the UNFCCC results in a 
sectoral approach to defining and implementing adaptation support; on the other hand, CBA is 
working at the ground level to identify the myriad of factors on which vulnerability depends, that 
are unlikely to fit neatly into sector- or impact-based policies. The tension between the global and 
local approaches to defining and addressing climate change vulnerability have resulted in 
surprisingly little discussion on if, and how, CBA-type approaches can actually be incorporated into 
adaptation policy making.  
 
 
Local Adaptation Plans of Action 
 
What is needed, then, is a policy framework that enables local, autonomous adaptation via 
community level institutions, but also links to formal state institutions such as through local 
government.  Yet, as Agrawal notes, to date there is a lack of “middle-range theories” to bridge 
the gap between community-based and national level adaptation planning (Agrawal, 2008). 
Agrawal suggests that the ‘missing link’ is an analysis of local institutions that operate between 
these levels of adaptation planning, proposing that local institutions determine adaptive capacity 
at the local level in three ways (Agrawal, 2008:3): 
i. They structure impacts and vulnerability  
ii. They mediate between individual and collective responses to climate impacts and so shape 
outcomes of adaptation 
iii.  They act as the means of delivery of external resources to facilitate adaptation, and thus 
govern access to such resources. 
 
The mediating role of local institutions between resource users and resource deliverers suggest 
they have a crucial role to play in facilitating deliberation between national adaptation planners, 
and local beneficiaries of adaptation interventions. Agrawal (2008) suggests greater attention is 
needed to, firstly, institutional access, related to who has access to which institutions at the local 
level that could enable, support, and develop autonomous adaptation strategies. Secondly, 
institutional articulation; attention to the linkages between local institutions and each other, and 
also higher level governance structures that enable autonomous adaptation strategies to be part 
of wider scale adaptation planning. However, in a recent review of NAPA projects, Agrawal (2008) 
shows that NAPAs 
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 Have attended only in a limited fashion to the role of local institutions in designing, 
supporting, and implementing adaptation” (Agrawal, 2008:3).   
 
Similarly, CBA practitioners have to date tended not to engage with institutional governance 
structures above the settlement level, if at all (Dodman and Mitlin, 2011).  
 
But how can these barriers to institutional engagement in adaptation be overcome?  In Nepal, an 
innovative approach to adaptation planning is currently being developed that attempts to do just 
this: Local Adaptation Plans of Action, or “LAPAs”.  The LAPA concept emerged from the Nepal 
NAPA Inception Workshop, (see box 5.6), in response to a perceived ‘top-down’ framework for 
NAPA development. This concept has since been picked up by DfID as an idea for how a LAPA 
could bridge the gap between local and national adaptation planning scales, intended to produce 
locally specific adaptation plans that redress the gaps between autonomous and planned 
adaptations.  
 
LAPA development begins with a detailed assessment of institutional options, access, and 
articulation as the starting point for a risk and adaptive capacity assessment, rather than beginning 
with climate change impacts information. The latter analysis of articulation is then used to 
consider how LAPAs both feed into national level adaptation planning; and also how national 
adaptation plans can be delivered through LAPAs.  The outputs of a LAPA are still under discussion, 
but the LAPA is envisaged as both a ‘local’ level adaptation plan (which could be community level, 
settlement, district), and a means of analysing institutional linkages across scales to ensure that 
gaps between ‘local’ and national adaptation planning, finance and delivery can be bridged 
(interview with DfID Nepal Climate Change Adviser, August 2010).  
 
While the LAPA concept is still in the design phase, a key promising feature is the flexible approach 
taken to scale. ‘Local’ is not predefined as either community, household, district and so on; rather, 
local institutions are taken as the whichever formal or informal institutions are important in 
enabling vulnerable people to gain access to the assets they require to help them build their 
adaptive capacity.   
 
This suggests that enabling ‘deliberative’ adaptation governance across scales requires not only a 
flexible approach to defining climate change risk; but also to understanding the linkages between 
how risks are conceived, and the politics of scale; it means democratising what we mean by scale 
itself.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Can global climate change adaptation policy be locally inclusive? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis aimed to address the question: In light of the “adaptation paradox”, where climate 
change presents a ‘global’ risk, but vulnerability is ‘locally’ experienced, can global climate change 
policy achieve local inclusiveness?  Based on insights from themes in social science around 
participation, expertise and deliberation, this thesis proposed the hypothesis that the adaptation 
paradox presents new challenges for inclusiveness: a globalised discourse on adaptation restricts 
discussion of risk to ‘global’ and technical expertise, and is not open to localised vulnerability-
based knowledge about how risks are experienced. This hypothesis is based on two assumptions; 
first, that perceptions of climate change risk differ across scales; and secondly, that this matters 
for achieving inclusiveness in adaptation governance.  
 
This study has tested this hypothesis and these assumptions by collecting and analysing a new set 
of data on perceptions of climate change risk, and opportunities for inclusiveness, at the 
international, national, and community scales. First, this study carried out key informant 
interviews with actors engaged in the international sphere of the climate change negotiations, and 
within the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change (IPCC); and conducted a detailed analysis 
of published and grey literature around adaptation policy making.  The evidence from this part of 
the study is presented in chapter three, and shows that there are two broad approaches to 
adaptation, which in turn depend on how climate change risk and vulnerability are defined and 
assessed.  First, an ‘impacts-based’ approach to adaptation, which takes climate change impacts as 
the starting point for vulnerability assessments, and gives rise to technological adaptation 
solutions that target the specific impacts of climate change. Second, a ‘social-vulnerability’ 
approach that takes a livelihoods or assets-based framework for assessing vulnerability, and 
results in adaptation interventions that target the underlying drivers of vulnerability that are 
highly differentiated at the local level.  
 
Chapter three showed that the original remit of the UNFCCC – to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions – promoted a globalised, “systemic” climate change discourse that penetrates 
adaptation policy frameworks. The result is a framing of adaptation under the UNFCCC that is 
impacts-based and ‘additional’ to development. This has also influenced the way in which risks are 
assessed for policy making under the IPCC. Chapter three presented evidence that the ‘expert’ 
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nature of an impacts-based approach provides limited opportunities for lay, vulnerability-based 
perspectives in the defining of climate risks.  
 
Chapter three also explored opportunities for governing climate change outside the UNFCCC, 
through international development frameworks. However, chapter three concluded that taking 
adaptation out of the UNFCCC divorces it from the global climate change agenda. On the one hand 
this could remove discursive barriers to more localised approaches in the governance of 
adaptation.  On the other hand, maintaining a systemic approach to climate risk – that climate 
change impacts are additional to existing development needs – has helped developing countries to 
lobby for funding for adaptation that is additional to development funding.  This is the crux of the 
adaptation paradox; it is important that climate change is taken as part of the global, systemic 
climate change problem to uphold principles of equity under the UNFCCC and garner funding for 
adaptation. But at the same time ways need to be found for localised climate change discourses to 
contest this if adaptation under the UNFCCC is to address local vulnerability.  
 
This thesis has therefore analysed opportunities for inclusive policy making within the UNFCCC, 
focusing on the main existing avenue for the inclusion of ‘local’ vulnerable people in adaptation 
policy-making: National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs). Two sub-cases of the NAPA 
process in Bangladesh and Nepal were analysed. The empirical findings from the two sub-cases are 
discussed in chapter six and so are only briefly summarised here. The sub-cases did reveal some 
evidence that NAPAs achieved inclusiveness; both processes were participatory in intent and took 
steps to engage ‘local’ actors. But in both cases the NAPA process was dominated by an impacts-
based paradigm that was not conducive to the inclusion of alternative discourses of vulnerability. 
Chapter five proposed that based on the evidence put forward in this study, the NAPA process in 
Nepal was ‘more inclusive’ than that in Bangladesh. This was both a consequence of the greater 
range of participatory technologies employed in Nepal, but also of the circumstances that resulted 
in these institutional design choices, such as histories of environmental policy making, the 
availability of scientific expertise, and the opportunities created for lesson learning.  
 
This chapter brings these findings back to the central question of this thesis, and demonstrates the 
contribution of this thesis to social science theory and environmental policy more generally.  This 
chapter will discuss the implications of these findings for wider theories of inclusiveness, focusing 
on the three main theoretical concepts that form the backbone of this study: (i) Participation, 
drawing from development studies; (ii) the politics of expertise and scale, drawing from Science 
and Technology Studies (STS); and (iii) Deliberation, drawing from political science.  Second, this 
chapter will discuss the practical implications of this research for inclusive environmental policy in 
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general, and climate change policy in particular. Finally, this chapter will directly address the 
central question of this thesis – can adaptation policy under the UNFCCC be inclusive? But also 
question the underlying assumption of this thesis - that inclusiveness is actually a valuable ideal in 
environmental policy-making, and why.  
 
 
7.2 Contributions to theory 
 
Participation in the governance of „global‟ environmental risk  
 
Chapter one of this thesis analysed the literature around inclusiveness in policy making for ‘global’ 
environmental problems. This analysis showed how the risk assessments that inform such policy 
decisions are often based on globalised, universalist statements of environmental problems, giving 
rise to policy solutions that do not meet the needs of vulnerable people (Basset and Zeuli, 2000; 
Jennings, 2009; Tiffen et al., 1994;Wynne, 1994). Such cases resulted in calls for environmental risk 
assessments to better reflect the realities of how risks are experienced on the ground; to be 
‘locally inclusive’ (ibid).  
 
These calls have been taken up by the international development community, and since the 1970s 
there has been a growing trend towards more participatory approaches to doing development 
(Blackburn and Holland, 1998; Castells, 1983; Chambers, 1983, 1997; Korten, 1989;). Yet, chapter 
one showed that participatory practice has faced a great deal of criticism over the last decade, 
much of which has focused on “participation as the new tyranny” (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Such 
criticisms have centred on the way in which participation has been used as a new form of political 
control, and has served to ‘depoliticise’ development practice by obscuring local power 
differences; uncritically homogenising ‘the community’; and using a language of emancipation to 
mask other means of regaining political control over development (ibid; see chapter one).  
 
The findings from this thesis, and in particular the case study of Bangladesh that focused on the 
success of participatory outcomes, supports these criticisms to some extent. For example, the 
regional consultation meetings in Bangladesh classed both local government representatives and 
also representatives of farmers group as both “local”, despite the power differential between the 
two groups (supporting claims that participation can homogenise “community”). Further, the 
voting system used to prioritise adaptation options was on a one-person-one-vote basis. Given the 
often greater presence of government officials and climate change expert consultants relative to 
community representatives at the meetings, such a system diluted the influence of ‘local’ 
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stakeholders on the decision making process despite the appearance of giving them equal say 
(supporting the claims that participatory activities can mask power politics of participatory 
processes).  
 
However, the evidence from this thesis also shows that the power politics of participatory spaces 
are perhaps more complex than the ‘tyranny of participation’ debates suggest. Participatory 
spaces do present opportunities for the subjugation of ‘the local’; but the evidence presented by 
this thesis suggests that the extent to which and the ways in which this happens, and the reasons 
why, are strongly influenced by the discursive context of the policy problem at hand. How the 
policy problem is framed influences the choice of participatory technologies; the scale at which 
they are undertaken; and the responsiveness of decision-makers to the outcomes of deliberation. 
In both the Nepal and Bangladesh case studies there is no evidence that the ‘inclusive intentions’ 
of policy makers were anything but genuine.  Rather, this thesis found evidence that the difference 
in the inclusiveness of outcomes of the two NAPA processes was more closely associated with how 
the problem of climate change risk was perceived by policy makers, and the contextual factors 
that resulted in these definitions of risk.  
 
For example, in Bangladesh, climate change risk was perceived as exacerbating existing 
environmental hazards for which there were long established risk discourses. In Noakhali, 
exposure to storms and cyclones were already familiar environmental stresses; policy-makers 
‘knew’ that these were the key environmental hazards before participatory exercises around 
adaptation priorities took place.   Thus, in line with the framework proposed by Funtowicz and 
Ravetz (1990), ‘certainty’ around the policy problem was already perceived as ‘high’, and the need 
for the inclusion of diverse ideas around defining the policy problem was low.  Policy makers did 
not intentionally subjugate local knowledge around defining climate change risks; it was simply 
not seen as relevant.  In Nepal, there was less certainty around climate change risk, because the 
hazards presented by climate change were less familiar. Thus, policy makers were more open to 
wider stakeholder engagement in the defining of both risk and solution.  
 
However, moving beyond the framework proposed by Funtowicz and Ravetz, this thesis has also 
shown that “certainty” around a policy problem is also not a neutral term, but is itself constructed 
based on assumptions about climate change risk. For example, the degree of certainty around 
climate change risks in Nepal and Bangladesh was partly a consequence of the different histories 
of environmental policy-making in each country. This thesis also suggested that other significant 
factors included the availability of expertise in each country and the timings of the NAPA process, 
as well as more normative political explanations.  
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Therefore the findings from this thesis support ‘tyranny of participation’ debates in that simply 
doing participation does not automatically generate meaningful stakeholder inclusion in policy 
problems, and greater attention is needed to the politics of participatory spaces (Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001; Cornwall, 2000). However, this thesis has also shown that these politics are in turn a 
consequences of assumptions about climate change risk that influences how participatory 
processes are structured and why. Thus, attempts at inclusiveness in ‘global’ environmental 
problems need to be critical of how such framings impact on the dynamics of participatory spaces; 
but also how and why such problem framings have arisen in the first place. This thesis has paid 
particular attention to the construction of expertise and the politics of scale in influencing these 
assumptions.   
 
 
The politics of scale and expertise 
 
This thesis has drawn on insights from science and technology studies (STS) to argue that current 
approaches to participation and inclusiveness do not pay adequate attention to the politics of 
scale and expertise in the construction of risk. Yet to date such debates have largely been confined 
to the examination of scientific and technological ‘risks’ in northern and largely industrial settings 
(Leach et al., 2005).  As noted by Leach et al., there is a “striking correspondence” between STS 
debates around the inclusion of ‘lay’ knowledge in the governance of scientific and technical 
problems; and insights from development studies around the participation of ‘indigenous’ 
knowledges in policy making; but only very recently have the overlaps between these debates 
been pursued (Leach et al., 2005:4). This thesis has sought to contribute to the trend towards 
integrating these two disciplines, by applying STS debates to adaptation policy in a developing 
country context.  
 
Chapter one showed how these debates have argued that the framing of problems as ‘global’ and 
‘expert’ is a politicised process that carries significant implications for the inclusion of ‘local’ and 
‘lay’ knowledge.  
 
 This challenges the “epistemic communities” approach that suggests that the conversion of more 
people to a scientific or normative judgement is a progressive means of developing authoritative 
expertise around policy-relevant knowledge (Haas, 1992; see chapter one). Yet, insights from STS 
have shown that ‘expertise’ can be defined in various ways, and in certain contexts ‘lay’ 
knowledge may be more informative for developing context-specific solutions to ‘global’ 
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environmental problems than the officially sanctioned expertise promoted by epistemic 
communities (Wynne, 1996). Thus, it is important to understand how and why problems come to 
be framed as ‘global’ and ‘expert’.   As stated by Martello and Jassanoff,  
 
The construction of both the local and the global crucially depends on the production of 
knowledge and its interaction with power. (Martello and Jassanoff, 2004:5).  
 
The evidence generated by this thesis supports these contentions. For example, chapter three 
showed how the UNFCCC adopts a ‘systemic’ approach to climate change risk that focuses on 
climate change as a global problem caused by greenhouse gasses. Adaptation has emerged from 
this globalised and technical perspective as a response to the specific impacts of climate change. 
Chapter three showed how this ‘expert’ and ‘global’ framing of climate change risk created 
barriers for the participation of alternative perspectives in risk assessments conducted by the 
IPCC.   
 
Similarly, this thesis has found evidence in support of the argument that these scalar politics of 
environmental governance matter for inclusiveness in environmental risk assessments. First, the 
framing of climate change risks as global impacts on ‘what’ was deliberated. In Bangladesh, a 
hazards-based risk assessment stemming from global climate change governance frameworks was 
reinforced by the national environmental risk narratives of floods and cyclones. However, these 
national narratives were themselves a legacy of decades of international development funding, 
and this narrative has been internationally propagated (Ayers and Huq, 2009a) and so were also 
‘global’ in a sense. The result was a fairly rigid existing discourse on climate risk that was difficult 
to contest. In Nepal, the global ‘environmental crisis’ narrative was one of rapid deforestation, and 
so did not serve to reinforce the climate change risk narrative that had developed around melting 
glaciers; and in any case both narratives had been significantly undermined.  This thesis has 
suggested that these circumstances left more space for a new climate change vulnerability 
discourse to be developed in Nepal than in Bangladesh.  
 
Second, the way in which ‘local’ was defined and operationalised in the participatory processes 
differed across countries, with implications for the scale at which activities took place, ‘who’ was 
considered local and therefore included, and the kinds of technologies that were employed. Third, 
this thesis has shown that the labelling of information as ‘global’ or ‘local’ is closely intertwined 
with the perception of that knowledge as ‘expert’ or ‘lay’, and the value attributed to that 
knowledge. This is particularly evident from the findings presented in chapter three that show the 
way in which ‘local’ knowledge has been branded as ‘inexpert’ and thus explicitly excluded from 
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the IPCC process.  
 
These insights support the contention that scalar discourses are not absolute and independent but 
also socially constructed and mutually reinforcing; and that this construction of scales has 
implications for ‘expertise’, ‘certainty’, and therefore for inclusiveness. 
 
Such observations have led critics such as Farrell et al., (2001) to suggest that greater attention 
needs to be paid to supporting the capacities of different stakeholders to participate in ‘expert’ 
and ‘global’ arenas (Farrell et al., 2001). Similar perspectives have led to an emphasis on a 
particular approach to “social learning” in sustainability science as a way of facilitating learning 
and therefore inclusion around ‘global’ policy problems (see for example Social Learning Group, 
2001). As discussed in chapter six, “social learning” links knowledge to action, often through an 
iterative process of ‘co-learning’ between ‘agents of change’ and ‘client groups’ (Angeles, 2004).  
 
In their two-volume work on Learning to Manage Global Environmental Risks, the members of the 
Social Learning Group suggest that where participation is the policy goal, social learning can 
improve the engagement of a wider range of stakeholders to come to a common understanding 
around a policy problem (Social Learning Group, 2001; see also Clark, 2003; Kasemir et al., 2003). 
This approach to social learning is based on normative assumptions of  ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ 
knowledge: The goal is to enable ‘lay’ participants to engage in ‘the expertise’, rather than opening 
up spaces for the expertise to be contested. The evidence presented in chapter four shows how a 
similar approach was adopted under the Bangladesh NAPA: the framing of vulnerability as 
‘hazards-based’ and therefore technical resulted in the design of consultation exercises that were 
dominated by experts formally recognised by the international risk assessment process. While 
local people were consulted, this consultation took the approach of ‘informing people with the 
science,’ rather than offering people the opportunity to contest whether or not ‘the science’ is 
actually the most appropriate way to approach vulnerability reduction.  
 
However, the analysis of this approach presented here suggests that this type of ‘social learning’ is 
not the same as meaningful “inclusiveness”. This thesis has understood “inclusiveness” to mean 
the democratisation of climate change risk for enabling different kinds of knowledges to be 
represented in the assessment of that risk. Yet, chapter four presents evidence that shows that 
although this consultation process resulted in apparent consensus (or ‘certainty’) around climate 
change risk, opportunities were not created for those risks to be contested. The result was that 
the outcomes of process did not necessarily meet the needs of those who were most vulnerable to 
climate-related hazards and other stresses.     
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Conversely, in Nepal the NAPA process moved away from essentialist categories of ‘expert’ and 
‘lay’, and adopted a “shared learning dialogue” approach to determining risk, in which vulnerable 
people were provided with the opportunity to contribute to the defining of climate change risks 
from a social-vulnerability-based perspective.  This approach is in line with an alternative 
perspective on social learning that sees learning – even that facilitated by external agents – as an 
iterative process of the coproduction of knowledge. This approach requires explicit recognition of 
the politics of expertise, the value of lay knowledges, and the influences of power politics on the 
dynamics of learning.  
 
Indeed, Pelling et al., (2008) and Pelling and High (2005) suggest that, if the power politics of 
learning processes are taken into account, “learning itself is considered a kind of adaptive 
behaviour” (Pelling et al., 2008:870).  For example, Pelling and High acknowledge “the influence of 
social institutions in sanctioning and legitimising the use of power between individuals” (Pelling 
and High, 2005:3) but suggest that, where this is explicitly acknowledged, such institutions can 
provide a platform for actors to influence discourses. Providing the opportunity for actors to do so 
is in itself a kind of adaptive capacity-building; chapter three pointed out that social assets are key 
to building resilience, and facilitating social learning provides actors with opportunities for 
strengthening social ties, improving access to social and political resources, and a platform for 
using them.  
 
Thus, the findings from this thesis show that the politics of expertise and scale do matter for 
achieving inclusiveness in problems that have come to be framed as ‘global’. The kind of social 
learning discussed above and evidenced by the Nepal NAPA process of ‘shared learning dialogue’, 
shows that achieving inclusiveness in the context of ‘global’ and ‘expert’ problems requires more 
than simply ‘teaching’ a certain form of expertise; it requires creating opportunities for concepts 
of scale and expertise to be contested, and for alternative approaches to risk to be coproduced. 
This thesis has proposed that achieving inclusiveness in global environmental risks requires more 
than participatory intentions; participation needs to be deliberative.  
 
 
Inclusive deliberative governance 
 
This thesis has proposed that opportunities for democratising risk lie in creating spaces for those 
risks to be deliberated. But chapter one also showed that there are different perspectives on how 
deliberation is understood, and how it should be done. There is general agreement that 
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deliberation as an ideal refers rational, reasoned debate around a policy problem, which can result 
in consensual decisions that are perceived by all involved as legitimate, rational, and just 
(Rosenberg, 2007). However, the dynamics of deliberation, and the potential for ‘reasoned 
discussion’, are debated.   
 
A Habermasian perspective suggests that deliberation occurs through a process of 
“communicative rationality”, where instrumentally rational agents take the optimal course of 
action to achieve their desired ends (Habermas, 1984). Actors with different positions on a policy 
problem come together to debate that problem in a neutral setting that emphasises equality 
between participants. Consensus around a policy problem is reached based on “the force of the 
better argument” (Cohen, 2007). But this perspective assumes that there exists a normatively 
‘better argument’. In line with the discussion above, such assumptions have resulted in an ‘expert 
teaches lay’ approach to social learning; ‘expertise’ is a given, and thus to achieve deliberation, 
people need to be empowered with expert knowledge in order to be able to engage with the a 
reasoned debate around the policy problem. Thus, the influence of a Habermasian approach to 
deliberation on current environmental politics overlooks the complexities of what is authoritative 
knowledge and expertise, and the specific history and politics of environment norms considered to 
be fact.   
 
Yet, evidence from this thesis supports an alternative approach to deliberation, which argues that 
the essentialist categories of ‘expert’ and ‘lay’, and ‘right’ and wrong’, are not normative but 
themselves politically constructed both before deliberation takes place and within the deliberative 
space itself. This is supported by the evidence from Bangladesh and Nepal that shows how the 
potential for risks to be redefined was dependent on the extent to which perceptions of ‘risk’ and 
‘expertise’ were already fixed. This evidence is more in line with how some scholars have 
interpreted a Foucauldian perspective on deliberation:  that all discourses are situated; hence 
consensus reached through deliberation is often the result of diverse social and political influences 
rather than rational ‘argumentative interplay.’ From this perspective, deliberative inclusiveness 
means more than creating spaces for informed participation; opportunities need to be created for 
people to redefine the risks that are being debated.  
 
But what do these insights mean for theories of deliberative institutional design? As discussed in 
chapter one, the ‘cornerstone’ of deliberative institutions is what Habermas describes as the 
“perfect public sphere” (Habermas, 1989): an arena within which policy norms can be discussed, 
new norms can be generated, and anyone can contribute to the validation of these norms through 
contributing to an open discourse. The prerequisites of the perfect public sphere to enable 
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reasoned debate are equality, freedom, openness and inclusiveness.  Yet, Habermas’ vision of the 
public sphere does not take into account the power dynamics within the public sphere that 
influence these conditions. As the analysis of the deliberative processes of Bangladesh and Nepal 
have shown, these dynamics are important in shaping deliberative outcomes.  
 
Other scholars from the field of political science have discussed deliberative institutions in light of 
such internal dynamics. For example, Smith (2001) discusses the need for deliberative processes to 
be carefully facilitated to foster meaningful deliberation in light of the power politics within 
deliberative spaces. But this thesis goes beyond these suggestions and shows how the internal 
dynamics of the deliberative sphere are also affected by the design of deliberative institutions and 
the participatory technologies employed.  
 
For example, the analysis presented in this study shows that assumptions about risk, expertise and 
scale influenced the internal deliberative dynamic: “What” was deliberated, and thus whose 
knowledge was seen as legitimate, and the extent to which dominant discourses of risk could be 
contested. But this analysis also showed that assumptions about risk, expertise and scale were 
implicit in the choices of participatory technologies employed, about the scale at which 
participation took place, who was invited to participate, and how deliberations were structured. In 
turn, the assumptions that led to these design choices were influenced by the political and 
historical circumstances of NAPA design in each country, as well as being grounded in the 
guidelines of the UNFCCC, which has its own embedded approaches to risk and expertise.  Thus 
the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the analysis of deliberation requires attention 
not just to the internal dynamics of participatory spaces, but also to the circumstances that lead to 
institutional design choices.   
 
 
7.3 Contributions to policy and practice  
 
The evidence presented in this thesis supports the argument that for climate change policy to 
achieve inclusiveness, more attention needs to be paid to the discursive dynamics that shape 
deliberative institutional design and participatory outcomes. The analysis from the NAPA case 
studies above shows that NAPAs did succeed in engaging ‘local’ actors in the adaptation policy 
making process. However, in Bangladesh inadequate attention was paid to creating opportunities 
for vulnerable communities to contest the dominant framing of climate risk, or contribute 
meaningfully in the identification of the underlying factors that drive vulnerability on the ground. 
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The policy consequences of adopting an impacts-based approach to adaptation are, firstly, 
opportunities for targeting the key drivers of vulnerability could be missed. For example in the 
case of Bangladesh, livelihood diversification was discussed as an adaptation option; but only in 
terms of ensuring the long term viability of the coastal mangroves. This perspective may exclude 
discussions around alternative livelihoods not linked to forest sustainability, but which may 
actually be more effective at reducing vulnerability. Second, resources for adaptation may not be 
put to the most effective use, for example in Bangladesh fishermen will be provided with 
improved information on weather conditions, when many stated that lack of information on 
climate conditions is not the problem given they cannot act on storm warnings because of 
financial pressure to fish the seas regardless.  Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, this 
approach actually risks implementing adaptation options that exacerbate the vulnerability of the 
most vulnerable groups, for example if the coastal afforestation scheme displaces those residing 
beyond the embankment in Noakhali.  
 
Given these conclusions, perhaps NAPAs are not the most appropriate avenues for enabling 
meaningful ‘local’ participation in the governance of ‘global’ risks? Perhaps, given that adaptation 
is at some point always locally specific, all adaptation should be locally managed through 
community-based adaptation initiatives that fit more easily under development or disaster risk 
reduction frameworks? However, as discussed in chapters one and six, simply decentralizing 
environmental management does not necessarily overcome the power politics of local inclusion; 
in fact, localizing environmental management can reinforce homogenous perceptions of ‘the local’ 
and further detach localized vulnerability perceptions from the political structures that can enable 
longer term adaptive management, and that will channel adaptation resources.  
 
What about shifting climate change adaptation outside the Framework Convention altogether? 
Some observers have suggested that the dominance of an impacts-based approach to defining risk 
under the UNFCCC may make alternative avenues such as development or disaster risk reduction 
frameworks more appropriate (Ayers et al., 2010; Huq and Ayers, 2009). For example, chapter 
three describes the ways in which development practitioners are increasingly “mainstreaming” 
climate change into their work both by ‘climate proofing’ their portfolios and also by directly 
funding activities that are intended to build resilience to climate change. Do development 
frameworks offer better opportunities for ‘democratise climate risk’ and enable local inclusion?   
 
In considering this question, it is interesting to review one example of a shift towards development 
funding for adaptation: the World Bank managed Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR) 
(see box 7.1).  
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Box 7.1: Managing adaptation through development? The case of the PPCR 
Source: Adapted from Ayers, 2009 
 
The PPCR is one of the World Bank Climate Investment Funds (CIFs). CIFs are multi-donor funds 
managed by the World Bank to provide grants and concessional loans to assist developing countries in 
transitioning to a low carbon development pathway and “climate resilient” economy.  
The PPCR has a target size of $1 billion USD and is intended to fund adaptation activities in developing 
countries. However, the development of the PPCR was highly controversial. First, it was originally 
entitled the “adaptation fund”, seen as a move by the World Bank to compete with the Adaptation Fund 
already established under the UNFCCC. Further, some of the funding under the PPCR will be made 
available through loans, not grants, and these loans are counted as development assistance 
contributions. This goes against the principle that support for adaptation should be additional to 
development assistance because climate change presents and additional burden to development needs.  
The World Bank has justified this decision by reinterpreting the concept of “new and additional”, stating 
that funds “...are new and additional to existing levels of ODA” but that “...it is expected that most 
donors will include contributions to the CIFs in their ODA reporting.” 
 
In principle, funds such as the PPCR should provide a more ‘open’ discourse of climate change risk 
that moves away from an “impacts-based” approach. Indeed, the name of the fund focuses on 
“climate resilience” and seems an explicit attempt to open up adaptation support to a broader 
range of activities that focus on resilience rather than just climate change impacts.  Such 
suppositions have led observers such as Ayers and Huq (2009b) to optimistically suggest that the 
arrival of the PPCR signified a real opportunity for development assistance to address underlying 
factors of vulnerability that are overlooked by a Convention-based approach. The authors state:  
 
[The establishment of the PPCR] does point to progress in understanding the role of ODA as 
contributing to broader adaptive capacity – or ‘climate-resilient development’ – rather than 
specific and additional climate-change adaptation…new development funds relevant to 
climate-change adaptation should be used to fund what the UNFCCC cannot; namely, 
broader resilience building, necessary for ‘additional’ adaptation to be successful.  (Ayers 
and Huq, 2009b:682). 
 
But has this opportunity materialized, and has it resulted in new avenues for a more inclusive 
approach to defining climate change risk beyond the UNFCCC? Unfortunately, early indications 
suggest not. For example, Nepal is one of the PPCR pilot countries. Interviews with the Ministry of 
Environment focal point for the PPCR, who is also the focal point for the NAPA, revealed that the 
PPCR is not making the same attempts at local or even national inclusion that the NAPA process 
did. This is well exemplified by the following quote from the joint-secretary of the Ministry of 
Environment, who is also the Project Director for both the NAPA and the PPCR processes:  
 
The NAPA process in Nepal was country driven. Every TWG [NAPA thematic working group] 
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was Government led. We have undertaken our vulnerability assessments, and we have 
identified adaptation priorities…though bottom-up processes. The PPCR should build on 
this. But the Banks are taking over…they see this as an opportunity to climate-proof their 
own projects. (Personal communication, Purushottam Ghimere, August 2009).  
 
A full analysis of the political economy of the PPCR process is beyond the remit of this thesis. 
However, such remarks show that simply re-branding adaptation funding as ‘climate resilient 
development’ does not automatically result in a more inclusive approach, and that the current 
opportunities presented by development assistance for adaptation may not open up adaptation 
discourses to local inclusion. Further, as shown in Box 7.1, the establishment of the PPCR was 
controversial because financial contributions are partly sourced from development assistance. This 
goes against the principle that adaptation funding should be ‘additional’ to development funding 
(see box 7.1). As suggested, this is the crux of the adaptation paradox: adaptation support needs 
to be provided under the global climate change framework to support the principle that climate 
impacts are an additional burden for developing countries on top of existing development needs; 
and  that adaption funding should be additional to development assistance. But, this principle also 
serves to reinforce a discourse around climate change risk that is global, systemic, and not 
compatible with more ‘local’ experiences of vulnerability.  
 
So, can local inclusiveness be achieved in the context of global climate change policy? The 
evidence from this thesis suggests more inclusive processes for adaptation policy making under 
the UNFCCC exist, but these depend on opportunities for democratising what we mean by risk, by 
expertise, and by ‘global’ and ‘local’. Currently, NAPAs do present the best, if an imperfect, 
opportunity for representing the needs of vulnerable people in adaptation policy making. 
Although ‘perfect deliberation’ was not achieved in either case, the approach taken by Nepal was 
‘more inclusive’ and thus can be learned from in terms of informing deliberative institutional 
design. In particular, Nepal undertook a wide range of participatory technologies; but it is argued 
here that these design choices were facilitated and enabled by a more open approach to climate 
change risk that did not focus on predetermined impacts. In turn, this approach to risk was a 
consequence of assumptions about scale and expertise that were not as fixed as in Bangladesh.  
 
How can these insights be applied to the task of deliberative institutional design? Chapter six of 
this thesis suggested that one promising institutional design that is attempting to take a flexible 
approach to risk, scale, and expertise, is “Local Adaptation Plans of Action” (LAPAs) currently 
under design in Nepal. Interestingly, LAPA development begins not with an assessment of climate 
change risk, but with a detailed assessment of the institutions important for enabling local 
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resilience. Thus, a flexible approach to ‘risk’ is adopted. Secondly, this institutional analysis is 
based on a flexible approach to scale; ‘local’ institutions are taken as whichever formal or informal 
institutions are important in enabling vulnerable people to gain access to the assets they require 
to help them build their adaptive capacity. The output of a LAPA is envisaged as both a ‘local’ level 
adaptation plan (which could be community level, settlement, district), and a means of analysing 
institutional linkages across scales to ensure that gaps between ‘local’ and national adaptation 
planning, finance and delivery can be bridged. In terms of expertise, the LAPAs have adopted the 
same ‘shared learning dialogue’ approach to assessing local institutions for resilience adopted 
under the NAPA.  
 
The LAPA programme of work is in its early stages of design; however, it presents promising signs 
that a more flexible approach to risk, expertise, and scale can be applied to the governance of 
climate change; but it remains to be seen whether the LAPA is successful in establishing the 
required institutional linkages to inform national adaptation policy making.  
 
Finally, it is important to justify one important assumption on which this thesis is based; that local 
inclusiveness is actually important in the governance of problems that have come to be seen as 
global. This thesis has accepted the normative assumption that ‘deliberation is a good thing’ for 
democratic policy making (Warren, 2007). As Warren (2007) states, 
 
As an ideal within today’s societies, it is virtually impossible to be ‘against deliberation.’ 
(Warren, 2007:274).  
 
But why should adaptation policy-making be democratic? Leaving aside the value of democracy in 
general, this thesis has reviewed insights from social science that shown how globally uniform 
approaches to managing environmental risks have overlooked the diverse ways in which risk can 
be experienced, and the factors that make people vulnerable (Bassett and Zeuli, 2000; Wynne, 
1994; 1996). This has resulted in inappropriate policies that do not meet the needs of vulnerable 
people on the ground, often exacerbating a lack of trust between policy makers and the 
stakeholders whom they are trying to engage (ibid). Building on these insights, this thesis has 
shown how accepting problems uncritically as ‘global’ means that important information on how 
problems can be effectively managed may be missed; and worse, investments could be made that 
actually increase the vulnerability of the most vulnerable.  
 
This thesis has proposed that facilitating “inclusiveness” in the assessment of ‘global’ risks is one 
way of democratising Universalist assumptions of risk, and enabling more contextual information 
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to be included in policy making that can better tailor environmental management to local needs. 
Enabling meaningful deliberation in policy-making processes allows learning to take place between 
scales and between different types of expertise, that will ultimately lead to better informed and 
more appropriate policy making. Clearly not everyone can be included in environmental policy 
making; but the point of inclusiveness is not to represent everyone. It is to provide spaces to 
question whether globalised approaches to managing risk actually meet the needs of people 
vulnerable to those risks; or whether alternative more flexible approaches are needed that can 
reflect the diverse ways in which risks are experienced on the ground.  
 
Further, this thesis has suggested that inclusive processes themselves can be a kind of adaptive 
capacity. This argument is in line with the more recent shift towards a ‘rights-based’ approach to 
doing development more generally. This argues that while assets and entitlements are important 
(Sen, 1999), we need to see how far people have the rights to access these assets and 
entitlements, and how their allocation is mediated by political processes (Keen, 2008). Facilitating 
inclusion can help people gain access to social and political assets, articulate their needs, and 
address more directly the causes of powerlessness that undermine adaptive capacity in the first 
place. Thus, enabling access to deliberation is a way of building resilience. This means that 
encouraging “inclusiveness” in the governance of adaptation can itself address vulnerability and 
poverty, as long as it is done in a way that empowers people, rather than imposing either 
predefined notions of risk; or predefined notions of environmental governance.   
 
7.4 Research Limitations and further research directions  
 
This research has explored the deliberative potential of the NAPA processes in Bangladesh and 
Nepal. It has shown that in these two countries the NAPA did not succeed in achieving meaningful 
deliberation, although this study concluded that the NAPA process in Nepal was more deliberative 
than in Bangladesh. Based on this study, this thesis has suggested that perhaps NAPAs are not the 
most appropriate avenue for including local people in the adaptation decision-making processes 
that affect them. However, this conclusion about NAPAs in general cannot be drawn off the basis 
of two case studies alone, so the limited selection of case studies is one key limitation of this work.  
 
However, criticisms do exist around the participatory technologies employed in more NAPA cases 
(see for example CAN, 2008, and COWI/IIED, 2009). Therefore this thesis builds on the evidence of 
these other studies, and provides more detailed case study analysis of why participatory processes 
under NAPAs might be constrained. Nevertheless, expanding this analysis to more case studies 
would strengthen the conclusions of this thesis.  
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Another key area that should be taken forward from this thesis is the analysis of alternative 
deliberative institutional designs. This thesis has proposed two promising alternatives: 
Community-based adaptation, and Local Adaptation Plans of Action (LAPA). Both of these options 
are in their infancy, and as they develop attention should be paid to whether or not they meet this 
potential. One area investigation will be whether or not CBA and LAPAs enable locally identified 
adaptation priorities to be “scaled up” to national planning processes, and what kinds of 
institutional designs would allow this to happen.  This means not only accepting a plural 
institutional arrangement at the local level, but also mapping how institutions articulate across 
scales (Argrawal, 2008).   
 
Thus, this thesis recommends that a key area of further study is to examine both the types of 
institutions that can support local level adaptation planning, but also and more interestingly the 
interfaces between institutions across scales that create spaces for adaptation to deliberated 
across these scales, as a key element of deliberative institutional design.  Given that the NAPA 
process in Nepal is currently a process in transition, with LAPAs being developed to inform the 
implementation of NAPAs, it would be particularly interesting to examine the relationship 
between LAPAs, NAPAs, and other climate change planning processes in Nepal as the process 
develops.  
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Annex 1: Key informant interviews: International stakeholders 
 
Name Affiliation Date/location of 
interview 
Notes34 
Agrawal, Arun  Professor, School of 
Natural Resources & 
Environment, 
University of Michigan. 
February 2010, 
University of Illinois, 
Champaign‐Urbana  
IPCC Lead Author 
Agrawala, Shardul OECD  Environment 
Directorate, Paris 
January 2009, 
Washington D.C. 
IPCC Coordinating Lead 
Author 
Alam, Mozaharul United Nations 
Environment 
Programme 
February 2007, Dhaka; 
May 2008, Bellagio 
IPCC Lead Author; 
former senior 
researcher for 
Bangladesh Centre for 
Advanced Studies 
(BCAS) 
Berger, Rachel Practical Action December 2007, Bali Co-Chair of Climate 
Action Network (CAN) 
Adaptation Group 
Biot, Yvan UK Department for 
International 
Development (DfID) 
February 2007, Dhaka; 
December 2007, Bali 
UK Member of the  
Adaptation Fund Board, 
UNFCCC . 
Brooks, Nick Independent 
consultant, affiliated 
with the Tyndall Centre 
January 2009, 
Washington D.C. 
Contributing author to 
IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report 
Burton, Ian Scientist Emeritus, 
Meteorological Service 
of Canada 
Numerous IPCC Lead Author 
 
IIED Visiting Fellow 
Byers, Alton The Mountain Institute January 2010; Email and 
phone  
Interviewed in relation 
to the IPCC glacial melt 
controversy – see 
chapter five 
Cannon, Terry Research Fellow, 
Institute for 
Development Studies  
Numerous Formerly IIED Visiting 
Fellow 
Chambwera,  Muyeye Researcher, IIED, 
London 
Numerous IPCC Coordinating Lead 
Author 
Chandani, Achala Researcher, IIED  Numerous Previously Sri Lankan 
Delegation to the 
UNFCCC; IPCC Lead 
Author 
Dodman, David Senior Researcher, IIED, 
London 
Numerous IPCC Lead Author 
Ebi, Kris IPCC Working Group II 
Technical Support unit 
December 2007, Bali; 
June/July 2010 (email).  
 
Huq, Saleemul Senior Fellow, IIED, 
London 
Numerous IPCC Coordinating Lead 
Author 
Jones, Roger Victoria University, 
Australia 
February 2007, Dhaka  IPCC Coordinating Lead 
Author 
Kaur, Nanki Researcher, IIED  Numerous Previously TERI (Delhi).  
Klein, Richard Climate change 
specialist, Stockholm 
Environment Institute 
(SEI) 
December 2006, 
London; December 
2007, Bali.  
IPCC Coordinating Lead 
Author 
                                               
34
 Unless otherwise stated all IPCC affiliations refer to roles in the forthcoming Fifth Assessment Report 
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Noble, Ian Climate Change Team, 
World Bank 
October 2008, Bangkok  IPCC Coordinating Lead 
Author 
Rahman, Atiq Executive Director, 
Bangladesh Centre for 
Advanced Studies 
(BCAS) 
Numerous   IPCC Lead Author 
Convenor of CAN South 
Asia 
Ribot, Jesse Associate Professor of 
Geography and 
Affiliate, 
Beckman Institute, 
University of Illinois  
February 2010, 
University of Illinois, 
Champaign‐Urbana 
 
Schipper,  Lisa Research Fellow, SEI February 2007, Dhaka; 
December 2007, Bali.  
IPCC Lead Author 
Shresta, Arun Climate Change 
Specialist, ICIMOD 
December 2009; 
Kathmandu 
Interviewed in relation 
to the IPCC glacial melt 
controversy – see 
chapter five 
Smit, Barry Canada Research Chair 
in Global Environmental 
Change. University of 
Guelph, Canada.  
December 2007, Bali.  IPCC Lead Author 
Solomon, Ilana Action Aid USA August 2007 (phone 
and email); December 
2007 (Bali) 
International climate 
finance specialist and 
active member of 
Climate Action Network 
(CAN).  
Tanner, Thomas  Research Fellow, 
Vulnerability and 
Poverty Reduction, 
Institute for 
Development Studies 
(IDS) 
January 2008, IDS, 
Sussex, 
IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report 
Reviewer; previous DfID 
Bangladesh consultant 
Vashist, Sanjay CAN South Asia December 2007, Bali Co-Chair of Climate 
Action Network (CAN) 
Adaptation Group 
Vaughan, Kit WWF  December 2007, Bali; 
February 2008, London 
Active member of CAN 
Adaptation Group 
 
 
 
247 
 
Annex 2: Key informant interviews: Bangladesh 
 
Name Affiliation Date/location of 
interview35 
Notes36 
Ahmed, Ahsan Uddin Practical Action adviser October 2007; 
February 2009 
Contributor to the 
NAPA. NGO/Academic.  
Alam, Mozaharul United Nations 
Environment 
Programme 
February 2007 
May 2008, Bellagio 
IPCC Lead Author; 
former senior 
researcher for 
Bangladesh Centre for 
Advanced Studies 
(BCAS). Academic.  
Asaduzzaman, Dr.  Bangladesh Institute 
for Development 
Studies 
October 2007 NAPA Team member. 
Academic.   
Bhuiyan, Musharraf 
Hossain 
Economic Relations 
Dept., Ministry of 
Finance, Secretary.  
February 2009 GEF focal point. 
Government.  
Chowdery, 
Rabindranath Roy 
Ministry of 
Environment and 
Forests, Joint Secretary 
February 2009 Government 
Chowdhury, Quamrul 
Islam  
Forum of Environment 
Journalists of 
Bangladesh 
October 2007; 
February 2009 
NAPA Team member; 
NGO/Government 
partnership.  
Ernst, Ralf Climate Change 
Technical Advisor, 
Climate Change Cell 
October 2007 Consultant 
Eusuf, Dr Senior Fellow, BCAS October 2007 Academic.  
Haque , Nasimul Information and 
Communication Expert, 
Climate Change Cell 
October, 2007 Climate Change Cell is 
a donor-funded Cell 
that sits within MOEF. 
Government/donor.  
Haque, Shamsul Ministry of Industries November 2007 Government 
Hassan, Abu Wali 
Raghib 
Ministry of Agriculture October 2008  Government 
Hossain, Ijaz Professor of Chemical 
Engineering, 
Bangladesh University 
of Engineering and 
Technology 
December 2007 (Bali); 
April 2008 
Often acts as climate 
change adviser to the 
Government of Nepal. 
Academic/consultant.  
Huq, Saleemul Senior Fellow, IIED, 
London 
Numerous IPCC Coordinating Lead 
Author; NAPA Team 
member. 
Academic/consultant. 
Islam, Aminul Sustainable 
Development Advisor, 
UNDP Bangladesh  
April 2008, February 
2009 
Part of UNDP NAPA 
Implementing Agency 
Team.  
Islam, Faisal DfID Bangladesh October 2007; April 
2008; February 2009 
Donor.  
Islam, Nilufa Principal Scientific 
Officer,(Environment, 
Forestry & Fishery), 
WARPO 
April 2008; February 
2009  
NAPA Team member. 
Government/NGO 
partnership.  
Khan, Mizan Chairman, Department December, 2007 (Bali) Often acts as climate 
                                               
35
 Unless otherwise stated, all interviews took place in Dhaka  
36
 Unless otherwise stated all IPCC affiliations refer to roles in the forthcoming Fifth Assessment Report 
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of Environmental 
Science and 
Management, North 
South University 
change adviser to the 
Government of Nepal; 
NAPA Team member. 
Academic.  
Mejbahuddin, 
Mohammad 
Economic Relations 
Dept., Ministry of 
Finance, Additional 
Secretary 
April 2008 Government 
Mukta, Ziaul Haq Oxfam GB April 2008 NGO. 
Nishat, Ainun.   Country 
Representative, IUCN 
Bangladesh 
October 2007; 
February 2009 
NAPA Team Member. 
NGO.  
Rahman, Atiq Executive Director, 
Bangladesh Centre for 
Advanced Studies 
(BCAS) 
Numerous  
IPCC Lead Author 
Convenor of CAN 
South Asia 
NAPA Team member; 
Academic.  
Rahman, Iqbal Director of Operations, 
Bangladesh 
Environmental 
Management Project 
October 2007 NGO/Consultant.  
Rahman, Mezbanur Comprehensive 
Disaster Management 
programme (CDMP) 
October 2008 CDMP was established 
in 2003 with donor 
funding to assist the 
Government in 
integrating climate 
change into disaster 
risk reduction efforts. 
It oversees the Climate 
Change Cell in the 
MOEF.  
Donor/Government.  
Rahman, Moklesur Centre for Natural 
Resource Studies 
(CNRS) 
October 2007; April 
2008; February 2009 
Adviser to Government 
on Bangladesh Climate 
Change Strategy and 
Action Plan, prepared 
following the NAPA. 
Academic.  
Reazuddin, 
Mohammad 
Ex-Director (Technical), 
Department of 
Environment, ex-Head 
of Delegation to 
UNFCCC 
December 2007 (Bali); 
April 2008; May 2009 
(Kathmandu) 
Technical Director of 
MOE during NAPA 
preparation; visited 
Nepal to present on 
lessons of the 
Bangladesh NAPA at 
Nepal NAPA Inception 
Workshop (see chapter 
5). Government.  
Rector, Ian Chief Technical 
Advisor, 
Comprehensive 
Disaster Management 
Programme (CDMP) 
October 2007; April 
2008 
CDMP was established 
in 2003 with donor 
funding to assist the 
Government in 
integrating climate 
change into disaster 
risk reduction efforts. 
It oversees the Climate 
Change Cell in the 
MOEF. 
Donor/Government.  
249 
 
Satendra, Mr     Livelihoods Adaptation 
to Climate Change 
(LACC – II) project 
October 2008 Government.  
Sharif, Moinul Islam United Nations 
Environment 
Programme (UNEP) 
October 2007; April 
2008 
Multilateral.  
Uddin, Abu Kamal  Climate Change Cell, 
MOEF/ UNDP 
October 2007; 
February 2009 
Climate Change Cell is 
a donor-funded Cell 
that sits within MOEF. 
Donor/Government.  
Uddin, Nasir Ministry of 
Environment and 
Forests, Deputy 
Secretary 
October 2008; 
February 2009 
Government 
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Annex 3: Key informant interviews: Nepal 
 
Name Affiliation Date/location of 
interview37 
Notes38 including 
details on 
stakeholder type39  
Aryal, Pravin R. Under Secretary 
(Technical) Ministry 
of Energy 
September 2009 Coordinator of Water 
and Energy TWG. 
Government.  
Bhatta, Padam Raj Joint Secretary of 
Ministry of Health 
and Population 
(Population Division) 
August 2009 Coordinator of Public 
Health TWG. 
Government.  
Bhattarai, Sushil Nepal Foresters 
Association 
October 2009 NGO/network 
Chaulagain, Narayan P. AEPC May, 2009 Government/Private 
partnership.  
Dahal, Hari.  Joint Secretary and 
Chief of Gender and 
Environment 
Division, Ministry of 
Agriculture  
October 2009.  Coordinator of TWG 
on Agriculture and 
Food Security. 
Government.  
Dahal, Ngamindra Climate change 
consultant  
June, 2009 Consultant.  
Devkota, Salil  Consultant September 2009; 
August, 2010 
Facilitator to Urban 
TWG. Consultant. 
Dixit, Ajaya ISET Nepal  May 2009; 
September 2009 
Academic 
Gautam, Usha Consultant September 2009; 
August 2010 
Facilitator to TWG 
Climate Induced 
Disasters.  
Academic/consultant.  
Ghimere, Purushottam MoE May 2009; August 
2009; December 
2009; August 2010. 
NAPA Project Director. 
Government.  
Gorkhaly, G.P. Joint Secretary of 
Department of Urban 
Development, 
Building and 
Construction  
August 2009 Coordinator of Urban 
TWG. Government.  
Gurung, Gehendra Practical Action, 
Nepal 
May 2009; 
December 2009 
NAPA TWG member. 
NGO. 
Kaphle, Gobinda P. Joint Secretary of 
Ministry of Soil and 
Forest Conservation  
August 2009 Coordinator of Forests 
and Biodiversity TWG. 
Government.  
Karki, Gyanendra MoE/UNDP May 2009; 
December 2009; 
August 2010. 
NAPA Technical 
Officer. Government.  
Khadka, Manahari National Planning 
Commission 
May 2009 Government 
                                               
37
 Unless otherwise stated, all interviews took place in Kathmandu. Formal ‘PhD’ interviews were held at three key 
points in the NAPA preparation process with ‘core’ NAPA stakeholders: NAPA team, UNDP and donors); the 
beginning (May, 2009); at the end of my placement (December 2009); and follow-up interviews  after draft NAPA 
completion (August 2010).  
38
 Unless otherwise stated all IPCC affiliations refer to roles in the forthcoming Fifth Assessment Report 
39
 Stakeholder type includes academic, NGO, Government, consultant, other.  
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Khadka, Manoj K. REDP Nepal May 2009 NGO.  
Khanal, Dilraj Federation of 
Community Forestry 
Users – Nepal 
August 2009 NGO Federation 
Koirala, Sankar Joint Secretary, 
Ministry of Home 
Affairs 
October 2009 Coordinator of TWG 
on Climate Induced 
Disasters. 
Government.  
Lamichhane, Anupa UNDP Project Officer, 
Energy and Disaster 
Management unit 
May 2009; 
December 2009; 
August 2010.  
UNDP Project Officer 
assigned to NAPA. 
Implementing agency.  
Moench, Marcus ISET International  May 2009; 
September 2009 
Academic 
Paudyal, Shiva Sharma Senior Programme 
Officer, Embassy of 
Denmark 
May 2009; 
November 2009. 
Donor. 
Pokhrel, Anil Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) 
May 2009; 
December 2009 
Academic/Consultant 
(consultant on PPCR 
programme Nepal, see 
chapters three and 
five) 
Regmi, Bimal  Climate Change 
Adviser, DfID Nepal 
May 2009; 
December 2009; 
August 2010. 
Donor.  
Rijal, Deepak.  Consultant September 2009; 
August 2010 
Facilitator to TWG on 
Agriculture and Food 
Security. 
Consultant/Academic.  
Shakya, Clare Senior Regional 
Environment and 
Water Adviser, South 
Asia Policy Team 
May 2009; 
November 2009.  
Donor. 
Sharma, Bishu Nath Ministry of Local 
Development 
October 2009 Government.  
Sharma, Toran   (Water)  Consultant  September 2009; 
August, 2010 
Facilitator to TWG on 
Water and Energy. 
Consultant/Academic.  
Shresta, Arun Climate Change 
Specialist, ICIMOD 
December 2009; 
Kathmandu 
Academic.  
Shresta, Moon WWF October 2009 NAPA TWG member. 
NGO. 
Shrestha, Kumud Consultant September 2009; 
August 2010 
Facilitator to TWG on 
Forests and 
Biodiversity. 
Consultant.  
Shrestha, Parvati Consultant September 2009; 
August 2010 
Facilitator to TWG on 
Health. Consultant.  
Singh, Prabin Man Oxfam, GB May 2009; 
December 2009 
NGO.  
Singh, Vijaya UNDP  Assistant 
Representative, 
Energy and Disaster 
Management unit 
May 2009; 
September 2009; 
December 2009; 
August 2010. 
Senior UNDP 
representative 
assigned to NAPA. 
Implementing agency.  
Uprety, Batu MoE May 2009; 
December 2009; 
August 2010. 
NAPA Project 
Manager. 
Government.  
Wright, Paul United Mission Nepal  June, 2009 NGO 
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Annex 4: The timeline of NAPA preparation in Bangladesh 
 
Source: Ayers, 2009: Bangladesh country report and annexes. In COWI/IIED (2009) 
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Annex 5: Sample Household Survey 
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